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History was a drama with many acts; it was moved by conflicts of forces in the realms of 
both ideas and reality. 
 
    Isaiah Berlin, 19881 
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The dissertation addresses the causes and consequences of the 1973-1974 energy crisis.  
A new postcolonial concept of sovereignty, “permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources,” challenged the structure of the international economy in the early 1950s.  The 
proponents of permanent sovereignty identified the relationship between the industrial 
nations and raw material producers as a vestige of empire.  By gaining control over 
national resources, Third World leaders hoped to reset the relationship between the 
developing and developed nations.      
The concept of permanent sovereignty authenticated new definitions and goals of 
decolonization and statehood. A new middle ground between U.S. diplomacy and Third 
World economic thought emerged in international oil politics.  Chapters on the 1967 
Arab oil embargo, Saudi and Iranian demands in the wake of imperial Britain’s Persian 
Gulf withdrawal, the legal battles over the Iraqi Ba’ath regime’s nationalized oil, and the 
reverberating effects of newly radical Libyan politics, explain how members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) remade permanent sovereignty 
between 1967 to 1972.   
 ix 
OPEC underscored the salience of permanent sovereignty in the international 
political economy, but it also undermined it.  The built-in tension culminated in the 1973-
1974 energy crisis.  The final chapters discuss how the impregnable sovereignty preached 
by OPEC and its transnational backers in the New International Economic Order 
engendered a strategic response from the United States: neoliberal diplomacy. OPEC’s 
cartel politics became a scapegoat for policymakers who simplified and codified 
neoclassical economic ideas.  Market-centered reform developed into an analytical refuge 
in the political-economic wreckage of the energy crisis.  American strategy toward the 
International Monetary Fund and the United Nations reveal that neoliberal diplomacy 
became widely influential in U.S. foreign policy.   
 x
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 1 
Introduction:  The Energy Crisis in History 
“As we who trod this path before know so well, the decolonization process is only the 
first phase,” the minister of foreign affairs of Guyana, Frederick Wills, warned the United 
Nations’ newest members in 1975.  “In the wake of victory comes added emphasis on 
economic liberation, cultural reaffirmation, and psychological decolonization,” he told 
the ambassadors of recently independent Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and 
Mozambique.3 
The first item on Wills’ list, economic liberation, confronted the nations of the 
developing world in the second half of the twentieth century.  Wills and fellow leaders 
from across the so-called “Third World” understood economic liberation as the 
elimination of constraints left over from the defunct imperial order.  “Most of us have 
inherited economies which had been distorted or malformed—economies based on a 
single crop or mineral, with enclaves organized as parts of the metropolitan country,” he 
continued, in a classic explanation of the postcolonial belief that atavistic inequalities still 
ruled the international economy.  “As we have come to see clearly that it is this system 
which has made us poor, it is inevitable that all the vital economic issues be increasingly 
politicized,” Wills concluded. 
Delivered from the rostrum of the UN General Assembly, the speech struck a 
delicate balance between rhetoric and reality.  Rhetorically, it captured the essential 
historical connection between international politics and economics in the postwar era, a 
central concern for many actors.  In real terms, one event stood at the forefront of Wills 
and his listeners’ minds, known worldwide as “the energy crisis.”  Two years earlier, 
                                                 
3UN Doc A/PV.2370, Provisional Verbatim Record, October 1, 1975, The Papers of Daniel P. Moynihan, 
I: 334, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. 
 2 
upon the outbreak of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Arab oil producers had declared 
an embargo on the supporters of Israel, including the United States.  The other members 
of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) saw the financial 
advantage of the Arab position.  OPEC imposed a unilateral four-fold increase in world 
oil prices between October and January 1974.   
The price increases were chronically bound up with questions of diplomacy and 
the international economy.4  For Wills, the energy crisis crowned a three-decade 
intellectual, moral, and political endeavor to achieve nothing less than economic 
decolonization.  By emphasizing that imperial inequalities still dominated the relationship 
between what often were referred to simply as the “rich” and the “poor” countries, he 
identified his membership in a coterie of Third World politico-intellectuals bound 
together by a cohesive school of economic thought.   This Third Worldist doctrine—
characterized by the desire for “permanent sovereignty over natural resources,” or 
“permanent sovereignty” for short—argued for the use of national power to force 
increases in the prices of raw materials.  By using national and transnational influence to 
control the global price of oil, the OPEC nations had distilled a long-brewing discontent.  
                                                 
4One scholar memorably describes the energy crisis as history's largest nonviolent transfer of wealth and 
the most fundamental reordering of power since World War II.  Steven A. Schneider, The Oil Price 
Revolution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983).  The second half of this claim is more 
debatable than the first, as it depends on the working definition of power.  Seminal works charting the 
development of power as a concept of analysis in international politics are Robert Dahl, “The Concept of 
Power,” Behavioral Science 2:3 (July 1957): 201-215; Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004 [1974]); Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World 
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); W. H. McNeil, The Pursuit of Power (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982); and Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and 
Interdependence, 2nd ed. (Glenville, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1989).  For a complementary definition, see 
Michele Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: 
Pantheon, 1977), 24-38.  This dissertation takes a broad definition of international power as the ability of a 
particular interest to set the international agenda on a given topic.  This is close to Lukes’ revisionist 
definition as the ability to set the international agenda, but it incorporates Focault’s insight that networks of 
knowledge inform international power relations.  For a hint at how Foucault informs even the least willing 
of scholars, see Thomas Flynn, Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason, vol. 2: A Post-Structuralist 
Mapping of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 230-259. 
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It was no wonder that Wills, a London-trained legal scholar who later played a leading 
role in calls for a Third World debt moratorium, supported OPEC and considered the 
energy crisis a moral victory.5 
The energy crisis signified something quite different for the U.S. Secretary of 
State, Henry Kissinger.  The crisis was an abomination to be defeated.  Kissinger 
emphasized his opposition to OPEC and was dismissive Third World objections to the 
structure of the international economy. “If the weak resort to pressure, they will do so at 
the risk of world prosperity,” he told the General Assembly.6  His interpretation of the 
energy crisis reflected assumptions about the global benefits of a liberal economic 
orientation.  Kissinger constructed the free market as an ideal: a rational organizing 
principle, detached from the coercive and impoverishing legacies of imperialism and 
nationalism that had afflicted the world in the twentieth century.   
The free-market ideal swept through the governing consciousness in the United 
States during the energy crisis and became a driving force in American diplomacy.  The 
free-market perspective had gained traction in the most powerful international policy 
circles by 1976.  The rise of neoliberal diplomacy, the policy application of free-market 
thought, came at the expense of Third World nations.  Development plans buckled under 
the burden of expensive oil and ultimately faltered because of unsustainable sovereign 
debt.  At the same time, the United States moved from a mood of uncertainty—the early 
1970s had been defined not just by the energy crisis, but also by Watergate, the end of the 
Vietnam War, and the fall of the Bretton Woods system—to one of unquestioned power.    
                                                 
5 Like many of his generation, Wills held this belief until the end.  See Frederick Wills, “A Third World 
Perspective,” International Negotiation 1: 2 (1996): 319-322. 
6Airgram A-4568 from the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts, June 5, 1974 in William B. 
McAllister, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-14, Part 1, Documents on 
the United Nations, 1973-1976 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2008), 16. 
 4 
Kissinger and Wills used strong language, millenarian in tone, to discuss the 
dialectic between permanent sovereignty and neoliberal diplomacy.  The tension reflects 
competing interpretations of the international economy in the second half of the twentieth 
century.  The friction between these visions reached a zenith during the energy crisis and 
remained at high pitch during the ensuing rise of oil-related sovereign debt.  By framing 
the energy crisis within the spatial, temporal, and conceptual milieu of permanent 
sovereignty, Third World leaders sought to reset the agenda of the international political 
economy.  Then, in a shocking twist, Kissinger and his contemporaries used a remarkably 
similar strategy to consolidate American global power.   
Exactly how did this transition occur?  What place does the energy crisis hold in 
twentieth-century international affairs?   
THE ENERGY CRISIS IN HISTORIOGRAPHY 
The dramatic transformation of the international agenda seemed to occur quite suddenly 
and has had long-lasting moral, intellectual, political, and economic effects.  The energy 
crisis is a pendular instant in international history, one in which one set of ideas gained 
diplomatic momentum as another lost it.  The crisis embodied the problems of a world in 
transition and served to order the future.7  Scholars across disciplines are fascinated with 
these watershed events, mostly due to a universal truth best captured by the William 
James a century ago: Episodic moments reveal the essence of longer patterns and provide 
unique views of the human experience.8 
                                                 
7 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after 
Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 10-11; Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and 
the Interests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003 [1977]), 67-70. 
8A Pluralistic Universe: Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College on the Present Situation in Philosophy 
(New York: Longman, Green, and Co., 1909), 253. 
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The energy crisis offers one such window.  Oil is the most valuable commodity 
on earth and historians have discussed its importance in the history of twentieth-century 
society, politics, economics, and culture in great detail.9  The “postwar petroleum order,” 
the quarter century after World War II characterized by stable and cheap supply, is rich 
territory in which historians and non-historians alike have found much of interest.10    
                                                 
9 For an introduction, see Daniel J. Sargent, “The United States and Globalization in the 1970s,” in The 
Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective, eds. Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and 
Daniel J. Sargent (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2010).  On energy and  American political culture, Daniel 
Horowitz, The Anxieties of Affluence: Critiques of American Consumer Culture, 1939-1979 (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2004), 203-244; Meg Jacobs, “The Conservative Struggle and the 
American Energy Crisis” in Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s, Bruce 
Schulman and Julian Zelizer, eds. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), 193-209; Meg 
Jacobs, Insiders: The Oil Crisis, Conservative Governance, and the Dismantling of the American State 
since the 1970s (New York: Hill and Wang, forthcoming).  For environmental history, see Adam Rome, 
The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American Environmentalism (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); David Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental 
Regulation in a Global Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); J. Samuel Walker, 
Containing the Atom: Nuclear Regulation in a Changing Environment, 1963-1971 (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1992). For relevant primary documents, see Daniel Horowitz, Jimmy Carter and the 
Energy Crisis of the 1970s: The "Crisis of Confidence" Speech of July 15, 1979 (New York: Bedford/St. 
Martin’s, 2004) and Karen R. Merrill, The Oil Crisis of 1973-1974: A Brief History with Documents (New 
York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007).   
10On the postwar petroleum order, see Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power 
(New York: The Free Press, 2008 [1991]), 391-412; Nathan J. Citino, From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: 
Eisenhower, King Saud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2005), 1-18.  Anthropologists, ethnographers, sociologists, and psychologists have joined historians, 
economists, and political scientists.  Seminal works provide the easiest entry point:  Gerald D. Nash, United 
States Oil Policy, 1890-1964 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968); Ian Skeet, OPEC: Twenty-
Five Years of Prices and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and John G. Clark, The 
Political Economy of World Energy: A Twentieth-Century Perspective (Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1991).  For scholarship that emphasizes the formation of OPEC, see George W. 
Stocking, Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 1970); Benjamin Shwadron, The Middle East, Oil, and the Great Powers, 3rd ed. (New 
York: Wiley, 1974); Dankwart A. Rustow and John F. Mugno, OPEC: Success and Prospects (New York: 
New York University Press, 1976); Mana Saed al-Otaiba, OPEC and the Petroleum Industry (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1975); Ian Seymour, OPEC: Instrument of Change (London: Macmillan, 1980); 
Mordechai Abir, Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era: Regimes and Elites: Conflict and Collaboration (London: 
Croom Helm, 1988).  Ethnographers have made particularly interesting contributions in the past decade: 
Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995); Fernando Coronil, The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity 
in Venezuela (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Suzana Sawyer, Crude Chronicles: Indigenous 
Politics, Multinational Oil, and Neoliberalism in Ecuador (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004); 
Andrew Apter, The Pan-African Nation: Oil and the Spectacle of Culture in Nigeria (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2005); Toby Craig Jones, Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi 
Arabia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010); Arang Kesharvarzian, Bazaar and State in 
 6 
Scholars on the postwar petroleum order in general and the energy crisis in 
particular accept one long-standing assumption.  Macro-economic considerations were 
the driving force behind the energy crisis.   To clarify, the end of the era of cheap and 
stable oil in the early 1970s was the necessary price adjustment to a supply-demand 
imperative.  The triangular affair between the principle oil company executives and their 
counterparts in producing and consuming governments makes for a gripping story, but in 
the end the supply-demand balance moves the narrative forward.11  Scholars may 
emphasize different variables, but they all hold that economic changes led to the energy 
crisis.  Changes in the global market stand at the root of energy insecurity.12   
According to the consensus, the market position of the largest multinational oil 
companies permitted them control over the world’s most prolific oil fields in the interwar 
era.  The Seven Sisters, as they were called, solidified their power over the industry after 
World War II by forming a cartel that could punish oil nationalists and maintain a cheap 
and secure supply.  The favorable situation had changed fundamentally by the early 
1970s.  The market tightened.  World demand for oil outstripped the ability of the 
industry to expand supply.  American indigenous production declined rapidly and the 
United States appeared on the market as a major importer.  World reserves became 
                                                                                                                                                 
Iran: The Politics of the Tehran Marketplace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Steffen 
Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2011). 
11Yergin, The Prize, 391-544. 
12 These factors include most importantly a precipitous increase in world demand, the deterioration of 
American oil production, and the increased dependence of Western Europe and Japan on Middle Eastern 
oil.  Notable works include: Richard Vietor, Energy Policy in America Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987); Fiona Venn, The Oil Crisis (London: Pearson Education, 2002); Stephen D. 
Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1978); Ethan Kapstein, The Insecure Alliance: Energy Crises and Western 
Politics since 1944 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Simon Bromley, American Hegemony and 
World Oil: The Industry, the State System and the World Economy (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1991); Michael J. Graetz, The End of Energy: The Unmaking of America’s 
Environment, Security, and Independence (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2011). 
 7 
concentrated in a limited number of countries.  A significant cutback by any single major 
producer threatened a severe dislocation of world oil supply.  The OPEC nations used 
their position as a counter-cartel to the Seven Sisters to restrict production and enforce 
quantum leaps in the price of oil.13 
The market consensus has dominated interpretations since the real-time analysis 
of the energy crisis by governments, industry experts, scholars, and journalists.   
Historians have confirmed the standard narrative, while providing increasing 
understanding and nuance.  In particular, historians of U.S. foreign relations have 
published in-depth studies of American policy in the immediate post-1945 years.14  The 
histories were written in the 1970s and 1980s and relied on newly declassified materials 
from the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower administrations, business archives, 
personal papers, and oral histories.  In most instances, these histories drew on the 
interpretive school of corporatism.  The scholars placed American foreign policy at the 
center of analysis, and emphasized the fitful relationships between multinational 
corporations and the U.S. government.  The methodology thus accounted for the roles 
played by non-state actors and government officials, analyzing the decision-making 
                                                 
13 For similar analyses, but with an emphasis on American policy, see Burton I. Kaufman, The Oil Cartel 
Case: A Documentary Study of Antitrust Activity in the Cold War Era (Wesport, CT: Greenview Press, 
1978); Walter J. Levy, Oil Strategy and Politics, 1941-1981 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982).  For the 
company-producer country relationship, see Frank C. Waddams, The Libyan Oil Industry (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1980); Louis Turner, Oil Companies in the International System (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1983); Yusif A. Sayigh, Arab Oil Policies in the 1970s: Opportunity and Responsibility 
(London: Croom Helm, 1983). 
14 Michael B. Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security: the Search for a National Policy on Foreign Oil, 
1941-1947 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980); David S. Painter, Oil and the American 
Century: The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Oil Policy, 1941-1954 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986); Aaron David Miller, Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American 
Foreign Policy, 1939-1949 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); Irvine Anderson, 
Aramco, the United States, and Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Dynamics of Foreign Oil Policy, 1933-1950 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981); Irvine Anderson, The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company 
and United States East Asian Policy, 1933-1941 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).  
Recently, see Stephen J. Randall, United States Foreign Oil Policy Since World War I: For Profits and 
Security (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005).  
 8 
processes of elites in government and business.15  The works collectively explain how 
American policymakers perceived oil was a necessary ingredient of national security 
during World War II and the rise of the Cold War.  To secure a cheap and stable supply, 
U.S. officials utilized a corporatist policy of relying on the multinational corporations to 
protect the national interest in foreign oil.16 
For World War II and the first decade of the Cold War, the interpretation of 
energy security has been sustained accurately and elegantly.  From the more detached 
perspective of 2012, the corporatist histories are models of analysis, part of a well-
regarded lineage of international business history that has long taken multinational 
companies as key political actors.17   The corporatist perspective, like any other, is a 
                                                 
15 For corporatism in U.S. foreign relations, see Thomas J. McCormick, “Drift or Mastery? A Corporatist 
Synthesis for American Diplomatic History, Reviews in American History 10: 4 (Dec., 1982): 318-330; 
Robert Griffith, “Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth,” American Historical Review 87 
(February 1982): 87-122; Michael J. Hogan, “Corporatism,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign 
Relations, rev. ed., Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2004), 137-161. 
16 That the U.S. government had done so was a widely held belief, especially following Idaho Senator 
Frank Church’s investigations into the oil industry, which has become an essential primary source: U. S. 
Congress. Senate. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Multinational Corporations and United States 
Foreign Policy. 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1975; U. S. Congress. Senate. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy. 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1975.  For the link 
between the initial academic response to the energy crisis and the corporatist historians, see Edith Penrose, 
“The Development of Crisis.” Daedalus 104: 4 (Fall 1975): 39-57; William D. Nordhaus, “The 1974 
Report of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers: Energy in the Economic Report.” The American 
Economic Review 64: 4 (September 1974), 558-565; Stephen D. Krasner, “The Great Oil Sheikdown.” 
Foreign Policy 13 (Winter 1973-1974): 123-138; Joseph Nye, “Energy Nightmares,” Foreign Policy 40 
(Autumn 1980): 132-154. 
17 The literature stretches from to the great trust-busting muckraker of the early twentieth century, Ida 
Tarbell, to the intrepid 1970s investigative journalist, Anthony Sampson, to international business 
historians like Mira Wilkins, Raymond Vernon, Alfred Chandler, and Edith Penrose. See Ida M. Tarbell, 
The History of the Standard Oil Company (New York: McClure, Phillips, and Company, 1904); Steve 
Weinberg, Taking Down the Trust: How Ida Tarbell Brought Down John D. Rockefeller and Standard Oil 
(New York: Norton, 2009); Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World 
They Shaped (New York: The Viking Press, 1975); Mira Wilkins, The Maturing of Multinational 
Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1974); Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971); Raymond Vernon, ed., The Oil Crisis (New York: Norton, 1976).  
A critical take of U.S. foreign policy co-existed closely with this field, providing many insights, but often 
slipping into biased tone: Harvey O'Connor, The Empire of Oil, 2nd ed. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
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result of the age in which it was written.  Writing about oil and national security in a 
decade marked by the coming and passing of the energy crisis influenced the 
interpretation, especially the emphasis on the physical security of inexpensive oil for the 
noncommunist world.18 
Just as corporatist historians used declassified material in the 1970s and 1980s to 
interpret wartime and postwar oil policy, scholars who emphasize the effects of 
nationalism and imperialism on oil politics have tapped into new sources in recent years.  
This scholarship includes work on the complex relationships that exist between Arab 
nationalist movements and oil production in the Middle East.  Scholars may differ on 
when and where to place the origins of nationalism, but they agree that pan-Arabism had 
a contentious relationship with oil production in the postwar era.19 
                                                                                                                                                 
1962 [1956]); Robert Engler, The Politics of Oil: A Study of Private Power and Democratic Directions 
(New York: MacMillan, 1961); John Blair, Control of Oil (New York: Vintage, 1976).  
18 Recently, company histories and biographies have added to the complexity of the field, but without 
changing its general direction.  For example, Edward J. Epstein and Armand Hammer, Dossier: The Secret 
History of Armand Hammer (New York: Carroll and Graf, 1999); James Bamberg, History of the British 
Petroleum Company. British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000); Steven Howarth, A Century in Oil: The "Shell" Transport and Trading Company 1897-1997 
(London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1998); Bennett H. Wall, Growth in a Changing Environment: A 
History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) 1950-1972 and Exxon Corporation 1972-1975 (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1989); Kai Bird, The Chairman: John J. McCloy, the Making of the American Establishment 
(New York, Simon and Schuster, 1992); Anthony Cave Brown, Oil, God, and Gold: The Story of Aramco 
and the Saudi Kings (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999). 
19 For an introduction, see: Alnaswari Abbas, Arab Nationalism, Oil, and the Political Economy of 
Dependency (Wesport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991); Rashid Khalidi, “Arab Nationalism: Historical 
Problems in the Literature.” American Historical Review 96 (December 1991): 1363-1373; Peter L. Hahn, 
“Containment and Egyptian Nationalism: The Unsuccessful Effort to Establish the Middle East Command, 
1950-53.” Diplomatic History 11 (Winter 1987): 23-40. On the Ottoman empire and tribal factors, see: D. 
K. Fieldhouse, Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914–1958 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006); Jeremy Salt, The Unmaking of the Middle East: A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); Frederick F. Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation 
of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Carl L. Brown, ed., 
Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996); Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State Formation in the 
Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).   The issue of imperialism and nationalism 
revolves on a major tension between historians about whether decolonization occurred predominantly 
because of metropolitan or peripheral factors.  This debate is subtly laid out in A. G. Hopkins, “Rethinking 
Decolonization,” Past and Present 200: 1 (2008): 211-247.  For surveys of this tension from the 
 10 
The nature of that relationship has been most thoroughly explored by historian 
Nathan J. Citino.  Building on the corporatist position, Citino holds that the strategy of 
reliance upon private corporate interest employed by the U.S. government expressly 
sought to limit the effect of Arab nationalism on oil politics.  The corporatist framework 
sought to adapt American economic power to the “anti-colonial currents of postwar 
global politics.”20 The emphasis on anti-imperial nationalism affirms analyses undertaken 
                                                                                                                                                 
perspectives of postcolonial studies, imperial history, and the history of globalization, see: Frederick 
Cooper, “What is the concept of globalization good for? An African historian’s perspective,” African 
Affairs 100 (2001): 189–213; David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins 
of Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989);  Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, eds., International 
Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997); Kristin Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the 
Reordering of French Culture (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).  For the perspective from historians of 
the British empire, see John Darwin, “Decolonization and the End of Empire,” in Robin W. Winks (ed.), 
The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. V: Historiography (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999); Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay, 1941–1945: The United States and the Decolonization of the 
British Empire (Oxford, 1977); Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–51 
(Oxford, 1984); Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968 
(Cambridge, 2006).  For a meta-historical view, Paul Bairoch, Economics and World History: Myths and 
Paradoxes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Hendrik Spruyt, “The End of Empire and the 
Extension of the Westphalian System: The Normative Basis of the Modern State Order,” International 
Studies Review 2: 2 (Summer 2000): 65-92; David Strang, “The Inner Incompatibility of Empire and 
Nation: Popular Sovereignty and Decolonization,” Sociological Perspectives 35: 2 (Summer 1992): 367-
384.  On the link between economic development and decolonization, see Nathan Citino, The “Crush” of 
Ideologies: The United States, the Arab World, and Cold War Modernization, Cold War History (2011); W. 
Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008); Susan Pederson, “Getting Out of Iraq—in 1932: The League of Nations and the Road to 
Normative Statehood,” The American Historical Review (2010); Robert Vitalis, “The ‘New Deal’ in Egypt: 
The Rise of Anglo-American Commercial Competition in World War II and the Fall of Neocolonialism,” 
Diplomatic History 20 (Spring 1996): 211-239; William Stivers, Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey, and the 
Anglo-American World Order, 1918-1930 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982); Paul W. T. 
Kingston, Britain and the Politics of Modernization in the Middle East, 1945-1958 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); Douglas Little, “Pipeline Politics: America, TAPLINE, and the Arabs,” Business 
History Review 64 (Summer 1990): 255-285; W. R. Polk, and R. L. Chambers, eds. The Beginnings of 
Modernization in the Middle East (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Gerwin Gerke, “The Iraq 
Development Board and British Policy, 1945-1950,” Middle Eastern Studies 27 (April 1992): 231-255; 
Edward P. Fitzgerald, “The Iraq Petroleum Company, Standard Oil of California, and the Contest for 
Eastern Arabia, 1930-1933,” International History Review 13 (August 1991): 441-465. 
20 Citino, From Arab Nationalism to OPEC, 2. Steve Galpern, a historian of British Empire, also 
emphasizes the accommodation of anti-colonial currents in oil and monetary policy, but in the context of 
British-Kuwaiti relations and the role of the pound-sterling as a global currency reserve. Steve Galpern, 
Money, Oil, and Empire in the Middle East: Sterling and Postwar Imperialism, 1944-1971 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009).  See also: Brandon Wolfe-Hunnicut, The End of the Concessionary 
Regime: Oil and American Power in Iraq, 1958-1972 (Stanford University, Ph.D., 2011). 
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in the previous decade on the link between oil and the Arab-Israeli conflict and in U.S. 
relations with Venezuela, Kuwait, and Iran.21  These histories are heirs to the corporatist 
interpretation, building on its basic assumptions and moving the issue of company-
government relations beyond U.S. foreign policy and into bilateral relations with oil 
producers. 
Despite their collective merit, the above approaches have limitations.  They tend 
to emphasize bilateral relations—discussing in deep detail the tension between two local 
views, usually those of the United States and a particular oil-producing nation.  The 
emphasis on bilateralism is well entrenched.  Citino warns against a conflation of oil 
politics with broader Third World trends, urging scholars to make “the crucial distinction 
between the Iranian nationalism of Prime Minister Muhammad Mussaduq and the Arab 
nationalism of Egyptian leader Gamāl ‘Abd al-Nāșir on the one hand, and a producers’ 
cartel of Arab and non-Arab oil states...on the other.”22  The warning should be heeded to 
a point; handcuffing separate nationalisms to oil politics in too blunt of a way is 
undoubtedly dangerous.  On the other hand, caution doesn’t mean tossing away the key.  
The broader intellectual and political currents that informed and often shaped individual 
nationalisms also set certain limits to their effectiveness.  These currents, which include 
                                                 
21 Uri Bialer, Oil and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 1998); Simon Smith, 
Kuwait, 1950-1965: Britain, the al-Sabah, and Oil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Mary Ann 
Heiss, Empire and Nationhood: The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950-1954 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997); Stephen G. Rabe, The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with 
Venezuela, 1919-1976 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982). 
22Citino, From Arab Nationalism to OPEC, xi.  On this point, I agree with Citino for reasons of historical 
and cultural differentiation, but in the Prologue I argue that Nasser and Mossadegh held important shared 
beliefs in the doctrine of permanent sovereignty.  Experts on Iranian and Arab nationalism would argue that 
Citino himself has committed a lesser version of the same sin by lumping Mossadegh and Nasser together, 
an error many believed the Eisenhower administration itself committed, but I believe makes sense.  On the 
dangers of conflating nationalisms, see Robert Dreyfus, Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped 
Unleash Fundamentalist Islam (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005), 65-119; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: 
Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 
2000); Joel Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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permanent sovereignty and neoliberal diplomacy, are useful categories of analysis for 
international historians.23 
Despite the fact that different actors drew different historical lessons from the 
energy crisis, little work has been done to examine the role of ideas in its causes and the 
consequences.   Yet, there is no doubt that decolonization and the transnational rise of 
permanent sovereignty heavily influenced politics and strategies of OPEC.  Permanent 
sovereignty, an intellectual movement with its own momentum, granted the oil price 
increases intellectual coherence and conceptual legitimacy.24  Likewise, the energy crisis 
helped bring about the rise of free-market thought in American diplomacy.  The energy 
crisis presents a striking illustration of the intimacy between imperialism, decolonization, 
and globalization. 
Researching and writing this story is another matter—the  hazard of transnational 
history of its being a mile long but an inch deep is magnified in a case as vexed as the 
energy crisis. The potential gain outweighs the danger. The following analysis links 
                                                 
23 On this point, in the context of the relationship between the Suez crisis and the pace of decolonization, 
see Wm. Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 589-726. Another central stem of energy historiography has analyzed the 
effects of oil production on the oil producers themselves, often noting “the resource curse” when examining 
their disappointing political, social, and economic development paths. This question of oil, of course, is 
linked to the broader problem of mono-crop economies, rentier theory, and in the end, the debate over non-
renewable resources.  For a start: Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Benjamin Smith, Hard Times in the Lands of Plenty: Oil 
Politics in Iran and Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007); Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil 
Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53: 3 (April 2001): 325-361; Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of 
Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).  The 
revisionist argument, that oil wealth does not make autocracy more likely, is made forcefully in Thad 
Dunning, Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). The best introductions to rentier theory in the oil states are E. Roger Owen, “One 
Hundred Years of Middle Eastern Oil,” Middle East Brief 24 (2008); Hazem Bablawi, The Rentier State in 
the Arab World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Michael L. Ross, “How Do Natural 
Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,” International Organization 58: 1 (Winter, 
2004): 35-67; Kenneth S. Deffeyes, Hubbert's Peak: The Impending World Oil Shortage (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001). 
24Giuliano Garavini, “Completing Decolonization: The 1973 ‘Oil Shock’ and the Struggle for Economic 
Rights,” International History Review 33: 3 (Sept. 2011): 473–487.   
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transnational intellectual movements to economic nationalism.  In doing so, it forms part 
of a third historiographical phase that aligns with recent trends of international and 
interdisciplinary scholarship.  In the past decade, several historians have discussed the 
societal effects of energy production on nations and transnational communities.25  Despite 
evident differences in scale and scope, these studies share prominent traits.  First, they 
assume that multiple different contexts affected their actors’ lives and decisions.26  Like 
                                                 
25 For a summary, see C. A. Bayly, Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyer, Wendy Kozol and 
Patricia Seed, “AHR Conversation: On Transnational History,” The American Historical Review 111: 5 
(December 2006): 1441-1464; Johan Heilbron, Nicolas Guilhot, Laurent Jeanpierre, “Toward a 
Transnational History of the Social Sciences,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 44: 2 
(Spring 2008): 146-160; David Thelen, “The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United 
States History,” The Journal of American History 86: 3 (December 1999): 965-975.  In the field of energy 
history, Alison Frank has combined economic, political, and social methodologies to examine the early 
twentieth-century in Galacia as a nerve center for Austrian imperial politics, local social tensions, and 
insurgent nationalist sentiment.  Robert Vitalis examines the development of the U.S.-Saudi security 
relationship within the dual context of Saudi societal change and the inherited Jim Crow labor structure of 
the Arab-American Oil Company’s work camps.  Melani McAlister has linked the energy crisis with the 
concurrent King Tut craze to discuss the rise of “commodity nationalism” in the oil-producing countries.  
Timothy Mitchell discusses the effect of the oil-intensive modern economy on political structures in the 
consuming and producing nations.  See: Alison Fleig Frank, Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian 
Galicia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007); Robert Vitalis, America’s Kingdom: 
Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Melani McAlister, Epic 
Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East since 1945 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005); Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (New 
York: Verso, 2011). 
26 Matthew Connelly, “Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian 
War for Independence,” The American Historical Review 105: 3 (June 2000): 739-769; Mary Elise Sarotte, 
Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2000); Matthew Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global 
Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003); Odd Arne 
Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the 
International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Elizabeth 
Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2007); Paul Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the 
Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Mark Atwood Lawrence, “Universal 
Claims, Local Uses: Reconceptualizing the Vietnam Conflict, 1945–60,” in A. G. Hopkins (ed.), Global 
History: Interactions between the Universal and the Local (London: Basingstoke, 2006), 229-252; Bradley 
R. Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); Hal Brands, “Economic Development and the Contours of 
U.S. Foreign Policy: The Nixon Administration’s Approach to Latin America, 1969-1974,” Peace and 
Change 33: 2 (2008): 243-273; Matthew Connelly, Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World 
Population (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008); Daniel Sargent, From Internationalism to 
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other new international histories, the monographs achieve this multi-layered perspective 
by reaching across disciplines and using many foreign archives.27  Recent collective 
appraisals of U.S. foreign policy in the 1970s also point in this direction, as do new 
monographs by monetary and financial historians.28   
Historical pluralism has led to a considerable rupture in the orthodox Cold War 
consensus in the history of U.S. foreign relations.29   Scholars have begun to discuss the 
different forces that upset the traditional assumptions of superpower conflict in the late 
1960s.  Attempts to forge synthesis out of this complex and heterogeneous historiography 
have been anything but straightforward. Interpretations are characterized as much by 
                                                                                                                                                 
Globalism: The United States and the Transformation of International Politics in the 1970s (PhD 
Dissertation, Harvard University, 2009); Nick Cullather, The Hungry World:  America’s Cold War Battle 
Against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010); Erez Manela, “A Pox on 
Your Narrative: Writing Disease Control into Cold War History,’ Diplomatic History 34: 2 (April 2010): 
299-323; Sarah Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of 
the Helsinki Network (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Christopher J. Lee, ed. Making a 
World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 
2010); Ryan Irwin, The Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order, 1960-
1970 (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
27 Diplomatic historians have correctly noted that this current emphasis on multinational scholarship has far 
deeper roots, including the work of historians like Henry Adams and Samuel Flagg Beamis. 
28 See most recently the contributions to Ferguson, Maier, Manela, and Sargent, eds.,The Shock of the 
Global. and Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, eds. Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 
1969-1977 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).  See also Alistair Horne, Kissinger: 1973, the 
Crucial Year (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009); Jussi M. Hahnimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry 
Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), and Jeremi Suri, 
Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Harvard: Belknap, 2007).  For bibliographical discussions, see 
Robert S. Litwak, “Henry Kissinger’s Ambiguous Legacy.” Diplomatic History 18: 3 (Summer 1994); 
Jussi M. Hanhimäki, “’Dr. Kissinger’ or ‘Mr. Henry’? Kissingerology, Thirty Years and Counting,” 
Diplomatic History 27:5 (Nov. 2003), 637-676.  Contributions in monetary and financial literature include 
Francis J. Gavin, Gold, Dollars, and Power: Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958-1971 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004),167-188; Galpern, Money, Oil, and Empire; Harold 
James, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996), 205-241; Timur Kuran, Islam and Mammon (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); 
Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000). 
29 Recent histories have examined superpower détente, economic development, globalization, the end of 
the Vietnam War, and human rights.  Pluralism should not be confused with relativism.  See Steven Lukes, 
“The Singular and the Plural: On the Distinctive Liberalism of Isaiah Berlin,” Social Research 61 (2004): 
687-717; Todd Hedrick, Rawls and Habermas: Reason, Pluralism, and the Claims of Political Philosophy 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
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conflict as cooperation. The resistance to synthesis has led prominent intellectuals to 
characterize the 1970s as “the age of fracture” or the beginning of a longer “age of 
turbulence.”30 
THE POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND IDEAS OF THE ENERGY CRISIS 
This perception of history explicitly notes how historical actors and ideas more often 
overrode than underwrote conventional boundaries.  Such ambiguity should encourage 
historians.   The energy crisis was a central moment for transnational groups as they 
sought to understand the lessons of history and shape the future.  Within the particular 
invisible college of this dissertation, the time seems right for an analysis of the ideas and 
diplomacy surrounding the energy crisis.31  The following contribution begins from a 
gestalt conception of the history of U.S. foreign relations, whose main elements are an 
understanding of the connection between political-economic thought and diplomacy and 
a belief in the benefits of interdisciplinary methodology and multinational research.   
The discussion uses insights from two particular subfields: international political 
economy and the diplomacy of ideas.  To frame the examination of the energy crisis 
using international political economy is to examine “the reciprocal and dynamic 
                                                 
30Daniel Rodgers, The Age of Fracture (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2011); Alan Greenspan, The 
Age of Turbulence (New York: Penguin, 2008); “Special Forum: U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Era of 
Détente,” Diplomatic History 33: 4 (2009). 
31 For the concept of an “invisible college,” see Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter, 1988), 
ix. The insights of international political economy have already caught the attention of historians of 
economic diplomacy and financial and monetary historians: Harold James, International Monetary 
Cooperation;  Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 
1990s (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Robert M. Collins, “The Economic Crisis of 1968 
and the Waning of the ‘American Century,’” American Historical Review 101: 2 (April 1996): 396-422; 
Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: History of the International Monetary System, 2nd ed. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008); Alan Matusow, Nixon’s Economy: Booms, Busts, Dollars, and Votes 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1997); Paul Volcker and Toyoo Gyohten. Changing Fortunes: The 
World’s Money and the Threat to American Leadership (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1993); Diane B. 
Kunz, Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy (New York: The Free Press, 1997). 
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interaction in international relations of the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power.”32    
The dissertation builds on the integration of market analysis and political studies by 
adding another realm of inquiry, “the diplomacy of ideas,” to the questions of wealth and 
power.33  In the context of the international political economy, the diplomacy of ideas 
implies a study of transnational debates about economic thought and the effect of the 
debates on foreign policy.34   An analysis of the diplomacy of ideas entails an 
                                                 
32Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 43.  In 
the 1970s, the field of international political economy rebuilt the unified concept of politics and economics 
that reigned from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, a period that ended when Alfred Marshall’s 
Principles of Economics replaced John Stuart Mill’s Principles of the Political Economy  as the most 
important theoretical text in that field.  For accessible introductions, see Benjamin J. Cohen, International 
Political Economy: An Intellectual History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Jeffrey A. 
Frieden and David A. Lake, International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, 
5th ed. (New York: Norton, 2009); and Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).  For the breakthrough works in the field, see Robert O. 
Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984); Susan Strange, “International Relations and International Economics: A Case of 
Mutual Neglect,” International Affairs 46: 2 (Apr. 1970): 304-315.  Important exceptions to the divorce 
between politics and economics in the early 20th century are Herbert Feis, Europe: The World’s Banker, 
1870-1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press of the Council on Foreign Relations, 1930); Karl Polanyi, 
The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon, 1944); Alfred O. Hirschman, National Power and the 
Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945); Klaus Knorr, “Economics and 
International Relations: A Problem in Teaching,” Political Science Quarterly 62: 4 (Dec. 1947): 552-568; 
Jacob Viner, “Power Versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries,” World Politics 1: 1 (Oct. 1948): 1-29. “Radical” exceptions are better known to historians and 
include what are often taught as the classics of imperialism: Hobson, Luxemburg, Hilferding, Schumpeter, 
and Lenin.  In the 1970s, theoretical work focused on international regimes, hegemony theory, and the role 
the state and international institutions in global society.  See: Peter J. Katzenstein, Between Power and 
Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1977); Stephen D. Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 28:  3 
(Apr. 1976): 317-347. 
33 Frank Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); John Kurt Jacobsen, “Much Ado About Ideas: The Cognitive 
Factor in Economic Policy,” World Politics 47: 2 (Jan. 1995); Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, 
eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1992). 
34 Ninkovich and others have used similar methods to examine the public and cultural diplomacy of the 
United States—or in the case of Emily Rosenberg, to attempt a broader synthesis of international 
commerce and culture.  See Frank Ninkovich, Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in 
the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism 
and World Order (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the 
American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1982); Julian Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security from World War II to the 
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examination of how economic thought constructed opinions and affected policy.  In a 
period in which decolonization brought greater attention to the challenges of economic 
development, the diplomacy of ideas helps explain the ideological, political, and 
economic tensions between the rich “North” and the impoverished “South” before, 
during, and after the energy crisis.   
The analysis has two final objectives.  First, it examines an explicit relationship 
between economic thought and foreign policy.  Second, it recognizes that ideas also faced 
a market of sorts, especially when competing for influence.   Without a thorough 
understanding of the crossroads between international ideas, the power of those ideas, 
and the related diplomacy, histories of the energy crisis and the period it defined remain 
incomplete.35 
Tracking the debates that surround the energy crisis is not simple.  To portray a 
lengthy transition of ideas is more complex than describing the rise of one independently 
conceived ethic, neoliberal diplomacy, that not only occured simultaneously with the 
decline of a different one, permanent sovereignty, but defeated it.  A nuanced depiction 
involves the identification of sequences of concatenated ideas.36  The enormous changes 
                                                                                                                                                 
War on Terrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2009); Susan Brewer, Why America Fights: Patriotism and 
War Propaganda from the Philippines to Iraq (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
35 The interpretation of the energy crisis works well with the standard sources of international history. 
Recently declassified documents from national archives, presidential libraries, the archives of international 
institutions, and the personal papers of principal actors provide useful material to uncover the movement 
and power of ideas in the international political economy.  In the reconstruction of such a sequence, one 
must draw on evidence from many other sources, including industry journals, speeches and interviews of 
intellectuals and national leaders, middle and high-brow media, and oral history. For a long-term analysis, 
see Manfred B. Steger, The Rise of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the French Revolution 
to the Global War on Terror (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
36 In discussing these broad international trends, my greatest fear has been stitching together disparate 
elements so haphazardly that the result is not so much a straw man as something of a Frankenstein's 
monster.  Where possible, I have attempted to avoid this problem of caricature in the text and in footnotes 
by noting the nuance in individual positions and citing the important works about those people.  Another 
related danger is to respond to the strident arguments put forth by the principle actors with commensurate 
vigor, in the words of one developmental economist, “to cap slogan with anti-slogan.”  See John Toye, 
Dilemmas of Development: Reflections on the Counter-Revolution in Development Theory and Policy 
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that occurred following the increase in oil prices did not result from a simple victory of 
one fully armed school of thought over another.  By giving attention to ideas that headed 
in different directions, the dissertation grasps at the arbitrary and precarious state of 
international affairs in the 1970s.  Defining the relationship between permanent 
sovereignty and neoliberal diplomacy is a complex and frustrating exercise.  Such 
classifications are by their nature static and simple, and the reality to be fitted into them 
was neither.   
THE (NARRATIVE) ARC OF CRISIS  
The real story is more roundabout.   The dissertation begins with the reconstruction of the 
international economy after World War II.  Rather than discussing the origins of the Cold 
War, the rise of material culture, or modernization theory, the prologue examines 
permanent sovereignty as a new turn in thinking about economic development that arose 
from the Third World itself.  To insist on this point of departure proceeds from evidence 
that economic thought became a political instrument with multiple purposes in the 
postcolonial world.   
The prologue traces the growth of the doctrine of permanent sovereignty in the 
international contexts of decolonization and the Cold War.  Permanent sovereignty 
helped connect an extraordinary range of transnational actors.  These actors had different 
ethnicities, nationalities, and worldviews, but shared a common material experience and 
                                                                                                                                                 
(New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987).   By examining ideas as concatenated and tracking their relative 
influence, this version of the diplomacy of ideas also builds on to social theorists’ study of the function of 
intellectuals in society, especially the more recent emphasis in “the sociology of knowledge” subfield on 
the ability of social networks to influence intellectual change.  For an introduction, see Sidney Tarrow, 
Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, rev. ed. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); Robert O’Brien, et. al., eds. Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral 
Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and 
Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits, “Neoliberalism, Embedded Neoliberalism and Neocorporatism: 
Towards Transnational Capitalism in Central-Eastern Europe,” West European Politics 30: 3 (2007). 
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international outlook.  Permanent sovereignty supported the anti-imperial character of 
global politics, and an increasingly cohesive group of Third World intellectuals began to 
espouse the new politics of sovereignty in the United Nations General Assembly.37  
Following the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951 and the Suez 
Canal in 1956, the critical aspect of permanent sovereignty became full national 
ownership over natural resources.  The reclassification of sovereignty in the UN General 
Assembly stiffened Cold War tensions.  It also began to pit the irrepressible right of the 
sovereignty of individual nations against the traditional structure of the international 
economy.   
The concept of permanent sovereignty opened up a pivotal reservoir for the 
authentication of new, inclusive goals of decolonization and statehood.  The emotional 
and economic ties in the minds of men were led to their belief in a common affinity, 
expressed in a shared location: the Third World.  Permanent sovereignty exposed tension 
between American diplomatic aims and Third World economic thought.  After World 
War II, American officials and their victorious allies defined the economic productivity 
of the West as a material and ideological weapon.  In doing so, the United States pegged 
“Free World” economic prosperity to a particular resource alignment between the 
industrial nations and the Third World.   Energy security fit within the American vision 
of a liberal global economy that linked the developed and developing worlds through 
capital investment and raw material exploitation.   
Permanent sovereignty soon became a refrain on the lips of leaders in the 
developing nations. Corollaries for the international economy were unmistakable.  
                                                 
37 Third World leaders became less concerned with nominal political sovereignty, what Robert Jackson and 
Carl Rosberg call “juridical sovereignty,” defined as sovereignty conferred by other states, and more 
concerned with real economic growth.  See Jackson and Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The 
Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood,” World Politics 35 (1982): 1-24. 
 20 
Leaders did not write the concept of sovereignty into the international lexicon, but they 
did fix a new meaning to it, darkened with the bête noire of imperial continuity—even if 
the imperial powers renounced the central political tenets of empire and transferred 
administrative control to national actors, decolonization was incomplete.  The logic 
driving imperial economic structures continued to hold sway.  New states emerged in the 
1950s and 1960s, but the structure of the international economy remained stacked against 
raw material producers.  
The idea of permanent sovereignty simultaneously served as a major tenet of post-
war anti-colonialism and a central construct of Third World economic theory.  
Decolonization became more broadly defined and, in turn, more inclusive.  The post-
imperial critique took command of the United Nations in the 1950s and 1960s, but it 
proved less authoritative in practice.  Even though permanent sovereignty gained popular 
momentum and theoretical coherence, American policymakers dismissed its relevance 
through invocations of “Mossadegh Madness” and “Arabs drinking their oil.”  The raw 
material alignment of energy security easily overcame the 1951 Iranian nationalization, 
the 1956 Suez Crisis, and the September 1960 formation of OPEC.   
The limits of permanent sovereignty were evident during the 1967 Arab oil 
embargo, the subject of Chapter 1.  Certainly, the success of the Egyptian president, 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, at drawing the oil producers to the Arab cause during the June 1967 
war augured an emboldened sense of permanent sovereignty.  However, the monarchies 
in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya only grudgingly joined the embargo and were much 
more concerned about being cut out of the international oil market than about flexing 
their sovereignty.   
 Still, the embargo did serve as a wedge that pried open a place for permanent 
sovereignty in the international economy.  During the embargo, the British government 
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discovered that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait held over two-thirds of the pound sterling 
reserve.  The potential of a petro-pound withdrawal caused great fear in London and 
Washington.  In the face of continuing financial crisis, Prime Minister Harold Wilson 
announced in January 1968 that his government had decided to withdraw nearly all 
British forces from the Persian Gulf and Asia by the end of 1971.   
This decision marked a new phase in the international influence of Third World 
economic thought.  OPEC members used newfound political cohesion, technical ability, 
and market power to remake permanent sovereignty.  The doctrine developed into a self-
conscious, collective discourse of progress for the oil producers.   
In order to fill in the “vacuum” left by Great Britain, American strategy anointed 
the Shah of Iran and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia as the guardians of Middle East 
security.  Chapter 2 explains that newly prominent positions of the Gulf powers were not 
without benefits for the practice of permanent sovereignty.  In an understudied 
development, the traditional bargaining process between the multinational companies and 
the oil-producing governments was scrapped beginning in 1968.  Iran and Saudi Arabia 
drew first the Johnson administration and then the Nixon administration into the 
negotiations.  Pressure from the U.S. government began to upset the structure of postwar 
energy security.  Despite its intent to avoid involvement, the Nixon administration 
insisted that the oil companies yield to Saudi and Iranian production demands in 1970, 
under direct order from the president himself.   Fiscal arrangements and production 
levels, central aspects of permanent sovereignty, began to be determined by the 
producing governments as opposed to private companies. 
If Iran and Saudi Arabia began to unwind energy security, Libya and Iraq would 
unravel it entirely.  Chapter 3 tells the story of the 1972 nationalization of the Iraq 
Petroleum Company by the Ba’athist government of Iraq.  Companies and governments 
 22 
in both Cold War camps helped the Ba’ath develop the technical capability to produce 
and market Iraqi oil.  So successful were they that the executives of the multinational oil 
companies were unable to blacklist Iraqi oil on the world market after the nationalization, 
as they had done to Iranian oil twenty years earlier.   
Chapter 4 explains how the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council, which 
seized power in September 1969, pushed the question of permanent sovereignty into the 
global spotlight.  Emphasizing the immense changes brought about by the 1971 Tehran 
and Tripoli oil accords, the chapter holds that U.S. policy toward Libyan demands 
amounted to naïve compliance to the imperatives of permanent sovereignty.  The catch 
phrase “Arab oil for the Arabs” became an increasingly acceptable political statement in 
the West.   The politics of “oil moderates” closely followed in Libyan and Iraqi footsteps, 
as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Kuwait supported the more radical governments during their 
nationalization episodes. 
The results were momentous.   In December 1972, OPEC and the multinational 
oil companies agreed that host governments would receive 25 percent ownership in their 
concessions, with the nationalized share gradually rising to 51 percent.  However, even as 
OPEC underscored the salience of permanent sovereignty, higher oil prices began to 
undermine Third World development plans.  Chapter 5 begins with three events that 
occurred in the same two weeks of October 1973: the fourth Arab-Israeli war in twenty-
five years, the establishment of a second oil embargo by the Arab producers, and the 
unilateral price increases by OPEC.  The impregnable sovereignty preached by OPEC 
and its backers in the New International Economic Order, an umbrella resolution in the 
UN General Assembly pressing Third World economic demands, engendered a strong 
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response from the United States.  Neoliberal diplomacy was employed to dismantle what 
Henry Kissinger called the “unholy alliance between OPEC and the Third World.” 38   
With the sudden increase in oil prices in late 1973 and early 1974, a central 
assumption of American grand strategy disappeared like a dream. Compounding the 
effects of the end of the Bretton Woods monetary system, the energy crisis represented 
for many the end of a great era of postwar growth.  Chapter 5 examines Kissinger’s 
changing thoughts about the ramifications of the energy crisis, emphasizing the fractious 
relationship between the United States and its oil-producing and oil-consuming allies. 
 The energy crisis became firmly enmeshed with the international politics of 
permanent sovereignty, especially after the UN General Assembly passed the New 
International Economic Order in April 1974.  Steeped in the concept of permanent 
sovereignty, the New International Economic Order sought to eviscerate traditional core-
peripheral arrangements. OPEC nations led the way, arguing that their success in raising 
oil prices called for a fundamental reappraisal of the relationship between the developed 
North and the less-developed South.   
As tensions rose, market-centered reform became an analytical refuge for the 
United States.  A close study of American strategy toward the United Nations and the 
International Monetary Fund reveals that neoliberal diplomacy began to drive central 
aspects of U.S. foreign policy.  The United States vetoed international proposals that 
encouraged the recycling of OPEC petrodollars though multilateral channels on the 
grounds that such recycling should take place via private financial markets. As OPEC 
harnessed permanent sovereignty, the results were entirely out of tune with the solidarity-
driven enthusiasm of the New International Economic Order.   
                                                 
38Memorandum of Conversation, November 16, 1975, William Seidman Papers, Box 312, The Gerald Ford 
Presidential Library (hereafter GFL, Seidman Papers, 312). 
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The conclusion examines the legacy of the energy crisis.  American policy toward 
the international economy maintained sovereignty as a key concept.  However, 
“sovereign debt” became the common invocation, a linguistic change that effectively 
placed sovereignty at the service of the free market. The emphasis on the market in 
international finance by American policymakers made national borders more permeable 
to capital.  Using a discourse of shared political values and economic interdependence, 
the neoliberal diplomacy of the United States facilitated the global projection of 
American financial power far beyond its earlier limits.   
THE ENERGY CRISIS AND THE LONG 1970S 
Despite the seamless quality that any narrative imposes on the past, the confrontation 
over expensive oil had consequences nobody could anticipate.  The energy crisis 
produced lines of political-economic connection more varied and complex than a simple 
dialectic between permanent sovereignty and neoliberal diplomacy, between a monolithic 
Global North and Global South.  
Still, the energy crisis changed the international agenda in the 1970s.  The United 
States and the less developed countries disagreed in their overall approach to the 
international economy. The West depicted problems of poverty and development as 
technical economic issues.  The developing nations identified a broader political problem 
in the structure of the international economy.  The debate over the energy crisis revolved 
around the question of whether the economy required a corrective to the imperial past, a 
reordering of the basic relationships between the developed countries and the primary 
producers of the Third World.  
The dissertation conceives of the “Long 1970s” as a time of adaptation, 
reinterpreting the energy crisis as a site of political, economic, diplomatic, and 
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intellectual conflict.39  By studying economic ideas as dynamic forces and collective 
endeavors, the project unearths transnational groups of intellectuals, diplomats, and 
policymakers whose experience tells us much about the international society they 
inhabited.  In turn, the emphasis on the links between economic thought and diplomacy 
reminds us that ideas mattered in shaping globalization, in the same way scholars 
understand their importance for earlier periods.40   This shift in perspective adds to 
scholarly debates over the histories of globalization, modernization, and decolonization.    
The dissertation works against a certain homogeneity in the study of 
globalization.  Scholarship, while complex, can be divided into three groups: devotees, 
detractors, and detached observers.  Detractors argue that coercion from multinational 
corporations, the United States, and international financial institutions have broken down 
national barriers to the movement of capital and ideas, with almost entirely negative 
effects.  Foreign capital has brutalized local businesses, undermined social welfare, and 
enriched national elites.  Worse still, globalization threatens to homogenize culture to the 
                                                 
39 This rendering of the energy crisis contributes to several scholarly literatures, an interdisciplinary 
emphasis that derives from a deeply held belief that scholars must look at broader horizons and avoid being 
blinkered by their narrow subfields.  Pluralism, memorably described by development economist Albert O. 
Hirschman as “trespassing” across disciplinary boundaries, has the distinct benefit of encouraging 
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philosophers, economists, policymakers, diplomats, and other humanists alike. See: Essays in Trespassing: 
Economics to Politics and Beyond (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
40 Classics include:  J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition, rev. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Thomas L. Haskell,  
The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and the 
Nineteenth Century Crisis of Authority (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1977); Daniel Rodgers, 
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Hall, ed., The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations (Princeton: Princeton 
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point of vapidity.41  Devotees accept the reality of globalization as understood by its 
detractors, but see benefits rather than liabilities.  The lowering of economic and cultural 
barriers leads not only to economic growth, but also to greater diffusion of the benefits of 
that growth.42  The third group, detached observers, has formed a synthetic narrative, one 
that examines specific relationships within the broad network in greater detail.43 
Devotees, detractors, and detached observers share basic assumptions.  All three 
schools of thought take for granted the centrality of globalization as a process or a series 
of processes in contemporary society.   All three usually begin their studies with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the market orientation of China in the late 1980s.   
Finally, more subtle but more essential, all three presuppose that the processes of 
globalization move in a common direction, toward greater and greater synthesis.  In 
economics, that synthesis is market-oriented. 
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The following dissertation recovers critical international ideas at play in 
diplomacy and inserts itself into a scholarly literature that moves against the mutual 
assumptions of the devotees, detractors, and detached observers.  The tendency has been 
to lay primary emphasis on the factors of globalization that have worked toards 
unification, without recognizing their ambivalent nature.  Through the examination of 
historical patterns that began well before the post-Cold War era, a close study of the 
causes and consequences of the energy crisis challenges the presentist periodization of 
many studies of globalization.44   The dissertation proposes that the history of global 
interconnection did not seem irreversible at the time.  The analysis of the diplomatic 
power of particular economic ideas returns specificity, contingency, and contestation to 
the early days of modern globalizaion. At the same time, the emphasis on the diplomacy 
of ideas maintains one of the strengths of the field, the analysis of large-scale, long-term 
patterns. 
The dissertation poses the alternatives of the might-have-beens that did not fully 
appear.  It moves beyond what historian and social theorist Frederick Cooper has called 
“the totalizing pretensions” of globalization and gives careful attention to intellectual 
reconfigurations of the international economy.45  The influence of these concepts, 
permanent sovereignty and neoliberal diplomacy, reveal that contemporary globalization 
                                                 
44Paul Bairoch, “Globalization Myths and Realities: One Century of External Trade and Foreign 
Investment,” in Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache, eds., States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization 
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has been much more than a constant climb toward integration.  The history of 
globalization is also a story of the struggle over the meaning of ideas, their transmission 
across space and over time, and their diplomatic use.   
By emphasizing ideas and diplomacy, the dissertation also corrects another 
standard assumption.  The current tendency is to interpret the economic transformations 
of the 1970s in a way that prioritizes structural change over diplomatic agency. Scholars 
are correct that the processes of globalization formed a powerful and often amorphous 
juggernaut, a point supported by close analytical work on the liberalization of capital 
markets and the growth of multinational enterprises.  Almost without dissent, narratives 
of modern globalization reflect Frederick Wills’ and Henry Kissinger’s shared 
understanding of the energy crisis as a turning point for the newly global economic 
structure.46   However, most writers have been content to note oil prices for their effect on 
policymakers.  This dissertation takes a step further by exploring the ideas and diplomacy 
surrounding OPEC and the price increases themselves.47  
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In the strongest such argument to date, historian Daniel Sargent explicitly uses the 
energy crisis to showcase a larger thesis that modern globalization evolved “more as the 
consequence of exogenous structural changes than as the achievement of specific policy 
choices.”48  The evidence in this dissertation points toward a more ambiguous conclusion.  
Change along these lines did not just happen.  A critical mass of newly available 
documents illuminates the question of how ideas and politics interacted with and shaped 
the policies of governments and international institutions, as well as processes of 
globalization.   
On a related note, scholars have come to identify neoliberalism as the central 
ideological framework of globalization, and thus a key category of analysis.49  Here, 
many have been trapped in the structure they seek to analyze.  Neoliberalism is a term 
whose meaning is opaque and over which considerable disagreements exist.   Most 
commonly, it is understood as a moral argument for the benefits of free trade and the free 
movement of capital.  Even if it carries a powerful set of images, the argument constitutes 
an overly broad use that embraces everything and means nothing.  The substitution of 
neoliberal diplomacy, the policy application of the free market ideal, gives historians a 
concept that is less sweeping and more precise.  In this way, historians can analyze with 
specificity the movement of ideas into policy, rather than looking at a system in vaguely 
defined and mechanistic terms. The terminological change points toward another, more 
substantive contribution.  Neoliberal diplomacy, even if it was conceived as universal and 
had long-running antecedents, emerged within the specific context of the energy crisis.50 
                                                 
48 Sargent, “The United States and Globalization,” 53. 
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The dissertation also contributes to another influential subfield in American 
foreign relations, the study of modernization policy and theory.  Historians have closely 
examined the ideological and material underpinnings of tenets of modernization like 
economic development and social progress.  However, the history of modernization 
largely has been written in a Cold War context.51  Some scholars have moved to 
complicate the bipolar narrative by describing the particular settings of multifaceted 
struggles over modernization.  The accounts provide tightly focused examinations of the 
relationship between specific developing states and the superpowers’ modernizing 
strategies and, increasingly, the developing states’ own ideas about modernization. The 
more complicated narrative moves the story beyond the tale of rival modernizers playing 
each other on a global chessboard and into the realm of local practice and experience.52 
The new direction, while innovative, misses common strains that connect distinct 
Third World experiences.53  Modernization theory is just one of those strains.  The 
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examination of permanent sovereignty as another, shared among Third World actors, 
builds on the strengths of the scholarly literature.  Diplomacy surrounding development 
was rigorously debated.  The international politics of development became a central 
location for arguments about the nature of the international economy.  Understanding 
American foreign relations with the Third World requires closer attention to the ideas 
about which the different parties disagreed.   
In addition to its interventions in the scholarship on globalization and 
modernization, the dissertation examines certain aspects of the history of decolonization.  
In part, the energy crisis analyzes the colonial past as it shaped the post-colonial era.  
Such an examination confirms a key insight, stated succinctly by Simon Gikandi:  
“Decolonized situations are marked by the trace of the imperial pasts they try to 
disavow.”54  Permanent sovereignty was in accords with the fundamentals of postwar 
politics, the transition from colony to statehood.  But permanent sovereignty was not in 
line with the prevailing strcture economic structure.  The energy crisis moves against a 
light-switch, entry-exit view of decolonization, in which transfers of power, 
independence, and international recognition extinguished the category of empire from 
politics.55  The links between permanent sovereignty and neoliberal diplomacy reveal that 
scholars are not faced with a stark choice between inquiries of imperial continuity or 
                                                                                                                                                 
United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2007), 316-320. 
54 Simon Gikandi, Maps of Englishness: Writing Identity in the Culture of Colonialism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), 15.  This was something that historians like Ronald Robinson, John 
Gallagher, and William Appleman Williams understood at the time.  See John Gallagher and Ronald 
Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” The Economic History Review, 2nd series 6: 1 (1953); William 
Appleman Williams, “The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy,” Pacific Historical Review 24:  4 
(Nov., 1955): 379-395.  See also John Darwin, The Empire Project: the Rise and Fall of the British World 
System 1830-1970 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 649-655. 
55 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005), 19-20; Christopher J. Lee, “Between a Moment and an Era: The Origins and 
Afterlives of Bandung,” in Lee, The Bandung Moment, 1-43. 
 32 
post-colonial change, but rather may examine the many ways people understood new 
forms of political and economic power.56  
The key insights of the dissertation come together to interpret the “long 1970s,” as 
Tony Judt put it, as “the hinge on which the second half of our century turned.”57  The 
                                                 
56Gikandi, Maps of Englishness, 15-19; Arif Dirlik, “The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the 
Age of Global Capitalism,” Critical Inquiry 20 (1994): 328-356.  The point builds on Salim Yaqub’s 
critique that orientalist bias does little to prove that the documented condescension had an impact on U.S. 
Middle East policies, even if it may help explain the broader assumptions of some policymakers. On this 
point, see Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, 11-15.  In the 1970s, for understandable reasons the same 
period in which Said researched and wrote this thesis, orientalist bias was much more evident in popular 
culture than in the debates of top officials.  One classic example is the creation of “The Iron Sheikh” as the 
nemisis of Hulk Hogan in professional wrestling.  In his seminal work on the subject, American 
Orientalism, Douglas Little contends that orientalism and anticommunism combined to “put the American 
eagle on a collision course with the sphinx of Arab nationalism.”  Importantly, Little concedes that this 
description holds most true for the period between 1945 and 1970, and less for the following era.  See 
Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945, 3rd. ed (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Idem., “The Eagle and the Sphinx,” The MacMillan Center, 
Council on Middle Eastern Studies, Working Papers, The United States & the Middle East: Diplomatic and 
Economic Relations in Perspective, 101-110.  
57 Quoted in Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2009), 6.  A first wave of scholarship has admonished the decade for its fiascos and failures.  “The 
history of the twenty years after 1973,” Eric Hobsbawm writes, “is that of a world which has lost its 
bearings and slid into instability and crisis.”  Of the increasingly colossal scholarship on foreign relations, 
writers have closely analyzed the impact of the Watergate debacle and the United States’ inglorious exit 
from Vietnam, as well as the grand vision and practice of “Nixinger” foreign policy.  See The Age of 
Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century (London: Verso, 1994), 403; Andreas Killen, 1973 Nervous 
Breakdown: Watergate, Warhol, and the Birth of Post-Sixties America (New York: Bloomsbury, 2006); 
Peter N. Carroll, It Seemed Like Nothing Happened: America in the 1970s (New York: Rutgers University 
Press, 1990). Political historians differ on the causes and consequences of that instability, emphasizing the 
early culture wars.  On one end of the spectrum, Bruce Schulman argues that American culture became 
more conservative.  On the other end, Philip Jenkins has rendered the 1970s as an inherently liberal culture, 
one in which mainstream culture absorbed movements considered radical in the 1960s.  See Bruce J. 
Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift In American Culture, Society, And Politics (New York: Da Capo 
Press, 2002); Bruce J. Schulman and Julian Zelizer, eds., Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative 
in the 1970s (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008); Philip Jenkins, Decade of Nightmares: 
The End of the Sixties and the Making of Eighties America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
New scholarship has emphasized the renewal of conservatism as the predominant force in national politics, 
describing it in local grassroots politics, the Washington bureaucracy, and the national economy.  See for 
example, Kenneth Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1987); Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing 
America's Politics (New York: Touchstone, 1980); Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the 
New American Right (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: 
Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); 
Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2007); James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (New York: 
Viking, 2004); Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the 
 33 
study of the energy crisis makes clear that the place of the United States in the world was 
not only a consequence of its own rising star.  American power also stood in the ability of 
policymakers to provide continuity for past linkages.  The most critical of these, cheap 
and plentiful energy, was fundamental to American prosperity and power in the first three 
decades after World War II.  The strength of the imperial linkage depended on the 
willingness of the oil producers to accept that continuity.  The following work is a story 
of how oil producers rejected continuity and how the United States sought to maintain it, 
moving through phases of indecision and acquiescence, but finally settling on a policy 
rooted in economic thought.   
 Telling the story in this way throws the high stakes of diplomacy in the 1970s 
into sharp relief.  Perhaps the best feature of recent histories of globalization is the 
emphasis on structural change in the international economy.  But by stressing process 
over agency, historians have obscured the role of individuals within national governments 
and international institutions.   Diplomacy was not submissive, reactionary, or 
immaterial.  Policymakers and diplomats in Washington, London, and New York, not to 
mention in Tehran, Riyadh, Caracas, Geneva, Tripoli, and Baghdad, shaped the energy 
crisis with their political and ideological gambles.  The recent movement of the 1970s 
from the realm of commentary to history has allowed scholars to reassess the period.  
Policymakers were forced, in the words of historian Charles Maier, to undertake a 
“fundamental rethinking of the economic and political axioms that had been taken for 
granted since the Second World War.”58  New beliefs emerged out of this rethinking.  
Foremost among them, according to the tenets of neoliberal diplomacy, was the notion 
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that free market competition would be the unfailing and exclusive remedy for 
international economic ills.   
The main point is the simplest: the significance of the energy crisis not only as a 
cauldron of ideas about international economy but as a moment of change in the second 
half of the twentieth century.  Permanent sovereignty and neoliberal diplomacy shaped, 
justified, and in the same instant presented powerful interpretations of the newly 
developing global system.  The emphasis on the ideological and material underpinnings 
of each, an evaluation of the links between power politics and ideas in the past.   The 
resulting narrative is one of intellectual and diplomatic forces that helped create the world 
in which we now live.   
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Prologue: Prelude to Crisis, 1939 - 1960 
In this scheme, it is Latin America’s position to act as part of the periphery of the world 
economic system, in the specific role of producing food and raw materials for the large 
industrial centers. 
       
Raúl Prebisch, 194959 
 
Rarely if ever, has the development of economics by its own force blazed the way to new 
perspectives....The major recastings of economic thought...were all responses to 
changing political conditions and opportunities. 
       
Gunnar Myrdal, 195760 
 
On a cold day in October 1947, the energy experts of the United States and Great Britain 
squared off in Washington, D.C.  The expertise at the negotiating table was impressive, 
the tension palpable.  Representing the United States were Walter Levy, a German 
émigré who tracked Axis oil shipments during the war, and John Loftus, the longtime 
director of the State Department’s Petroleum Division.  Heading the British delegation 
was Angus Beckett, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Power and the 
chair of the Oil Committee of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development from its inception until his retirement in 1973.61 
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The experts formed part of a trans-Atlantic planning project, an enormous 
bureaucracy with the official mission of nothing less than the design of the postwar 
international economy.  The ravages and dislocations of war had left the industrial world, 
particularly Western Europe, in ruins.  Economic and political vulnerabilities loomed 
large.  For many planners, an atomic-powered Cold War created near-apocalyptic 
anxiety.   Months earlier, U.S. President Harry Truman had shocked Congress with a 
$400 million aid request for Greece and Turkey.  The experts understood that the petition 
had been but a small down payment on the Western effort to stem the advance of 
communism. In June, U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall made public the European 
Recovery Act, a plan under which the United States would bankroll Western European 
reconstruction.62 
Energy was a vital subtext throughout. The two delegations shared a common 
objective, the secure control of the raw materials most critical to postwar prosperity. But 
discussions had stalled on how best to supply the energy needed to implement the 
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Marshall Plan.  Time was wasting; the proposal was due before the American Congress.  
In Beckett’s opinion, the Americans had held up matters by arguing that recovery should 
be stoked by European coal rather than petroleum.  The American fear, shared in the 
State Department and the White House, was that instability in the Middle East would 
limit western access to the massive oil deposits there.  A combustible mix of nationalism 
and imperialism, not to mention the economic drain of oil purchases on Europe’s scant 
dollar supplies, made German and Polish coal a safer bet.63  For Beckett, this attitude was 
a deal breaker.  He would not budge from his position that low-cost oil from the Persian 
Gulf would better fuel the economic recovery of his country, as well as of continental 
Europe and Japan.64 
Considerations beyond the control of the experts soon resolved the disagreement.  
As autumn turned to winter in 1947, the clash between the United States and  the Soviet 
Union reached a fever pitch.  Fears that Josef Stalin would use East German and Polish 
coal as a political lever finally convinced the Truman administration that Middle Eastern 
oil presented the best option for industrial recovery.  Over 10 percent of the total aid 
extended under the Marshall Plan would finance imports of oil from American oil 
companies to Europe between 1947 and 1952. The aid helped preserve markets for the 
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multinational companies and shape the relations between the oil-consuming and oil-
producing countries.65 
A dominant concern drove the oil experts’ discussion: the link between 
international politics and oil production was a potentially explosive one.  The United 
States used a corporatist policy to wet the fuse, separating questions of international 
politics from economic concerns.  The period marked by this foreign policy, the postwar 
petroleum order, lasted approximately twenty years.   
 Conflicts over the international economy during those two decades did not 
revolve solely around the battle between capitalism and communism.  The issue of the 
place of former colonies and underdeveloped nations challenged the viability of the 
postwar structure envisioned by planners such as Loftus, Levy, and Beckett.  Third World 
economic nationalism emphasizing permanent sovereignty over natural resources yoked 
international politics and economics together more and more tightly.  By 1960, 
permanent sovereignty would become a major tenet of post-war anti-colonialism.  The 
belief that permanent sovereignty was an inherent national right united Third World 
leaders, including the founding members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC).   
WORLD WAR II AND ENERGY SECURITY, 1939-1952 
This discussion of permanent sovereignty does not attempt to recount the details of 
challenges to energy security in the 1950s, which have been told many times elsewhere.  
Rather, the objective here is to explain how permanent became the foundation of an 
alternative vision for the international political economy, essential to Third World 
leaders’ conception of a post-imperial age.   
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To understand the movement of economic thought across Third World political 
culture, it is necessary to delineate the broad transformations in the international 
economy during and after World War II, especially those concerning oil.  During the war, 
American policymakers became convinced that the security of the United States 
depended on keeping the world’s oil supplies under Allied control.  As the Cold War 
commenced and the first wave of decolonization began to crest, Middle Eastern oil 
became crucial to Western economic growth, the containment of the Soviet Union, and 
the control of nationalism.  The policy guidelines set down in the Roosevelt and Truman 
administrations created a postwar petroleum order that had considerable staying power.   
U.S. government interests in foreign oil were limited prior to its entry into World 
War II.  High levels of domestic production had more than covered American needs for 
the previous 75 years. The United States had been the undisputed global leader in 
production, supplying between 60 and 70 percent of worldwide demand, almost 
exclusively from indigenous deposits.  To be certain, the issue of foreign oil drew the 
attention of officials at particular junctures.  During World War I, military officers 
recognized the importance of foreign oil for wartime needs.  Foreign supply became a 
focal point immediately afterwards, when U.S. Geological Survey predicted the imminent 
depletion of domestic sources.  At the same time, oil executives and State Department 
officials worried over British efforts to exclude American companies from impressive 
new fields in the Dutch East Indies and the Middle East.66 
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The aggressive policy gave British companies 50 percent of the world’s proven 
reserves. For American oilmen, British actions smacked of the worst kind of imperialism. 
Most galling, British officials had signed the San Remo Agreement with the French in 
1920, dividing between themselves the preeminent oil areas of Mesopotamia and the 
Balkans and closing the regions off to companies from other nations.67 The actions 
breached the Open Door policy and flouted the larger Wilsonian principles of economic 
internationalism.  Executives blamed the U.S. government for failing to provide 
diplomatic support in the face of British verve.  In an argument that would become 
familiar, they linked national security to the expansion of American oil holdings abroad.68 
 Domestic events soon overtook these international concerns.  The fear of scarcity 
disappeared as unbridled competition led to the discovery of new fields in Texas, 
California, and Oklahoma, confirming the United States as the global production leader.69  
Furthermore, pressure by the U.S. State and Commerce Departments helped American 
companies gain concessionary positions in the Middle East and Dutch East Indies in the 
1930s.70  Thus, the New Dealers in charge of American oil policy faced the problem of a 
glut rather than a shortage, as oil from the American Southwest, Venezuela, Mexico, 
Russia, and Iraq flooded world markets and drove prices below production costs.  In the 
national and international contexts of economic depression and industrial collapse, 
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policymakers and businessmen worked to slow production to a profitable level, although 
they rarely agreed on how to do so.71 
Internationally and nationally, business competitors eventually found a common 
solution to the problem of competition.  They bonded together into cartel arrangements to 
lower production and control marketing.  The relative success of the 1928 Achnacarry 
Agreement—in which Shell, Anglo-Persian, and Jersey Standard settled terms that 
stabilized the price of oil in the international market—was soon copied by the smaller oil 
companies within the United States.72  The Interstate Oil Compact of 1935 vested 
authority over oil production with state agencies, particularly the Texas and Louisiana 
Railroad Commissions.  Working closely with the American Petroleum Institute, the 
commissions consolidated a public-private, corporatist system by which the industry 
evaded federal anti-trust regulations and protected the markets from price-gouging 
surpluses.73 
Despite its growing importance as a fuel in the interwar years, foreign oil did not 
become a national security concern for Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his closest 
advisers until the outbreak of hostilities.  Oil came to their attention for one reason: it was 
critical to fighting and winning the war.  Hitler’s plan to militarize Germany included the 
national conversion from a coal-based to petroleum economy.  The 1941 invasion of the 
Soviet Union owed much of its motivation in great part to Germany’s need to secure the 
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petroleum of the Ukraine, Romania, and the Caucasus.74  Similarly, Japanese militarists’ 
drive to free their country from its dependence on western companies for petroleum was a 
basic motive for the takeover of Indonesian oil fields and the attack on the United 
States.75  To defeat the Axis, the United States and its allies needed to send the spare 
capacity of the Western Hemisphere, especially from the southwest United States and the 
Caribbean, to forces in Europe and Asia.   To meet military needs, the Roosevelt 
administration diverted civilian consumption, built new pipelines, redirected tankers from 
the East Coast to England, and defended those tankers from Germany’s deadly U-boat 
campaign in the North Atlantic.76 
Control over oil production outside the Western Hemisphere became a major 
strategic imperative after March 1941, when a pro-Axis military junta seized power in 
Iraq.  The Roosevelt administration began to share its allies’ trepidation that the Axis 
could take over the Middle East. If this happened, Japan and Germany would be united 
along Asia’s southern rim, with dreadful consequences.  British oil concessions in Iran, 
Iraq, and Kuwait, as well as the great refinery at Abadan, provided the war effort with 
vital products.  Not only would the Axis gain control of the enormous oil reserves of the 
Persian Gulf, it would also seal off the critical supply route to the Soviet Union and cut 
British lines of imperial communications.77   
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The Allied powers undertook two major initiatives to prevent the Axis from 
making further gains, thus keeping the upper hand in the Middle East.  First, the 
Americans, British, and Soviets occupied Iran, which was dangerously close to aligning 
itself with Germany.  Second, the Roosevelt administration declared Saudi Arabia 
eligible for Lend-Lease aid.   
Wartime events in Saudi Arabia and Iran foreshadowed the conflicts between 
nationalism, colonialism, and oil production that the postwar petroleum order would need 
to allay.  Concerned about the German presence, Great Britain and the Soviet Union 
invaded Iran on August 25, 1941.  Muhammad Reza Pahlavi replaced his exiled father as 
Shah.  Upon entering the war, the United States joined the USSR and Britain in the 
occupation.  Iranian leaders feared of a joint Anglo-Soviet imperial dismemberment and 
pushed for greater American influence.  An independent Iran was in the interest of the 
United States and policymakers readily complied, declaring Iran eligible for Lend-Lease 
aid on March 10, 1942.78 The American presence grew considerably in the following 
three years, which sharply increased tension between the United States and the other 
occupiers.  The Soviet Union was particularly alarmed in 1944 when the State 
Department recommended that the Iranian government hire American petroleum 
consultants as the primary advisers on the granting of concessions.79   
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British leaders also expressed concern.  Britain had successfully undermined 
American company attempts to gain concessions in Iran in 1920, 1937, and 1940.  Now it 
appeared that the growing American presence would upset the international petroleum 
status quo. In response to concern about “the oil question” expressed by Winston 
Churchill, Roosevelt wrote the prime minister in March 1944 to express his “assurances 
that we are not making sheep’s eyes at your oil fields in Iraq or Iran.”  Churchill thanked 
Roosevelt and, continuing the ovine metaphor, promised in turn not “to horn in upon your 
interests or property in Saudi Arabia.”80 
The Roosevelt administration had no intention of allowing the British to do so, 
and also declared Saudi Arabia eligible for Lend-Lease aid in 1943.81  The vast extent of 
Saudi oil reserves was familiar to strategic planners and soon would be considered “the 
greatest single prize in all history” by one analyst.82  The nascent commercial production 
of what would become the Arabian American Company (Aramco), a joint initiative of 
Chevron and Texaco, had only begun in 1939.  Production virtually ceased because of the 
war.  The owners of Aramco approached the Roosevelt administration in 1941 with a 
proposed $6 million loan for the cash-strapped Saudi monarchy.  Roosevelt agreed but 
channeled the loan through the British government for political reasons.  Aramco 
executives, though thankful, feared that the British would use their loan to gain control of 
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the Saudi concession.83  State Department officials agreed, and in February 1943 
Roosevelt authorized direct Lend-Lease aid to the kingdom. Over the next two years, the 
U.S. government supplied $18 million of goods and services to the Saudi monarchy.  
Saudi oil began flowing to the Allied cause by 1944, even as the effort to choke off 
German and Japanese oil supplies found success.84 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull condensed the positions of Iran and Saudi Arabia 
for President Franklin D. Roosevelt in August 1943.  American diplomacy needed to 
counteract historical and contemporary British and Soviet aspirations to control Iran, Hull 
told Roosevelt. “From a more directly selfish point of view, it is to our interest that no 
great power be established on the Persian Gulf opposite the important American 
petroleum development in Saudi Arabia,” he continued.85   
For the Roosevelt administration and its successors, international oil was 
inextricably linked to the question of imperialism and international corporations.  
American interest in the Persian Gulf contradicted traditional national positions regarding 
imperialism and business cartels.  Roosevelt himself had long been a staunch anti-
imperialist and, like many others, had decried the anti-Wilsonian agreements that had 
become pervasive in the interwar era.  “As a people, as a country, we’re opposed to 
imperialism—we can’t stomach it,” he told Winston Churchill over dinner in 1942.86  The 
president used anti-imperial imagery to emphasize the uniqueness of the American 
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relationship with Saudi Arabia in 1945, telling Ibn Saud during their famous meeting in 
the Great Bitter Lake that “the English...work and sacrifice to bring freedom and 
prosperity to the world, but on the condition that it be brought by them and marked Made 
in Britain.”87 
Roosevelt found international business cartels as anathematic as imperialism and 
described them in similar terms.  “During the past half century, the United States has 
developed a tradition in opposition to private monopolies,” he wrote to Cordell Hull.  
“The Sherman and Clayton Acts have become as much a part of the American way of life 
as the due clause of Constitution.”  Identifying cartels in the hands of the Nazis as 
“governmental instrumentalities to achieve political ends,” Roosevelt further argued that 
“the defeat of the Nazis will have to be followed by the eradication of these weapons of 
economic warfare....Cartel practices which restrict the free flow of goods in foreign 
commerce will have to be curbed.”88 
On both counts, corporate cartels and imperialism, Roosevelt and his successor, 
Harry Truman, backed away in practice from what they preached.  Roosevelt gradually 
began to see the pragmatic benefits of empire as the Allies planned for the postwar 
world.89  Leaders of liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East quickly 
became disenchanted with the Roosevelt and Truman administrations’ decision not to 
uphold the much-touted revolutionary nationalist principles of the United States.90  In an 
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understudied aspect of this broader political pattern, the Roosevelt and Truman 
administrations shared the British, French, and Dutch belief that decolonization could not 
be permitted to upset the utilization of colonial raw materials for the reconstruction of 
Europe.91 
Continued access to those materials would be achieved by a variety of corporate 
relationships, which often moved along imperial lines.  Issues of concern to the less 
developed territories were muted by problems western policymakers believed to be of 
greater importance.   The economic role of the “new” countries and other so-called 
“backward areas” was a shared assumption, second fiddle to the larger questions of the 
Cold War.  American officials in particular understood that the great majority of the raw 
materials necessary for reconstructing European industrial capacity would come from 
what would soon be called the Third World.92  The assumption was pro forma.  The 
enabling legislation of the Marshall Plan included specific language supporting the goal 
of conserving western hemisphere resources by encouraging the raw material 
development of these countries. The language was hardly debated.93  The containment of 
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communism included the strategy of aligning the Western European, American, and 
Japanese industrial effort with the natural resources from less-developed areas.94 
At the same time, a “politics of productivity” became axiomatic to the Western 
sense of security.  Economic revitalization and the containment of communism relied on 
economic growth and increases in standards of living.95  Cheap and accessible energy 
supplies would drive that sense of well-being.  Thus, the recovery of the international 
economy and the security of the United States and its Cold War allies depended 
increasingly on access to the oil of the Middle East.  “Enough oil within our certain grasp 
seemed ardently necessary to greatness and independence in the twentieth century,” 
wrote historian and State Department adviser Herbert Feis in 1946.96 
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That year, planners projected that by 1951 Western Europe would be importing 
80 percent of its oil from the Middle East.  The prediction was nearly correct.  By 1953, 
NATO countries obtained about 75 percent of their oil from the Persian Gulf.97  Some 
scholars have described Marshall Plan aid as expediting the political process of 
decolonization, but it also shaped an international political economy in which raw 
material producers and industrial nations had specific roles.98  The primary economic 
position of the Third World was to serve as the source of raw materials for European and 
Japanese reconstruction.99     
World War II and the nascent Cold War had transformed American strategic 
thinking, leading to a more expansive conception of national security.  In an era also 
marked by decolonization and the emergence of national liberation movements, the task 
of restoring capitalism involved upholding Western European and Japanese economic 
growth.  Prosperity was a tool to prevent the ideological divisions that led to the war, as 
well as the ascendance of groups hostile to capitalism or sympathetic to the Soviet Union.   
Yet Western Europe and Japan lacked the financial resources needed for reconstruction.  
An expansion of American trade and investment in the Third World would build on the 
temporary relief provided by the Marshall Plan.  American dollars would flow to the 
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Third World through investment and imports of raw materials.  Western Europe and 
Japan would engage in trade, investment, and taxation to obtain these dollars.100 
The treatment of oil-producing countries provides one example of the 
predominance of European and Japanese reconstruction in the American vision of 
national security.  The understanding shaped the posture of the United States toward the 
developing countries after the war.101  Oil produced in Saudi Arabia and Iran—not to 
mention in Iraq, Kuwait, and the Trucial sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf—was crucial to 
the postwar recovery of Europe.  Control over Middle Eastern oil was also necessary to 
keep oil prices low and to increase the profits of the big American oil companies that 
dominated the world oil market.   
The United States decided on a corporatist structure to secure the flow of oil, by 
which the largest multinational companies would ensure energy security.102 By the early 
1950s, five American companies—Socony-Vacuum (later Mobil), Standard Oil of 
California (Chevron), Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon), the Texas Company 
(Texaco), and Gulf—along with the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later 
British Petroleum), and Royal Dutch/Shell controlled over 90 percent of oil reserves 
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outside of the United States, Mexico, and the Communist countries.  The same companies 
accounted for nearly 90 percent of world oil production, owned almost 75 percent of 
world oil refining capacity, and provided about 90 percent of the oil traded in 
international markets.  The joint ventures of the companies, with the cooperation of their 
home governments, exercised an informal but strict control over the world oil economy, 
maintaining prices at highly profitable levels.103 
To fuel what George Kennan called in 1932 “the romance of economic 
development,” the West relied on oil from the Middle East and raw materials from other 
less-developed regions, including colonies and former colonies.104  The supply of these 
materials reinforced the alignment envisioned by the economic planners of the day, 
between what Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch would soon term the “center” and the 
“periphery.” 
A CENTER AND A PERIPHERY 
As the postwar petroleum order became a foundation of the international 
economy, a new school of thought gained popularity among the leaders of non-
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industrialized nations, new nations, and anti-colonial groups in Africa, Asia, Latin 
America, and the Middle East.   The link between international politics and economics 
moved in the opposite direction of the corporatism of the postwar petroleum order, which 
sought to separate political problems from economic interests.  If American policymakers 
took as given that these areas would serve as the sources of low-cost raw materials, the 
planned landscape preoccupied actors in what historian Vijay Prashad calls the “darker 
nations.”105  In the early 1950s, a transnational cluster of Third World elites began to 
argue that the international economy was steeped in a legacy of territorial and 
commercial expansion of imperial powers at the expense of less powerful and ethnically 
different peoples.  The group found a voice in Raúl Prebisch, an Argentine central banker 
employed by the United Nations.  In the following decade, Prebisch’s economic thought 
became intimately linked to nationalist challenges to the postwar petroleum order in Iran 
and Egypt.106   
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UN action was central to the dissemination of Prebisch’s economic ideas into the 
international community.107  A relatively well-known economist, Prebisch first refused 
and then accepted an offer to direct the new UN Economic Commission for Latin 
America in 1948.  His 1949 paper for the first conference of the commission, “The 
Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems,” distilled an 
economic critique of the continuity of imperial economics.108  Prebisch gave a full 
exposition of what became known as the doctrine of unequal exchange, or the terms of 
trade thesis.109  Prebisch argued that the trade relationship between industrial nations and 
the producers of raw materials was characterized by inequality.  The relative price of raw 
materials vis-à-vis finished products, their terms of trade, were too low to provide for 
economic growth in Latin America.110   
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This was just the beginning for Prebisch.  He would continue to promote the 
terms of trade thesis in a series of books, pamphlets, and articles that reached a crescendo 
with the 1964 founding of the United Nations’ Conference on Trade and Development.  
From the publication of “The Problems of Economic Development” to a global 
application of his Latin American thesis, Prebisch argued that imperialism bequeathed an 
international economy stacked against the producers of raw materials.111 
Many others joined him.  Prebisch’s initial analysis was influential for a number 
of reasons.  Prebisch used the stark terms of “center” and “periphery” in a way that 
connected international economics with the politics of decolonization.  Others quickly 
attached importance to the new use of the terms, and they soon became standard fare for 
discussions about the structural inequality of the international political economy.112  
Prebisch’s critique also was readily available and persuasive for the leaders of anti-
colonial movements, new nations, and the other members of Prebisch’s “periphery.”  The 
recent past of Latin America, particularly Argengina, informed Prebisch’s thinking.113   
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The example may have been narrowly national, but mimeographs of Prebisch’s analysis 
were translated into English and French, reprinted in journals, and distributed to the 
governments of new nations by the UN Department of Economic Affairs.114   
Leaders across Prebisch’s periphery were receptive to his analysis, which was 
broad enough to cover specific terms of trade for England between 1873 and 1938.   The 
application of the doctrine of unequal exchange also made sense for other areas of the 
world.  In the expanded analysis, the American, French, Dutch, Belgian, and Japanese 
empires had joined the British in concentrating most of the resources of the less-
developed world in non-local hands.  The argument would become the economic basis 
for calls against “neo-colonialism” by the end of the decade.115  A new subaltern elite—
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the leaders of the nations of the Third World, many newly-independent—began to 
characterize themselves in terms of their peripheral economic position.    
Prebisch himself implied the broader nature of the Latin American experience 
through his explicit contradiction of the classical theory of comparative advantage.  
Taking a position against what he considered as the “false universality” shared by Smith, 
Ricardo, Mill, Marshall, Keynes, and others, Prebisch identified international terms of 
trade favoring technological advancement and industrial productivity of the nations of the 
center.116  The terms of trade thus forged a potent legacy in which the value of raw 
materials progressively declined as productivity rose.117  The spatial distinction between 
the center and the periphery and the statistical analysis of the prices of raw materials and 
finished goods expressed this dichotomy forcefully.   
The economic argument had obvious political implications.  A plurality of the 
world’s nations, colonies and territories, and aspiring nations had been left with 
economies that relied on the sale of raw materials and the import of finished goods.  The 
structural imbalance led formerly colonial and underdeveloped countries to export their 
raw materials at a relatively low price.  Thus, the industrial world’s wealth had less to do 
with the benefits derived from the expansion of commerce than with the inequitable 
structure of that commerce.   In this way, Prebisch designated the wealth of the rich 
countries and the poverty of the poor areas as corollaries to imperialism.  Prebisch 
labeled the industrial nations with the double-entendre los grandes paises, implying 
power as well as size.  The message was clear.  If the collective benefits of trade 
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gradually reached throughout the industrial world, they did not “extend into the periphery 
of the world economy.”118  The center continued to dominate international economic 
relations even if its empires had begun to dissolve.  
The emphasis on continuity in the international economy helped give birth to a 
new type of international politics.  What mattered most after political liberation from 
empire was economic liberation from imperialistic structures.  Prebisch believed that his 
argument had moral implications.  “The benefits of the development of productivity have 
not arrived to the periphery at a comparable level,” he wrote trenchantly.  “From there 
come the differences, so accentuated, in the quality of life of the masses of those 
countries and these, and the notorious discrepancy between their respective forces of 
capitalization.”119  The terms of trade question was more than an economic or even 
political issue; it was an ethical appeal to reconsider an international economy that had 
been unfairly tilted in favor of developed nations by dint of the imperial past.   
The moral invocation had another consequence, less recognized but no less 
significant.  Prebisch stressed the shared economic condition of the peripheral areas, 
which otherwise had disparate political and territorial experiences.  The periphery 
included colonies, former colonies, and “poor” nations who had long been nominally 
independent.  Thus, the question of economic liberation became a more inclusive 
category, broadening the definition of decolonization.   
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Prebisch’s analysis was a description not only of a structural deficiency but also 
of ways to correct that deficiency.   The conclusion of Prebisch’s critique thus contained 
a broad policy recommendation.  To become “modern,” the poor nations needed to move 
from the production of raw materials to the production of industrial goods.120  To do so, 
an infusion of capital was necessary.  Prebisch proposed a corrective type of nationalist 
economics to draw in capital—the employment of national sovereignty to gain control 
over the production, marketing, and pricing of natural resources.  “Permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources” became a fundamental platform for many Third World groups in 
a new international landscape marked by decolonization.  Different people would amend 
the idea in future years, but its core assumption remained the same.  Prebisch and other 
development economists suggested various strategies to employ permanent sovereignty 
for the sake of national development, all based in the basic premise of natural resource 
control.  Policies included the creation of commodity cartels to set production levels and 
prices, as well as tariff and subsidy mechanisms and the creation of regional development 
agreements.   
The policy prescriptions were in conflict with the major development trend of the 
era, modernization theory.  To be sure, Third World development economists agreed with 
the basic premise of the mainstream view in the United States and Western Europe.  
Capital investment was necessary for the transfer of technological prowess, increased 
economic production, and greater social benefits.  But Third World economists disagreed 
with modernization theorists on a principle question.  Where would this money come 
from? Whereas modernization theorists emphasized foreign capital in the form of aid and 
investment, many in the developing world saw this as risking a reprisal of imperialism.  
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Rather than rely unduly on foreign sources, Prebisch and other development economists 
argued for nationalist policies to create indigenous capital.  The amount of money 
required for national development, moreover, needed to be greater than the amount 
modernization theorists predicted was necessary for “takeoff.”121 
The disagreement about the source and amount of capital was steeped in the fact 
that Third World thinking originated from the experience and the interest of the global 
periphery.  The terms of trade thesis became bound up with attempts to use the 
international political equality inherent in decolonization and national self-determination 
to forge economic equality.  The dispute between Third World development economists 
and modernization theorists was more than a debate over capital.  It was an argument 
about the shape of the post-colonial political economy.  The challenge confronting the 
Third World, Prebisch and others held, was intractable without acknowledging the 
vestigial impact of colonial rule and imperial economic networks.122  Modernization 
theory, as scholars have suggested, placed the onus for development elsewhere, on 
changing the “backwards cultures” of “traditional societies.”  Modernization theorists 
banished the histories of colonialism and unequal exchange, which Third World 
economists found central, from their economic analysis.   
In an era characterized by rapid political change, different ideas about the shape 
of the postwar economy battled for primacy, and economists often coopted each others’ 
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ideas.123  Arguments about the injurious effects of the imperial imprint and the beneficial 
effect of permanent sovereignty quickly intensified.  Not all agreed about either the 
imprint or the effect.  Influential academic interlocutors opposed Prebisch’s terms of 
trade thesis.   Among professional economists, Jacob Viner, Simon Kuznets, and 
Gottfried Haberlerl questioned the empirical validity of Prebisch’s work.  Viner even 
dismissed Prebisch’s “manifesto” as a set of “malignant fantasies, distorted historical 
conjecture and simplistic hypotheses.”124  
Others took a further stape and conflated Prebisch’s critique with Marxism.  
Similar ideas to those posed by Prebisch, of course, had long been present in Marxist 
thought on finance capitalism.125  There exists an affinity between Prebisch’s emphasis 
on unequal exchange and the popular Marxism-Leninism of the period, especially the 
new emphasis on neo-colonialism.  Both shared the premise that structural imbalances 
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characterized the international political economy.  Drawing too close a comparison, 
though, would attribute ideas to Prebisch that he did not hold.126   
That the terms of trade thesis engendered a counter-polemic alludes to its 
importance.  The reception of Prebisch’s ideas, though, was generally positive; the 
Rockefeller Foundation even gave some funding to Economic Commission for Latin 
America, notably supporting the research of the Brazilian economist Celso Furtado.127   
The terms of trade thesis pushed against an open door in other ways.  Many western 
observers agreed with the basic proposition linking the economic malaise of the Third 
World to vestiges of imperialism.  Historians joined other scholars in finding no difficulty 
accepting the inherited imperial past and in fitting the avowedly anti-colonial United 
States for imperial garb.  A new theory of “informal imperialism,” supported by a 
generation of revisionist scholars writing American diplomatic history in the 1950s and 
beyond, added legitimacy to this position, as did the creation of the new subfield of 
“economic development.”128  The terms of trade thesis found support among a number of 
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development economists, including Hans Singer, Hollis Chenery, Ragnar Nurske, and 
Gunnar Myrdal.129 
From this perspective, American policy embedded the colonial character of the 
international political economy, rather than eroding it. The point here is not to note 
theoretical and empirical flaws or insights of Prebisch’s scheme, but to demonstrate that 
his ideas reflected beliefs held by many.   Whether endorsed or opposed, the terms of 
trade thesis caused considerable intellectual excitement.  The interest in the terms of trade 
theory was also intrinsically political, as events in Iran would soon demonstrate. 
IRAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS  
Levy, Loftus, and Beckett determined the shape of the international economy and 
Prebisch critiqued it.  For the United States and its industrialized allies, the Cold War had 
begun.  For the Third World, economic inequality marred the advent of decolonization.  
The U.S. government had employed a corporatist strategy to separate these political 
strands from the economic imperative of oil production.  The terms of trade thesis sought 
to tie economics and politics back together.    
Nowhere were they already more intertwined than in Iran.  Upon the Soviet-
British occupation in 1942, Josef Stalin and Winston Churchill signed a treaty pledging to 
withdraw all occupying armies at an unspecified time after the war.  When the United 
States joined the occupation, Franklin Roosevelt promised American forces would depart 
as well.  After a series of conferences in 1945, all three powers agreed to leave Iran 
exactly six months after the Japanese surrender.  By the deadline on March 2, 1946, 
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British and American troops had departed.  Citing threats to Soviet security, Stalin 
declared that the Red Army would remain in the northern province of Azerbaijan.  
Members of the communist Tudeh Party proclaimed Azerbaijan a People’s Republic, 
Moscow began to arm local militias, and the Army announced it would prevent Iranian 
soldiers from entering the province.  The lengthened occupation confirmed suspicions in 
many American quarters that the Soviet Union had designs on Iranian oil.130 
Crisis was averted when the Iranian prime minister, Ahmad Qavam, traveled to 
Moscow and negotiated a withdrawal.  Still, Soviet actions signified that Iran and its oil 
production, controlled by the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, had become 
implanted in the budding Cold War rivalry. Half a decade later, a longstanding nationalist 
opponent of the company, Muhammad Mossadegh, became prime minister.  Mossadegh 
pushed a law through the Iranian parliament, the Majlis, nationalizing Anglo-Iranian’s 
assets in April 1951.  The company contested the validity of the action and continued its 
operations in oil fields and at the Abadan refinery.  After the Iranian government forced 
Anglo-Iranian workers from the fields, the British Foreign Office, the American State 
Department, and the multinational oil companies blocked Iranian oil products from 
international markets.  With the help of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Mossadegh 
government was toppled in 1953.131 
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The central players in this event—executives of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
and top officials from Iran, the United States, and the United Kingdom—engaged in an 
early round of what became a perpetual combat over the practical limits of permanent 
sovereignty.  Iran’s nationalization ended with the replacement of Mossadegh and the 
retrenchment of the postwar petroleum order, but the idea of permanent sovereignty 
gained a central place in broader debates over the international political economy.  The 
prevalence of the anti-imperial economic narrative revealed a range of international 
groups in support of Iran.   
As the Anglo-Iranian question moved to the forefront of international concern, the 
formulation of permanent sovereignty became influential in Third World political culture.  
While no evidence exists that Mossadegh read Prebisch’s paper, his decision to 
nationalize Iranian oil was couched in similar language and buoyed Prebisch’s thesis.  
When Mossadegh brought his case to the UN Security Council, the notion of permanent 
sovereignty ignited a larger and more far-reaching discussion about what the UN 
Economic and Social Council termed “economic self-determination.”  The Iranian crisis 
led directly to a UN declaration of “permanent sovereignty over natural resources” as a 
fundamental right of states in the international community. 
Permanent sovereignty became part of a sensational international debate.  As this 
occurred, the economic corrective of permanent sovereignty assumed a strident 
ideological tone.  More than that, it became a focal point for Third World demands, a 
political tool with multiple purposes in the post-colonial world.  Permanent sovereignty 
cultivated Third World solidarity and encouraged national and international projects to 
redress past and current economic injustices, perceived and real. 
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Mossadegh held a deep-seated enmity toward the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.132   
As a member of the Majlis during the 1946 crisis, the 64-year-old had argued against 
increased Soviet and American petroleum exploration.133  The same year, he supported oil 
workers after violent protests broke out at Anglo-Iranian’s Abadan refinery.  In 1947, he 
was among the legislators who pushed through a law forbidding the granting of further 
concessions to foreign companies and directing the government to renegotiate Anglo-
Iranian’s 1933 concession.  In 1949, Anglo-Iranian offered Iran a contract known as the 
Supplemental Agreement. The contract guaranteed that annual royalty payments would 
not drop below £4 million, reduced the area in which Anglo-Iranian would drill, and 
pledged to train Iranians for administrative positions.  All this was in return for an 
extension of the concession for another 60 years.  Iranian officials invited Anglo-Iranian 
to negotiate the contract, but were imperiously told the offer was final.  The Shah of Iran 
had recently survived an assassination attempt and understood that despite rising 
nationalist feeling he needed to accept the British offer to maintain revenues.  His cabinet 
did so and then sent it on to the Majlis.134 
Nationalist members of the Majlis, including Mossadegh, denounced the 
Supplemental Agreement. Instead, they demanded that Anglo-Iranian begin splitting its 
profits with Iran on a fifty-fifty basis, as American oil companies did in Saudi Arabia and 
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Venezuela.  The legislative term ended before a vote could be taken.135  Accusations of 
royal bribery and fraud tainted the following elections.  Mossadegh created a new 
political party, the National Front, and successfully staged a sit-in forcing the Shah to call 
new elections.  Mossadegh was elected prime minister.  He began to work to prevent 
parliamentary approval of the Supplemental Agreement and called for the establishment 
of an oil committee.   The Majlis then elected him as the committee’s chair.  The director 
of Iran’s petroleum institute, Manucher Farmanfarmaian, described how Mossadegh 
dominated the committee meetings: “Mossadegh did not care about dollars and cents or 
numbers of barrels per day.  He saw the basic issue as one of national sovereignty.  Iran’s 
sovereignty was being undercut by a company that sacrificed Iranian lives for British 
interests.”136 
Mossadegh’s feelings on sovereignty were broadly shared within Iran.  Anglo-
Iranian’s highest-ranking Iranian employee, Mostafa Fateh, wrote a 23-page letter to a 
member of the company’s board of directors.  The company needed to recognize that “the 
awakening nationalism and political consciousness of the people of Asia” necessitated 
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compromise.137  At a rally for Mossadegh’s National Front party, the Ayatollah Kashani 
read a fatwa condemning the Shah’s government for selling Iran’s “birthright” to infidels.   
Three months later, the oil committee recommended that the Majlis nationalize Anglo-
Iranian.  Soon after, the British government sent warships to the coast off the Abadan 
refinery, where a series of riots had left six Iranians and three British dead.138  In April, 
the Majlis unanimously approved legislation to implement the nationalization, including 
provisions to audit of the company and weigh the claims for compensation.  In May, the 
Shah signed the measure into law.139 
Mossadegh seemed to have reached his goal of increasing Iran’s control over its 
oil industry. The British accused the Iranian government of stealing their property and 
demanded that the International Court of Justice arbitrate the dispute.  Mossadegh 
rejected both the accusation and the demand.  He held that the court did not have 
jurisdiction over a domestic issue.140  Anglo-Iranian then sent a negotiating team to 
Tehran with a proposal that recognized the principle of nationalization and agreed to 
market oil on a fifty-fifty basis.  Mossadegh rejected the proposal.141  Anglo-Iranian—
supported by the British and American governments, as well as other multinational oil 
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companies—announced that it would sue any tankers carrying Iranian oil. The legal 
threat was remarkably effective and forced Iranian oil production down by 90 percent.142 
It was clear that the boycott would devastate the Iranian economy.  The 
multinational oil companies increased production in Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia to 
offset Anglo-Iranian’s loss.  The British pressed their advantage.  In June 1951, the 
British ambassador to the United Nations, Gladwyn Jebb, asserted that Iranian oil 
covered under the concession was “clearly the legal property of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company.”  The general manager at the Abadan refinery, Eric Drake, refused to open 
company books for Mehdi Barzagan, the managing director of the new National Iranian 
Oil Company.  Barzagan then threatened to have Drake arrested for sabotage.  Drake took 
the company accounts and crossed the Shatt-al-Arab to an office in Basra, Iraq.  From 
there he continued to refuse the demand for receipts.143 
The British referred the dispute to the UN Security Council in September 1951.  
Mossadegh himself travelled to New York to present the Iranian case.144   At the Security 
Council meeting, Mossadegh explained the importance of the nationalization in the 
broader terms of decolonization and self-determination: 
 
It is gratifying to see that the European powers have respected the legitimate 
aspiration of the people of India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and others who had 
struggled for the right to enter the family of nations on terms of freedom and 
complete equality.... Iran demands just that right. It expects this exalted 
international tribunal and the great Powers to help it, too, to recover its economic 
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independence, to achieve the social prosperity of its people, and thus to affirm its 
political independence.145 
For political independence to be real, economic independence needed to follow.  On 
October 22, Mossadegh left New York for Washington.  His train stopped in 
Philadelphia, where he lectured a 200-person crowd in Independence Square on the 
similarities between the Iranian nationalization and the idealism that led to the American 
Revolution.146 
Mossadegh’s negotiating position was similar to his public stance, especially in 
terms of the tight connection he drew between political and economic independence.  
Mossadegh held over 80 hours of talks on his U.S. trip with George McGhee, the former 
Oxford student and Texas oilman who was the State Department’s assistant secretary for 
Near East Affairs.  McGhee tried to make it clear that the U.S. sought a compromise 
between the British and Iranian positions.  However, the State Department could not 
accept nationalization because “it would set a dangerous precedent, which would be 
damaging to all oil concessions of the U.S. and other oil companies around the world.”  
The line of reasoning, steeped in the national security thought of the Cold War and the 
corporatist structure of the postwar petroleum order, failed to convince the Iranian prime 
minister to abandon his non-negotiable position on permanent sovereignty.147 
The problem of Iranian oil was symptomatic of a larger global imbalance for 
Mossadegh.  His position lined up neatly with Prebisch’s argument about terms of trade 
and the national right to employ permanent sovereignty.  As a crisis of immense 
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proportions, the nationalization of Anglo-Iranian had the effect of linking these ideas.148  
Anti-colonial leaders supported Mossadegh’s plight.  In the Security Council, Yugoslavia 
and India commiserated with the Iranian argument that the conflict between the company 
and the government should fall under domestic jurisdiction.149  At the same time, 
Mossadegh and his international supporters bestowed a moral and curative connotation 
on permanent sovereignty.  The economic dangers of nationalization were secondary to 
the establishment of political rights.  Thus, like Prebisch, Mossadegh abandoned the 
broader separation of economics and politics that stood at the center of postwar American 
diplomacy. 
The question of the Iranian nationalization was an international one. The U.S. 
State Department expressed concern that the nationalization created a dangerous 
precedent threatening concessions in other oil-producing countries.  In 1951, while 
Mossadegh was in New York at the Security Council, reports began to emerge from 
Cairo that a bill soon to be introduced in the Egyptian parliament would call for the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal Company.150  “[T]he Iranian move for the 
nationalization of oil induced extremists in Egypt to demand, in like manner, not only the 
immediate abrogation of the Treaty but also the nationalization of the Suez Canal,” the 
professor of Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins, Majid Khadduri, wrote in 1951.151 
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In 1952, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution declaring that “the right of 
peoples free to use and exploit their national wealth and resources is inherent in their 
sovereignty.”152  The timing of the declaration meant to demonstrate the international 
legitimacy of the Iranian nationalization.  The resolution began with a joint proposal by 
Iran and Bolivia, where the revolutionary government had just nationalized mining 
industries, in the Economic and Financial Committee of the General Assembly.153  
“Intended to promote nationalization of resources in less developed countries,” according 
to one international lawyer, the proposal moved “contrary to the views of the United 
States and other countries that sought to protect the rights of the private investor.”  Over 
American opposition, 31 states supported the resolution.  The president of the New York 
Stock Exchange lamented that the UN had “serve[d] notice on investors everywhere that 
rights of long standing will no longer be protected.”  Likewise, the Guarantee Trust 
Company responded that the resolution “deprecates any action by a member state to 
uphold the rights of its nationals against the confiscation of investments made in good 
faith.”154 
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The General Assembly resolution explicitly stated that “the right of peoples freely 
to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources is inherent in their sovereignty.”155  
UN delegates reformulated the meaning of national sovereignty to include permanent 
ownership of natural resources, unambiguously linking postcolonial self-determination 
with national resource control. Concurrently, the principle of permanent sovereignty 
became identified with human rights discussions in the UN Economic and Social 
Council.   A corporate lawyer who observed the proceedings described the outcome of 
the debate in pointed terms. “Into this discussion...the capital-importing countries were 
able to inject the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural wealth,” he wrote. “In 
the jargon of the Human Rights Commission, this principle came to be known as 
economic self-determination.”156 
Although the Eisenhower administration made sounds of support for Iranian 
economic self-determiniation, the United States ultimately opposed both the 
nationalization and the broader principle behind it.  In February 1953, Eisenhower used 
his State of the Union Message to declare that it was official U.S. policy “to encourage 
the flow of private American investment abroad.”  He added that this involved, “the 
encouragement of a hospitable climate for such investment.”157  Following discussions 
with the UK Foreign Office soon after, the State Department wrote that “the essential 
elements of a workable and productive economic system should include....the creation of 
conditions, both by creditor and by debtor countries, which will foster international 
investment and the sound development of the resources of the free world.”158 
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The question of the Iranian nationalization ultimately was decided in the favor of 
continuity with the postwar petroleum order.  In 1953, the National Security Council 
produced a paper on Middle Eastern oil.  Middle Eastern oil was “crucial to the strength” 
of European recovery.  The United States continued to hope that their corporate 
arrangement would continue to serve as a buffer between the politics and economics of 
the postwar petroleum order.  American policy was to distance itself from private 
interests to avoid accusations that “the American system is one of privilege, monopoly, 
private oppression, and imperialism.”159  
A combination of popular discontent and Anglo-American covert operations 
overthrew Mossadegh and returned the Shah to power in 1953.  Acrimonious 
negotiations over the future of Iranian oil followed.  In the end, the parties created the 
Iran Consortium, a Western group of firms that controlled the production of oil.  If 
Mossadegh’s ouster and the international blacklisting of Iranian oil were not clear enough 
evidence, the contract between the Consortium and the government of Iran revealed the 
practical limits of permanent sovereignty.  No doubt, Iran received formal title to its oil 
and a fifty-fifty profit-sharing agreement.  But even if the Consortium was “nationalized” 
in name, the companies retained full rights to manage oil output and price.  On the 
question of sovereignty and legal jurisdiction, nationalization issues would not be 
adjudicated under Iranian law.  Rather, the contract moved arbitration considerations to 
“a jurisprudence intermediate between public international law and private international 
law.”  National law did not have jurisdiction according to the contract, a position directly 
opposite that put forth by Mossadegh months earlier in the UN.160 
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Still, many observers understood the potential power of permanent sovereignty.  
One British official summed up the lesson.  The new arrangement made it more difficult 
to “kick out” western companies, but resource nationalism would gain steam elsewhere.  
“I do not think the leopard has changed his spots,” he wrote.  “[The oil companies’] 
policy must be to make hay while the sun shines!”161  The principle of permanent 
sovereignty was now directly involved in the issues of decolonization and national self-
determination.   
The question of economic liberation also extended to nations that long had been 
officially decolonized and to commodities other than oil. Six months after the Shah’s 
return to power, the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in Guatemala invoked the 
principle of permanent sovereignty as a right when nationalizing the property of another 
“imperialist aggressor,” the United Fruit Company.  The invocation of permanent 
sovereignty, in line with Prebisch’s center-periphery definition, helps measure the 
practical effect of permanent sovereignty in diplomatic affairs.162  In a note to the 
government of Guatemala, the Department of State formulated the right to “just 
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compensation” as a principle of international law: “If the contrary were true, states 
seeking to avoid the necessity of making payment for property expropriated from foreign 
nationals could avoid all pecuniary responsibility simply by changing their local law.”  
The result, according to U.S. logic, could be catastrophic: “Every international obligation 
could thus be wiped off the books.”163 
The concern with precedent would be evoked again and again, most prominently 
when responding to the “radical” oil policies of Iraq and Libya in the early 1970s.  The 
new prominence of permanent sovereignty in the international community occurred, in 
part, because Mossadegh presented Iranian economic nationalism as an application of a 
widely accepted and thoroughly familiar principle.  International support for Mossadegh, 
so evident in the United Nations, emphasized economic control over natural resources as 
a basic sovereign right.  The support also spelled out another count on which permanent 
sovereignty set itself against the traditional agenda of the international economy.  Like 
the terms of trade thesis, the thesis of permanent sovereignty became a tacit dimension of 
Third World political thought.  The two propositions, often if not always systematically 
articulated, were shared by Third World leaders.164   
Permanent sovereignty also transformed into an explicit diplomatic strategy when 
Mossadegh invoked nationalization as a right.  In fact, the failure of Mossadegh led to a 
more general and enduring formulation of the concept of permanent sovereignty.  The 
UN debates on permanent sovereignty and economic self-determination began to 
transcend the period in which they occurred.  The rise of permanent sovereignty as an 
economic doctrine in the Third World had much to do with the specific Iranian 
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experience, which served as a lightning rod.  The broader context of decolonization also 
shaped the Third World agenda.  The Wilsoninian principle of national juridical 
sovereignty became more broadly applied as decolonization proceeded in the 1950s.  
More people began to feel that anti-colonial nationalism, especially in the economic 
sphere, held legitimacy after formal independence.  For Third World nations, the UN 
resolutions made clear, sovereignty implied control over national resources.  As in 
Prebisch’s initial analysis, sovereignty was the first step toward economic independence 
and development.  By turning from the specific example of Iran to the general category of 
decolonization, Mossadegh confirmed this link in his Security Council speech. 
With the return of the Shah and the passing of the UN resolution, the question of 
permanent sovereignty focused on control over resources as its core meaning.  The 
emphasis was a practical one, and occurred not only in the language of international 
politics, but in terms of specific goals of Third World countries.  Even if presented as a 
timeless idea of liberation, the particular question occurred in a historically defined 
moment.  The failed Iranian nationalization, not to mention similar events in Guatemala 
soon after, served as a lesson for other nationalists.  The oil-producing nations would not 
consider expropriation a viable idea for almost two decades. 
Yet while western observers assumed that the lesson was punitive, the crisis in 
Iran led to a further step in the sequence of reasoning first described by Prebisch.   For 
the strategies associated with permanent sovereignty to have ready applicability, for 
permanent sovereignty to become “operational” in the argot of policy studies, the owners 
of raw materials needed somehow to control production and access to markets. The 
Iranian example denoted the need for greater diplomatic calculation with respect to the 
manner in which permanent sovereignty could be pursued. 
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A PILLAR OF PAN-ARABISM 
Advocates of permanent sovereignty began to do battle on two fronts.  On the conceptual 
level, they continued to assert the existence of inequality in the international economy.  
Diplomatically, they began to look specific imperial links that could be reset to the 
advantage of Third World nations.   One particular one was the Suez Canal, which was 
important for many geopolitical reasons, especially as the gateway between Western 
Europe and Middle Eastern oil fields.165  
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the British-owned Suez 
Canal Company in July 1956.  “We shall all of us defend our nationalism and Arabism,” 
he said, adding that the tolls Egypt would collect on the canal would be used to finance 
development projects.166  Like Mossadegh, Nasser pitted national sovereignty against 
what he perceived to be the imperialistic internationalism of the Cold War.  In actions as 
well as words, he equated his actions with the greater good of the Third World. 
The response to the nationalization was immediate. The American Undersecretary 
of State, Herbert Hoover, Jr., advised that Britain would not accept the nationalization, 
especially since Nasser could not prevent the flow of the “two-thirds of Middle Eastern 
oil [that] passes through the Canal.”167  The United States disagreed with the November 
1956 French-British-Israeli invasion of the Canal Zone, especially in light of the 
Egyptian government’s arguments about continued British imperialism and its affront to 
Egyptian sovereignty.168  However, American leaders also worried that Nasser had 
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inspired nationalist sentiment in many oil-producing countries, which were 
predominantly Arab.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed concern about Nasser’s 
influence not only in the oil-producing states, but in “all Moslem countries and in 
neutralist and under-developed countries throughout the world.”169  
The Suez Crisis overlapped with the new settlement between Iran and the 
Consortium.  The nationalist leader who precipitated the crisis over Suez, Gamel Abdel 
Nasser, discussed Mossadegh’s emblematic and exemplary status with reporters in 
1956.170  The similarities between the two leaders are striking. Like Mossadegh, Nasser 
had come of age in a period of nationalist and anti-imperialist ferment.  After joining the 
army in 1937, he earned rapid promotion.  When British troops surrounded King Farouk 
in the Royal Palace and forced him to appoint an allied-friendly government in 1942, 
Nasser and other officers began discuss reform in the army.  Failure in the war against 
Israel in 1948 and 1949, especially the poor showing of Egyptian and other Arab armies, 
reinforced the officers’ sense of frustration.  The group concluded that the Egyptian 
government needed to be drastically reformed and, if not, overthrown. 
During the Truman administration, the British maintained their pre-war imperial 
presence in the Middle East.  The most important holding was Egypt, which had been 
under British occupation since 1882.  After the war, colonial administrators stood on an 
increasingly wobbly edifice.  It began to crumble in late 1951.  Groups of workers, 
students, activists, and military units struck at British troops and facilities in the Canal 
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Zone.  Widespread rioting led to scores of deaths.  Nasser’s group, now known as the 
“Free Officers,” seized control of the government on July 23, 1952.171   
Nasser quickly became an international figure.  His oratorical style, combined 
with the new availability of cheap transistor radios and a powerful signal from Radio 
Cairo, made him popular with millions of listeners in Egypt and neighboring Arab 
states.172   Anti-imperialism formed a central part of his pan-Arab philosophy as it 
developed in the mid-1950s.  His emphasis on the political, economic, and social 
development of the Arab world enveloped the oil-producing states.  Nasser identified the 
control of Arab oil by Western interests as a colonial vestige. The oil-rich states, the pan-
Arab doctrine held, should nationalize oil installations and share the resultant wealth with 
the rest of the Arab community.173 The Eisenhower administration understood the 
ramifications of his assertion in The Philosophy of Revolution that oil was “the vital nerve 
of civilization” in this context.174   Likewise, the Kennedy administration viewed with 
great concern the potential for Nasserism in the Saudi technocracy and military, despite 
Nasser’s constant pledges that he “was not after the oil of Saudi Arabia.”175   
Against this background, the United Nations again passed a resolution on 
permanent sovereignty.  In 1955, the Third Committee of the General Assembly, whose 
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delegates had been assigned the broad question of social and humanitarian affairs, 
devoted considerable time to the discussion of “economic self-determination.”176  In the 
debate, a basic division over the link between natural resources and self-determination 
pitted the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands against an “Asian-
African-Arab group.”  This group, led by Abdul Rahman Pazhwak of Afghanistan and 
Jamil Baroody of Saudi Arabia, argued that “unless a state is the master of its own 
resources, it cannot exercise the right of political self-determination.”177   
The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Egypt was fraught with tension.  
Nasserism had forced King Saud into a corner.  The conflict between his cooperation 
with the West and pan-Arab nationalism was tenser than ever.  After the invasion of 
Suez, Saud was forced to withhold oil from the imperial powers Britain and France, at 
great cost to the kingdom.178   
Despite the mutual antagonism between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Baroody 
expressed his belief in the same broad principles as Nasser.  In the Third Committee 
debate, he affirmed economic self-determination as a right.  The resolution on permanent 
sovereignty was necessary “to prevent what had been a frequent occurrence in the 
nineteenth century, namely that a weak and penniless government should seriously 
compromise a country’s future by granting concessions in the economic sphere.”  The 
resolution, he said, “was intended as a warning to all who might consider resorting to 
such unfair procedure.”179 
Baroody was establishing a principle in the UN speech, but when Israel troops 
invaded the Sinai on October 29, 1956 the threat to energy security became material.  
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Nasser closed the Suez Canal.  Syrian groups sabotaged the pipeline in their country that 
carried petroleum from Iraq to the Mediterranean.  For the United States, the disruptions 
had the geopolitical effect of endangering European recovery, so central to the national 
security doctrine of the early Cold War.  The disruptions also explicitly linked corporate 
investment with the legacy of imperialism.180 
The United States delegate to the Third Committee, the flour heiress Mary Lord, 
rejected the notion of permanent sovereignty.  As had her predecessor, she invoked the 
sanctity of private investment, for good measure calling the 1952 resolution an 
“unfortunate history.”  Linking natural resources to self-determination would “be widely 
regarded as...the endorsement of a right of expropriation,” she continued.181   
Lord’s assumptions ran counter to the relationship Prebisch had established 
between international politics and economics.  Her basic objection to the resolution was 
couched in the corporatist rhetoric of the postwar petroleum order: “the political principle 
of self-determination does not have clear economic applications.”  Nevertheless, the 
Economic and Social Council of the UN recommended to the General Assembly that it 
establish a commission to conduct a full survey of “the status of the right of peoples and 
nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources.” Then, the 
commission would recommend provisions to strengthen that right.182 
Nasser depicted the Suez crisis as representative of the plight of non-aligned, 
Third World nations.183  For most Third World leaders, statehood was just the beginning 
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of a post-independence drive for economic development.  When the president of the new 
state of Indonesia, Sukarno, opened the 1955 Bandung conference of non-aligned nations 
by decrying “the modern dress” of colonialism “in the form of economic control, 
intellectual control and actual physical control,” he mirrored the desires of a generation of 
Third World leaders.  Almost all viewed Western capitalism, or at least parts of it, as an 
extension of imperialism.184  The Bandung communiqué—signed by Nasser, Nehru, 
Sukarno, as well as representatives from Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Libya—made 
Economic Cooperation its first line-item.  “Respect for national sovereignty” was central 
to Third World development.  The Bandung signatories also recommended “collective 
action” to increase the prices for commodities and raw materials.185 
The conceptual and political breakthrough of permanent sovereignty was evident 
by its high profile in the contemporary anti-imperial consciousness.  As time wore on, 
what was first an economic model and then a new moral language would become a 
diplomatic strategy. The political sovereignty inherent in decolonization was a means to 
an end, not an end in itself.  
But, what of its ability to upend the unequal terms of trade?  The results of the 
Iranian and Suez crises had been decidedly mixed.186  In the case of oil, global production 
rose and prices dropped even further by the end of the decade. 
FROM PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY TO OPEC 
It is impossible to divorce the the history of the international economy from the history of 
decolonization.187  Raúl Prebisch did not insert the concept of sovereignty into the 
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international lexicon, nor were Mohammed Mossadegh and Gamal Abdel Nasser the first 
to invoke it in defense of nationalization.  But as the terms of trade thesis commanded 
wider acceptance, the idea began to fix a new meaning to sovereignty.  Sovereignty now 
emphasized national control over resources as an economic palliative to post-imperial 
economic inequality.188  The new definition of sovereignty came with definitive political 
and economic criteria.   Economically, even if imperial powers renounced the central 
political tenets of empire and transferred the power of colonial administration to new 
national actors, the imperial logic driving the international economy continued to hold.  
The attitude pushed against the corporatist attempt by western governments in the late 
1940s and 1950s to depict economics as above political frays. As it turned out, the 
approach shared by Prebisch, Mossadegh, Nasser, and others showed real virtuosity in 
handling the relationship between international politics and economics, so much so that it 
leaves even today’s reader breathless.  
The idea of permanent sovereignty resonated through the Third World in the 
1950s.  Analyzing the influence of permanent sovereignty implies that the process of 
decolonization was far more complicated than the emergence of national consciousness 
and the transfer of imperial power.  To be sure, the result of the loss of imperial 
legitimacy was a generalized system of nation-states.  However, in the mid-1950s the 
argument became widespread that Third World interactions with the developed nations 
were characterized by highly asymmetrical power relations, even if the nations were 
formally equivalent in terms of juridical sovereignty.    
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The doctrine was accepted by a loose group of Third World elites, who had 
different experiences and were connected in different ways.  A central adhesive binding 
them together was the shared notion of permanent sovereignty as a core belief.  In time, 
the belief began to affect the tone of international politics.189  Several meetings—
including those of Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Conference, the Non-Aligned 
Movement, the Organization of African Unity, and the UN Conferences on Human 
Rights—placed permanent sovereignty at the center of their discussions.190  In a series of 
investigations beginning in 1957, the UN Secretariat and the Economic and Social 
Council reported that the question of permanent sovereignty had become a standard part 
                                                 
189 To say that permanent sovereignty became an important aspect of Third World political or economic 
thought is only to say that many other thinkers understood and agreed with the nature of the call to arms.  
Permanent sovereignty  was part of a wave of intellectual ferment in the decolonizing world, and it would 
be overzealous to understand it as overriding other conceptions of actual or future political arrangements in 
the heady days of early post-imperialist thought.      
190 On decolonization and development, see: Jawaharlal Nehru, Independence and After: Speeches, 1946-
1949 (New York: Ayer, 1971), 245-264, 325-338; Kweku Ampiah . The Political and Moral Imperatives of 
the Bandung Conference of 1955: The Reactions of the US, UK, and Japan (Poole, England: Global 
Oriental, 2007); Steven Metz, “In Lieu of Orthodoxy: the Socialist Theories of Nkrumah and Nyerere,” The 
Journal of Modern African Studies  20: 1 (1982): 377-392; Kwame Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path (London: 
Panaf Books, 1973); Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982);  
Aime Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973 [1955]), 14, 31; Franz 
Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Penguin, 1967), 29-33; Thomas Hodgkin, “Some African 
and Third World Theories of Imperialism,” Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, Roger Owen and Bob 
Sutcliffe, eds., (London: Longman, 1972), 93-116; Léopold Sédar Senghor, On African Socialism (New 
York: Praeger, 1964); Michael F. Lofchie, ed. The State of Nations: Constraints on Development in 
Independent Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Jonathan Kelley and Herbert S. Klein, 
“Revolution and the Rebirth of Inequality: A Theory of Stratification in Postrevolutionary Society,” 
American Journal of Sociology 83:1 (Jul. 1977): 78-99; Steven M. Schwebel, “The Story of the United 
Nation's Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources” American Bar Association 
Journal 49 (1963): 463.   On new national constitutions and permanent sovereignty, see Russell H. 
Fitzgibbon, “The Process of Constitution Making in Latin America,” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 3: 1 (Oct. 1960): 1-11; Jorge Castañeda, “Revolution and Foreign Policy: Mexico's Experience,” 
Political Science Quarterly 78: 3 (Sep. 1963): 391-417; Seymour J. Rubin, “Nationalization and Private 
Foreign Investment: The Role of Government,” World Politics 2 (July 1950): 485-510; Hans Kohn, “The 
United Nations and National Self-Determination,” Review of Politics 20 (1958): 526-545; Cecil J. 
Olmstead, “Nationalization,” New York University Law Review 32 (1957);  Stephen Haber, Noel Maurer 
and Armando Razo,  “When the Law Does Not Matter: The Rise and Decline of the Mexican Oil Industry,” 
The Journal of Economic History 63: 1 (2003): 1-32.  
 85 
of the legislation of new nations, including constitutional protection of the right of a 
nation to control its natural resources.191   
Permanent sovereignty had become a central economic plank of Third World 
unity by the end of the 1950s.  At the same time, prices remained stable, guaranteeing 
income for the oil-producing nations.  Then, in the late 1950s, prices began to drop.  
Increased production among the largest companies, as well as new production from 
smaller companies and the entry of the Soviet Union as an oil exporter, caused a market 
glut.  Furthermore, U.S. import quotas, formalized by a proclamation by President 
Eisenhower in 1959, closed off the American market.192  The largest oil companies 
decided to reduce their tax commitments to the producing countries by reducing the 
posted process for crude oil.193  Exxon reduced the posted price of oil in the summer of 
1960 without consulting the producing states.  The unilateral move cost Saudi Arabia 
alone over $30 million in lost revenues in the following year.194 
OPEC emerged out of this immediate economic environment, but it had more 
complex origins.  Abdullah al-Tariki, the Saudi oil minister who studied Geology at the 
University of Cairo and the University of Texas in the 1940s, sought ways to increase the 
role of the Saudi Arabian government in the management of its resources.195 In 1954 he 
had pushed for a contract with the Greek magnate Aristotle Onassis that would allow 
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Onassis to replace Aramco as the primary shipper of Saudi oil.196  When the United 
States invaded Lebanon, he called the United States “an imperialist aggressor supporting 
reactionary governments to cloak western exploitation of Arabs.”197  In 1958 Fortune 
magazine described him as “a fanatical nationalist.”198   
For the First Arab Petroleum Congress in 1959, Tariki hired an American lawyer, 
Franck Hendryx, to present a paper entitled “A Sovereign Nation’s Legal Ability to Make 
and Abide by a Petroleum Concession Contract.”  Hendryx argued in the paper that the 
oil producing nations could “modify or eliminate provisions of an existing petroleum 
concession which may have become contrary to the best interests of its citizens.”199  
Other presenters made similar arguments.200  In each of these papers, the generalized 
challenge to the sanctity of international contracts was couched in the rights-infused 
language of permanent sovereignty. 
The Director of Mines and Hydrocarbons of Venezuela, Juan Pablo Pérez 
Alfonso, agreed with Tariki.   The first official talks between Venezuelan and Middle 
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Eastern oilmen had occurred ten years earlier, when a three-man Venezuelan team toured 
the region after the fifty-fifty agreements.  Now, Pérez Alfonso attended the Congress 
with text of his country’s tax laws and other oil legislation translated into Arabic.  Wanda 
Joblanski, the prominent oil journalist of her time, introduced Tariki and Pérez Alfonso in 
her hotel room.201 
The two found common ground.  Pérez Alfonso and Tariki believed that if the 
world’s largest oil-producers entered into a pro-rationing agreement—a collective 
decision to produce less oil—they could reset the terms of trade.  By using a system 
similar to that employed by the Texas Railroad Commission in the United States, the oil 
ministers hoped they could exchange supply for price.  Unlike the current price system, in 
which the producers received a flat rate according to volume, Pérez Alfonso believed 
supply-side control could bring a “fair” price that took into account “the intrinsic value of 
oil.”202 A day after the initial discussions, Pérez Alfonso and Tariki met again at a yacht 
club in Mehdi, a northern suburb of Cairo.  They were joined by Iranian, Kuwaiti, and 
Iraqi representatives, who agreed to a series of measures, including the defense of oil 
prices and the establishment of national oil companies.203  Months later, Tariki visited 
Pérez Alfonso in Caracas to work out a plan for production control.204 
When the oil companies cut posted prices again in 1960, Tariki telegraphed Pérez 
Alfonso.  The revolutionary Iraqi government then invited the members of the Mehdi 
Pact to Baghdad.  On September 14, representatives from Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Iran, 
Kuwait, and Iraq announced the creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries.  The first communiqué of OPEC read much like the UN documents on 
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permanent sovereignty.  OPEC demanded to be consulted on pricing matters and called 
for a system of “the regulation of production.”  Tariki considered “OPEC as an 
instrument for economic emancipation.”205  The future deputy director of OPEC, Fadhil 
al-Chalabi, later called the communiqué “the first collective act of sovereignty on the part 
of the oil exporters.”206 
When the OPEC leaders made their decision, permanent sovereignty stood at the 
center of a general agreement about the nature of the Third World’s place in international 
society. The individual interests of each nation cannot be discounted, but their broader 
agreement was characterized most strongly by its abhorrence of the traditional economic 
structure.207 It was the individual decisions of these various Third World actors, state and 
non-state, to employ the language of permanent sovereignty that helped make the fortune 
of the idea.  By nature ecumenical in its rhetoric of common plight and its universal 
condemnation of classical terms of trade, permanent sovereignty provided a lingua franca 
that diverse voices could use to criticize the international political economy.   
ECONOMIC SELF-DETERMINATION 
The conviction that economic and political structures were inseparable was shared by 
elites throughout the Third World.  The conceptual breakthrough of the terms of trade 
theory was that imperial economic continuities continued to exist and were in fact part of 
the more massive phenomenon of decolonization. Prebisch formed part of a growing 
Third World intellectual cohort that, in the words of W.E.B. Dubois, believed “the 
present plight of the world is a direct outgrowth of the past.”208  The doctrine of unequal 
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exchange provided a touchstone for the rise of non-communist scholarly critiques of 
Western capitalism that outlived the Cold War, including dependency theory and more 
recent critical analyses of high modernism, neoliberalism, and globalization.  On a 
practical level, the terms of trade thesis supported a conclusion common to a number of 
Third World leaders without the aid of statistics or theory.   
Jean-Paul Sartre later held that many nations had only achieved “a simulacrum of 
phoney independence.”209 In a common front, Third World leaders insisted that the 
economic structure and performance of their countries had been shaped decisively by 
their colonial experience.  Furthermore, their present and future development was being 
retarded by neo-colonial influences, such as foreign aid, the overt presence of 
multinational corporations and, most importantly, their subordinate position in the 
western capitalist political economy. 
Once political self-determination was achieved, economic development became 
the chief cause of the anti-colonial struggle.  The theory and language behind this 
development, terms of trade and permanent sovereignty, reinforced anti-colonial 
nationalism even as it modified its end objectives.  In this way, Prebisch’s thinking 
returned to its point of departure: It began with inequality, then turned to consider 
problems of state-driven economic development, and in due course led back to theorizing 
about imperial legacies.  Third World ideas fused prevailing contemporary notions about 
the nature of the international economy with new suggestions for economic development.  
The terms of trade concept and the potential diplomacy of permanent sovereignty shaped 
the narrative of Third-World advocates regarding the international political economy.   
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The implications of this argument for the postwar petroleum order were profound.  
In the 1960s, the advocates of permanent sovereignty continued to seek real economic 
and diplomatic power from the nominal political sovereignty that came with statehood 
and UN membership.210   In the longer story, the western concern with the “Arab oil 
weapon” in the late 1960s and early 1970s began with simultaneous collapse of European 
colonialism and continuity of unequal economic arrangements after World War II.211   
The gap between American policy and Third World aspirations was wide.  The 
corporatist design of the postwar petroleum order sought to remove the link between 
economics and international politics.  Permanent sovereignty made that connection 
explicit.  Still, American policymakers remained optimistic about the structural integrity 
of the postwar petroleum order.  Even though the five largest oil-producing states had 
now banded together, no serious concern was expressed in the United States.  In just one 
example, Dwight Eisenhower and Allen Dulles disagreed on the ramifications of the 
formation of the cartel in a January 1960 meeting of the National Security Council 
(NSC).  Eisenhower expressed the majority opinion.  “Anyone could break up the 
Organization,” Eisenhower said, “by offering five cents more per barrel [to] one of the 
countries.”  Dulles was not so sure, noting that OPEC’s five founders held more than 80 
percent of global reserves.212  In the 1960s, at least, it would seem like Eisenhower was 
right. 
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Chapter 1:  Crisis Forestalled: The 1967 Arab Oil Embargo 
 
We know that the imperialists are very interested in the region of the Middle East, 
because they have very strong interests in oil and other things.   
 
    Josef Brop Tito to Gamal Abdel Nasser, 1967213 
 
[I]f we do not have a common stand, we will be picked off one by one. 
 
    Eugene Rostow to Karl Schiller, 1967214 
 
“To open the Gulf of Aqaba to at least oil for Israel,” Walt Whitman Rostow wrote to 
Lyndon Baines Johnson on June 4, 1967, “will be the test of who wins this trial of will 
and nerve.”215  Two weeks earlier, the U.S. president and his national security assistant 
had learned that the president of the United Arab Republic, Gamal Abdel Nasser, had 
declared Aqaba an Arab mare clausum, removing UN peacekeepers and shutting the 
waterway’s only entrance, the Straits of Tiran, to Israel-bound vessels with “strategic” 
cargoes.  Nasser’s term, “strategic,” pointed directly to the five Liberian tankers that 
transported 300 million tons of Iranian crude to Israel per year.216  Israel’s prime minister, 
Levi Eshkol, told Johnson that the blockade formed the final link of an Arab chain of 
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“stranglish encirclement” threatening Israel’s existence.  A third Arab-Israeli war in 
twenty years was imminent.217 
In the two weeks between the closing of Aqaba and Rostow’s memo, the Johnson 
administration designed and employed several strategies to ensure Israel’s oil supply and 
prevent war.  All of them failed.  The discussions in the White House and the State 
Department surrounding these strategies revealed overlapping limitations for American 
diplomatic, military, and economic influence.  Policymakers yoked these limitations 
together with a single theme: the formidable power of Arab oil-producing nations.  Two 
days after Rostow’s memo, the first shots of the June 1967 war rang out.  The Arab oil-
producing countries imposed what would be a three-month embargo on the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and West Germany.   
Historians have accounted for many of the demands that stretched the sinews of 
American global power in the late 1960s and created a new sense of vulnerability among 
American policymakers.218  In the international economy, the novel feeling was closely 
linked to the development of permanent sovereignty. Moments of extremity often reveal 
the essence of longer patterns. The 1967 oil embargo was no different. The threats posed 
by instability in the Middle East that summer—a diplomatic situation the U.S. 
ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, described as operating “within very 
                                                 
217 Tel Aviv to White House, June 5, 1967, LBJL NSF 107. 
218 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Jeremi Suri, “The Cold War, Decolonization, and Global 
Social Awakenings: Historical Intersections,” Cold War History 6 (2006): 353-63; Bradley R. Simpson, 
Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2008); Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War (Boston: Harvard University 
Press, 2010); Frederik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of the War 
in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).  On the Arab world in particular, see Nathan 
Citino, From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Saud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations, 
2nd ed.(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005); Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: 
Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002); SalimYaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). 
 93 
narrow limits and a short time schedule”—were symptomatic of broader shifts in the 
international system.219 
The month preceding the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, known at the time as the Tiran 
Crisis, provides a unique window onto longer trends that confronted the Johnson 
administration and its successors.   Initially, the Tiran Crisis recast international maritime 
law and revealed declining U.S. military power.  As policy options narrowed, the 
confrontation galvanized the idea of permanent sovereignty in the international agenda 
and emphasized its potential to subvert traditional American Cold War strategies.  
Economic concerns rose in importance in foreign affairs.  Permanent sovereignty and its 
diplomatic corollary, the power of Arab oil producers, presented a new challenge to the 
security of the industrialized West.220 
The challenge of an oil embargo in June 1967 was closely linked to the broader 
theme of permanent sovereignty.  The long-running Arab-Israeli problem had become 
more than just a regional concern.  The crisis transcended the geography of the Middle 
East, becoming a space in which competing interpretations of the international political 
economy collided.221  Different schools of thought were based on a particular 
understanding of the past and sought divergent goals for the future.  Permanent 
sovereignty became more than a commonly held aspiration among Third World leaders.  
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Within OPEC, certain leaders began to realize that “oil power,” built on the structure of 
permanent sovereignty, was a real possibility.222 
DIRE STRAITS IN THE SHADOW OF SUEZ 
Discussions at the United Nations and within the upper echelons of the American foreign 
policymaking establishment exposed the feeble international influence of the United 
States in certain realms.  Debility in the domain of maritime law was particularly notable.  
Weak influence in this realm was closely bound up with questions of permanent 
sovereignty.    
President Johnson laid down the legal principle that underpinned U.S. policy by 
announcing that Nasser’s interdiction of “free and innocent” passage through Tiran broke 
with maritime law.223  Johnson’s appeal to the Law of the Sea provoked a fierce debate 
over the historical precedents of the legal principle.  In particular, discussions centered on 
the two articles passed at the 1958 UN Convention on the Territorial Sea that governed 
the relationship between “innocent passage” and the legality of blockades.  Article 14 
defined innocent passage as “not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the 
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coastal State.”  Article 16 gave coastal states the right “to prevent passage which is not 
innocent.”224 
The ambiguity of Articles Fourteen and Sixteen left ample room for 
interpretation.  Johnson used a reading that emerged from the legal branch of the State 
Department.  Innocent passage was “determined objectively according to the conduct of a 
transiting vessel, not by the character of its cargo.”225  The passage of merchant oil 
tankers was innocent by this definition.  The American interpretation, however, ignored 
Nasser’s assertion that oil was a “prejudicial” material.  The UN ambassador from 
Morocco expressed this concern in an emergency meeting of the Security Council.  
Nasser sought to bar only oil and other cargoes that strengthened “Israel’s aggressive 
potential.”226 
Although the Johnson administration publicly maintained its adherence to the 
principle of innocent passage, internal memos validated Nasser’s interpretation.  “The oil 
shipments to Israel are prejudicial to the security of the UAR on the ground that they will 
supply the military forces of Israel,” one NSC official wrote.227  The State Department 
considered “a public statement that ‘only oil for commercial or civilian use’” would 
navigate Tiran, “while oil for military use continued to be banned.”228  Officials also 
conceded that Nasser stood on the firm ground of international practice.  “In 
recharacterizing oil as a strategic commodity,” one acknowledged, Nasser pointed to the 
                                                 
224 Leo Gross, “Passage through the Strait of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba,” in The Middle East Crisis: 
Test of International Law, ed. John W. Halderman (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publicantions, 1969), 141; 
M. McDougal and W. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 
258.   
225Meeker to Rusk, May 27, 1967, “Legal Status of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba,” LBJL NSF 
106. 
226 S/PV.1346, June, 1 1967, 13. 
227 Nathaniel Davis, Memorandum, May 26, 1967, LBJL NSF 106. 
228“Contingency Paper: Immediate Arab-Israeli War,” May 28, 1967, LBJL NSF 107. 
 96 
United States’ placement of oil on the list of embargoed goods to Cuba and China.229  
Nasser, moreover, was hardly the first leader to use oil as a weapon in the postwar era.  
During the 1956 Suez crisis, the Arab nations, the Soviet Union, and the United States 
had limited their oil flows to France, Great Britain, and Israel.   American import quotas, 
defended since 1959 on national security grounds, also lent support to Nasser’s 
definition.230  “Petroleum could not be equated with peaches and pineapples,” as historian 
Stephen Rabe notes.231  Nasser would have agreed. 
The guiding policy of “innocent passage” also fell on stony soil because it 
renewed an acerbic, decade-old debate linking postwar international law to post-colonial 
politics.  The legal protection of Israeli passage through Tiran and Aqaba had been raised 
in the aftermath of the Suez crisis—a fact that Arab leaders had not forgotten.  For Nasser 
and others, the denouement of U.S.-Israeli relations following the crisis was instructive.  
Egypt had maintained a blockade in the Straits of Tiran from Israel’s founding, an action 
that effectively enclosed Israel’s southern border.  When David Ben-Gurion first directed 
Moshe Dayan to prepare a Sinai military operation in October 1955, his tactical objective 
was to break the blockade.232  John Foster Dulles struck an agreement with Israel that 
fulfilled Ben-Gurion’s objective in October 1956.  In return for Israel’s withdrawal from 
the promontory overlooking Tiran, Dulles promised to support Aqaba’s international 
character.  Few in the Arab world ever accepted the agreement as legitimate.    In 1956, 
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an Egyptian delegation argued to Dulles that Arab territorial waters comprised the Gulf 
and that passage should not “be undertaken without the consent of the Arab states 
concerned.”233 As Dwight Eisenhower recalled to the New York Times in May 1967, 
Egypt never consented to Israeli passage.234 
The shadow of the Suez Crisis bore down on the 1958 Law of the Sea conference, 
in which Articles 14 and 16 enshrined the concept of innocent passage into international 
law.  In a committee meeting late in the conference, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and 
Portugal maneuvered to keep Dulles’ promise by submitting what became known 
informally as the “Aqaba Clause.”235  Inserted into Article 16, the revision protected 
passage not only through straits connecting two parts of the high seas but also between 
“the high seas and territorial waters.”236  After a contentious debate, the committee 
adopted the change by a margin of one vote, the closest roll call of the conference.237  The 
Saudi Arabian representative spoke for the Arab delegations in the final plenary session.  
He called the amendment a “mutilation of international law” that “had nothing to do with 
the principle of freedom of navigation.”  The article stretched the definition of innocent 
passage to include a situation that applied exclusively to Aqaba.  International law “no 
longer dealt with general principles,” he continued. Rather, it had been “carefully tailored 
to promote the claims of one state.”238 
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The Arab participants withdrew from the conference in protest.  In their absence, 
the new maritime law passed by a vote of 65 to 1.  The head of the American delegation, 
Arthur Dean, celebrated the outcome in the American Journal of International Law: “The 
Geneva Conference... in a politically charged arena, achieved agreement sufficient to 
write a new and beneficent rule into international law.”239  UN Emergency Forces, 
employed in the Sinai the previous year as a buffer between Egypt and Israel, now had 
the new mandate of ensuring the passage of Israeli ships and goods through Tiran.  In the 
following decade, Israel’s deepwater port of Eilat grew in importance as part of a national 
strategy to accelerate commerce within the trade systems of the South Atlantic and Indian 
Oceans.  In addition, Israel constructed a pipeline between Eilat and a refinery in Haifa to 
accommodate the increasing quantities of imported energy necessary for economic 
growth.240 
Johnson’s invocation of innocent passage couched U.S. foreign policy in the 
language and the context of the 1958 law.  For the Arab states, as well as the supportive 
Third World nations, the seemingly impartial vehicle of international law did not conceal 
the partisanship underlying its formulation.   As American efforts to convince the 
Security Council to censure the embargo sagged, Johnson expressed his frustration to 
British Prime Minister Harold Wilson.  Despite doing “everything we could to get an 
even-handed Security Council pronouncement,” he wrote, the United States had been 
unable to prevent the “determined effort to have the Council…legitimize Nasser’s 
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action.”241  Article 16, steeped in a suspect tradition of maritime law, was anything but 
innocent for a majority of the sitting members of the Security Council.242 
A BLEAK VERDICT 
The limitations of American military power aligned with the scrutiny of maritime law.  A 
day after Johnson endorsed innocent passage, Wilson declared his support for the 
American position by directly quoting a 1957 British statement guaranteeing Israeli 
passage.  The Times of London reported that the renewed pledge likely meant that the 
Anglo-American alliance planned to enforce Israeli passage through Tiran and Aqaba 
with naval power, with or without UN approval.243  The Times was discerning.  Even as 
Johnson tried to sweeten international opinion through the language of maritime law, the 
Pentagon began work on the bitter pill of military tactics, “hurriedly” developing plans to 
break the blockade.244 
Almost at once, the Joint Chiefs of Staff came to the grim realization that any 
naval initiative would prove impossible. One difficulty concerned Israeli demands to 
participate.  In a “somber” message to the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Levi 
Eshkol explained that the detention of any ship or strategic cargo would be cause for 
war.245  Israel’s reflexive recourse to retaliation made the drawing up of naval sequences 
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a meaningless exercise.246  The political geography of Tiran posed another hitch.  The 
State Department considered passing the convoy through the east channel of Tiran, along 
the Saudi Arabian coast.  This course also was deemed undesirable because King Faisal 
could not agree to passage.  If he did, “he would be an almost certain casualty of the 
current pro-Nasser emotionalism throughout the Arab world.”247  To make matters worse, 
the State Department rallied minimal international support.  Only the Netherlands and 
Great Britain were willing to employ naval force.  More discouraging still, the travel time 
from The Hague to the Red Sea was weeks, and the Dutch were already dragging their 
feet.248 
 They were not the only laggards.  The Pentagon immediately ordered its own 
ships from the Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean, but informed Johnson that the 
transfer of naval forces from the Atlantic Fleet to the Red Sea would take at least a 
month.  Rotation around Africa was necessary because the United States’ East-of-Suez 
forces would not fare well in the case of armed conflict.  “The capability of these forces 
to prevail if attacked by major UAR forces is doubtful,” wrote the Joint Chiefs.  Military 
advisers mistrusted the efficacy of U.S. armed forces in the region and concluded that the 
American Navy was too weak to hazard a confrontation over the blockade.249   
Military capital was banked in Vietnam. Earlier in the month, the Joint Chiefs 
noted their “reservations concerning the ability of the United States to meet worldwide 
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military commitments and contingencies beyond the current Southeast Asian conflict.”250  
The Pentagon admitted that conventional power could not be decisive in Tiran, an early 
hint of the need for a stronger presence in the keystone of what Zbigniew Brzezinski 
would label the “arc of crisis” in 1979.251  After careful consideration, the Johnson 
administration was forced to conclude that the naval solution was nothing but a fig leaf.  
The failure was nakedly evident on the international stage. The Soviet chargé to the 
United Nations took the opportunity to publicly mock the “dissatisfaction of those 
imperialist circles” that could “no longer deploy their military forces as they wished.”252 
PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY AND PAN-ARABISM 
Like maritime law, military power had been exposed as an impotent strategy.  As the 
avenues of influence narrowed in late May 1967, efforts to orchestrate a multinational 
declaration in the United Nations supporting the principle of innocent passage also 
floundered.  Eugene Rostow, the State Department’s contact point with the UN 
delegation in New York, reported that most nations were prepared “to support the 
principle regarding international waterways” but shied away from considering “the use of 
force to secure adherence to that principle.”253  As the crisis mounted, almost all 
governments backed away from the American position, reneging even on their support of 
the notion itself.  The reasons given for backpedalling confirmed Nasser’s initial 
                                                 
250JCSM-288-67, May 20, 1967, LBJL NSF 107. 
251 For the history of U.S. weakness in the region, see William Odom, “The Cold War Origins of the U.S. 
Central Command,” The Journal of Cold War Studies 8: 2 (2006): 60. 
252 S/PV.1343, May 29, 1967, 22. 
253Eugene Rostow, “Memorandum to the President,” May 30, 1967, LBJL NSF 107. 
 102 
contention that oil was indeed strategic.  It also suggested the increasing power of 
permanent sovereignty as an instrument of diplomacy for the oil producers. 
In preparing the policy of innocent passage, the Johnson administration had oil 
power at the forefront of its collective thinking.  The appeal to international law was 
designed to give “the producing countries the best possible excuse for moderation by 
presenting a plausible image of evenhandedness.”254  After reading cables from the UN, 
Eugene Rostow reported that this scenario was doubtful.  It would “not be possible to 
present the American action to the Arab world (nor probably to most of the Third World) 
as simply an assertion of a recognized international right,” he wrote.255 The pledge to 
innocent passage shaped a policy that ignored the reality of an international split setting 
the United States against a bloc of decolonized and other underdeveloped nations.   
The rupture had been patently evident in the debates over international law.  The 
crisis deepened in late may.  Arguments in the Security Council bore out Rostow’s 
prediction.  Third World ambassadors reacted viscerally to the maritime declaration and 
the rumors of naval movements.  The Indian ambassador took the floor to discuss “the 
repressive measures being adopted by colonial powers.”  The delegate from Cairo likened 
possible military maneuvers to “the nineteenth century of warship diplomacy.”256 In the 
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General Assembly, the Saudi Arabian delegation identified western military pressure as 
“a new form of colonialism.”257 
The Johnson administration’s support of innocent passage not only yielded 
charges of neo-colonialism, but those charges increasingly became bracketed into 
conversations about the growing importance of Arab oil wealth.  The ideal of permanent 
sovereignty formed the essential subtext to these discussions.  In a representative 
statement, the Bulgarian ambassador linked “the policy of interference and intervention 
conducted by certain imperialist circles” to the goal of “appropriating and exploiting...the 
vast wealth” of the Middle East.258  Such statements grabbed the attention of oil-
consuming nations and undermined support for the maritime declaration.  Potential 
signatories to the maritime statement, the Pentagon noted, had taken notice and had 
begun “to believe that even such a declaration on their part would lead to serious 
discrimination against their Middle Eastern interests.”259 
Action against Western interests could take the form of seized assets, an oil 
embargo, or even expropriation.  The culmination of Nasser’s long-running desire to 
connect pan-Arabism to oil wealth seemed at hand.  The American ambassador in Cairo 
told Rusk that “any Arab leader who refused to [take measures] would risk literal as well 
as political assassination.”260  The U.S. embassies in Libya, Algeria, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, and Iraq all expressed their concern about street violence.  Adding to this 
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concern, the leaders of several Arab labor unions met in Damascus.  There, they resolved 
to “destroy the oil sources, pipe-lines and installations from which the enemy could 
benefit.”261 The Syrian delegation to the United Nations proudly referred to the 
“determination of the Arab masses.”262  Failure to support Nasser, State Department 
intelligence agreed, would expose “every regime” in the Arab world to “the revenge of 
the aroused masses.”263 
In Saudi Arabia especially, the situation presented King Faisal with a dilemma.  
His amoldering abhorrence of Nasserism, owing largely to Nasser’s stoking of the 
conflict in South Arabia, was well-known.  Still, the State Department reported that “at 
present he knows he must…live down the accusation of being a Western stooge.”264  CIA 
operative Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., organized a lunch between Harold Saunders of the NSC 
and Saudi Prince Mohammed in late May.  The prince told Saunders that the Saudi royal 
family knew Nasser was bent on undermining pro-American regimes.  That much was 
obvious.  But nothing could be done to stem the tide of pan-Arabism surging through his 
country.  “Where Israel is involved, no Arab government has any choice but to rally to 
the common cause,” he continued. In the case of war, Saudi Arabia would take 
precautionary measures to deprive “extremists” of a reason for sabotage, including 
“closing oil installations indefinitely.”265 
                                                 
261 FRUS, 1964-1968, XXXIV, 240.  Memorandum of conversation, June 12, 1967, cited in note; FRUS, 
1964-1968, XXXIV, 242. Memorandum from Solomon to Katzenbach, June 12, 1967. 
262 S/PV.1346, June 3, 1967, 9. 
263Intelligence Note, June 2, 1967, LBJL NSF 107. 
264“The Working Group on Economic Vulnerabilities,” LBJL NSF 106. 
265Saunders, “Memorandum for the Record,” May 31, 1967, LBJL NSF 106. 
 105 
The State Department believed the situation even less tractable because the 
nonaligned nations that “Nasser might listen to,” Yugoslavia and India, had “already 
declared for the UAR.”266  In a meeting with Nasser at the Kubeh Palace in Cairo two 
months after the crisis, Yugoslav President Josef Brop Tito neatly summarized Third 
World feeling.  In his analysis, as in nearly everyone else’s, control over oil stood front 
and center.  “We know that the imperialists are very interested in the region of the Middle 
East because they have very strong interests in oil and other things,” Tito told Nasser.267 
Tito’s handle materialized at a central juncture between the ongoing regional 
conflict, the Cold War, and the spread of the concept of permanent sovereignty.  The 
support of innocent passage had the “obvious effect” of strengthening “the Soviet 
position as friend and protector of all Arabs against their imperialist foes,” the CIA 
concluded in late May.”268  Eugene Rostow agreed: “Barring a miracle,” Egyptian and 
Soviet propaganda would succeed in “branding the U.S. as the ally and protector of Israel 
against the Arabs.”269  Soviet propaganda sought to do so.  Soviet foreign minister Andrei 
Gromyko explained the direction of policy to the foreign ministers of Eastern Europe: 
“Although it is still quite loose, an anti-imperialistic coalition of Arab states is 
emerging.”270 
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 As scholars have long asserted, ongoing American support of Israel certainly 
strengthened the bond between the Soviet Union and pan-Arabism.271  Another group of 
historians has rightly linked the “Arab oil weapon” to the desire for political gains 
concerning the question of an independent Palestine and, especially for King Faisal of 
Saudi Arabia, continued Moslem access to Jerusalem.272  Despite the merits of these two 
lines of scholarship, the international emphasis on oil power in the run-up to the June 
1967 Arab-Israeli war points to a distinct, if related, pattern in international history.   The 
growing assertiveness of the oil-producing states during and after the war suggests that 
permanent sovereignty had climbed to the top of the global agenda of the late 1960s.   
The crisis brought Arab oil producers, some less willingly than others to the 
vanguard of the Third World movement for permanent sovereignty. In 1964, building on 
the widespread acceptance of Prebisch’s initial analysis of the international economy, the 
United Nations voted to found the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. Diego Cordovéz, a member of the UN Secretariat, argued that the 
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founding of UNCTAD “exploded the myth that all countries are economically equal.”273  
The selection of Prebisch as the inaugural Secretary General confirmed the terms of trade 
thesis as a dominant Third World belief. 
For many Third World leaders, statehood had become just the beginning of a 
post-independence drive for economic growth.274  The doctrine of unequal exchange 
gained traction throughout the 1960s and UNCTAD evolved into a sort of Third World 
think-tank.  The terms of trade theory was an existential challenge to the structure of the 
international economy, which like the Law of the Sea, was perceived to have been 
created by imperial powers to maintain imperial inequalities.  Likewise, permanent 
sovereignty increasingly symbolized the post-colonial determination to move beyond the 
political sovereignty of decolonization and challenge the exploitative nature of the Cold 
War political economy.  In the words of the Pakistani development economist Mahbub ul 
Haq, the terms of trade theory was “a natural stage in the liberation [struggle] of the 
developing countries.”275 Jagdish Bhagwati wrote in a popular textbook in 1966, “The 
biased allocation of world affluence to the white race lends an ugly and dangerous accent 
to a situation that is explosive enough in itself.”276 
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The application of permanent sovereignty continued to be a diplomatic solution to 
the dilemma of economic liberation. In 1962, the General Assembly codified an 
economic “bill of rights” positing the inalienable privilege of nations over their natural 
wealth. During the UN debate, the Syrian delegate expressed the view that the resolution 
formed “‘a new legal basis’ for the relationship between developed and the 
underdeveloped countries.”   The U.S. delegation continued to hold otherwise and 
emphasized that the resolution was nonbinding.  Furthermore, the American ambassador 
maintained that the diplomatic practice of permanent sovereignty violated “the 
obligations of national sovereignty.”  The argument denied permanent sovereignty as a 
fundamental right and maintained “the supremacy of international law over domestic 
legislation.” Several countries responded that “economic self-determination” was indeed 
a right, but the United States made clear that its acceptance of the principle of permanent 
sovereignty was linked to what it considered the responsibility of states in using it.  “The 
crux of the question,” the U.S. delegation held, “was whether contracts would be 
observed, for if this was not the case, there would be no foreign investments.”277 
A lengthy debate in the Permanent Sovereignty Committee of UNESCO laid bare 
the opposing positions of the United States and the Third World.  After proposing a 
resolution designed to protect international investment, the U.S. delegation noted “the 
binding nature of agreements concerning foreign investments including agreements by 
States with private investors.”  The Iraqi delegation, whose nationalist leaders had been 
                                                 
277 Karol N. Gess, “Permanent Sovereignty at the United Nations: An Analytical Review of the United 
Nations Declaration and Its Genesis,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 13: 2 (Apr. 
1964): 409-450, quotes at 410, 412, 416, 414, and 437.  This article closely examines the 1962 resolution’s 
“doctrinal effect” on international law. 
 109 
in a dispute with the multinational oil companies since their 1958 revolution, responded.   
It was illogical for a UN resolution to preserve unfair contracts between companies and 
states.  Rather, the UN existed to emphasize “the inalienable right of sovereign states to 
nationalise, expropriate,” and take all measures to ensure “complete sovereignty over 
anything which is theirs.”  Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Libya, Yugoslavia, 
Tanganyika, and Uganda joined Iraq in voting against American provisions ensuring 
external legal remedies for international contracts.278 
The Algerian ambassador argued against the continuity of international contracts 
signed under colonial rule in the ensuing General Assembly debate.  Failure to recognize 
new nations’ sovereignty was akin to maintaining the validity of colonialism, he said.   It 
was necessary to differentiate between contracts freely entered into and those concluded 
while one party was under colonial rule.  Peoples and nations “who were basically 
sovereign” could not lose their inherent sovereignty during their time under colonial rule.  
Rather, sovereignty had only been suppressed.  The return of sovereignty forced new 
national leaders to reexamine any agreements made while under colonial status. If such 
agreements were found wanting, sovereignty should be “restored to normal.”   Thus, 
permanent sovereignty implied the need for new agreements between Prebisch’s center 
and periphery.  The control of former colonies over their natural resources should not be 
compromised by any “alleged rights acquired before accession to full national 
sovereignty.”279 
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The debates before the 1962 resolution showed that “the topic is one that can 
inflame a good deal of passion,” one observer wrote.  “Economic pragmatism,” however, 
remained a constraint to action.  Advocates of overturning the terms of trade “realized the 
mere possession of resources and the State’s assertion of its permanent sovereignty over 
them would do little to move such resources from their underground deposits into world 
trade channels.280  
Permanent sovereignty nevertheless had become a conspicuous idea in the half 
decade before the 1967 oil ebargo.  The debate over its practice continued to move from 
the conference tables of academia and the halls of the UN into the more public arena of 
the international political economy.  Later in 1962, for example, the president of Ghana, 
Kwame Nkrumah, told African guerillas in Accra that “the imperialists and colonialists 
are determined to retain the African countries in the position of suppliers of cheap raw 
material.”  In a speech to the national assembly, Nkrumah held that trade relations 
consolidated the strength of a “rich Europe...against the poorer nations of the world.”  
The latter received “less and less for their raw materials while the industrialized nations 
were getting more and more for their exports of manufactures.” Also in 1962, the third 
Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) conference warned from 
Tanganyika of the economic power of a “united imperialist front” that sought “the 
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penetration of foreign capital for political subversion through an economic stranglehold 
on developing countries.”281 
Officials in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations did not take such positions 
seriously.  Three years after the Tanganyika conference, Che Guevara spoke to the 
AAPSO conference in Algiers.  In keeping with the emphasis on redressing post-colonial 
economic grievances, Guevara stressed the need to change “low world market prices for 
raw materials.”  The State Department acidly reported that his speech called for “a 
program couched more in moral imperatives than economic realities—a viewpoint 
holding considerable attraction for underdeveloped nations.”282 
 If the State Department considered the pursuit of permanent sovereignty a futile 
exercise in radical rhetoric in 1965, events soon compelled reconsideration.  The General 
Assembly adopted a stronger resolution on natural resources and national wealth in 1966.  
As in previous resolutions, the declaration emphasized the link between national self-
determination and raw material control.  Moving further, it called for “mutually 
acceptable contractual practices” that would increase the share of Third World 
governments in “the administration of enterprises which are fully or partially operated by 
foreign capital.”283 
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In the Generally Assembly debate on the new resolution, ambassadors from Third 
World nations predictably decried the international terms of trade as a vestige of 
imperialism. Standing against this line of reasoning, the U.S. ambassador drew their ire 
by declaring “it would be a mistake” to give national governments greater participation in 
production “regardless of the practical considerations of contractual obligations and the 
equity of the case.”  With six abstentions, including the United States’, the resolution 
entitled “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources” passed 104 to zero.  The 
journal World Petroleum described the outcome as “the pragmatic consequence of the 
age of equality among countries.”284 
Months later the prospect of the Arab oil-producers’ sovereignty unnerved many 
Western leaders, including the British prime minister.  Harold Wilson had steadily (but 
not stealthily) backed away from his early commitment to innocent passage.  First he 
publicly recalled recalling the uncertainty regarding the international status of Aqaba 
expressed in 1957 by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld.  The Pentagon took note of 
the “softening position.”285  Then he wrote Johnson of the “immense dangers” of 
superpower confrontation “in a part of the world where neither side can confidently 
expect to control the passions or reactions of the local participants.”286  The “dramatic 
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prospect of great power confrontation,” he added two days later, was such “as to make it 
essential that everything is done to avoid it.”287 
Despite the Cold War content of these letters, invoking superpower conflict barely 
concealed Wilson’s greater concerns about the grave economic troubles gripping Great 
Britain.  The remnants of the British Empire in the Middle East haunted the debate.  Two 
weeks before the Tiran crisis began, the European Economic Community rejected the 
British bid for entry for the second time in five years.  In a drastic response, British 
sterling reserves fell by over $300 million in the first half of May, increasing pressure to 
devalue the pound and reduce defense requirements East of Suez.288   
The sterling outflow called attention to the growing financial power of certain oil-
producing countries.  As a result of rampant monetary speculation, Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia now held two-thirds of the remaining sterling reserve, approximately $2 billion.  
This led State Department officials to fear that “the Arabs could precipitate a run on the 
sterling that could literally almost bankrupt the British.”289  London’s financial infirmity 
compounded unease in Washington, where policymakers knew the dollar would not be 
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spared the monetary consequences of a sterling run because of the international gold 
market.290   
The American defensive gold stock was “virtually exhausted,” the State 
Department continued.  “[T]he already massive demand” for gold would only increase in 
the case of “economic war or even the threat of such a war.” The effects of this global 
dynamic would further weaken the dollar.291  The Johnson administration believed that a 
petro-pound withdrawal could force the United States into a no-win situation.  The 
Treasury Department would need to decide whether or not to sell large amounts of gold.  
A gold sale would hold the dollar’s price in the London market, but further gut its value.  
Alternatively, the Treasury could let the price of the dollar float, with the attendant risks 
for world economic stability.292 
To parry the thrust of potential Arab economic diplomacy, the United States 
wielded few weapons.  Previously, foreign aid had served as a traditional arrow in the 
American diplomatic quiver.293  Owing to the relative peace in the Middle East and the 
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increase in regional development capital from oil receipts in the decade after the Suez 
crisis, the State Department had concluded in 1965 that “there would be no substantial 
political benefit from an aid relationship.”294  Officials lamented during the Tiran crisis 
that the United States had “run down our aid programs close to the vanishing point.”295    
In the case of an oil embargo, the Johnson administration considered other 
options, including the denial of the oil producers’ access to finance capital, including the 
$2 billion in London and more than $700 million in New York.  The administration 
decided that such a bold ove was unwise.  Given “the powerful economic weapons” the 
producers could “use against the Atlantic nations,” the State Department concluded that 
this option was “more a gun at our head than at theirs.”296 
THE ARAB OIL WEAPON 
Nasser brought the Arab oil producers into the pan-Arab fold of permanent sovereignty.  
The transnational Arab media was central to his strategy as the crisis wore on.  At a press 
conference in Cairo on May 25, a Kuwaiti correspondent pointedly inquired about the use 
of “Arab oil as a weapon in battle.”  Nasser responded with verve, linking oil to pan-Arab 
nationalism.  “I believe that all weapons must be used in this battle, whether by 
governments or by the people,” he said in a scarcely veiled warning to the oil 
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producers.297  The threat of popular action was enough to bring the Arab oil ministers to 
Baghdad on June 4.  There, the conferees unanimously decided that oil would be denied 
to all countries supporting Israel in case of war.298 
Scholars still disagree almost a half-century later over whom to blame for the 
beginning of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.299  It is certain, though, that soon after Israel 
applied the doctrine of preemptive warfare, Nasser instructed Radio Cairo to broadcast 
the charge that U.S. and British aircraft participated in the attack.  Immediately, Iraq cut 
off oil shipments to the two countries for their “military assistance to the enemy.”  The 
other Arab producers quickly followed suit.300   
Anti-American riots broke out across the Arab world, in what one State 
Department official called the “continued polarization...of the political scene.”301  The 
International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions again urged workers to sabotage 
pipelines and oil rigs.  Bahraini officials closed down production in two refineries owing 
to labor stoppage.302  In Saudi Arabia, petroleum minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani told 
Aramco officials that they would be held “gravely responsible if any drop of our oil” 
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reached the United States or Great Britain.303 On June 8, as Israeli freighters triumphantly 
prepared to sail through Tiran, Kuwaiti oil workers also walked out.304  The offices of 
Standard Oil in Algeria were taken over and repainted in the colors the state-owned oil 
company.305 
Anti-western actions, especially the government-supported oil stoppages in Saudi 
Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait, were designed as much for popular pan-Arab consumption as 
for using permanent sovereignty to alter the United States’ position on Israel.306  But the 
1967 oil embargo also heralded a change in the context in which U.S. foreign relations 
operated.  The transformation of the idea of permanent sovereignty into functional 
diplomacy threatened to upend the structural imbalance that Prebisch, Nasser, and the 
leaders of OPEC considered a vestige of economic imperialism.  Nasser’s merger of the 
Arab oil producers with Guevara’s “moral imperatives,” Nkrumah, Tito, and Sukarno’s 
“imperialist” concerns, and Prebisch’s terms of trade presented a real and present danger 
to international economic stability.  Even though the most important Arab producers—the 
pro-American monarchies that ruled Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya—were dragooned 
into collaboration grudgingly, the strategic position of Arab oil production in 1967 
introduced a fundamental challenge to the postwar petroleum order.   
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The most immediate area of concern for American policymakers was Vietnam, 
where the oil embargo potentially affected operations.  Middle East production provided 
75 percent of monthly military requirements in Southeast Asia, including all aviation 
fuel.307  In the case of an extended embargo, the State Department observed, military 
supply would need to be rerouted from the Western hemisphere.  The deviation would 
“probably require production controls and product allocations in the United States,” the 
State Department observed.308  
 Within the broader context of the international economy, the possible effects of 
the Arab embargo on the war in Vietnam was a secondary concern.  Western 
preoccupations are more fully understood within the larger framework of the effects of 
decolonization on the corporatist separation of international politics and economics.  If 
the UN resolutions on permanent sovereignty recognized the political power of peripheral 
production, the oil embargo reinforced that potential by removing a necessary component 
of stability of the international political economy, energy security.  American officials’ 
working definition of energy security drew on recent history.  The United States had 
become increasingly conscious of the industrialized world’s dependence on raw materials 
during World War II.  After the war, especially following Stalin’s refusal to commit 
Eastern European coal to Western European reconstruction, officials framed much of the 
Third World’s strategic importance in terms first of European and Japanese 
reconstruction and, then, of the continued economic growth of those countries.  To this 
                                                 
307“Official Report of Proceedings before the U.S. Department of the Interior, March 31, 1965,” LBJL EX 
TA 6 Oil 19; CSM-310-67, Appendix E, June 2, 1967, LBJL NSF 107. 
308 “The Working Group on Economic Vulnerabilities,” May 20, 1967, LBJL NSF 106. 
 119 
end, American policy had favored the same terms of trade, based on inexpensive raw 
materials, that Prebisch and others bemoaned. 
 Industrial strength, economic productivity, and the generation of wealth were 
primary components of the American strategy of containment in the Cold War. The 
Johnson administration inherited this legacy.  As Johnson told Pentagon officials in 1964, 
“We are the richest nation in the history of the world.  We can afford to spend whatever 
is needed to keep this country safe and to keep our freedom secure.”309  Similarly, as the 
American system of mass production and consumption spread to Europe and Japan, the 
post-war premise of liberal capitalism proved successful across national boundaries.310  
Energy-intensive industrial production was central to the process.  As recovery gained 
speed, national appetites for energy grew.  The member states of the Organisation of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) consumed 60 percent of the world’s 
energy by 1966. When the 1967 embargo began, the Middle East provided Western 
Europe with almost two-thirds of its total oil imports.311 
The rising importance of Middle Eastern oil occurred at the same time as 
decolonization changed the landscape of the international political economy.  After 16 
African nations joined the UN in 1960, the number of people under some sort of colonial 
rule had declined from 750 million to fewer than 40 million in just a decade.  The leaders 
of new nations overwhelmingly distanced themselves from the Cold War.  “Adherents of 
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the neutralist philosophy” represented “almost one-third of humanity,” over 1 billion 
people, one observer wrote in 1962.312  One effect of this transition was a greater 
emphasis on national economic development.  Many leaders of new nations, especially 
advocates of permanent sovereignty, began to contest the “court vernacular” of 
development thought, modernization theory.313  As UN membership grew and the Cold 
War superpowers sought ideological allegiance through their development policies, Third 
World development thinkers questioned the universal nature of Soviet and American 
ideas of economic development.   
The advocates of permanent sovereignty did not disagree with the broadest 
assumption of modernization theory, that capital accumulation was necessary for 
economic growth.  They did disagree with Walt Rostow’s classic 1956 assertion that a 
rapid transformation could occur in “a relatively brief time interval of two or three 
decades.”  They also took umbrage with his 1960 assertion that this “take-off” point 
could easily occur if “traditional societies” left their future to a technologically proficient 
and entrepreneurial elite.  Simon Kuznets, the economist who had criticized Prebisch 
trenchantly during the previous half-decade, believed Rostow’s definition of 
modernization carried “the danger of misleading us into believing that the suggested 
                                                 
312 Crabbe, “American Diplomatic Tactics and Neutralism,” 418. 
313 Nick Cullather, “Development? It’s History,” Diplomatic History 24: 4 (2000): 641; John Toye and 
Richard Toye, The UN and the Global Political Economy: Trade, Finance, Development (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2004), 163-183. 
 121 
connotations are relevant to observable reality.”  The amount of capital available, 
Kuznets and others believed, did not match up to the tasks at hand.314   
Hans Singer, the German economist who developed the terms of trade thesis 
alongside Prebisch, found modernization theory more appealing than Kuznets did.  But, 
he still disagreed with the American emphasis on foreign aid and investment.315  A 
“gathering conviction” existed “that things cannot be allowed to go on as they are,” he 
wrote in 1961.  “It simply does not make sense to expand aid programs and help the 
underdeveloped countries along while at the same time they are allowed to lose on the 
swings of trade.”316  Prebisch agreed. Although he was an early supporter of the Alliance 
for Progress, he soon criticized it on similar grounds.  The “late industrializers” he had 
written about in 1949—the United States, Germany, and Japan—had been able to gain 
the necessary capital for development because they had constructed tariff walls around 
their nascent industrial economies.  If the periphery was not allowed similar leeway with 
tariffs, its development would be stillborn.317 
One economist wrote afterwards that Prebisch’s critique merited the respect of his 
status as “the dean and elder statesmen among specialists.”  His work “generated a wider 
and more protracted discussion among specialists than any other proposition related to 
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the field of Latin American economics.”318   In 1967, his theories would receive a fillip 
with the publication of André Gunder Frank’s Capitalism and Underdevelopment in 
Latin America, which was published by the Monthly Review Press and reached a much 
wider popular audience.319  By 1973, Gunder Frank would note that the doctrine 
“penetrated ever wider circles,” thanks to the “subjective intentions and self-perceptions” 
of a group of “prominent ECLA economists-ideologues” led by Prebisch and including 
Aldo Ferrer, Celso Furtado, Maria de Conceção Tavares, Aníbal Pinto, and Osvaldo 
Sunkel.320 
The Arab oil embargo and the doctrine of permanent sovereignty also threatened 
the international status quo by providing fodder for Malthusian critiques of the United 
States’ “cowboy” economy at home and abroad.321 The embargo called into question 
something more fundamental than the strategic concept of energy security.  It loomed 
over the postwar formula of high growth, high consumption, and low unemployment that 
had come to define American and increasingly Western culture.322  In May, the 
Department of the Interior concluded that the extended loss of Kuwait and Saudi Arabian 
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production would cause “serious disturbances” in the national economy.323  The CIA had 
its own reasons for anxiety. The economic impact of an embargo would be severe within 
six months.  “There would be a decline of perhaps twenty percent in the industrial 
consumption of primary energy,” one analyst observed, “which would cause a sharp 
decline in production.”324 The products that defined American consumer culture were at 
risk because of instability in the Middle East. 
As it threatened to derail two decades of economic growth, the embargo also 
unsettled relations within the North Atlantic alliance.  Much to the chagrin of the Johnson 
administration, the French government began to encourage bilateral diplomacy between 
producing and consuming nations. The issue would bedevil U.S. officials for years.  
American policymakers believed that bilateral deals would create nationalistic 
competition among consumers, undermine the price benefits of the privately controlled 
international oil market, and prevent a rapid solution to the potential supply crisis 
presented by the embargo.   The dispute over the relative merits of Western cohesion 
came to a head at a June 1967 meeting of the OECD Oil Committee.325  On the table was 
an American proposal for to officially declare the embargo an emergency.  Doing so 
would allow the Johnson administration to authorize a temporary suspension of American 
antitrust legislation under the 1950 Defense Production Act.  The suspension of anti-trust 
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laws would allow the American multinational oil companies to work with each other and 
with European companies and governments to solve supply problems.326 
The meeting began with a French objection to the “provocative” nature of a 
united consumer effort.  Anything but a quiet Western front would cause a dangerous 
polarization between oil consumers and producers, the French delegates argued.  Angus 
Beckett— twenty years after helping to construct the postwar petroleum order, now the 
permanent chair of the committee—described the French position as “sitting on our 
bottoms and doing nothing.”   The French withdrew from debate.  Now unimpeded, the 
group debated whether to declare the embargo an official emergency.  The committee 
rejected the declaration but did create a plan to circumvent the embargo by taking 
advantage of the oil producers’ difficulty of detecting shipments on the high seas.327 
American concern about oil supplies grew when West Germany tilted toward 
French policy in mid-June 1967.  In a conversation with the German economic minister, 
Karl Schiller, Eugene Rostow emphasized the necessity of international cooperation to 
minimize the impact of the embargo.  In a tone “disturbing” to Rostow, Schiller “entered 
into a lengthy diatribe” about American companies’ domination of the German energy 
market.  Schiller would initiate a national energy policy should it become necessary to do 
so.  Rostow responded that the idea was short-sighted.  “Western cohesion would have a 
beneficial effect on conservative oil producers since it would strengthen their hand in 
arguing that Nasser was damaging Arab interests and would show that hard Arab line not 
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likely to succeed,” he told Schiller.  “On the other hand, if we do not have a common 
stand, we will be picked off one by one.”328 
Rostow understood that major changes had taken place in the international 
economy.  Not only had permanent sovereignty gained influence as a central plank to the 
Third World platform, but the basic assumptions of energy security had begun to change.  
In 1964, the German émigré economist E. F. Schumacher had warned that “no substitute 
existed for energy.  The whole edifice of modern life is built upon it.”  As a finite 
resource, oil reserves would dwindle and exporters would seek to capture a larger share 
of profits.  Specifically, Schumacher warned of overdependence on Middle Eastern oil.  
The world’s most unstable countries held the cheapest oil. “Faced with such uncertainty, 
it is tempting to abandon the quest for a long-term view and simply hope for the best,” he 
wrote.329 
French and German obduracy owed in part to initially favorable prospects for 
continued supply.  Their confidence resulted from French bilateral agreements with 
Algeria, Libya, and Iraq, as well as shared measures, including three-month storage 
requirements for petroleum and national tanker fleets.  But, French and German attitudes 
toward cooperation began to change when leaders realized that exports might not 
promptly resume.  Both countries acquiesced in the Oil Committee in July, enabling the 
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emergency statement.330  The resultant cooperation between the industrial nations and the 
multinational oil companies allowed the companies to meet the European shortage 
through increased Venezuelan, Iranian, and U.S. exports.331 
GONE THE WINE FUMES 
For all the ink spilled on the embargo in the White House and the State Department, its 
outcome made those concerns seem anticlimactic.  Early on, one State Department 
official confidently reminded Johnson, “We must remember that the Arabs never stick 
together for long.”332  Indeed, since the formation of OPEC in August 1960, a split 
existed between what State Department officials termed the Arab “moderates”—the 
monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya—and the “radicals,” led by Iraq.  The 
embargo reinforced OPEC’s reputation as an ineffective body, renowned above all for the 
mutual mistrust of its members.  The disagreements between the moderates and radicals 
in 1967 trumped the notion of a collectively held sense of sovereignty in OPEC.  
The moderates immediately worked to limit the duration and magnitude of the 
embargo.  According to the U.S. ambassador in Kuwait, the embargo was “an extremely 
delicate and dangerous game of proving their Arabism and at same time not jeopardizing 
their long-range interest in keeping oil flowing.”333  All three governments affirmed his 
belief that the monarchies would not jeopardize production.  Instead of aiding the Arab 
effort against Israel, Kuwait deployed tanks to the north, “out of concern for possible 
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Iraqi moves.” The Kuwaiti government also approached the American ambassador about 
secretly contravening it by using the “bedu chicanery” of changing tanker manifests.334 
On the same day, Saudi Oil Minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani proposed his own form 
of chicanery to an Aramco executive.  Yamani had replaced Abdullah al-Tariki in 1962.  
One of the first Saudis to be trained in the United States, Yamani had gained the 
reputation as a friend of the West in the half-decade since his appointment.335  He told the 
executive that a visiting Iraqi delegation had urged “vigorous measures,” including 
nationalization, to protest the U.S. support of Israel.  Yamani invited the oilman to a 
meeting with Iraqi officials on the following day.  He instructed the executive to defend 
his role as a conduit between Western and Arab governments and to urge the Johnson 
administration “to use their best efforts” to see negate the recent territorial gains of Israel.  
“I know your government willing to give this assurance,” Yamani told the executive.336  
The State Department was willing indeed. McGeorge Bundy, on loan from the Ford 
Foundation to lead the NSC emergency committee on the crisis, advised Johnson to give 
companies “some U.S. statement or action for which they can claim partial credit.”337 
Libya also sought to shorten the embargo.  In a June 1967 telegram to Tripoli, 
Dean Rusk requested that the ambassador discuss oil supply with King Idris.338   Idris told 
the ambassador that the oil stoppage was “particularly regrettable,” but also said that he 
                                                 
334 CIA Intelligence Information Cable, June 8, 1967, LBJL NSF 107; FRUS XXXIV, 238. Embassy in 
Kuwait to the DOS, June 10, 1967. 
335 Steffen Hertog, “Petromin: The Slow Death of Statist Oil Development in Saudi Arabia,” Business 
History 50: 5 (2008): 645-667; Robert Lacey. The Kingdom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1981), 339-340; Robert Vitalis, America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2007), 233-234. 
336 FRUS XXXIV, 238. Aramco cable PC 683, June 10, 1967, editorial note.  
337 FRUS, 1964-1968, XXXIV, 256. Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the NSC Special 
Committee to Johnson, July 10, 1967.   
338 Telegram, Libya to DOS, June 22, 1967, National Archives and Records Administration, Records of the 
State Department, Central Foreign Policy Files (hereafter,  NARA, RG 59, CFP 1967-1969),  PET 17-1 
LIBYA; Telegram 213238 to Tripoli, June 20, 1967, NARA, RG 59, CFP 1967-1969, PET 17-1 LIBYA. 
 128 
could not order the resumption of production “for appearances’ sake.”339  Nevertheless, 
Libya began to secretly break the embargo in early August, through direct exports to 
West Germany and indirect shipments via Canada and Ireland to the United States and 
the United Kingdom.340 
A public quarrel between Saudi Arabia and Iraq revealed the extent of the schism 
dividing the moderate and radical Arab oil producers.  Yamani told the Financial Times 
that if the embargo continued the Arab world “stood to lose as much economically as 
they had already lost territorially.”341  Dean Rusk welcomed evidence of Saudi 
“enlightened self-interest.”342  The New York Times reported, “The Arabs, as usual, had a 
proverb to fit the situation.  Rahet al-sakra; waijit al-fakra.”  The newspaper slickly 
translated the couplet: “Gone the wine fumes; thinking resumes.”343   
A different rhyme applied in Iraq.  Prime Minister Tahir Yahya told the Iraq 
News Agency that the embargo would continue indefinitely, notwithstanding the “losses 
we suffer for the sake of the Arab nation.”344  After the King of Jordan’s official denial of 
Anglo-American collusion in the initial Israeli air attack in July, Saudi-based Jedda Radio 
argued that the embargo was no longer valid.  Yahya responded by accusing the Saudis of 
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deserting the Arab cause.  Al Ahram, the influential daily newspaper in Cairo, called the 
Saudi pronouncement a “shameful act.”345 
The moderate monarchies continued to posit that the loss of oil receipts had 
become a serious problem.  In mid-July, Kuwait and Libya announced that the embargo 
had cost each government approximately £1 million and $1.5 million per day.346  These 
losses, Yamani worried, would translate into a new regional balance of power: “Iran is 
going to become the largest oil-producing state in the Middle East and probably the 
world.”347  Iran and Venezuela took advantage of Arab production cuts to increase their 
market shares, in a raw display of the internecine tensions that had plagued OPEC in the 
previous decade.348  Commenting on Arab oil policies to Dean Rusk, the Shah of Iran 
said, “[I]t was ridiculous for any Arab to believe that the West could really be hurt by an 
Arab oil embargo.”  Production from Venezuela, Iran, and the United States could more 
than cover the gap.349 
By late August, the embargo had failed.  On August 29, the Arab heads of state 
met in Khartoum.  The resultant communiqué is most famous for its “three no’s”—no 
                                                 
345 “Saudi Call to Resume Oil Supplies,” The Times (London), July 8, 1967; “Soviet Warships to Visit 2 
Egyptian Ports Today,” New York Times, July 10, 1967. 
346 Here it is better to report each earnings loss as reported by the governments, especially given instability 
in the currency spot rates between May and Novermber 1967.  See Michael Bordo, Michael Oliver, Ronald 
MacDonald, “Sterling in Crisis: 1964-1967,” NBER Working Paper Series 14657 (January 2009), 8-10. 
347Middle East Economic Digest: Weekly Report 11: 26 (July 6, 1967): 478.   
348 Jane Perry Clark Carey, “Iran and Control of Its Oil Resources,” Political Science Quarterly 89: 1 
(March 1974): 147-174; Stephen G. Rabe, The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela, 
1919-1976 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982).   
349 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII, Iran (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O, 
1999), 231. Memorandum of Conversation, “Oil and Gas,” August 23, 1967.  On Iranian and Venezuelan 
policy, see: FRUS, 1964-1968, XII, 229. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, 
August 23, 1967; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central 
America; Mexico (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O, 2004), 542. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the 
Department of State, June 7, 1967; FRUS, 1964-1968, XXXI, 543. Memorandum From the President's 
Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, July 28, 1967. 
 
 
 130 
peace, no recognition, and no negotiation with Israel.  However, Khartoum had other 
consequences.  Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait would pay approximately $378 million 
a year of reconstruction aid to Egypt and Jordan.  In return, Nasser promised to remove 
Egyptian troops from Yemen, and the conservative producers received his approval to 
resume full oil shipments to the West without accusations of betrayal.350  
A DOOMSDAY SCENARIO? 
The Khartoum payments extended well into the following decade and soon became a 
central means of financial support for Palestinian front-line organizations.351  The August 
1967 communiqué also employed the discourse of permanent sovereignty, noting that 
“Arab oil...is an Arab asset which can be put to use in the service of Arab aims.”352 
Still, the embargo ended with a whimper, not a bang. There was no dramatic rise 
in oil prices, nor had Arab oil power changed U.S. policy.  Robert Dunlop, a government 
consultant and the president of Sun Oil Company, wrote a morality tale to this effect in 
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Oil magazine.  A friend had embarked on that great American summer vacation, a road 
trip.  Throughout his 2000-mile drive, he had been blissfully unaware of the embargo. “It 
surely did not occur to him that shortly after he started his trip, the most massive 
disruption of Free World petroleum supplies in history occurred,” Dunlop wrote.  More 
to his point, “his fellow-Americans, going about their normal business at work or at play, 
were untouched too.”353 
The orthodoxy of energy security did not escape unscathed.  An immediate 
renewal of confidence expressed after the Khartoum summit masked the vulnerability 
exposed by the crisis.  The tension between confidence and vulnerability pulled strategic 
thought about foreign oil in opposite directions. A long memo by the assistant secretary 
for economic affairs, Anthony Solomon, displayed the conflicting ideas.  Solomon 
described the “doomsday scenario” put forth by Walter Levy.  Levy, now a renowned 
independent analyst, believed the embargo could have ended much worse than it did, 
with unmanageable shortages that threatened “the united political and oil front of the free 
world.”  Although Solomon agreed with Levy’s “chamber of horrors” in the event of total 
oil denial, he doubted that case would ever materialize.  In any other case, he wrote, “the 
national economy itself could be manipulated to provide the resources necessary to 
sustain the world economy.”354 
Other officials shared Levy’s concern.  They held a more cautious, nuanced view, 
in which the politics of decolonization could undermine accepted economic orthodoxies.  
In late June 1967, CIA director John McCone told the National Security Council that oil 
could no longer be “dismissed as purely a commercial and vested interest.”  In the 
context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, he believed that the corporatist perspective was 
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increasingly obtuse.  “Public indoctrination by Radio Cairo” had placed the “the friendly 
regimes” in an impossible position.  Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait could not take a 
public stand against the embargo “for fear of the indignation of the masses which, 
whipped up by Cairo propaganda, might even cause [their] overthrow.”  Oil reserves in 
Western Europe had dropped quickly as a result of Saudi Arabia’s policy to avoid 
shipments through the trans-Arabian pipeline as long as it ran through occupied territory.  
If production did not resume to pre-1967 levels, it would pose “all kinds of trouble” for 
the European economy.355 
The conflicting positions set confidence in opposition to concern, demarcating the 
boundaries of a debate over energy security that continued through the Cold War and 
beyond.  On one level, the dispute between bureaucratic actors and hired consultants was 
about the ability of the U.S. government to weather an admittedly ephemeral challenge.  
But the 1967 oil embargo also revealed deep strains in the corporatist logic that underlay 
energy security.  The disagreement reflected contradictory conceptions of the long-term 
strategic power of permanent sovereignty, especially in the hands of the oil producers.  
Many actors began to believe that the oil-producing nations could affect American global 
priorities. 
Along a parallel track, the practice of permanent sovereignty by the Arab 
producers threatened to unsettle superpower relations.  At the beginning of the Tiran 
crisis, Secretary of State Dean Rusk wrote that the United Arab Republic and the Soviet 
Union shared the same goals: “Nasser’s ascendancy in the Arab world and Soviet control 
of oil and other interests vital to the security of...the free world generally.”356   Former 
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Vice President Richard Nixon agreed.  If the situation persisted, he warned Rusk in a 
June 1967 letter, “we will have given the Soviet Union an unparalleled opportunity to 
extend its influence in the Arab world to the detriment of vastly important United States 
and free world interests.”357 
Despite the Kremlin’s belligerent Cold War rhetoric, Moscow showed interest in 
averting conflict.358  The chief-of-state hot-line, installed after the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
had been silent since.  Now, it had “been revived by the Soviets with a vengeance,” one 
NSC official wrote Eugene Rostow.  “We may have something we can build on.”359  
Indeed, for some, the desire for order in the Middle East seemed to open the way for a 
broader superpower détente.  Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Columbia University professor on 
Rusk’s Policy Planning Council, used the changing circumstances to draw into sharp 
focus the relationship between the United States’ regional concerns in the Middle East 
and its global hegemonic responsibilities.  A day after the war began, Brzezinski sent a 
memo to Rostow with a handwritten note attached, “Here’s an idea, for what it’s worth.”  
Perhaps the “unwanted problems” of the Middle East could be linked to “strategic 
difficulties” in Vietnam.  Following this line of reasoning, the administration could 
respond to the hot-line renewal with “an act of statesmanship and imagination.”  Because 
Soviet leaders seemed “anxious,” Johnson could capitulate with “a short and dramatic 
television speech” linking peace in the Middle East with peace in Vietnam.  He could 
unilaterally proclaim a ceasefire in Southeast Asia and simultaneously call on the Soviet 
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Union to “encourage Hanoi to halt its military operations, its infiltration, and to begin 
negotiations.”360 
Although he knew that such an audacious change in policy was implausible, 
Brzezinski had a point.  Cooperation in one region could lead to compromise in another.  
Invoking the strategy of linkage that was en vogue in realist intellectual circles, 
Brzezinski argued that the Cold War had become a series of inextricable conflicts.361  
Within the dense web, the international economy would increasingly become contested 
terrain.  As concern over the Tiran crisis and embargo demonstrated, the changing 
circumstances of the international economy had diffused power from the center.362  
Against this backdrop, imaginative reassessments of orthodox Cold War policy became 
increasingly necessary.363  In Brzezinski’s rendering, the connection of two problems in 
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foreign policy within the larger international framework made possible thoughts easing 
superpower tensions.  Brzezinski understood foreign relations as a series of interlocked 
relationships and used connections between disparate events in the Third World to join 
the Cold War opponents in an integrated vision of international security.   
LONGER PATTERNS IN A MOMENT OF CRISIS 
American policymakers recognized that permanent sovereignty posed an acute threat to 
international economic stability in the summer of 1967.  In one sense, the oil embargo  
was a test of the integrity of national security at a moment of crisis.  In this moment, a 
disturbing pattern quickly emerged: The United States lacked the capacity to obtain a 
favorable settlement at every turn.  The inability to muster either a persuasive maritime 
argument or a convincing naval force revealed that the U.S. government could employ 
neither law nor order on its behalf.  A hamstrung military suggested the need to reassess 
the global balance of forces.   American diplomacy seemed feeble in the face of the post-
colonial politics of permanent sovereignty.   
The industrial West nonetheless weathered the embargo with relative ease.  
Orthodox assumptions about energy security received new and perhaps unwarranted life. 
Traditional strategic thinking prevailed in the United States and oil policy retained its ad 
hoc character into the Nixon administration.  Soon Nixon would reprise Johnson’s 
inability to formulate a policy framework for dealing with the deep-seated political and 
economic challenges of permanent sovereignty and the Arab oil producers’ increasingly 
sophisticated use of oil power.  Washington would continue to lack a coherent policy for 
dealing with the centrifugal forces unleashed by permanent sovereignty.   
                                                                                                                                                 
interpreted as an integrative framework of international security.  From this perspective, détente reacted as 
much to decolonization and the rise of anti-colonial nationalism as it was pro-active.    
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The events of the summer of 1967 set the stage for even more drastic changes in 
the international economy in the near future.  Over the next two years, the disappearance 
of U.S. spare production capacity, the formation and radicalization of the Organization of 
Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, the British withdrawal from East of Suez, and the 
Libyan revolution would rapidly alter the postwar petroleum order.364   
Moderate oil producers would be swept up in the broader stream of Third World 
permanent sovereignty, the Arab oil weapon redeployed from a regional to an 
international arena. Even so, the potential lessons of the 1967 oil embargo quickly 
receded from public memory.  The embargo was so quickly forgotten that Henry 
Kissinger, a year after the much more successful 1973 embargo, could say without a hint 
of irony, “One embargo…should be enough to underline the implications of 
dependency.”365 
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Chapter 2: In the Wake of Withdrawal, 1967-1971 
The Shah is an oriental despot and the oil executives are dinosaurs.  If they come to 
blows it could be the battle of the century. 
      
State Department Oil Expert James Akins, 1968366 
 
These countries consider their raw materials as their property. That’s just a fact of life.  
 
    Anonymous NSC Official, 1971367 
 
In general, I don’t like to get a brawl started without knowing where the cards are. 
 
Henry Kissinger, 1972368 
 
In the early afternoon sun, American consul James Dinsmore stood in line on the Kuwaiti 
side of the neutral zone.  As he awaited the attentions of a Saudi customs clerk, a man 
suddenly approached his driver and asked pointedly “why he worked for the Americans 
who were the enemies of the Arabs.”  An altercation ensued and the consul intervened, 
pulling his driver back to the car.  “Unable to simmer down,” Dinsmore’s chauffeur 
revealed that the quarrel was not an isolated incident.  He was subject to insults daily.  
Even children commonly ran alongside his car “to call out ‘imperialist.’”369 
Recorded in June 1969, the above vignette epitomized the growing anxiety 
American policymakers felt about the future of the Persian Gulf.  The evidence available 
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pointed to one incontrovertible fact: the British announcement in January 1968 of its 
impending withdrawal from the region, planned for December 1971, threatened regional 
security.  The British imperial project had maintained stability in the region for over a 
century, suppressing Arab dissidence and keeping deep-rooted Arab-Persian antagonisms 
dormant.  Arab nationalism, barely simmering since June 1967, now threatened to boil 
over.  Reports like Dinsmore’s flooded the State Department, with the Arab airwaves 
often telling the story.  Radio stations operating out of Damascus and Baghdad, the public 
voices of the Syrian and Iraqi governments, continuously attacked Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
and Iran for their coziness with the West.  Radio Taiz in Aden added to the anti-Western 
animus by exhorting South Arabians “to deal British imperialism the death blow.”370 
As countless Arab specialists had predicted since 1947, U.S. support for Israel 
had severely eroded American popularity.371  “The Arabs of the Gulf,” the National 
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Security Council wrote gravely in 1970, “are becoming increasingly involved in the 
Arab/Israeli issue.”372  Withdrawal anxiety was a broadly held feeling.  “For God's sake 
act like Britain!” the normally imperturbable U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, roared 
at the British Foreign Secretary, George Brown, when Brown revealed the plan to 
withdraw from the Trucial States and Bahrain.  In this “disturbing and distasteful” 
meeting, Brown reported, Rusk accused Britain of “opting out of our world 
responsibilities.”373 
Rusk’s dismay was more than the reflexive howl of a frustrated hegemon.  
Beneath lay a legitimate concern over the future of the region, in which the United States 
had long relied on British power to defend Western interests.   Rusk cabled Brown soon 
after.  The withdrawal would “feed instability in the region.”374  The imperial pull-out 
faced the lame-duck Johnson administration, to be replaced by that of Richard Nixon in 
just weeks, with a difficult set of questions.  What would happen when the Union Jack 
rolled down?  Would the hidden antagonisms between Iran and its Arab neighbors 
surface?  How would the Soviet Union use its footholds in southern Arabia and Iraq?  
How would pan-Arabism, increasingly fueled by public outcry over Palestine, affect the 
course of events?  In sum, what mixture of forces would fill the British vacuum?    
To meet the challenge, Rusk decided on a policy of building up the conservative 
monarchies of Iran and Saudi Arabia as regional policemen. Later advertised as the 
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“Twin Pillars” policy, American encouragement of trans-Gulf cooperation helped fashion 
a stable United Arab Emirates from the Trucial Sheikhdoms. American policy also was 
largely successful in tamping down the hostilities between Saudi Arabia and Iran and 
encouraging the development of an overwhelmingly a pro-Western region.375    
 Success also bred failure.  As the Johnson and Nixon administrations worked to 
bring Iran and Saudi Arabia into closer dialogue, the monarchies used their new strategic 
position as a lever in their annual earnings negotiations with the multinational oil 
companies.  In an understudied event of great import, the Nixon administration pressured 
the oil companies to meet the income demands of the Gulf sovereigns.  In effect, Nixon 
and his foreign policy team sided with the oil producing nations in the long-running 
dispute over permanent sovereignty.   
PETRO-POUNDS AND THE BRITISH VACUUM 
The change in the valence of permanent sovereignty occurred in complex political and 
ecominic contexts.  Britain’s January 1968 decision to withdraw its last imperial troops 
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from their East-of-Suez stations in Malaysia, Singapore, and the Persian Gulf had been at 
least a decade in the making.  Employing hindsight, pundits of the day noted that the 
1956 Suez Crisis had been the definitive nail in the Empire’s coffin.376  Afterwards, one 
influential commentator wrote, the “‘world role’ East of Suez was a piece of humbug.”377 
This sense of inevitability did not exist within the Labour government of Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson, which had been in office in 1964.378  Before and even after the 
oil-induced sterling crisis in the summer of 1967, Wilson’s cabinet did not make its 
decision to remove troops lightly.379  At the center of the debate was a question of 
priorities.  Was the maintenance of British power abroad worth its cost?  Initially, despite 
obvious signs of economic slowdown, the Wilson government believed it was.  “The 
shadow of economic pressure,” Wilson told Rusk in 1964 and Johnson in 1965, did not 
bring into question the British imperial presence in the Middle East and South Asia.  
When presenting Britain’s annual defense review to U.S. officials in 1966, foreign 
secretary Michael Stewart confirmed that troops would withdraw from Aden sometime 
after 1968, but soothed the worried Rusk by telling him that Persian Gulf forces would be 
increased as a counterweight.380 
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A rapid sequence of events after the 1967 oil embargo changed the British 
outlook.381  The sterling outflow in the month before the Six Day War had increased to 
the point that Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti petro-pounds made up the preponderance of the 
national monetary reserve.  In the following month, Libya and Kuwait withdrew a total of 
41 official funds from British banks operating in the sterling area.382  Nasser’s public 
policy of “inducing the Arab nations to move out of sterling” increased pressure for even 
greater action by the moderate Arab producers.383  The British Treasury quickly noted 
that the effects of “abnormal” movements of Arab funds on the pound sterling reserve 
could not “be at all precise,” but by September the Bank of England attributed a net loss 
of £80 million to Arab actions.384   
By the end of 1967, the economic effects of the Middle East crisis, the Labour 
government’s reflationary measures, and a national dockworkers strike had coalesced to 
drain over £500 million from the reserve.  The empty coffers led officials at Whitehall to 
devalue the pound sterling from $2.80 to $2.40 on November 18, 1967.  The 
ramifications for the dollar and, more broadly, the international financial system would 
be great.385  The sterling devaluation also strengthened the hand of a faction within the 
British cabinet that sought to cut military expenditures.  The combination of a weak 
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pound and continued imperial responsibilities, the cabinet ultimately decided, was not 
feasible.  In early January 1968, at the same time Brown spoke with Rusk, British 
officials told the Gulf rulers that Harold Wilson would soon announce the British 
intention to withdraw all Persian Gulf forces by the end of 1971.386 
It would be difficult to exaggerate the gravity of this decision.  By virtue of its 
massive oil deposits, the Persian Gulf was fundamental to international economic security 
and strategically significant in the Cold War.  When Wilson announced the British 
departure, nobody knew that by 1971 the United Arab Emirates and an independent 
Bahrain would come in to being with Saudi and Iranian support, ensuring stability in the 
lower Arabian Peninsula.  Rather, policymakers feared that the Trucial States and 
Bahrain would join Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the Yemens as new and weak states in the 
region.   
An uprising in Aden had taken a turn for the worse in the past year, heightening 
concern about what could occur in those weak states.  The growth of Nasser-inspired 
Arab nationalism had presented problems for British colonial administrators in southern 
Arabia for over a decade.387  Immediately after the June 1967 war, the U.S. consul 
reported, the situation in Aden had deteriorated “beyond British capacity to repair.”  
What was initially described as a mutiny developed into a majot armed conflict.  The mix 
of British colonial mismanagement and “the growing awareness of Arab 
interdependence...stimulated by Cairo” was akin to “lighting a match in a prewar Czech 
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refinery,” the consul continued.388  After several months of brutal repression by British 
colonial troops, the Marxist National Liberation Front (NLF) came out as the prime local 
power.  When the British High Commissioner recognized the nationalist forces, imperial 
authority collapsed like a broken accordion.  Beleaguered British officials left the colony 
at the end of 1967.389  The NLF declared the People's Democratic Republic of South 
Yemen.390 
The British transferred some of their forces to the Trucial States, foreign secretary 
Michael Stewart told Wilson, “to reassure the Shah of Iran and the King of Saudi Arabia 
about our intentions to maintain and reinforce our position.”391 But ongoing guerrilla 
warfare in Oman and the new Marxist government in South Yemen presaged a salubrious 
climate for dissident activity in the Sheikhdoms.392  Through the Special Police Branch 
and the more famous 1,400-man gendarmerie force, the Trucial Oman Scouts, one 
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primary function of the British presence in the lower Gulf was to provide an effective 
police intelligence capability for curbing dissident activities.393   
The reaction of Persian Gulf leaders to the withdrawal was as serious as that of 
Rusk.  On a whirlwind tour the following week, the British Minister of State met with the 
rulers of Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.  The Kuwaiti 
foreign minister predicted that “there would be chaos” when the British left.  The 
withdrawal “would make way for Soviet influence, which was already spreading fast in 
the Yemeni Republic and South Yemen.”  The Bahraini ruler expressed his “profound 
shock” at the British decision.394  According to the British Special Commissioner, Sir 
William Luce, the fears of the smaller states reflected “their qualms at the prospect of 
moving into the harsh and dangerous world of independence and their anxiety to shelter 
for a little longer under our shield.”395 
Cold War and regional issues complicated matters.  Even before the withdrawal 
announcement, the weakened British position in the Middle East had caused concern.  
The Shah had begun a military build-up in the middle of the decade with a targeted 
completion date of 1968, when the British had initially planned to leave Aden.  “The 
Nasserist threat will become more serious,” he predicted to the U.S. ambassador, Armin 
Meyer.396  The Shah also consistently expressed concern about the “Soviet threat,” telling 
officials that recent developments in Syria and Iraq created the potential for a “Red 
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Crescent” in the region.397  King Faisal agreed. “No doubt the Gulf will fall into the 
maelstrom of unrest which prevails throughout the Middle East,” he told British foreign 
secretary Alec Douglas-Home.398  The Shah and Faisal noted, moreover, that the removal 
of Egyptian troops in Yemen agreed to as part of the 1967 Khartoum proceedings had 
created another sort of vacuum.  “Soviet arms sent to the Yemen Arab Republic after 
Egyptian troops had been withdrawn,” the State Department reported, “have been very 
disturbing to Iran and Saudi Arabia.”399 
The British believed regional disputes provided the greatest possibility for 
instability.  Largest of all, Iran resurrected its 200-year-old territorial claim to Bahrain 
and the “little islands” of the Tunbs and Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf.400  The potential 
for conflict between Iran and the Arab states only increased when the Trucial 
sheikhdoms, including Bahrain, announced the formation of a Federation of Arab 
Emirates in February 1968, an abrupt decision that worried the British government.  The 
decision was “an ambitious project devised and announced with characteristic Arab lack 
of preparation,” one official wrote with Orientalist deprecation.401  The Iranian foreign 
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ministry argued against the inclusion of Bahrain in the new federation, commonly 
referred to as the United Arab Emirates, holding that “the artificial aspect of the hastily-
formed confederation clearly shows that it has been made to the order of the 
Imperialists.”402  To the United States, the Shah accused the British of “double cross.”403 
The most disconcerting conflict, over the median line in the Persian Gulf, was 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia.404  In a strange twist of fate, the British announcement 
coincided with the discovery of large oil reserves on the Saudi side of the line.  The Shah 
repudiated an earlier agreement and began to press claim to part of the undersea 
deposits.405    In January 1968, Saudi oil minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani complained to the 
American ambassador in Jidda, Hermann Eilts, of Iranian “deviousness.” Detailing 
broken promises to stop operations in the area and Iran’s gunboat diplomacy against a 
seaborne Aramco rig, Yamani held that the Shah could “out-Machiavelli Machiavelli.”406 
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The difficulties were daunting.  Above all, the British and the Americans agreed, 
most problems arose from potentially aggressive moves by Iran.  The CIA noted the 
Shah’s “determination to extend his influence in the Persian Gulf as the British depart.”407  
However, neither British nor American officials found this or other related challenges 
insurmountable.  Because of the “endlessly patient negotiating” of the British, it seemed 
unlikely that the transfer of power would spiral into what one official called “an ‘Aden’ 
type of catastrophe.”408 
For one, the Shah lifted Iran’s historic claim on Bahrain and its Persian minority.  
“The last thing he wanted was to have to look after and finance Bahrain,” the Shah 
privately told British and American diplomats.409  Other leaders also pressured the Shah.  
The president of Pakistan, Ayub Khan, urged him to “benefit from the lessons of other 
people's misfortunes and to reflect on the fact that, if India had behaved sensibly after the 
British had left, none of the problems that had divided the sub-continent thereafter need 
have arisen.”  Whether the Shah agreed or disagreed with Ayub’s specific historical 
analysis was irrelevant.  The broader lesson was not.  The Shah “should seek to reach 
agreement with the Arabs and to look to the future not to the past.”  In that meeting, the 
Shah again admitted that “all he needed was some face-saving solution.”410  Given the 
domestic political difficulties of reneging on his commitment to the Persian minority in 
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Bahrain, the Shah suggested that the British hold a referendum on independence.  The 
policy soon mutated into a poll administered by the UN, and an independent Bahrain.411   
Likewise, on the issue of the Persian Gulf Median line, the Saudi and Iranian 
monarchs quickly found a compromise.412  Finally, although the Sheikh of Sharjah never 
gave up hope on the Tunbs, the other Sheikhs, the Shah, and Faisal agreed that Iran could 
station a “token presence” on the islands, even if it did leave a “canker sore” for the 
Arabs.413  In short, negotiators were able to iron out the details for each of the territorial 
issues, paving the way for the stable independence of the United Arab Emirates.    
An all-encompassing Saudi-Iranian compromise was key to the resolution of each 
of the above issues.  “Friendly relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia,” the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office wrote to its ambassadors, “are clearly of fundamental 
importance.”414  In 1970, the Defense and Overseas Policy Committee also recommended 
continued high-level discussions with the Shah and King Faisal, “with a view to 
agreeing...on a pattern for the future of the area.”415  The British relied on Saudi-Iranian 
goodwill to make progress in the negotiations of the imperial withdrawal.  In short time, a 
reversal of the decision to withdraw became implausible, despite electoral bombast by 
Conservative leaders promising otherwise.416   
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In 1970, Sir William Luce reported that British policy was likely to be successful 
in its primary goal to preserve the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the West.  He 
recommended that the new Conservative government maintain the original timetable for 
withdrawal.  “It would be a fallacy,” he wrote, “to think that the prolongation of 
protection would provide further opportunity to bring about a viable union.”417   
CREEPING ANXIETY 
The Nixon administration also believed the British would leave a stable political situation 
behind.  The National Security and the State Department reported in 1970 that “any 
major policy reversal is doubtful.”418  Nevertheless, the rising anxiety of policymakers 
worked against their better judgment.  Concern about regional security would cause the 
U.S. government to take a more hands-on role in oil negotiations between the producing 
countries and the multinational companies, breaking with the corporatist past of the 
postwar petroleum order.   
If the circumstances did not warrant such a profound governmental intervention, it 
is also true that the reasons for anxiety were not entirely imaginary.  Unrest rocked 
southern Arabia.  By April 1967, officials and news correspondents had begun to 
describe Aden as “a little Vietnam.”419  The thought of the British vacuum perturbed the 
top policymakers of the Johnson administration in January 1968.  After unsuccessfully 
attempting to dissuade Brown from the announcement, Rusk said he “smelt the acrid 
aroma of the fait accompli.”  He was concerned about the possibility of a “chain reaction” 
in domestic politics regarding the unpopular war in Vietnam: “people would argue: ‘If 
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the British can do it why can’t we.’”  Furthermore, the Johnson administration was 
physically and morally bogged down in Southeast Asia, and could not “take over British 
commitments.” But his primary discontent was with the political and economic 
ramifications of imperial withdrawal.  The British risked “with one gesture flushing away 
what had been done since the Second World War in bringing stability to the world.”  The 
withdrawal, Rusk concluded, “represented a new dismal chapter in the world scene.”420 
Rusk’s rant was well-prepared, exposing at least some composure within the 
Johnson administration.  In fact, the United States had anticipated and planned for an 
eventual British withdrawal, only not so soon.  After the British informed the Johnson 
administration in 1966 of their plan to evacuate Aden by 1968, State Department and 
NSC officials had begun to plan for a British-less Persian Gulf.  Like their British 
counterparts, Johnson and his advisers settled on a strategic framework in which Saudi 
Arabia and Iran would police regional security.  The president’s advisers in the State 
Department, the National Security Council, and the Department of Defense agreed:  
trans-Gulf cooperation would provide the cornerstone of regional stability for the 
indefinite future.421  Johnson began discussions with the Shah of Iran and King Faisal to 
“fill the gap the British will leave in South Arabia and the Persian Gulf.”422   
American officials shared the relatively unruffled assessment of their British 
counterparts regarding the ease of post-imperial transition.  To be sure, the question was 
taken seriously—the Persian Gulf held a unique position in the international economy 
because of its oil.  However, the largest producers were under no serious threat.   
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Officials expected the bridge-building exercise between Iran and Saudi Arabia to be a 
successful endeavor from its inception.  The balancing act between the two nations could 
be achieved through a simple equation, agreed upon in the National Security Council and 
the State Department.   The United States would accept Iran’s assumption of the leading 
role, but urge that the Shah act tactfully.423  At the same time, policymakers would 
encourage Saudi Arabia to play a larger role in Gulf affairs.  The United States would 
strengthen Saudi Arabia militarily and encourage what one policy report called “a 
judicious mixture of subsidies and favors, capitalizing on Faisal’s position as the 
Protector of the Islamic Holy Forces.”424 
Still, officials expected the birth pangs of the Twin Pillars doctrine to be painful at 
times.  The Johnson administration noted that fostering trans-Gulf goodwill was “sure to 
be an uphill struggle.”425  The points of contention between Saudi Arabia and Iran, if not 
momentous, had been noteworthy since Faisal’s accession to the throne in 1964.  Like 
other OPEC members, the two countries competed for increases in production.  The Shah 
constantly reminded U.S. officials that Saudi oil money reached the Arab front-line 
through the Khartoum agreement and by other means.  In one characteristic instance, he 
told the American ambassador “with a sardonic smile” that a substantial percentage of 
Saudi profits went directly to Egypt to finance “Nasser’s campaign of vilification of the 
U.S.”  This policy, the Shah charged, was comparable to that of interwar American 
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commercial interests exporting “tremendous amounts of scrap iron to Japan only to have 
it returned in finished form...for four long years in the Pacific.”426 
Furthermore, the Shah did not see Saudi Arabia as a source of regional stability.  
In October 1969, he told Rusk’s replacement at the helm of the State Department, 
William Rogers, that Saudi Arabia was an unreliable ally due to its limited military 
ability and weak internal situation.427  The Shah fueled speculation about unrest in Saudi 
Arabia by commenting pointedly on reports of the Saudis’ problem with Nasserism in the 
military. As he told one NSC official, King Faisal had been forced to execute one-third of 
their Air Force, who had “sided with the Egyptians over the Yemen question.”428 
Likewise, the Saudi government had no love lost for the Shah.   The Saudi 
minister of foreign affairs, Omar Saqqaf, complained about his “openly contemptuous” 
attitude toward Arabs.  Saqqaf had been an Arab nationalist in his student days, educated 
in Cairo and the American University in Beirut, but his grievances with Iran were 
considered equable by the United States.   His “maturity has mellowed his once strident 
views,” the State Department reported.429  “Iranian territorial ambitions” in the lower Gulf 
were troublesome, Saqqaf told U.S. officials.  Regarding the argument that the Tunbs and 
Abu Musa were necessary for Iranian security, the Saudi government saw no 
“requirement for Iranian military occupation...at any time.”  It was impossible to 
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“overcome suspicion that the long-term Iranian purpose is to use these Islands to 
dominate the Gulf and Arab littoral states.”430 
The Johnson administration, followed by the Nixon administration, prodded the 
leaders of both states to begin high-level discussions and discouraged each from taking 
unilateral measures. Iran and Saudi Arabia were receptive to American policy, and helped 
resolve two of the biggest headaches in negotiating the British departure: the Saudi-
Iranian median line and the question of Bahrain.  In April 1969, Saqqaf made what the 
United States hoped would be the first of “a periodic exchange of visits” between the two 
countries’ foreign ministers.  The trip was useful as a step toward high-level dialogue.  
The Iranian foreign minister, Ardeshir Zahedi, was absent, so the Shah received Saqqaf 
personally.  However, the meeting yielded little on the problem of Iran’s aggressive 
military posture.  Especially in the case of Bahrain, Saqqaf felt that the lack of progress 
was a disappointment.  The Shah already had made it clear that any concessions on that 
issue would have to be part of a “package” certifying Iranian sovereignty over the little 
islands.  Faisal, Saqqaf told Harold Eilts, was “not very satisfied with the results of the 
trip.”431 
In the following two years, the U.S. and the British governments worked to find a 
compromise.  Explicitly, the United States sought to channel the Shah along constructive 
lines, reasoning with him to give up his claim on Bahrain and to settle the seabed 
dispute.432  Likewise, Saudi Arabia took to conciliation with gusto.  Saqqaf told 
                                                 
430Telegram, AmEmbassy Jidda to SecState, “Saudi-Iranian Relations,” April 3, 1969, NARA RG 59, CFP 
1967-1969, POL 7 SAUD. The two countries had other ongoing diplomatic haggles, including Saudi 
refusals of Iranian requests to construct a building in Mecca for Shiite pilgrims and to mark the graves of 
Shiite martyrs near Medina.   
431 Telegram, AmEmbassy Jidda to SecState, “Saqqaf Visit to Iran,” April 30, 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFP 
1967-1969, POL 7 SAUD. 
432 AmEmbassy Iran to SecState, “Gulf Islands,” November 15, 1971, RNL, NSF 602, Iran, Vol. IV. 
 155 
Ambassador Eilts that Saudi policy regarding the British withdrawal was “one of 
conscious self-restraint to allow the Shah time to find a solution to the Bahrain problem 
and cement Saudi-Iranian cooperation.”433 
By early 1970, Saudi-Iranian relations were so good that the Shah transferred 
weapons to Saudi Arabia so the monarchy could drive back Yemeni incursions on its 
southern border.434  The centerpiece of trans-Gulf rapprochement continued to be 
improved communication, by which the United States consistently reminded both 
countries that they shared common security goals, particularly opposition to an increased 
Soviet or radical Arab presence. In his last meeting with the Shah before leaving the 
White House, Johnson personally expressed his pleasure at the Shah’s recent visit to 
Jidda, first suggested by U.S. officials.435  Days before leaving office, Rusk wrote to Eilts 
that he hoped periodic meetings between Saqqaf and Zahedi would “presage even greater 
cooperation between two powers on Gulf affairs.”436  In another report, the NSC noted 
that Iranian-Saudi communication was the “best insurance against change in the present 
favorable environment for U.S. interests.”437   
State Department officials at the Near East desk consistently observed that the 
threats to the strategically significant region were modest. All the same, many American 
officials employed language and analysis characterized by a sense of impending crisis.  
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According to these anxious appraisals, the British withdrawal had revived Soviet interest.  
“Together with the Iranian plateau, the region forms the keystone in an arch of non-
Communist countries stretching from Africa to South Asia,” the Assistant Secretary of 
State for Near Eastern Affairs, Luke Battle, wrote Rusk.  The naval command of the U.S. 
Mideast Forces, just one flagship and two destroyers operating out of Bahrain, would be 
the only outside military force stationed in the eastern Arab world.  “Russian emissaries 
were active in Kuwait and down the Gulf in the 1890s,” Battle continued.  The recently 
published Molotov-Ribbentrop correspondence of 1939 also pointed towards lingering 
Soviet ambitions in the area.438 “The Soviet Union is seeking...to take a direct role in 
Persian Gulf political affairs now that the UK plans to withdraw,” another State 
Department report warned in 1968.  “The Soviets already have attacked as 
‘neocolonialist’ the U.S. position that countries in the vicinity of the Gulf should provide 
for its peace and security on their own.”439  This reflected a broader trend in Soviet 
activity in the Middle East and North Africa. As a State-Defense interdepartmental group 
put it, “In recent years, the USSR has masked its direct threat to Europe by proclaiming a 
desire for détente but has continued that threat indirectly by its thrust into the 
Mediterranean.”440 
According to this position, held by officials in the State Department, the NSC, the 
CIA, and the armed forces, recent inroads in the Arab world, especially support for the 
UAR, Algeria, Iraq, and Syria, advanced the Soviet thrust.  At the same time, Eugene 
Rostow noted Kremlin statements that American interests in the Persian Gulf were 
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“directed against the security of the southern borders of the Soviet Union.”441  Dean Rusk 
also reminded Johnson, “The Soviet aim is to break up the Irano-American relationship 
and eventually to establish Soviet influence and presence in the Persian Gulf area.”442 
Still, most American policymakers understood the unlikelihood that Soviet 
objectives, or at least their perception of them, would be met.  For one thing, the Cold 
War seemed more fungible in the Middle East.  Iran had long used the superpower rivalry 
to its advantage.  In 1965, the Shah accepted a $289 million credit from Moscow for the 
Isafahan steel mill, a development project Western companies had turned down.443  In 
1967, the two countries signed a five-year trade agreement and an arms deal, involving 
the extension of a $110 million credit for tanks and anti-aircraft weapons.444  At the same 
time, the Shah took an overt anti-communist stance with U.S. officials, pragmatically 
explaining his Soviet contacts as necessary given the shortcomings of American offers.   
“The Soviets could get both Iraq and Syria in their clutches,” he told the U.S ambassador 
in one instance.  “Particularly since they are doing so well [in the] triangle of Cairo, 
Aden-Yemen, and Djibouti this would place them in a dominating position in the 
Mideast.”445 
Noting both the Shah’s creative geography and the weakness of Arab nationalists 
in the region, more serene voices muffled the outcry.  “The well-known themes,” the 
ambassador to Iran wrote home after the above conversation, “included...the readiness of 
                                                 
441Telegram, SecState to Amembassy Iran, Marcdh 8, 1968, RG 59, CFP 67-69, POL IRAN-US. 
442 Rusk to Johnson, “Your Meeting with the Shah of Iran,” August 15, 1967, Johnson Library, National 
Security File, Country File, Iran. 
443 FRUS, 1964-1968, XXII, 113. Memorandum for the Record, December 21, 1965; FRUS, 1964-1968, 
XXII, 123. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, March 14, 1966; FRUS, 1964-
1968, XXII, 127. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, March 30, 1966. 
444CIA Intelligence Memorandum, “The Shah of Iran and His Policies,” June 5, 1967, LBJL, NSF, Country 
File, Iran, Vol. II. 
445FRUS, 1964-1968, XXII, 255. Telegram, Amembassy Iran to SecState, December 29, 1967. 
 158 
Arabs to serve as Commie tools.”446  The CIA agreed that the Shah’s “fear” of the Soviet 
Union was largely simulated.  The Shah was not “greatly worried about the Soviet 
threat.”447 
Calm prevailed at the end of the Johnson administration.  “While the British 
announcement will give radical political movements in the Gulf a psychological shot in 
the arm,” the State Department advised, “we do not expect it to lead to any dramatic 
political future.”448  Policymakers generally accepted that the resounding Egyptian defeat 
in the June 1967 war and Nasser’s subsequent withdrawal of forces from Yemen 
removed another source of instability.  In early 1968, Johnson’s senior interdepartmental 
group agreed: “the chances are reasonably good that general stability will be maintained 
in the Gulf region.”449  Later, the NSC reported that any instability was “not likely to be 
of a magnitude seriously to threaten basic U.S. interests.”450 
The Nixon administration also noted the successful cooperation between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran.  As part of an overall review called for by the National Security Advisor, 
Henry Kissinger, the NSC and State Department undertook a close analysis of Persian 
Gulf policy.  The review group arrived at the same conclusions as its predecessors. The 
British presence had served historically to “dampen intra-regional antagonisms.” Imperial 
departure naturally gave way to overlapping territorial disputes, “ethnic strife,” and 
religious animosities.  Premature withdrawal had allowed radical pressures to advance 
their agenda in the southern part of the peninsula.  Likewise, recent Russian naval visits 
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to the Gulf, the first since the Czarist regime scouted positions in Kuwait and along the 
Iranian coast in 1902, raised eyebrows.  The broadest goal of U.S. policy, fitting well 
within the confines of the long-term strategy of containment, was to prevent the Soviet 
Union from gaining positions that might undermine American strategic interests.451 
The Nixon administration agreed with its predecessor that the concerns were 
minimal.  The Soviet threat was unlikely to materialize in any grand way in the Persian 
Gulf, the NSC wrote.   Advisers convinced Kissinger to hold off on his initial idea of the 
United States assuming the “UK role of ‘protector.’”  The Nixon administration would 
follow the cautious course previously set.  “It would be wrong to assume that when the 
British leave there will be a vacuum in the Gulf area,” the review group wrote.  “A new 
set of interregional relationships will fill the vacuum.”  A direct American role in the 
Gulf was inadvisable, because the country could not “be draw into the complex and 
volatile regional diplomacy.”452  With broad interdepartmental support, the administration 
made the Twin Pillars policy official in National Security Decision Memorandum 92 in 
November 1970.453 
OIL AND ARMS SALES 
In the face of the British withdrawal, the United States worked to improve 
communication between Saudi Arabia and Iran.  At the same time, the Twin Pillars 
policy was part of a broader “Nixon Doctrine” that sought to draw back the direct 
American military presence in the world.454  The rise of Iran and Saudi Arabia as regional 
policemen had a converse effect on American participation in oil negotiations.  Iranian 
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and Saudi diplomacy on this front, much of which took the idiom of permanent 
sovereignty, fueled American anxiety to the point that it spilled into negotiations over oil 
revenue and arms sales.  As a result, the Nixon administration began to participate 
directly the oil revenue negotiations between the producers and the multinational 
companies.   
American officials understood that the Shah and King Faisal sought to use their 
new positions in the Cold War for gains in their long-running dispute with the oil 
companies.  The British withdrawal, the ambassador in Tehran wrote after a long 
discussion with the Shah in early 1968, “will mean the oil consortium being subjected to 
further pressures at a time when their performance is, however unfairly, unsatisfactory in 
Iranian eyes.”455   The Shah’s repeated invocations of the Cold War and Nasserist 
extremism, NSC adviser Peter Flanigan wrote Nixon, were “colored by the desire to 
encourage us to give him favorable oil treatment.”456 
Several factors led American officials to forget or ignore the subtext of Iranian 
Cold War rhetoric.  First, the growing global importance of Saudi and Iranian production 
helped tip the scales in the producers’ favor.  The oil industry had undergone a 
transformation in the past half-decade.  Middle Eastern oil had risen to over three-
quarters of Western Europe’s and almost all of Japan’s requirements, and continued to 
supply most of the oil used by American military forces in Southeast Asia.457  With 
production costs roughly a tenth of those of the United States and an annual growth rate 
of 12 percent since the end of the Second World War, the Middle East provided over a 
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third of “Free World” oil production.  It also contained more than two-thirds of reserves.  
“The simple statistics regarding Middle Eastern oil can only be defined as staggering,” 
the State Department reported.458 
A second factor involved improvements in Arab technical ability. Over the 
previous half-decade, indigenous skill levels had increased to the point that national oil 
companies could manage oil production. The 1967 embargo had failed, the NSC 
believed, because of the “demonstrated inability of Arabs, without Western supervision, 
to extract, process, or market the oil.”  OPEC nations, Arab and non-Arab alike, had long 
realized the problem.  Building on the nationalist tenets of permanent sovereignty, they 
had made great strides in their technical capacities.459  In light of their growing expertise, 
the Near East office reported in December 1967 that the danger of recurrent embargoes 
required “a careful appraisal.”460 
A third factor was that the Gulf region was of unique financial importance to the 
United States.  The concern with British petro-pounds in 1967 was just an early indicator 
of the oil producers’ financial clout. The net dollar inflow of American companies’ oil 
profits from the region was approximately $1.5 billion.  Oil money had reduced the 
United States’ deficit by more than 40 percent in the past five years, the Senior 
Interdepartmental Group for NSDM 92 estimated.  Just as petro-pounds had played a 
crucial part in the British decision to devalue the sterling, so too petrodollars became an 
outsized presence in American strategic thinking.  In 1968 alone, Saudi and Kuwaiti 
investments in the United States grew by over $100 million.461 
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A final factor affected the oil negotiations more drastically—the longstanding 
ability of the companies to restrict production in Saudi Arabia and Iran. A series of secret 
agreements to limit the flow of oil, unknown to Middle Eastern sovereigns, quickly 
unraveled after the 1967 war.  After the reinstatement of the Shah in 1953, the oil 
companies used several different means to prevent too much oil from flooding the 
market.  Most important by far, the companies maintained a secret system of “off-take 
agreements” for Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two largest producers.  These mechanisms 
penalized partners of the Iran Consortium and Aramco for producing more oil than a 
carefully calculated mean of the partners’ total demands from the previous year.462   
For a decade, the boardroom deal effectively limited both Iranian and Saudi 
production to levels that would not depress world oil prices.  However, the Shah declared 
the modernizing “White Revolution” in 1963, a process that relied almost exclusively on 
greater oil revenue.  Iranian revenue demands became a driving force in the annual 
revenue negotiations.  In 1966, after the Shah announced an ambitious five-year 
development plan, the Iranian government began a press campaign that threatened the 
Consortium with partial nationalization if production were not drastically increased.463 
The U.S. government learned of the secret off-take agreements as early as 
1962.464  Walter Levy warned Eugene Rostow in 1966 that “the very fact that a restricted 
secret agreement exists would be political dynamite in the hands of the Iranians” if the 
negotiations between the Shah and the Consortium broke down. Following the corporatist 
policy of separating economic questions from political ones, the Johnson administration 
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ignored the provision.  Soon after, a State Department memo concluded that the off-take 
agreement was “a highly sensitive, inter-company commercial policy matter.”  As such, it 
was “desirable for the U.S. government to limit its involvement.”465  The companies 
agreed and told the U.S. government that any increases in Iran’s off-take in 1966 would 
result in similar demands from the Arab producers.466 
The U.S. government maintained its position of official neutrality in 1967.  The 
Iranian ambassador to Washington, Husang Ansary, pressed the U.S. Assistant Secretary 
of State for Economic Affairs, Anthony Solomon, to compel the Consortium to meet 
Iranian revenue requirements.   Solomon refused, telling Ansary that “the Iranian 
requests... here and in Tehran to insure greatly increased petroleum exports from Iran had 
caused us considerable difficulty.”  The State Department commiserated with the need 
for more development capital to modernize Iran, but could not “translate this 
sympathy...into pressures on the American companies in the Consortium to comply with 
Iranian wishes.”  To explain, Solomon reverted to the corporatist mantra of the business-
government separation in U.S. foreign policy.  In the “free system, companies act 
according to their commercial interests rather than following instruction from the U.S. 
Government,” he told Asnary.467  In less doctrinaire terms, Solomon also informed the 
British government that there was no need “for the U.S. Government to intercede with the 
American companies and bring political considerations to their attention.”468 
Solomon nevertheless used the negotiator for Mobil Oil as a vehicle to 
recommend that the Consortium agree to the Shah’s demand that the corporations 
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liberalize the over-lift agreements.469 Solomon’s small interference, agreed to by the 
Consortium, was designed with the limited purpose of helping the companies “appreciate 
the need in making their commercial judgments take into account wider political 
consideration.”470  Beginning with the slight intrusion, the oil companies found 
themselves in an increasingly uncomfortable position.  In a meeting with oil company 
executives during revenue negotiations the following year, Eugene Rostow repeated the 
corporatist mantra.  The American government “did not wish to take responsibility or 
become involved in a commercial negotiation.”  Still, Rostow reminded the businessmen 
that the United States had “a national interest in successful and harmonious resolution of 
the oil negotiations.” Given the new security role of the Gulf powers, the oil companies 
should not restrict production too much for either.  He continued: Saudi Arabia and Iran 
needed increased oil revenues to meet their budget requirements.471 
The secret off-take agreements had been effective because the four member 
companies of Aramco also belonged to the Iran Consortium.  After the Shah learned 
about the scheme in December 1967, the United States found it impossible to preserve its 
policy of keeping its diplomatic distance from oil discussions. The Shah’s discovery, 
which the other Consortium companies believed was leaked by the Compagnie Française 
des Pétroles, changed the tone of the annual revenue negotiations.472  He used terms 
“such as ‘robbery,’ ‘thieves,’ and some unprintable epithets” to describe the company’s 
behavior to the U.S. ambassador.  “If the companies wanted war, they could have it,” he 
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fumed. “This time it would not be with a Mossadegh, but with a united Iran behind the 
Shah himself.”473 
Like Mossadegh, and not unaware of the irony, the Shah argued that the secret 
off-take agreements flouted the principle of permanent sovereignty.  He grounded his 
argument in the same questions of imperialism, decolonization, and sovereignty that 
many Third World leaders had incorporated into their intellectual and political programs 
for development. “The consortium is sitting astride Iran’s vast reserves,” he told the U.S. 
ambassador.  It was unacceptable for boardroom decisions to prescribe the pace of his 
country’s economic growth.   The Shah went on to threaten national legislation, adding 
that “Iraq had long since found companies submissive to such measures.”  He then 
demanded increased oil liftings meet a total income of $5.9 billion over five years.  This 
sum meant an average yearly revenue increase of 20 percent.474   
After meeting with the Shah, the ambassador in Iran wondered “whether the time 
may not have come for the U.S. government to caution the companies against such 
‘restraint of trade.’”475  The State Department agreed and used strong language “to urge 
the companies be as generous as they can in making their next offer to the Iranians.”  If 
the Iran Consortium did not do so, Anthony Solomon worried, “we might have to take a 
more active role in the talks.”476  The companies nonetheless resisted the Shah’s 
demands, and Iran accepted production levels that were $40 million less than stipulated 
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for 1968.  Officials prepared for another round of negotiations. “Although the Shah has 
backed down, the issue is far from settled,” the CIA warned.477 
By mid-1968, the Shah put forth further “incessant demands,” according to the 
U.S. ambassador, despite the fact that the State Department had “assisted the Shah in 
satisfactory solution...in the crisis with the consortium” months earlier.478  The CIA 
reported that the Shah would continue to press the consortium “vigorously for vast 
amounts of revenue.”  The Shah’s demands exemplified his metamorphosis “from a 
timorous, titular monarch into a self-confident potentate,” the CIA believed, a 
transformation symbolized by his elaborate self-coronation in October 1967.479  American 
policymakers noted that permanent sovereignty informed the Iranian stance. “In Iran’s 
dealings with the Western oil consortium, the Shah has cultivated an image of a 
nationalist hero fighting against foreign exploitation,” one State Department official 
reported to Rusk.  “He has striven to succeed the late Mossadegh in that role.”480 
The State Department’s oil expert, James Akins, was blunter: “The Shah is an 
oriental despot and the oil executives are dinosaurs.  If they come to blows it could be the 
battle of the century.”481  To improve his position, the Shah began to exploit his Cold War 
status to shape oil negotiations.  Military desires contolled the dialogue.  In 1972, Nixon 
famously overrode State Department concerns that the sale to Iran of the F-15, the United 
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States’ most advanced fighter plane, might lead to increased Soviet sales to Iraq and 
Syria, exacerbating the regional arms race.482 
The momentous decision to “hand the Shah the keys to the store,” in the words of 
William Bundy, had precedents.  The United States shifted arms supply for Iran from a 
grant basis to credit sales in 1964 because the Johnson administration considered Iran 
wealthy enough to pay.  In 1966, the U.S. refused to extend credit and the Shah 
concluded a $110 million arms purchase agreement with the Soviet Union.483  The State 
Department noted the confluence of the British decision to withdraw from Aden and the 
Soviet sale.  Harold Saunders wrote that the Johnson administration was “increasingly 
aware of the Shah’s legitimate interest in the Persian Gulf and is working its way to 
encouraging him to take a larger role there.”484   
After the Six-Day War, Johnson stated publicly that the United States would 
terminate the nascent regional arms race.  He described the “waste and the futility” of 
ballooning military budgets and called for the investment of the region’s “scarce 
resources” in programs of economic and social development.485  Throughout 1967 and 
1968, the Shah held otherwise. “Present developments in the Mideast underscore the need 
for Iran to develop an adequate defense capability,” he told the U.S. ambassador.486  
Although Johnson claimed that “America has always opposed this arms race,” Dean Rusk 
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noted to the president a month later that “Iran is one of the countries we have had in mind 
in pressing the Congress for authority to continue extending credits for military sales.”487 
In 1968, the Shah requested a commitment of $600 million in military sales over 
the next five years.  When the Johnson administration hesitated, he threatened again to 
turn again to the Soviet Union.  Deciding “that it could not commit itself to such a long-
term arrangement,” the United States offered $75 million of credit for the following year.  
The Shah responded by describing Soviet offers of destroyers, submarines, and aircraft.  
“The policy of political maneuvering between East and West” was effective, the State 
Department reported.488   The regional heads of the State Department, the NSC, the 
Department of Defense, and the CIA all recommended increased arms sales because “our 
arms supply relationship has a vital importance in our overall ties with Iran.”489   
The regional advisory group continued to express concern, however, over the 
“major uncertainty” regarding Iran’s ability to pay for these purchases, owing to the 
ongoing battle between the Shah and the companies over oil revenue projections.  Henry 
Kissinger summed up the relationship between oil revenues and arms sales to Richard 
Nixon in 1969: “Iran’s future financial soundness is still fragile, depending as it still does 
on the continued flow of oil revenues at a high level. The Shah annually squeezes the 
American oil companies as hard as he can to maximize those revenues.”  If the Shah 
squeezed the oil companies “to the breaking point,” his ability to repay the credits for 
military sales would become a serious burden.490   
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In the case of the annual revenue negotiations between Aramco and Saudi Arabia, 
the link between the British withdrawal and arms sales also provided a useful bargaining 
chip for the Saudi royal family.  The biggest concern for the United States regarding 
Saudi internal stability in 1967 was the prospect that the Saudi's “already limited 
resources” would be unable to deter the “hostile forces...following in the British wake.”  
The weakness of Saudi Arabia, the embassy reported, had been dramatized by the “abject 
Saudi capitulation...when faced with Iranian gunboat diplomacy” in connection with 
offshore oil prospecting in the center of the Gulf.  The Saudi military handicap, expressed 
under the consistent refrain of “inadequate resources,” was echoed throughout the U.S. 
foreign policy establishment in the late 1960s and early 1970s.491 
The Johnson administration maintained diplomatic distance from the oil 
negotiations despite this concern, as it had with Iran.  In 1966 and 1967, the 
administration successfully side-stepped discussions with the Saudi oil minister on 
production and revenue, citing the corporatist philosophy.492  As late as 1970, the 
Department of Defense recommended that the Saudi government undertake a “careful 
balance between expenditures for military and for civilian development purposes.”  The 
Pentagon further suggested that “in times of financial stringency serious consideration 
might well be given to postponement or scaling down of any major projects.”493 
As it had in the case of the Iran Consortium, the U.S. government also made its 
way into the annual negotiations.  Mid-1969 again proved to be a turning point.  The U.S. 
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ambassador, Hermann Eilts, was central to the change in policy.   Prompted by the broad 
reassessment of U.S. foreign policy by Nixon and Kissinger, Eilts held extensive 
discussions with Saudi leaders, especially oil minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani and defense 
minister Prince Sultan.  Afterwards, he wrote that “the nature and tenor of U.S.-Saudi 
relations” would be “strongly influenced by the extent to which we demonstrate 
willingness to meet legitimate Saudi military needs.”494  In July, Eilts reported that other 
economic development spending was “scarcely feasible in the current unsettled Middle 
East situation.”  Above all, Prince Sultan had told Eilts that Saudi Arabia “must be 
prepared to defend itself.”495   
The coups in the Sudan, Libya, and Somalia in 1969 intensified Saudi and 
American concern.496  The director of the Near East desk, Joseph Sisco, wrote to 
Secretary of State Rogers in October that the concern regarding the “overthrow the 
moderate regimes in the Sudan and Libya” had been “further heightened by the arrest of 
the pro-Nasser officers” in the Saudi military.  In turn, Saudi officials had begun to 
criticize American officials “with displaying little interest in actively supporting our Arab 
friends and unconcern at what they see as ‘the march of communism’ in the region.”  In a 
pattern that resembled the initial response to the Shah’s red-baiting, the Saudi “siege 
mentality” annoyed Sisco and other Middle East experts.  He asked Rogers to remind 
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Prince Fahd that the Soviets were not “ten feet tall” and that “indigenous factors rather 
than Moscow-directed Communist conspiracies...were behind the recent coups in the 
Sudan and Libya.”497 
American poise did not extend into the oil negotiations.  Faisal argued 
consistently that Soviet efforts in Yemen were designed as a springboard for their 
occupation of Aden and control of the Bab al-Mandeb.  Even if certain officials did not 
fully accept the reasoning of Faisal, The Nixon administration continued to strengthen the 
counter-subversion capabilities of the Saudi military.  The confluence of Saudi pressure 
with Iranian revenue goals affected the annual negotiations between the companies and 
their hosts.  As the Shah’s demands increased, the companies reported that they were 
“hard-pressed...by the Saudis, who will be anxious to catch up.”498  In August 1969, Eilts 
wrote that the Saudis believed their shortfalls in offtake and revenue resulted from the 
preference the oil companies had given to Iranian production. The oil companies were 
“not sufficiently alive to growing Saudi dissatisfaction on this score.”499 Saudi officials 
began to insist that the U.S. government to intervene on Saudi Arabia’s behalf in the 
negotiations with Aramco.  “The oil companies gave into Shah’s pressure over Iranian 
offtake despite their knowledge that the Shah’s performance was largely a bluff,” the 
finance minister of Saudi Arabia held.500   
In October 1969, Prince Fahd asked both Nixon and William Rogers if the U.S. 
government could purchase Saudi Arabian oil directly.  Although the United States 
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referred Fahd’s concern to the oil companies, concurrent Iranian and Saudi pressure 
would soon undermine the corporatist structure of energy security.501 
PARADISE LOST 
In his 1969 meeting with Prince Fahd, Nixon called the Saudi-Iranian relationship “an 
anchor in a very troubled sea.”  For Nixon, “it was important to build strong relations 
among those who have similar views,” especially given the imminent departure of the 
British.502 As it gripped American policymakers, withdrawal anxiety not only encouraged 
trans-Gulf cooperation, it also forged a new relationship between the multinational oil 
companies and oil-producing governments.  The oil producers had begun to take the 
offensive, and companies found it increasingly difficult to fend off Iranian and Saudi 
production demands.  As the Nixon administration became more deeply involved, the 
new situation would have long-term consequences for the power of permanent 
sovereignty and the politics of the international economy.   
In May 1970, the director of Near East affairs for the National Security Council, 
Harold Saunders, lavished praise on Nixon’s adviser on the international economy, Peter 
Flanigan. Days earlier, Flanigan had brokered a new revenue deal between Iran and the 
Consortium.  For the time being, the agreement ended the Shah’s threats of moving closer 
to the Soviet Union and his warnings of national legislation against the oil companies.  
“Due to your efforts with them,” Saunders wrote, the companies had “worked in a more 
flexible manner this year to bridge the gap between their capabilities and Iran’s 
requirements.”503 
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Flanigan’s diplomacy toward the companies was the result of a year of NSC 
intervention in the bargaining process between the Consortium and the Shah’s 
government.  The National Security Council briefed Nixon in January 1969, “The key to 
our relations with the Shah and his regime is our assistance for the modernization of 
Iran's armed forces.”  The Shah’s demands for military equipment were “insistent and 
large, and have increased since the announcement of the British withdrawal from the 
Gulf.”  Failure to meet these demands spelled disaster.  Unless the United States 
remained Iran's principal military supplier, the NSC wrote, “our interests in Iran, 
including our ability to maintain our own strategic interests...will be seriously 
weakened.”  American influence required “the maintenance of constructive relations 
between Iran and the major oil companies.”504  A joint NSC-State Department review 
group agreed that “the annual disputes” between the Shah and the Consortium were a 
matter of considerable concern: “the key question is whether the increase in Iran’s 
income from oil will keep pace with the Shah’s demands and Iran’s expenditures.”505 
In an unrecorded meeting with the Shah in the Oval Office on October 21, 1969, a 
week after meeting with Prince Fahd, Nixon made a promise along those lines.  He 
instructed Flanigan to tell the American oil companies that it was in the “U.S. national 
interest” to “make every effort” to close the gap between the company off-take estimate 
and Iran’s projected governmental requirements.  In the following months, Flanigan 
contacted the CEOs of companies to impress “the President’s desire, on the basis of the 
national security interest, that the consortium go a long way toward meeting the $155 
million gap.”506 
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The State Department reported to Kissinger that the Shah was “counting heavily 
on alleged Presidential assurances... given during his October state visit.”507  For their 
part, the companies protested that Iranian demands were insatiable. Flanigan reported to 
Nixon in February 1970 that he saw “no prospect of persuading the Consortium.”  On 
Flanigan’s memo, Nixon wrote in the margin: “Tell them that if they don’t help us on this 
I will redraw the Oil Import Decision.  This is an order.”508  The threat worked.  The 
companies agreed on May 7, 1970 to meet the Shah’s development needs through 
production increases and a loan to be repaid in future oil production.509 
Flanigan’s deal marks a signpost in the history of the oil producers’ permanent 
sovereignty and the postwar petroleum order.  Officially, American policy was to stand 
against government-to-government oil negotiations between the producing and 
consuming countries, because any such development would curtail the major operations 
in the Gulf by private American companies.  The very basis of postwar corporatism was 
the separation of the questions of oil economics from postcolonial politics.  In supporting 
Iranian revenue demands, the Nixon administration eliminated the gap.  Flanigan 
influenced the company-host country negotiations, which in effect accepted the linkage 
of international politics and economics.  
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King Faisal appears to have acted largely independently from his Persian 
counterpart.  Still, the oil revenue negotiations with Saudi Arabia moved along similar 
lines, as Saudi leadership also used the concern with Nasserist or Soviet-induced 
radicalism to buttress their production.  In December 1970, Saudi Arabia completed the 
first of the series of negotiations for increased revenue.  Following successful Libyan 
accords that September, the Saudis obtained an agreement that boosted oil revenues by 8 
percent.  Saudi Arabia reaped further gains in 1971 for its Mediterranean oil. 
Furthermore, projected output and revenue increases grew rapidly because of continued 
Western consumption.  The State Department wrote that the oil windfalls terminated 
Saudi Arabia’s traditional concern over the strain of defense outlays.  Increased revenues 
provided “considerable scope for increased spending.”  The Saudi hierarchy’s “5% men” 
and foreign munitions salesmen would drive military spending up in the future. The State 
Department expected the military budget to rise well past previous estimates, which had 
been “conceived during a time of financial difficulties.”510 
By then, the Nixon administration was heavily committed to improving Saudi 
Arabia’s defense capability.  King Faisal paid an official state visit to Washington in May 
1971.  According to the NSC, he and Nixon established a “good rapport” and U.S.-Saudi 
relations begab “to broaden and deepen on the political level.”511  Saudi Arabia used its 
political position to continue to urge the oil companies to grant it greater control over 
production.  The OPEC countries renewed members’ demands for “host-country 
participation” in existing producing operations in 1971.  The Saudi oil minister, Ahmed 
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Zaki Yamani, represented Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Iraq, and Qatar in negotiations with 
the companies in March 1972.512   
At the same time, talks over partial ownership began in Iran between the Shah and 
the chairman of Exxon.  The Iran talks ended in May with an outline of a twenty-year 
agreement to govern company-country relations.   Soon after, the companies accepted 
Saudi demands for partial ownership of company operations.  Citing the “law of changing 
circumstances” that governed oil politics, the U.S. government contact with the 
companies, John Irwin, accepted Yamani’s argument positing “a new relationship 
between the oil companies, the producer governments, and the consumers.”513 
The debate over Iranian and Saudi oil resided at the intersection of larger trends in 
U.S.-Third World affairs.  The revenue and participation negotiations marked victories 
for believers in permanent sovereignty.  “These countries consider their raw materials as 
their property,” one American official noted.  “That’s just a fact of life.”514  Henry 
Kissinger described the Saudi situation as “a first class brouhaha.”  Oil executives 
requested government assistance in the negotiations, and Kissinger declined.   “The less I 
have to do with this the better,” he told Exxon President Ken Jamieson.515  Afterwards, he 
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told U.S. Treasury Secretary John Connally that even though the executives’ “political 
acumen [was] not up to their income,” the Nixon administration could not “do Standard 
Oil business.”516 
THE LEFTWARD-MOVING CENTER  
In an earlier conversation, Kissinger explained to Connally his reason for caution in 
dealing directly with Yamani and other oil ministers.  “In general, I don’t like to get a 
brawl started without knowing where the cards are,” he said.517   It seemed that the cards 
had already been dealt.  The composure the United States exercised in Saudi-Iranian 
bridge-building between 1968 and 1971 had not transferred into the field of oil.  In fact, 
the support the U.S. government lent to Saudi Arabia and Iran had the effect of 
strengthening economic nationalism and the oil producers’ practice of permanent 
sovereignty.    
“The elimination of the UK military position in the Gulf would be an irreversible 
decision,” an official warned Dean Rusk in January 1968.  “[The decision] could be 
penny-wise, pound-foolish if political changes in the Gulf were to bring about revisions 
in the terms by which the UK gets its oil.”518  The insight could have been applied more 
broadly.  Following the British decision to withdraw, both Iran and Saudi Arabia sought 
to increase military spending.  The Johnson administration and then the Nixon 
administration turned to these regional allies to fill the British security vacuum, but 
initially urged restraint in arms purchases.   
The requests by the Twin Pillars became insistent, American restraint proved 
ephemeral.  The Shah and King Faisal used their newly ascendant positions in the Cold 
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War to draw the U.S. government into their deliberations with the oil companies.  In 
1970, the bargaining process between the producer nations and the multinational 
companies fundamentally changed. 
Anxiety about the future of American power became more widespread.  
Commentators of all stripes debated the practice and often the very nature of international 
power.519  By 1971, “oil conservatives” and “oil radicals” would begin to work more 
closely together.  The United States’ options for controlling regional events were severely 
circumscribed.  “New winds were now blowing,” the Saudi oil minister told the 
American ambassador, “as marked by Algerian action, and Libyan and Iraqi attitudes.”520   
The limitations of the postwar petroleum order became even more evident when faced 
with the new oil policies from these countries, especially from the Revolutionary 
Command Councils in Ba’athist Iraq and revolutionary Libya. 
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Chapter 3:  Arab Oil Belongs to the Arabs, 1967-1973 
In accordance with principles established by the United Nations, the companies cannot 
… prevent exploitation of Iran's natural resources. 
 
The Shah of Iran, 1970521 
 
 We and the masses of the people everywhere in this country are today celebrating an 
important event in our national history – the beginning of the direct national exploitation 
of oil. 
 
    Saddam Hussein, 1972522 
 
 
On October 31, 1967, the American ambassador to Iran, Armin Meyer, joined the Shah at 
a concert by the Los Angeles Philharmonic in Tehran. On the last leg of a 23-city tour, 
the orchestra opened with Opus 20 from “Don Juan” by Richard Strauss.523   At 
intermission, Meyer mentioned the Iranian revenue windfall from the recent Arab oil 
embargo, noting especially “how poorly Iraq has been doing as a result of its excesses.” 
Unlike other Arab oil producers, Iraq had not recommenced supply to its regular markets.  
Furthermore, the country was engaged in a bitter struggle with the Iraq Petroleum 
Company (IPC), the exploration and production consortium formed by Shell, British 
Petroleum, the Compagnie Française des Pétroles, Esso, and Mobil.524  The Shah 
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responded that the Iraqi government was “totally irrational” and was taking the “poor 
Iraq people down the same catastrophic road as Mossadegh.”525 
The Shah’s invocation of what a State Department once referred to as 
“Mossadegh madness” was conventional wisdom in the oil industry.  Governments and 
companies alike assumed that the successful boycott of nationalized Iranian oil between 
1951 and 1953 would deter similar applications of permanent sovereignty.526  Three years 
after the concert, however, the Shah’s analogy seemed empty.  Ba’athist Iraq did not lose 
its major markets.  To the contrary, the country developed the ability to independently 
produce and market its oil.   
The sophistication of the government-run Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) 
unnerved oil executives.  IPC company lawyers wrote a “letter of warning” to the Italian 
company Cosindit in May 1970.  The company had just inked a nine-year barter deal 
exchanging future INOC oil for the construction of two refineries and a plastics plant.  
The letter threatened legal measures against the Italian industrialists as “third party 
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trespassers” to the 1925 concessionary contract between the IPC and Iraq.  The lawyers 
contended that the contract, established for a period of 75 years, gave the IPC sole 
proprietary rights to oil in “the whole territory of the republic of Iraq.”527 
The letter was one of 56 written between 1964 and 1970 as part of a strategy to 
prevent successive Iraqi governments and their prospective patrons from signing future 
contracts for oil from territories nationalized in 1961.528  The nearly identical letters 
sought to “deter other companies from seeking to benefit from the IPC’s difficulty either 
by securing a concession for all or part of the disputed area, or by contracting to take oil 
extracted from that area.”529  The letters warned that the IPC would sue any takers of “hot 
oil” produced from expropriated areas.  The contracts further undermined the company’s 
interests “by helping the Iraqis to develop the oil resources of the expropriated area.”530   
For a time, the letters had the desired effect.  However, by early 1970 the dispute 
was waged in a different international setting, in which the company’s legal threats were 
proven vacuous, their entitlement to the disputed oil illusory.  The Ba’ath government 
nationalized all IPC holdings in June 1972.  Although the multinational companies 
protested, IPC executives realized they had little recourse and accepted the 
nationalization in 1973.  
What had changed between the Iranian nationalization in the early 1950s and Iraqi 
one in the early 1970s?  To be sure, the Iraqi nationalization culminated a power struggle 
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between the IPC and successive nationalist governments.531  But when viewed from a 
broader perspective, the conflict over the ownership of Iraq’s petroleum was much more 
than a two-sided affair.  Working within a shared postcolonial context of permanent 
sovereignty, oil companies and national governments from the Eastern and Western blocs 
crossed Cold War lines to sign contracts with the Iraq National Oil Company, helping 
Iraq develop its oil-producing capacity.   
PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY AND THE COLD WAR  
The influence of the idea of permanent sovereignty helped create a new locus of 
economic and political power in the international community.  Rooted in the question of 
the Third World’s place in the post-imperial order, the concept of permanent sovereignty 
does much to explain major changes in the international economy, including in the 
postwar petroleum order.  As it became an increasingly influential force in international 
relations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, permanent sovereignty collided with that 
orthodoxy of the early Cold War, energy security.  The debates leading to the June 1972 
nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company uncover that tension. 
The Cold War orthodoxy of energy security can be defined simply as the 
uninterrupted provision of cheap energy supplies for the United States and its allies.  
Although arguments linking U.S. national security to the postwar petroleum order can be 
overstated, policymakers considered cheap and stable oil central to the grand strategy of 
Cold War containment.532  As containment proved successful, an emphasis on economic 
                                                 
531Michael E. Brown, “The Nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company,” International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 10: 1 (1979): 107. 
532 For skepticism about the link between foreign oil and national security, see Maurice Adelman, “The 
Real Oil Problem,” Regulation 27: 1 (Spring 2004): 16-21.  Recently, see: Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring 
Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs 85: 2 (Mar.-Apr. 2006): 69-82; Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, “The 
African ‘Oil Rush’ and US National Security,” Third World Quarterly 27: 4 (2006): 609-628; John H. 
 183 
productivity as an essential weapon became entrenched in U.S. national security 
thought.533 
By the mid-1960s many signs pointed toward a new era in which energy 
insecurity would become as axiomatic as security previously had been.  Demand in the 
industrial countries outstripped supply and American oil production no longer held the 
surplus productive capacity necessary to control market prices.534  The structural 
emphasis on economic factors, however valuable, obscures political trends that were at 
least as important.  At the bare minimum, the development of permanent sovereignty as a 
potent rallying point, first in theory and increasingly in practice, helps explain energy 
insecurity.  From its origins, the political and economic arguments that comprised the 
doctrine of permanent sovereignty were inseparable.  In a series of books and articles 
beginning in 1949 and culminating in the 1964 founding of the UN Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) as a Third World think-tank, Raúl Prebisch had used his 
prominent position to provide intellectual grounding for Third World leaders’ familiar 
calls of neo-colonialism.  The terms of trade thesis and the corrective of permanent 
sovereignty, steeped in a critical interpretation of the imperial foundation of modern 
economic thought, continued to strike a responsive chord with Third World leaders.  
The debates over UNCTAD between 1963 and 1965 demonstrate the broad 
traction of Prebisch’s interpretation of the international economy.535  Prebisch spoke to 
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the delegates of the UN Economic and Social Council in 1963, as the considered whether 
or not to approve the creation of UNCTAD.  He told them that he had initially declined 
an offer to work for the United Nations in 1948 because of his “conviction that the 
economic thinking of the day was not in line with the realities of the situation in [the 
developing] countries.”  In doing so, he “had been afraid that any action taken...might be 
undermined or thwarted by the predominance of Anglo-Saxon economic ideas.”  Fifteen 
years later, that was no longer the case. “All those explosive and revolutionary ideas 
seem today a mere statement of the obvious,” Prebisch said.536 
Third World leaders should “never be deterred from advocating ideas that were 
called heretical,” he continued. “Intellectual independence” was central to solving the 
problem of development in the Third World, even more so in an era where economic 
inequality continued to limit the political freedom inherent in decolonization. The 
developing countries needed capital to modernize their economies, Prebisch continued.  
But indigenous capital formation was constantly prevented by the deterioration of terms 
of trade.  Prebisch and others had noted four lamentable trends in the terms of trade for 
the post-war period: the slow growth in demand for primary products, the decline of the 
developing countries’ share in world trade, the deterioration of commodity prices, and the 
inability of developing countries to finance their development.537 
New statistical surveys supported the doctrine of unequal exchange.  A report by 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the predecessor to the World Trade 
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Organization, provided statistics demonstrating that the volume of exports of industrial 
countries had increased at nearly double the rate of the developing world between 1928 
and 1955.  The United Nations’ 1962 World Economic Survey also held that “developing 
primary producing countries” had suffered “the long-term deterioration of [their] terms of 
trade” at an annual decline of around ten percent between 1950 and 1960.538 
The analysis—supported by the scholarship of Charles Kindleberger, Hans 
Singer, Rupert Emerson, Gunnar Myrdal, and others—had been vocally espoused by 
Third World leaders like Sukarno, Nasser, Mossadegh, Jacobo Arbenz, and Kwame 
Nkrumah.  Contradicting classical economic analyses of comparative advantage, these 
scholars and politicians held that past inequalities had created international terms of trade 
favoring their own technological prowess, thus forging a potent legacy in which the 
values of raw materials progressively declined as industrial productivity rose. 
Numerous UN delegates voiced their belief in Prebisch’s interpretation.  Kifle 
Wodajo, an Ethiopian delegate who had studied the history of his country’s foreign 
relations at the University of Wisconsin, noted the need for forum in which to “discuss 
primarily the trade relations between the developing countries and the industrial countries 
in order to provide the former with remunerative prices for their exports.”539  The Indian 
ambassador, R. K. Nehru, agreed: “In spite of the progress of decolonization, the gap 
between the developed and less developed nations of the world—the rich and the poor—
had not yet closed and in many ways had widened.” Like his colleagues, Nehru 
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emphasized “the important problem of improving the terms of trade for producers of 
primary commodities.”540 
The annual reports for the regional economic commissions of the United Nations 
held the same position.  U Nyun, the Burmese director of Economic Commission for Asia 
and the Far East, told the delegates, “Terms of trade continued to be less favorable to the 
Asian countries.”541 African heads of state had also discussed imperial economic 
continuity recently in Addis Ababa, where it was jointly decided that “Africa 
was...conditioned by specific economic ties with the former metropolitan countries.”  In 
the most recent Economic Commission for Africa session, the majority of countries 
circulated reports about their own “deterioration in the terms of trade.”  Countries 
continued to depend on a narrow range of export commodities, and remained vulnerable 
to short-term price fluctuations.542 
The Economic Commissions for Asia and the Far East and Africa had joined the 
Latin American countries in stressing the need to take international measures to reset the 
terms of trade. Eastern European nations, both nonaligned and communist-bloc, 
supported the position of the developing nations.  The representative from Yugoslavia, 
Miso Pavicevic, argued that questions of development were inherently linked to structure 
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of the international economy.543  Without changes to that structure, it would be 
impossible to promote international economic cooperation “on a footing of equality.”  If 
the United Nations was to achieve any results, Ladislav Smid of Czechoslovakia held, it 
needed to concentrate on “the speedy economic decolonization of the under-developed 
countries.”  Smid contended that the question was “of a political nature...so dynamic that 
[it] had an enormous influence on international trade relations.”544 
In the preparatory meetings for the first meeting of UNCTAD, seventeen 
developing countries submitted a joint statement identifying the terms of trade as the 
central problem facing the international economy.  In a meeting afterwards in Tehran, 
delegates of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East agreed, unanimously 
adopting a resolution that painted “a clear picture” of the shared problems of the 
developing world.  The resolution of the terms of trade issue would “contribute to...the 
integrated growth of the world economy as a whole.”545 
A year later, the impact of the notion of permanent sovereignty in Third World 
politics was palpable in the inaugural meeting of UNCTAD.  Khalil Rahman of 
Pakistan’s trade board responded vehemently to a statement by the British representative 
that the Third World nations should not generalize the terms of trade theory too broadly.  
“Variation did not falsify the general trend,” he said.  “[O]verwhelming indications 
[were] that the terms of trade were falling to the disadvantage of the developing 
countries,” he said. The unfair terms of trade transcended mere economic reasoning—“it 
was true that every economist had his own view, but the vast majority held that 
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prospects...were very bleak.” Oil producers were among the nations that agreed with 
Rahman.  The Iranian delegate stood to express his support, and noted that similar views 
had been expressed by the representatives from India, Mali, Venezuela, and Argentina.  
“The fact was,” he said, “that the terms of trade of the primary exporting countries had 
been deteriorating.” Immediately after, Joe Appiah of Ghana agreed.  “Deteriorating 
terms of trade” were “an accepted fact.”546  The representatives of Iraq, Nigeria, Bolivia, 
El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mauritania tacked on 
their support for the statement.547 
The United States joined Great Britain in discussing “the weaknesses of terms of 
trade analyses and the dangers of studying commodity phenomena from that point of 
view only.”548  However, it was clear that the thesis outweighed other interpretations.  
After introductory discussion, the delegates established a series of General Principles for 
the conference.  The first was, “Economic relations between countries...shall be based on 
respect for the principle of sovereign equality of states, self-determination of peoples, and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.”549 
After the conference, Prebisch spoke again to the delegates of the UN Economic 
and Social Council.  If there was any merit in the first meeting of UNCTAD, it was that it 
“reproduced systematically the ideas that had been gaining ground since Havana,” he told 
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them.  “[T]he developing countries are determined to interpret current economic and 
social phenomena in their own way, and provide the solutions which seemed appropriate 
to them.”  The UN Secretary General, the Burmese diplomat U Thant agreed. “The gap 
between poor and rich is still a problem second to none,” he said.  In dealing with the 
problem of development, U Thant found solace that “the South could now be clearly 
identified as a large group of seventy-seven votes when it chose to assert itself.”  By 
demonstrating the possibility of “greater cohesion among the less developed countries,” 
he hoped that the debates over terms of trade and permanent sovereignty would “prove to 
have been a turning-point in the history of international economic relations.”550 
The Southern delegates were in unison in their position that their countries should 
be accorded special treatment in the international economy.  From this perspective, it was 
essential to establish a system of rights and obligations that took account of the different 
stages of economic development and created opportunities for “equitable international 
economic relations.” Encouraged by a dramatically enlarged UN membership, Third 
World economic thought nurtured a growing sense of solidarity between aligned and non-
aligned underdeveloped countries.  Understood as economic redress for the wrongs of the 
colonial past, permanent sovereignty derived its diplomatic clout from the belief that the 
industrialized world had built the international economy on the unequal framework of the 
past.    
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For the Secretary of Education of Cameroon, Josue Tetang, the message was 
clear.  UNCTAD represented nothing less than “the expression of the developing 
countries’ awareness that their common interests transcended their particular 
differences.”551  In an increasingly unified common front, Third World leaders insisted 
that the economic structure and performance of their countries had been shaped 
decisively by their colonial experience.  Furthermore, their present and future 
development was being retarded by neocolonial influences.  
Oil producers participated actively in this conversation. The delegates from Iran 
and Iraq were especially active in the Economic and Social Council.  The oil procuers’ 
participation also extended beyond individual nations.  In 1965, OPEC established 
official relations with the Economic and Social Council.  The official linking of OPEC 
and the group pleased Iraq’s foreign minister, Adnan al-Pachachi.  “Such relations,” he 
held, “would be fruitful both for the United Nations and for OPEC.”552  Majid Rahnema, 
the Under-Secretary of State for Economic and International Affairs of Iran, supported 
Prebisch’s interpretation of world-wide changes in economic thinking.  “Ideas which had 
seemed unpalatable only ten years before were now generally accepted,” he noted.  “It 
might therefore be said that a turning point,” he continued, echoing U Thant, “had been 
reached in the evolution of economic thought.”553   
Unfortunately for Rahnema, the turning point had not been accompanied by a 
“striking change” in “the mechanisms of the international economy.”  As another step 
towards adjusting those mechanisms, OPEC adopted a “Declaratory Statement of 
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Petroleum Policy in Member Countries” in 1968.  The statement emphasized the 
“inalienable right of all countries to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural 
resources in the interest of their national development.”  The declaration was drafted by 
Francisco Parra, the Venezuelan Secretary General of OPEC, and the director of the 
organization’s legal department, Hasan Zakariya, an Iraqi lawyer trained at Harvard.554 
For a growing group of political leaders and intellectuals, the international 
political economy was a continuation of colonialism, if through different means.  Just as 
William Appleman Williams’ “non-colonial imperial expansion” occurred side-by-side 
with formal colonial rule, so too did decolonization abet a broader Third World 
understanding of the possibilities of statehood.555  By the late 1960s, permanent 
sovereignty came to symbolize the post-colonial determination to move beyond the 
political sovereignty of decolonization and challenge the inequalities of the international 
political economy.556 
In a period in which multinational companies could no longer rely on the 
intervention of their home governments, as they could in the era of the Big Stick and the 
Pith Helmet, company lawyers devised other means to defend their interests.557  The most 
common tactic was to argue that the inalienable nature of the concessionary rights of the 
multinational oil companies, even if acquired as part of a colonial or otherwise dependent 
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relationship, continued after independence.558  One international lawyer described the 
principle of “legally acquired rights” as the position that “old investments should not be 
jeopardized by new laws.”559 
The corporate stance stood squarely against the post-colonial idea that natural 
resource contracts were steeped in inequality.  The legal debate provides a lucid example 
of how international law, as an endeavor to resolve political disputes, frequently reiterates 
problems rather than solving them.560  In the dispute over permanent sovereignty, the 
General Assembly built on the momentum established in UNCTAD and the Economic 
and Social Council. A 1966 resolution on “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources” took a stronger stance on the role of foreign capital, charging corporations 
with the development of “mutually acceptable contractual practices” that would 
“supplement the efforts undertaken by developing countries.”  These contracts were 
explicitly charged with increasing governments’ shares in “the administration of 
enterprises...operated by foreign capital.”561 
The 1966 resolution removed confidence in the sanctity of international 
contracts.562  These contracts, of which the largest were the oil concessions, were already 
viewed in much of the world as part of an inauthentic imperial tradition.   National 
governments including Iraq already understood the concessionary contracts as an affront 
to their sovereignty.  Now they were no longer sacrosanct.  Therefore, contracts were 
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subject to negotiation.  The right to abrogate contracts, the very thing oil companies and 
their governments had feared since the expropriations of the 1930s, passed with near-
unanimity in 1966.  The passage of the permanent sovereignty resolution in UN squarely 
placed the weight of international legal credibility on the side of raw material producers.   
Cyclical debates in the twentieth century regarding multinational companies 
demonstrate that disputes over sovereignty wax and wane with the perception of foreign 
exploitation.563  The new iteration in the mid-1960s, however, made for terms far 
different from those that existed during the 1951 Iranian nationalization.  The 
legitimization of permanent sovereignty marked a transfer of legal power.  The change 
was at loggerheads with the postwar petroleum order of the previous two decades and, for 
many, the unequal economic relationships that characterized the imperialism of the 
previous two centuries.   
OPEC AND PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY  
The shift in legitimacy, moreover, challenged a fundamental tenet of the international 
economy, the corporatism of the postwar petroleum order.  Many events imparted greater 
power to the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in the late 
1960s.  In one instance, the “Arab oil weapon” dovetailed neatly with regional politics, as 
the Shah’s opera conversation noted.  Pan-Arabism had spread during and after the June 
1967 war.  By the turn of the decade the diplomatic practice of permanent sovereignty, by 
Arab and non-Arab oil producers alike, became fused to the question of Palestinian self-
determination.  The confluence encouraged Iraq to press on with the development of 
disputed oil reserves. 
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The evolution of the company-government in Iraq provides a marvelous example 
of the greater role permanent sovereignty began to play as it moved into the arena of the 
international economy.  For Iraq, the adhesion to permanent sovereignty did not begin 
with independence.  The Iraq Petrolem Company signed its first concession under formal 
mandatory control in 1925, and Great Britain granted Iraq independence in 1932 as a 
means to avoid League of Nations supervision.564  The Hashemite monarchy maintained 
an emphatic pro-Western stance in the following quarter-century, despite intermittent 
nationalist rhetoric and campaigns to increase royalties.565 
Nationalist tenets drove government-company relations after the 1958 revolution.  
The revolutionary government of Abd al-Karim Qasim interpreted the presence of the 
IPC as a vestige of imperialism.  Qasim defiantly confronted the company.  He demanded 
greater production, increases in Iraq’s share of the profits, and the relinquishment of a 
large portion of its concession.  In response, the IPC offered similar terms to those 
accepted by Iran after the reinstatement of the Shah in 1953.566  Against a domestic 
backdrop of increasing unrest, Qasim refused.567  At the same time, the major oil 
companies cut the posted price of crude oil, shrinking the oil producing countries’ 
revenues by fifteen percent.  This was the same price cut led Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, Iraq, and Venezuela to form OPEC in Baghdad in September 1960.568 
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Negotiations in Iraq faltered in 1960 and Qasim raised Persian Gulf transit rates to 
Basrah by 1200 percent.  The IPC responded by suspending production for all fields that 
used the port.569  After that, mutual animosity scuttled any potential agreement.  In late 
1961, the government passed Law 80, which expropriated concession areas not under 
production.  The law covered 99.58 percent of the 1925 concession, but the principle 
bone of contention involved only a small area.  Controversially, Law 80 expropriated all 
non-producing areas, including ones that the IPC already had surveyed.  The most 
promising of these was the Rumaila field in southern Iraq.  Though the company argued 
that their legally acquired concessionary rights invalidated the new law, Western 
purchasers did not boycott Iraqi oil as they had Iranian oil a decade earlier, because 
Qasim had not nationalized any actual production.570   
Iraq did not possess the competence to develop the expropriated areas, the fields 
lay undeveloped, and the oil remained in the ground.  The prospects for eventual 
production improved in the second half of the 1960s.  The new technical capacity of Iraqi 
nationals strengthened the government’s hand in the ongoing negotiations with the IPC, 
which continued to produce all Iraqi oil.   
Syrian nationalism played a part in the process.  In August 1966, an extreme wing 
of the Syrian Ba’ath Party took control of the national government.  Based on the 
increased capacity and lower average costs of oil sent through the pipeline to Banias, the 
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government sought to raise the fees for Mediterranean-bound crude.  After the IPC 
refused to negotiate, Syria unilaterally increased transit and loading fees.  The Syrian 
Ba’athists declared the conflict “[a]n episode in a broader struggle to free the Arab nation 
from the domination of Western imperialism and exploitation by oil monopolists.”571  
Soon after, the government argued that Arab oil was a “tool for liberation” and “fuel to 
‘burn imperialism.’” Syrian action also fell within the broader Third World attempts to 
use natural resources to “preserve peoples’ rights.”572 
Abdullah al-Tariki, the former Saudi oil minister, also commented on the IPC 
situation from his offices in Beirut.  The concession had been “concluded by unequal 
parties” and reinforced the power of the IPC as a “government within a government,” the 
editor of Arab Oil and Gas wrote in Al-Thawra, the leading Baghdad newspaper.  
“Governments of civilized countries do not resort to negotiations but [rather] to 
legislation,” he concluded.573  Iraqi policymakers agreed.  The Iraq Petroleum Company 
reduced production in Iraq during the transit dispute.  The cutback caused revenue losses 
of approximately 60 percent, prompting the Iraqi finance minister to predict that the clash 
would “cripple the economy.”574  Still, Iraq supported Syria and ordered the IPC to 
resume production to Banias in January 1967.  Furthermore, the government claimed that 
the IPC purposefully dawdled during the Syrian negotiations in order to exert financial 
pressure regarding the fields expropriated in 1961.575 
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Pressure on the IPC became increasingly commonplace after the Ba’athist coup in 
1968, which lifted the military officer Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and his nephew, Saddam 
Hussein, to power.  After purging its opponents, the Ba’ath government embarked on a 
process of economic development.  The Ba’ath party abandoned pan-Arabism for Iraqi 
nationalism once in power, but the concept of permanent sovereignty remained at the 
center of policy toward the IPC.576  In 1970, an editorial in the Ba’ath journal Al-Taakhi 
argued that Iraq “continue[d] to suffer as a result of the discriminatory production 
policy…firstly as a means of revenge and secondly to bring pressure to bear upon Iraq to 
submit to the will of the companies.”577   Ba’ath leaders consistently used the discourse of 
permanent sovereignty to support their claims, reminding the IPC managing director that 
the control of oil profits and production fell within sovereign governments’ “generally 
recognized rights.”578   Al Thawra took an identical editorial line in “the battle to extract 
our rights from the oil companies.”579 
The rights of permanent sovereignty, in this case to production in the surveyed 
fields expropriated in 1961, continued to be the principle obstacle to agreement between 
Iraq and the IPC.  The company proposed substantial production increases and a new 
agreement on royalty expensing in 1970.580  It also offered to surrender its claims to the 
majority of the expropriated area.  As quid pro quo, company executives asked the Ba’ath 
Revolutionary Command Council for “exclusive control and marketing of production” 
from Rumaila.  The Revolutionary Command Council, holding line established by Qasim 
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in, refused to negotiate “on the grounds that IPC had not really accepted the provisions of 
Law 80.”581 
THE MULTINATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL OIL COMPANY 
Each side adamantly opposed compromise after the 1970 refusal.  The tenor of the 
negotiations changed perceptibly in the government’s favor later in the year.  The 
decisive factor was the national oil company’s newfound ability to produce oil from 
Rumaila.  The ability to bring oil to the tap provided the Ba’ath government with an 
advantage not held by their nationalist predecessors.  Once the national oil company 
gained the capacity to produce its oil, it began to find ready markets.  The negotiating 
position of the IPC quickly slipped. 
Reflecting its new capabilities, the national oil company signed a number of 
contracts after 1970.  The proliferation of IPC warning letters threatening legal 
challenges to “hot oil,” composed by the London corporate office, were closely analyzed 
by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).  The warning letter strategy 
initially found support from different elements within the FCO, especially the Oil 
Department.  The embassy in Baghdad opposed the strategy. By early 1971, the FCO 
arrived at the near-unanimous conclusion that the embassy’s analysis was correct.  The 
warning letters would not deter the national oil company from developing the facilities to 
produce and finding markets for Rumaila oil. 
The British ambassador, Hugh Glencairn Balfour-Paul, held that the IPC was 
unlikely to gain any ground without compromising on Rumaila.582  Balfour-Paul believed 
that the Ba’athist negotiating levers had improved to a point that undermined the IPC’s 
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position.  In the sharp light of the international politics of permanent sovereignty, he 
believed, the companies’ hands were bound.  Balfour-Paul characterized the decision by 
the director of Shell, Sir David Barran’s, to call what he believed to be an Iraqi bluff as a 
“death wish in action.”  He wrote that the IPC’s assessment of its “unassailable position” 
ran counter to his analysis and that of his French, Dutch, and Italian colleagues.583  The 
ambassador urged the British government to pressure the IPC to meet Iraqi demands 
multiple times in early 1970.584 
The Oil Department disagreed.  Balfour-Paul’s call to “intervene forcibly” in the 
negotiations could not be heeded for three reasons.  First, the company had made “many 
efforts,” all failures, to find a solution.  For example, the IPC increased production in 
December 1969 despite problems with global over-supply and their members’ concurrent 
need to satisfy the “aspirations of the Shah and others.”  Thus, requesting control of 
Rumaila oil was “reasonable.”585  Viewed from London, the impasse resulted from Iraqi 
intransigence, not multinational myopia.   
Second, members of the Oil Department believed that “economic factors [did] not 
point in the same direction as the political.” The Iraqi government was “in no position to 
dispense with the IPC, above all since the latter alone can at present provide markets for 
Iraqi oil.”  The cash-strapped Ba’ath could be forced to concede Rumaila in order to 
maintain revenue streams.  The IPC hoped that the “financial stringency” so evident 
during the Syrian stoppage would weaken Iraq.  The FCO even told the Iraqi oil minister 
in March 1970 that “a settlement with the IPC would put an immediate injection of cash 
into the Iraqis’ pockets.”586 
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Third, the Oil Department disagreed with Balfour-Paul on the question of 
precedent.  Policymakers feared that capitulation to Iraq would lead to repercussions in 
other oil-producing countries.  Concurrent negotiations between different oil producers—
most notably Libya, Iran, and Iraq—threatened a perpetual leapfrog effect, by which each 
government would seek to improve upon the best deal signed elsewhere.  OPEC already 
had begun to consolidate the producers’ collective permanent sovereignty, with the new 
Libyan Revolutionary Command Council of Muammar Qaddafi as the frontrunner.  The 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office felt it could not press the IPC “to change their 
stance...unless we accept that they should jeopardise [the companies’] position 
throughout the major concessionary areas.”587 
The British foreign secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, followed the advice of the 
Oil Department throughout 1970.  Some facts supported the decision.   Oil revenues were 
of overwhelming importance for the Ba’ath regime, which had not fully consolidated 
power.  Other observers agreed that the costs of rule made it less likely that the Ba’ath 
could withstand any extended revenue losses.  The International Monetary Fund reported 
that Iraq's foreign assets had undergone negligible increases in 1968 and 1969, despite 
growing oil revenues.588  The “diversion of foreign exchange for unacknowledged 
purposes before it reaches the official reserves,” an internal Shell report said, had “such 
large discrepancies” that only one explanation was plausible: “payments for the arms she 
has undoubtedly obtained.”589  The Foreign and Commonwealth Office hoped the revenue 
shortages caused by arms spending would soften the Ba’ath.  The concern with precedent 
was also legitimate.  If the IPC gave in to Iraq regarding the legality of the 1961 
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nationalization, other consortiums, often comprising the same member companies, would 
face stronger demands from elsewhere.   
The FCO correctly identified the problems of revenue and precedent, but 
committed two paramount errors in its analysis.  First, the policy put forward by the Oil 
Department, which held regular “tea parties” with Shell and BP executives, nearly 
mimicked the position of the companies.  Above all, the British government assumed that 
the IPC was willing to find negotiable terms.  The IPC’s managing director and principle 
negotiator in 1970, Geoffrey Stockwell of BP, made it clear that the essential factor for 
agreement was a settlement granting the IPC exclusive resale rights of Rumaila oil.590  
Balfour-Paul’s position in Baghdad led him to believe, correctly, that Stockwell’s stance 
was untenable.  Since 1961, the rights to Rumaila had been a public issue of sovereignty. 
The second flaw was more basic.  Steeped in a long history of imperial 
economics, the Oil Department ignored the international context of permanent 
sovereignty as a political force in the negotiations.  Both the IPC and the FCO 
consistently held that oil companies served as “purely commercial concerns whose 
activities are regulated by the terms of international trade in oil.”591  By 1970, the 
separation of international politics and economics was disingenuous, especially if made 
using a terms of trade argument.  The politics of sovereignty became a center of gravity 
in the negotiations, but the FCO ignored the obvious political ramifications of the IPC’s 
claim to oil that had been expropriated legally under Iraqi jurisprudence.   
In addition to discounting Iraqi sovereignty, British policy suffered from internal 
contradictions, particularly in its own assertion that oil was purely a commodity.  The 
argument mirrored some aspects of U.S. policy during the 1967 embargo, especially after 
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Nasser characterized oil as “strategic.”  By supporting the warning letter strategy, the Oil 
Department buoyed a tenuous argument in which the companies denied the political 
nature of their own actions even as they paradoxically recognized the international 
implications of Iraqi demands.  Refusing to accede to Ba’ath objectives, the companies 
maintained a diametrically identical position to the Ba’athist one in their concern about 
setting a political precedent—the concern that other countries might follow in Iraq’s 
footsteps was as political as the arguments put forth by Iraqi negotiators.  
The IPC and the Oil Department fashioned a resoundingly illogical rationale that 
could not have been compelling even under the best of circumstances.  At a 1970 dinner 
in Baghdad, a Soviet diplomat bluntly explained the absurdity of the warning letters to a 
company executive.  Recent letters addressed to the Kremlin had not been answered 
because they were simply “unfair.” The legal issue was not with the USSR, other 
countries, or even other companies, which were “acting as subcontractors to INOC.”   
Rather, the dispute was with the Iraqi government itself.592 
The warning letter strategy hardly even passed muster within Great Britain.  
When the FCO disallowed British companies from providing development assistance to 
Iraq or accepting future Rumaila oil as payment, several companies lobbied the Board of 
Trade to challenge the decision.593  The politics of permanent sovereignty began to 
influence national commercial policy.  Foreign firms—including not only Eastern bloc 
countries, but also the French, Italian, Swiss, and Spanish companies already under 
contract with INOC in 1970—would not “hold back” from the opportunities presented by 
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Iraq.  By preventing British firms from competing for lucrative contracts, the Board of 
Trade argued, the FCO was “depriving ourselves of business.”594 
The gap between reality and the IPC’s interpretation of reality quickly became too 
wide to sustain by the middle of 1970.  Still, company directors confirmed that 
immovability would continue to underpin their policy. A settlement with the Ba’ath, 
David Barran told Oil Department officials, would lend too much credence to the 
producers’ permanent sovereignty.  Concession to Iraqi demands “would be damaging to 
[IPC] interests over all, with no compensating gain to the West.”595 
In early February 1970, the Ba’ath government increased pressure on the 
companies by announcing the revocation of Article 3 of Law 80.  The article allowed the 
government to double the companies’ area of operation.  According to the head of oil 
affairs for the Revolutionary Command Council, Sa’doun Hamadi, Article 3 was a “gap 
incompatible with national oil policy, as it allows expansion of the area of concessions 
for the monopolistic companies.”596  The annulment prohibited any future growth in IPC 
influence.  The no-new-concession policy represented a clear toughening of the Iraqi line.  
On February 23, the Revolutionary Command Council announced Law 20, which granted 
wide powers to the government.  Among the articles of the new law was the right to “fix 
the price of commodities, e.g. posted prices of oil.”597  Observers recognized the 
application of permanent sovereignty.  The law “vested considerable power in the 
Government to interfere” with company operations, including seizing oil with 
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compensation or taking over operations without compensation.  According to the Oil 
Department, the law was “one more milestone on the road to state control.”598 
The continued efforts to prevent the production and sale of nationalized oil 
represented a last-ditch legalistic attempt that was, in the words of Balfour-Paul, 
“tantamount to closing their eyes to the facts of history.”599  By the end of 1970, the Oil 
Department also realized that the warning letters had little effect.  “We wonder how 
much longer we and the IPC can go on like this,” the department briefed the foreign 
secretary in December.  “We feel that the sands may be running out.”600 
In the end, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office realized that the legal 
argument was bunk.  The Oil Department attempted to convince the IPC to abandon the 
warning letter strategy.601  The IPC’s decision to continue nonetheless was regrettable, 
Balfour-Paul wrote.  Despite their profession to be nothing more than commercial 
warnings regarding a breach of contract, the letters had a more profound political 
meaning.  They were “regarded by all Iraqis concerned as a slap in the face,” Balfour-
Paul concluded.602 
TRITE SLOGANS 
Like the British Oil Department, State Department policymakers underestimated the Iraq 
situation.  Ignoring reports of the growing capability of the Iraq National Oil Company, 
officials characterized the “hard-line intransigence” of the Iraqi government as nothing 
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more than the “trite slogans of ‘Arab oil for the Arabs.’”603  The U.S. embassy in 
Baghdad expressed frustration with the official position, arguing to the Near East desk 
that “it is insufficient simply to cluck our tongues sympathetically and urge moderation,” 
but American policy remained one of non-intervention.604 
The Nixon administration was not alarmed about the problem of permanent 
sovereignty in Iraq.  American diplomats generally agreed with their British counterparts 
that the Iraq Petroleum Company had significant leverage they could use to gain access to 
Rumaila oil.605   The IPC had an outsized role in the national economy, analysts wrote, 
giving the threat of a production shutdown particular weight. Especially during the Syrian 
shutdown in 1966 and 1967, the U.S. government did not expect Iraq to stand up to the 
IPC on the question of nationalized oil.606 
In the second half of 1971 and again in early 1972, the IPC limited the flow of 
Iraqi oil to the Syrian port of Banias.  The company cited lower Persian Gulf freight rates 
as its economic logic, a result of supertanker construction following the 1967 closure of 
the Suez Canal.  Still, the cutbacks upset the Ba’ath leaders.  The young vice president of 
the Revolutionary Command Council, Saddam Hussein, complained to the head French 
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member of the IPC, Jan Duroc Danner, that the reduction was a heavy-handed 
negotiating ploy.607 
OPEC supported Iraq, labeling the production cuts “political.”608  When the 
national oil company began production in Rumaila in April 1972, the IPC restated its 
ownership claim and further limited Iraq’s Mediterranean off-take, cutting Iraqi oil 
revenues by a third.  The IPC once more denied that the action was retaliatory, but most 
observers assumed that it was.  Decrying the “pressure tactic,” the Ba’ath government 
issued an ultimatum: The IPC could abandon the bountiful Kirkuk fields or allocate part 
of its pipeline capacity to Rumaila.609  The IPC did not budge, promising only to reinstate 
production.  The company maintained its Rumaila claim; the counterproposal did not 
address the fundamental assertion of Iraqi sovereignty.  The Revolutionary Command 
Council brusquely rejected it.610   Iraq nationalized all IPC operations on June 1, 1972.611 
The Journal of World Trade Law provided a concise summary of the 
consequences of the IPC nationalization for international contracts: “Following along the 
path laid out by history…the traditional concession surrendering huge areas to the oil 
interests now seems a thing of the past.”612  After the nationalization, the IPC filed cases 
based on their warning letters in the Brazilian, Indian, and Italian legal systems.613  Each 
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case failed, and despite a worldwide advertising campaign by the IPC in August 1972, 
private and public companies from many more nations signed contracts with the national 
oil company.614  In February 1973, after World Bank President Robert McNamara 
personally cancelled a final attempt to pressure Iraq to raise its compensation through a 
“blocking operation” on an education loan, the IPC officially accepted the 1961 and 1972 
nationalization decrees.615 
As the warning letter façade collapsed, it became clear that the IPC stood alone.  
It was equally evident that the debate over sovereign ownership did not occur in a 
geopolitical vacuum.  Neither did it remain within the traditional superpower binary.  To 
be sure, Soviet bloc countries abetted the production and marketing of Rumaila oil.  
However, the politics of permanent sovereignty also blurred Cold War boundaries, as 
Western importers and other oil-producing nations in the Middle East cultivated the 
Ba’ath capacity to develop nationalized crude.    
State visits by Saddam Hussein to Moscow and Paris in 1972 best explain the 
transition. Borth ventures were successful and undoubtedly increased Hussein’s stature in 
the Arab world. Hussein, who rarely travelled abroad “unless the matter [was] of extreme 
importance,” arrived in Moscow on February 10.616   The joint communiqué published 
after the meeting stressed Soviet readiness to help Iraq “exploit its oil wealth 
independently.”  Although the communiqué was typical of Soviet policy, the Jordanian 
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ambassador in Moscow informed his American counterpart that Hussein’s primary goal 
had been a substantial agreement on the marketing of Rumaila oil.   Iraq, according to his 
sources, had acquired fifteen Soviet oil tankers as a result of the visit, which would make 
“harassment of their operations by oil companies more difficult.”617 
The Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin, paid a return visit to Iraq in April 1972 to 
sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.  The treaty was timed to overlap with the 
commencement of national production in Rumaila.  At the ribbon cutting ceremony, 
Hussein and Kosygin gave brief speeches.  Hussein’s opening lines provide a unique 
window into the international politics of permanent sovereignty:  
 
We and the masses of the people everywhere in this country are today 
celebrating an important event in our national history – the beginning of 
the direct national exploitation of oil.  This industry has been monopolized 
for about half a century by foreign monopolistic companies.  It is indeed 
splendid that this celebration should take place on the same day when the 
people and their revolutionary forces are celebrating the 25th anniversary 
of the Ba’ath Party, which has struggled throughout these years to liberate 
Arab countries from all types of imperialist influence and raised the 
national slogan “Arab oil belongs to the Arabs.” 
The slogan the State Department had written off as “trite” in 1967 now was less so.  
Kosygin then discussed Rumaila as an example of Iraq “strengthening its sovereignty,” 
part of a broader struggle to ensure that “natural resources, and above all oil, belong to 
their true owners.”618 
These speeches culminated a half-decade relationship between Iraq and the 
eastern bloc in which Cold War concerns and the politics of permanent sovereignty 
became increasingly enmeshed.  Legislation created the Iraq National Oil Company in 
1964.619  It was not until the end of the decade that the national oil company became a 
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viable enterprise.  Soviet financial backing and technical know-how provided the 
essential factors in its development.  In July 1967, after Soviet President Nikolai 
Podgorny became the first high-ranking leader to visit Iraq, the director of the national oil 
company stated that “[o]ur aim must be the complete control of our oil wealth.”  A week 
later the prime minister, Tahir Yahia, also called for further governmental control over 
the oil industry.620     
Such statements were empty as long as the Iraq National Oil Company could not 
bring its oil to the surface.  The Soviet Union and Iraq continued to work together to 
develop production capabilities.  The two governments signed a protocol setting up an 
agenda for economic cooperation in December.  The protocol emphasized Soviet 
assistance with technical formation, the drilling of wells in Rumaila, and the 
transportation and marketing of crude oil.  The director of the national oil company again 
used the language of permanent sovereignty to stress that Soviet-Iraqi cooperation would 
“weaken the foreign oil monopolies and strengthen both our countries and our peoples.”  
Iraq’s president denounced the IPC with “the strongest attack... in several years,” 
according to the U.S. ambassador in Beirut, calling the company “blood suckers” that 
sought “to prevent us from developing the country’s national resources.”621 
The Soviet-Iraqi protocol held that Iraq would pay for Soviet assistance with oil 
to be produced in the future.  The future oil clause would be repeated frequently by 
companies and countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain in the coming years.   Financial 
support followed technical aid.  In 1969, the Ba’ath Revolutionary Command Council 
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announced a $140 million Soviet loan for the exploitation of Rumaila.  The Kremlin 
news organ, Ivestia, employed a broad brush to paint the implications of the loan.  It 
represented the “mutually advantageous cooperation between Arab and socialist 
countries” that was “being extended to an ever-widening range of economic problems, 
including the problem of creating a national oil industry for the Arabs.”  In a separate 
article, Ivestia identified Western discomfort with the Soviet presence in the Persian Gulf 
as rooted in “the fact that their own plans to control the Arabs’ oil are breaking down.”622 
Soviet columnists may have exaggerated the level and unity of Western concern, 
but support form the Kremlin undoubtedly strengthened the Iraqi negotiating position.  
Iraqi exclamations of its permanent sovereignty before the 1969 agreement were typically 
couched in ambiguous terms.  The State Department noted that the 1967 agreement dealt 
in generalities, giving “no clue to the scope and terms of Soviet assistance.”623  
Conversely, the goals of the 1969 agreement were specific—expansion in Rumaila 
production to 100,000 barrels per day by early 1972 and up to 360,000 barrels by 1975.  
The Soviet agreement to transport the crude also made IPC threats of boycott 
unworkable.624  Soviet and Hungarian companies drilled several producing wells in the 
Rumaila field in 1970, in spite of British reports of their “antiquated and inefficient” 
machinery.625  Iraq received additional loans from Bulgaria, East Germany, and 
Czechoslovakia the same year, all to be repaid in future oil.626 
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The Ba’ath Party had called for nationalization since 1962, even as a small 
opposition group.627  The language of Ba’ath nationalism continued unabated.  Now in 
power, and buoyed by Communist-bloc support, Iraqi negotiators changed their tack in 
1970.  Nationalist demands became more specific and the IPC’s position became 
increasingly tenuous.  In lock-step with Muhammed Maghrebi in Libya, the Shah of Iran, 
and Saudi oil minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani, Iraqi oil minister Sa’doun Hamadi used the 
threat of unilateral legislation to draw several concessions from the IPC between 1970 
and 1972.628  The concessions included hallmarks of permanent sovereignty: a series of 
price increases and 20-percent government participation in company assets.629 
The Soviet-Iraqi relationship between 1967 and 1972, based on technical and 
financial assistance in return for future oil production, undermined the company’s 
negotiating position of the Iraq Petroleum Company.  To certain observers, Soviet 
involvement in the strategically vital Persian Gulf made a broader superpower détente an 
impossibility from the beginning.630    Balfour-Paul, for one, was alarmed.  “The Soviet 
Union,” he wrote, “continues to make easy tricks here and steadily improves her 
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standing, not least in oil affairs.  Assuming, as we must that subversion in the Gulf States 
is a Soviet aim, it would be surprising if they did not use Iraq…as a stalking horse.”631  
The State Department agreed that Iraq was part “of a series of Soviet moves to promote 
the development of indigenous oil industries in developing countries.”  The promotion of 
permanent sovereignty had become a “key element in USSR aid policy,” designed “to 
undermine the dominant position of Western...oil interests.”632 
The Shah of Iran joined Western diplomats in their concern about the greater 
Soviet presence.  The Shah warned the U.S. ambassador in 1970 that the USSR was 
“equipping Iraq with offensive armaments.”633   He reiterated to military officials that 
“the Soviets, after British withdrawal from the region” would “stir up mischief” through 
Iraq and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen.  To fill the imperial void, the Shah 
requested increased armaments sales and made clear that he would force the Iran 
Consortium to “meet his demands” for greater revenue to fund these sales.634 
A May 1972 CIA report summarized Soviet policy in the Persian Gulf since the 
Six Day War.  The Kremlin had “followed a consistent course” in “prob[ing] the area, 
seeking—as opportunities arose—to extend its political and military influence into a 
region of traditional Russian concern.” Like U.S. policy toward the Twin Pillars, Soviet 
penetration dealt largely in energy and arms.635  Of greater import for the CIA, the Iraqi-
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Soviet treaty included a carefully formulated reciprocal security clause that had not been 
included in recent Soviet treaties with Egypt and India.  The security agreement relieved 
the “logistic constraints on Soviet operations in the Indian Ocean.”  The port city of Umm 
Qasr, although underdeveloped, had a deep harbor with a large anchorage area.  The Iraqi 
Air Force had calso ompleted six military airfields with Soviet assistance “that could be 
used to support a Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean.”636 
Few American officials believed these concerns amounted to much.  State 
Department and National Security Council analysts conceded that the Kremlin sought 
greater influence, but they also believed that the Soviet leadership valued détente too 
much to take any catastrophic risks.  Some officials even hoped that the Soviet Union, in 
light of their recent natural gas contract with the Shah, could “persuade the Iraqis to 
exercise restraint vis-à-vis Iran.”637   Indeed, according to a 1972 National Intelligence 
Estimate on Iraq, the Ba’ath regime’s “extreme and unbending pan-Arab nationalism” 
was a greater concern than incipient communist influence.  At any rate, “Iraqi assets and 
capabilities [were] outclassed by those of Iran and Saudi Arabia.”  Soviet influence was 
thus “not a significant source of irritation.”638 
Still, many policymakers remained wary of the relationship between Soviet policy 
and permanent sovereignty.  After the nationalization, the American representative in 
Baghdad wrote to the State Department that a quick compensation settlement between the 
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IPC and Iraq would be “a significant setback to the USSR.”639  The Assistant Secretary 
for Near Eastern Affairs, Joseph Sisco, contacted the head of the Iraqi Interests section in 
Beirut to “prepare the groundwork for a possible improvement in bilateral relations.”  
Sisco hoped to reward Iraq for settling the IPC case in order to build on “indications that 
Iraq may be seeking a more independent stand in its international alignments.”640 
SADDAM VISITS PARIS 
For Sisco, Soviet assistance to the Iraq National Oil Company was not a trifling matter. 
Neither was Western support for the permanent sovereignty of Iraq over its oil.  
Immediately after the IPC nationalization, Saddam Hussein led a delegation on another 
successful visit, this time to Paris.  There, he met with the French government, which 
owned one-third of the French member company of the Iraq Petroleum Company, the 
Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP).  To the consternation of the other members of 
IPC, the delegation negotiated an agreement allowing CFP to receive its formerly allotted 
share of oil for ten years under pre-nationalization conditions.641 
The other IPC members begrudgingly accepted the French connection only after 
CFP executives assured them that they would use the relationship to negotiate “adequate” 
compensation for the nationalized property.642  On the issue of compensation, the IPC 
would fare as poorly as it had in defending its contractual rights.  Following the June 
1972 decree, the IPC claimed that it had “quasi-property rights” over underground 
reserves and argued that the value of the expropriation, including oil, totaled $1 billion.  
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The Ba’ath government rebutted the claim and offered a much lower compensation value, 
based on the net book value of $15 million.643 
Owing to his close relationship with Hussein, the IPC members appointed the 
director of CFP, Jan Duroc Danner, to mediate the compensation.  British and American 
executives immediately regretted the decision, speculating that self-interest drove Danner 
and force the IPC to settle for a depressed compensation value. The negotiations dragged 
on until late 1972.  British and American executives expressed their distrust of Danner, 
recalling a rumored deal between the CFP and the Iraq National Oil Company for 
Rumaila production in 1967.644   The doubts about Danner increased when he told the 
other IPC companies in September 1972 that “Iraqi patience [would] run out” and the 
Ba’ath would unilaterally assign a compensation value, unless they showed “concrete 
progress” in the shape of major concessions.645  The Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
noted the “increasing pressure on the French oil industry” to develop “its own favourable 
position in Iraq, if necessary at the expense of its allies.”646 
The French company, the other member companies of the IPC believed, yielded 
to Iraqi pressure and pushed for a final settlement on unfavorable terms.  The IPC agreed 
on March 1, 1973 to pay Iraq $350 million “as settlement of past debts” in return for 
fifteen million tons of Iraqi oil.  Upon announcing the settlement, Iraqi president Ahmed 
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Hassan al-Bakr stated that the agreement “guarantees our sovereignty over our natural 
resources and gives the companies the compensation they deserved.”647 
The courting of France, a major oil importer and a Western power, reflected a 
wider Iraqi policy of using permanent sovereignty to its national advantage.  Beginning in 
the mid-1960s, at the same time as the initial Soviet deals, Iraq signed development 
contracts with several Western companies.  The International Monetary Fund lauded the 
strategy as “a favorable line of policy to encourage activities of the private sector.”648  As 
early as 1964, the U.S. Undersecretary of State, George Ball, presciently predicted that 
the IPC would eventually find itself undercut by Japanese, Italian, and other foreign oil 
operators. The IPC “could not hold the line in Iraq forever,” he wrote.649 
Iraq favored development bids and trade agreements that were based on payment 
in future oil.  One common stipulation was that oil purchased in return for development 
capital or projects would be purchased from the Iraq National Oil Company.  A series of 
bilateral deals between 1969 and 1972 ensured that nationalized Iraqi oil had a broad 
backing and diverse markets. In the pursuit of diversification, the Iraqi government used 
permanent sovereignty to show partiality to nations willing to brave the possibility of an 
IPC lawsuit.650 
Before the 1972 French-Iraqi agreement, the national oil company already had 
signed forward oil contracts with the Italian, Brazilian, and Spanish national oil 
companies. After nationalization, Iraq sold oil to companies in India, Greece and several 
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Eastern European states, as well as making additional industrial agreements with Italy 
and Japan.651  In 1973 and 1974, both France and Japan extended direct government loans 
to Iraq, at least in part to maintain their privileged oil position.652  A U.S. intelligence 
report recognized that Iraqi “efforts to arrange alternative supply contracts have been 
relatively successful.”653 
At times, Iraq’s “maverick behavior” had decidedly mixed individual results.  
One British diplomat invoked the “sad” image of the lone Brazilian representative’s 
suitcase spilling its contents “over the Syrian desert during his trip from Beirut to 
Baghdad.”654  The State Department held that Iraqi permanent sovereignty had serious 
limits.  It was unlikely that the Soviet Union could import more than a marginal amount 
of oil.  Furthermore, in 1972 the OPEC countries had “promis[ed] an uninterrupted 
supply of oil to world customers at terms tolerable to both producers and sellers.”  Iraq 
could not expect “wholehearted support” from its fellow oil-producing states.655 
The State Department assessment severely underestimated the strength of the oil 
producers’ sovereignty and misgauged their desire to use it.  Events quickly disproved the 
report’s verdict.  Although the Shah and King Faisal professed alarm at the Soviet 
presence in Iraq, both accepted Saddam Hussein’s basic assumption of permanent 
sovereignty and the Ba’athist goal of developing production control.  In Iran’s ongoing 
negotiations with the Consortium, the Shah used the same sovereignty-based arguments.  
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“The main point,” he repeated to Secretary of State Rogers in 1970, “was that, in 
accordance with principles established by the United Nations, the companies cannot … 
prevent exploitation of Iran's natural resources.”656 
At the crucial moment of nationalization, Iraq also received material support from 
its fellow oil producers, who in the recent past had been as likely to capitalize on an Iraqi 
pitfall as to lend a helping hand.  In the months preceding nationalization, Kuwait made 
substantial loans to Iraq, despite their considerable differences.  The finance ministers of 
the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) 
agreed to lend Iraq £54 million to make up for production shortages resulting from 
nationalization.  OPEC also released a public statement supporting the nationalization as 
“an act of sovereignty valid under international law.”657  In the following six months, Iraq 
received somewhere between $50 and $90 million in loans from Kuwait and Libya.658 
The solidarity of oil power surprised some policymakers.  Many traditionally 
doubted ability of the producers to work together.  In 1970, one British official frankly 
repeated the sentiment, arguing that the Ba’ath had “shown a remarkable tendency, like 
other Arabs, to cut off their nose despite [sic] their face.”659  Residual bias had proven a 
reasonably accurate analysis during the 1967 embargo, even if international 
circumstances gave the lie to Orientalist outlooks on Arab cohesion.  More recently, 
disharmony had been evident in the founding of OAPEC itself.  The history of the group 
remains tainted by a commonly held misperception among scholars who assume that the 
Arab producers founded the organization to better coordinate their use of the “Arab oil 
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weapon” in the ongoing battle with Israel.660  In reality, OAPEC was window dressing to 
conceal the contrary.  In January 1968, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya founded the 
organization “chiefly to give the conservative oil-rich states a pan-Arab umbrella under 
which pressures from the radical Arab states might be more easily resisted,” the State 
Department reported.661 
The 1969 coup in Libya perforated the umbrella.  In early 1970, serious strains 
between the founders appeared when Libya accused the other two members of opposing 
the admission of Algeria and Iraq. They qualified for membership as Arab countries for 
which oil was the principal source of national income.   To balance the radical presence, 
according to the Oil Department, “Saudi Arabia made great efforts, reportedly at King 
Faisal's personal command, to bring the Gulf Emirates into the organization.”  Algeria, 
Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Dubai became members in May 1970.  OAPEC could boast that it 
represented 55 percent of global oil exports.662 
Iraq applied to join the organization a month later, but a decision was deferred 
until December 1970 and again until June 1971.  The latter meeting was suspended when 
Secretary General Suhail Sa’dawi of Libya tendered his resignation and warned publicly 
that the organization might be dissolved.  In December 1971 Saudi Arabia sought 
compromise through an amendment to the membership qualifications that allowed Arab 
oil producers to join regardless of whether oil was their principal source of income. The 
amendment opened the way for the admission of Egypt and Syria, as well as Iraq, in May 
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1972.  “It is possible that Saudi Arabia, having seen that the pass could not be held 
indefinitely against Iraq, decided to dilute Iraq’s influence in the organization by opening 
the gates to as many Arab states as possible,” the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
observed.663 
Despite obvious Saudi and Iranian reluctance to be associated with Ba’athist Iraq, 
OPEC and OAPEC assistance complemented Soviet and Western actions.  When 
Kosygin and Hussein joined hands to cut the ribbon at Rumaila in April 1972, it was with 
preponderant Soviet assistance.  But, Iraq also had pre-established markets in both the 
Eastern and Western blocs by dint of its future oil contracts.  Concurrent pressure on the 
oil companies from the royal families of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, both of whom slowed 
production to pressure the IPC, helped consolidate the position of permanent sovereignty 
as a key component of diplomacy within the international community. 
COLD WAR BOUNDARIES 
On the day of the 1972 nationalization, Ba’ath party members hung posters around 
Baghdad that caricatured sinister British oil magnates, a bloodthirsty Moshe Dayan, and a 
money-grubbing Uncle Sam being driven from the nationalized fields by an Iraqi soldier 
dousing them with a spray of petroleum.664  A closer version of reality would have 
depicted multiple Eastern and Western bloc companies sidling in behind the evictees and 
other oil producers placing bets on Iraqi success. The direct influence of the Soviet Union 
far outweighed that of the Western and Arab nations, laying bare the crucial position of 
energy politics as a fundamental problem of the Cold War.  Even so, at the same time as 
the nationalization showed Cold War tensions, the preponderance of East-West support 
for INOC’s development crossed Cold War boundaries.   
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Permanent sovereignty became a greater force in the determination of diplomacy.  
The 1972 nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company was a reflexive interplay of 
moral and material support from OPEC, OAPEC, the Soviet Bloc, and Western 
consuming nations.  Permanent sovereignty disturbed the Cold War orthodoxy of energy 
security, the corporatist structure of the postwar petroleum order, and the economic 
alignment of the periphery and the center.  The international economy rested on 
increasingly shifting sands.  In retrospect, the nationalization stands at the intersection 
between a defunct economic rationale based on unchallenged Western control of 
resources and a new one in which the politics of permanent sovereignty began to raise 
doubts about the future. 
Hard-nosed, rights-based expressions of sovereignty were now a permanent part 
of the international economy.  In time, permanent sovereignty came to refract the broader 
tension between East-West politics and North-South economics.  The tension between 
politics and economics triggered a concern regarding the disjuncture between the 
geopolitical reality of energy insecurity and Western domestic policies of unbridled, 
energy-intensive growth.  As the effects of increased oil prices shook the world economy 
after 1972, the contradiction between growth and limits would define many important 
debates of the period.665 
If events in “moderate” Saudi Arabia and Iran and “radical” Iraq demonstrated the 
power of permanent sovereignty, the activities of Libya, a state once considered 
“moderate” but now “radical” would cut even deeper.   
                                                 
665Donella H. Meadows, The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the 
Predicament of Mankind (New York: Universe Books, 1974); Joseph A. Yager, Energy and U.S. Foreign 
Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1974); Ford Foundation, A Time to Choose: America’s Energy 
Future: A Final Report (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1974).   
 222 
 
Chapter 4:  Consenting to the Whip Hand, 1969-1972 
The blow of Mossadegh Madness to the Iranian treasury in 1951-1954 has not been 
forgotten.  
 
State Department Policy Review, 1967666 
 
The companies do not have a leg to stand on because the oil-producing countries will 
simply claim participation as a sovereign right. 
 
UK Oil Committee Report, 1972667 
 
On December 7, 1971, the director of British Petroleum operations in Libya, Chris Willy, 
arrived at his Tripoli office building to find it surrounded by police.  The authorities 
escorted Willy to the offices of the Libyan National Oil Company.  There, officials 
informed him that BP’s exploration and production activities had been nationalized in 
retaliation for “British collusion” in the Iranian seizure of the little islands in the Persian 
Gulf.  After negotiating the release of his secretary trapped in the building, Willy drove 
home.  He was tailed but managed to “double back and…lose the police.”668 
If one date were chosen, the road to nationalization began four years, six months, 
and one day earlier.  After the first shots of the third Arab-Israeli war on June 6, 1967, the 
American embassy in Libya—as well as those in Algeria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and 
Iraq—wrote the State Department to express their concern about street violence.669  That 
summer, as outsiders viewed a region poised on the brink of chaos, political radicalism 
became a basis for governmental legitimacy in the Arab world.  One consequence of the 
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radical uptick was the September 1, 1969 Libyan revolution, which deposed the Senussi 
monarchy of King Idris and brought to power a 27-year-old army captain, Muammar al-
Qaddafi.   
Western diplomats knew little about Qaddafi or the new Libyan Revolutionary 
Command Council.  For the State Department, Qaddafi was a caricature—“a man raised 
in the desert” with “the virtues and vices of a fundamentalist prophet.”  American 
officials understood no more than that the hitherto unknown leader had “a strong sense of 
mission.”670  As Qaddafi applied his ardor to a variety of activities, assessments of him 
became more nuanced.  Neither the world community nor the Nixon administration could 
have predicted that these activities would convert Libya into a pariah state by the end of 
the decade, when Qaddafi embarked on a continuous and spiteful interference in global 
affairs.  However, it was apparent only months after the revolution that the Revolutionary 
Command Council would use the country’s vast oil wealth to stand at the vanguard of 
those advocating permanent sovereignty.  Iraq, Venezuela, and the conservative 
producers provided moral and material support when Libyan leaders began to do so. 
  American foreign policymakers miscalculated the effects of Libyan diplomacy 
on the international political economy.  Often working against the counsel of the 
multinational oil companies and the British government, the Nixon administration 
preferred consent over confrontation, much as it did in the Saudi and Iranian revenue 
negotiations.  Meanwhile, Libyan diplomacy catalyzed other producers into bolder action 
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and stimulated a transfer in the locus of power and the direction of profits in the 
international oil industry.   
The primary goal of American policy was to placate the Arab oil-producing 
countries. What were the reasons for this policy?  What were its consequences?  
Although it lasted for only three years between 1970 and 1972, the policy of placation 
had immediate and long-term effects on the international political economy.   By the time 
of the December 1971 nationalization, escalating oil prices enabled political regimes that 
were hostile to the West, particularly those of Iraq and Libya, to actively challenge the 
postwar petroleum order.  The success of the oil producers would catapult the doctrine of 
permanent sovereignty to the top of the international agenda by 1973. 
MONARCHICAL LIBYA  
King Idris feared the influence of Libyan exiles and students before the 1969 revolution, 
but did not identify the plot fashioned within the military by Qaddafi’s small group of 
Nasserists.671  Likewise the CIA expressed little concern about the possibility of domestic 
uprising affecting the stability of the regime or the security of Libyan oil supply.  “Libya 
is so dependent on oil revenues that we see little reason to anticipate any internal political 
developments likely to lead the Libyans to attempt to deny oil to the US,” one analyst 
wrote days before the revolution.672  More astute observers were not surprised when the 
coup caught Idris on an Aegean vacation on September 1.  Months earlier, David 
Newsom, recently returned from his post as U.S. ambassador, told State Department 
officials that “the situation politically in Libya was not healthy.”  Newsom’s insight, 
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shared by others in the Johnson administration, reflected the aging king’s inability to 
quell the indignation in the post-1967 Arab world.673   
Libya gained influence in the international economy at the same time as the 
monarchy lost domestic credibility.  American policymakers viewed the country within a 
dual framework, the political context pan-Arabism and the economic context of oil 
supply.  These contexts became wound together more tightly in the latter half of the 
1960s and transformed Libyan oil policy. Pan-Arabism and petroleum became intimately 
linked during the June 1967 war and the subsequent three-month Arab oil embargo.  
Libya and the other conservative Arab oil producers did not accept the connection, and 
understood Nasser’s association of oil to pan-Arabism as a form of demagoguery.   
The opening of the oil pumps after the August 1967 Khartoum Agreement 
inaugurated only a momentary Indian summer for the international oil industry.  In the 
following three years, Arab radicalism impinged again and again on the corporatism of 
the postwar petroleum order, each time with more substantial results for the diplomacy of 
permanent sovereignty.  Between 1968 and 1970, policy analysts noted that the 
heightened tension involved in the war of attrition between Israel and the Arab front-line 
states.  Among other problems, the 70-percent contribution oil fields in the occupied 
Sinai Desert made to Israeli needs had inflamed public opinion across the Arab world.674  
The vigor of anti-Israeli opinion aggravated the tense relationship between Nasser and his 
oil-producing bankrollers.  Nasser complained about the oil producers in 1968 to 
Eisenhower’s former Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Anderson, who was in Cairo to 
finalize a deal between Boeing and United Arab Airlines.  Anderson reported to the State 
Department that the steadfastness of the Khartoum financing agreement was in question.   
                                                 
673 Little, American Orientalism, 212. 
674Bialer, Oil and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 245. 
 226 
If Nasser eased his stance toward Israel, the oil producers “would welcome [the] pretext 
to discontinue their aid.”  If aid was cut off, Nasser believed he would “lose control of the 
country.”675 
 At the same time, some oil experts expressed a growing concern after June 1967 
that the Arab “oil weapon” could derail the Free World economy. Walter Levy had 
warned the State Department in 1967 that continued Arab-Israeli tensions would cause 
political instability in the producing states.  Instability, Levy believed, could lead to a 
more radicalized Arab position, from which “they and their Soviet backers” could apply 
political pressure on any number of issues.676  Most believed this to be unlikely.  Because 
of the Arab penchant for disunity, it was improbable that the producers could ever 
coordinate the oil weapon.  The difference of opinion replicated the lingering debate in 
national security planning over oil, which pitted confidence in energy security against 
foreboding of energy dependence.  Except in moments of crisis, expressions of 
confidence were typical.   
Most policymakers viewed energy security with confident equanimity in the late 
1960s, but State Department analyses gave reason for caution.  Reviews prepared by the 
Persian Gulf desk noted the inability of the West to separate its political and economic 
interests in the region.  The link between politics and economics made the area’s 
“absolute dominance” in global oil production unnerving.677  World oil supply began to 
tighten after 1967, as the Suez Canal and the Trans-Arabian pipeline remained closed, 
production in Nigeria virtually ceased, and Iraqi production fluctuated greatly.  A 
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December 1967 policy review for the White House Senior Interdepartmental Group 
recognized that increased oil dependency made Western nations more “vulnerable to 
Arab threats.”  Multiple sources of danger loomed, including a “renewal of Arab-Israel 
hostilities…a unified anti-Western policy by the Arab countries themselves and/or 
Communist domination of the area.”678 
Against this background, U.S. administrations from Eisenhower to Johnson 
viewed monarchical Libya as a font of stability.679  A February 1967 review noted 
Libya’s importance as a regional voice of reason. As the global economy grew in the 
1960s, so too had petroleum exploration.  Alternative sources had entered the market and 
decreased the dominance of the Persian Gulf producers.  The most important new source 
was Libya.  “In a trend favorable to European security,” Libyan production had “reached 
the level of a major Persian Gulf producer,” providing Western Europe with a quarter of 
its petroleum needs.680 
American officials first suggested monarchical Libya’s position as a reliable oil 
alternative in a May 1959 meeting of the National Security Council.  The meeting 
convened to discuss NSC directive 5820, the dramatic reconsideration of Near East 
policy by the Eisenhower administration.  In the wake of the anti-Nasserist Eisenhower 
Doctrine, cooler heads had convinced the president that Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalism 
was not necessarily incompatible with American objectives: the maintenance of the free 
flow of oil and the exclusion of Soviet influence from the region.681  Still, the NSC found 
reason for concern.  The Persian Gulf “was in a position to exert too much economic and 
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political leverage against Western Europe.”  The Suez Crisis had made plain European 
energy dependence.  More radical Arab countries would be tempted to use oil power 
“arbitrarily” for political gain.682 
Libya’s newly discovered reserves, on the other hand, were safely within the 
Western bloc and ready for exploitation.  The only roadblock lay with the multinational 
oil companies.  The companies, according to meeting notes, were “loathe to…jeopardize 
their position in other Middle Eastern countries.” The NSC members debated how best to 
convince the multinationals to increase their Libyan investments.  Eisenhower held that 
U.S. oil policy should be premised on economic ideology rather than on what he 
considered more pedestrian political concerns.  “Under a system of free enterprise,” he 
said, the government’s role was to “make certain that there are no obstacles” to “world-
wide” oil development, not to encourage a “crash program for...Libyan fields.”  Richard 
Nixon disagreed on pragmatic terms.  “The nub of the matter was what to do about 
Libya,” he responded.  If the oil companies “deliberately retard[ed] the development of 
the Libyan oil fields,” the relationship with a regional ally could be weakened.    
The problem of Libyan oil development, the president and vice president failed to 
realize, had already been resolved by the Idris regime.  The Libyan Ministry of Justice 
employed a Palestinian lawyer, Anis Qasem, to write a new Petroleum Law in 1955.  
(Qasem represented Libya at the 1959 Arab Petroleum Congress, where he presented a 
paper on the uses of national legislation to increase oil income for the producing 
nations.683)  In a subtle application of permanent sovereignty, Qasem used national law to 
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impose limits on concession sizes.684   Nixon’s concern did not come to pass; smaller 
companies jumped at the chance to enter Libya.  Production grew rapidly in the 1960s.  
Under King Idris, the nation remained securely pro-American in the Cold War.  The State 
Department considered Libyan oil “uniquely important for Europe” and a “safe 
alternative” to the Persian Gulf by 1967.685 
American policymakers hoped that other producers would follow King Idris’s 
moderation regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict by decoupling oil from the dispute. In its 
February 1967 review, the Persian Gulf desk argued for the cultivation of closer political 
relations with the conservative producers.  More intimate contact along the lines of that 
achieved with Idris would emphasize the mutually reinforcing links between the oil-
producers and the global economy.  In turn, such a policy would help the Arab producers 
overcome the ideological ferment of pan-Arabism and become more “interdependent 
with the West.”686   
The emphasis on interdependence and political moderation belied arguments, 
made by the companies and in policy circles, that oil needed to be treated as any other 
commodity would, regulated best by market rules of supply and demand.  The diplomacy 
of permanent sovereignty increasingly challenged the definition of oil as a simple 
commodity.  During the 1967 embargo, the Johnson administration took decisive action 
to guarantee that the break in Libyan oil remained minimal.  Libya even broke the 
embargo by indirectly dispatching shipments to the United States and the United 
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Kingdom, via Canada and Ireland.687  The morning the Khartoum resolution was adopted, 
Libya resumed full production.688   
The British Oil Department also hoped Libyan “moderation” would help 
guarantee Western European energy security in the case of another embargo.  At the time 
of the 1969 revolution, the country was the fourth largest producer in the world and 
supplier of a quarter of Western Europe’s energy needs.  In short, Libya was “a 
phenomenon of the post-war oil boom.”689 
A BLOW FOR THE THIRD WORLD IN GENERAL 
Libya’s newly prominent position in the global oil industry did not escape the notice of 
its intra-OPEC competitors, as demonstrated in the 1969 and 1970 Arab summits.  King 
Faisal, for one, was frustrated by Libya’s new significance.  The king had joined his 
counterparts in Kuwait and Libya in subsidizing the Fedayeen, the frontline groups 
fighting against Israel, with “heavy financial support” beyond the Khartoum promise, 
according to the CIA.  The conservative monarchies nevertheless remained under 
continued pressure to take more radical public positions and use oil production as a 
weapon against Israel.690 
During the November 1969 Arab summit, Nasser and Qaddafi publicly and 
privately pressured King Faisal to declare an embargo on the United States in response to 
recent arms sales to Israel, a plan Faisal rejected as “catastrophic.”691  The Saudi foreign 
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affairs minister, Omar Saqqaf, threatened days later to end his country’s “multi-million 
sterling contribution to Palestinian guerilla groups.”692 The threat was empty, Saqqaf told 
the U.S. ambassador.  Saudi Arabia was “isolated and under attack.”  The only way for 
Saudi Arabia to “defend herself against accusations of luke-warmness and weakness in 
the Arab cause,” he continued, was to increase its Khartoum “insurance” payments.693 
A similar message arrived from Iran.  The Shah did not appreciate the attention 
that oil companies had showered on Libya in the 1960s.  Again, he made the case that the 
new wave of radical pan-Arabism threatened further instability in the Arab oil-producing 
countries.  His sources informed him of a new “propensity for demagoguery by Nasser” 
at the January 1970 Arab summit.   Nasser “put on a big act” and insisted that he receive 
£35 million for armaments for al-Fatah in addition to the Khartoum fees.  Qaddafi voiced 
his support and after a “frantic putting together of Arab heads,” the Arab oil-producers 
promised the money.  The meeting was an example of the deterioration of Arab political 
moderation, the Shah held.  The “leftist coups” in Libya, as well as in Sudan and 
Somalia, provided evidence that moderate Arab states were in a precarious position.694 
The regional atmosphere remained tense.  The Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine, under the leadership of George Habbash, had announced a sabotage policy 
against the Trans-Arabian pipeline. Saudi authorities scheduled new deliveries through 
the pipeline for January 1970 even though it travelled through the Israeli-controlled 
Golan Heights.  Popular Front activists sabotaged the pipeline four times in the second 
half of 1969 before Syria finally closed its outlet in early 1970.695  The pipeline sabotages 
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“made it clear that the future of U.S. oil interests was bound up with U.S. Middle East 
policy,” the chairman of Aramco told the British ambassador to Saudi Arabia.696  The 
corporatist policy of the previous quarter century, designed to separate politics from 
economics, no longer seemed viable.    
The connection suited the new Revolutionary Command Council of Libya, which 
envisioned an outsized role for itself in discussions regarding international petroleum.  
Petroleum and pan-Arabism were inseparable in the Revolutionary Command Council 
worldview.  “For the puritanical young officers who rule Libya,” the British ambassador 
in Tripoli wrote after an initial round of meetings, oil politics combined two concerns: 
“recovering the people’s ‘usurped rights’ and the Arab struggle against Israel.”697   
Post-revolutionary Libyan politics became the primary trigger for a 
transformation in the impact of permanent sovereignty in the international political 
economy. Occidental Oil’s assent to Libya’s unilateral thirty-cent price hike in September 
1970 is well-documented.698  Less understood is the intimate nature of the link between 
radical pan-Arab politics, permanent sovereignty, and Libyan oil policy, especially after 
the Revolutionary Command Council began to pressure the larger oil companies for an 
Occidental-equivalent price increase and a more beneficial profit-sharing agreement.  The 
leader of the Libyan negotiating team, Muhammed al Maghrebi, was a former employee 
of Standard Oil.  In 1966, Maghrebi published his graduate thesis at Columbia University 
with the same Beirut publisher that recorded, translated, and distributed the minutes of 
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the First Arab Petroleum Congress in 1959.  Like others before him, Maghrebi explicitly 
linked permanent sovereignty, decolonization, and national control over oil resources.699 
Maghrebi returned to Libya from Beirut in April 1970, after failing to secure a 
post with the Palestinian movement, despite a close friendship with George Habbash—
his former schoolmate in Cairo, now the radical Marxist leader of the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine.700  Upon his return, Muammar Qaddafi charged Maghrebi 
with forming a negotiating committee that reported directly to the Revolutionary 
Command Council.701  “Noted for his extremist attitude to Western oil interests,” 
Maghrebi’s return to Libya brought “no comfort to the companies,” the British embassy 
reported.702  Maghrebi used his first announcement to state that “no limit” existed to the 
measures he would take to obtain a price increase.703  His enlistment of the oil consultants 
Abdullah al Tariki, the founder of OPEC who had been fired from his job as Saudi 
Arabian oil minister in 1962 for his “radical leanings,” and Nicolas Sarkis, a Lebanese 
economist, confirmed their concern.  Sarkis and Tariki both were staunch advocates of 
permanent sovereignty in its most extreme form, outright nationalization.704 
Maghrebi set the tone for the 1970 negotiations by insisting on compensation for 
the low receipts of contracts signed during the Idris regime, when companies sold Libyan 
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oil at 10 to 15 cents per barrel less than the Middle Eastern average.705  The lower prices 
had been a successful attempt to woo investors and gain a foothold in the European 
market, but Maghrebi now depicted them as an affront to Libyan sovereignty.  Maghrebi 
ordered the companies to make retroactive payments and increase the current posted price 
of oil.  The Revolutionary Command Council forced down production from 3.7 million to 
2.9 million barrels per day between April and September 1970 to force the issue.  By 
October, Maghrebi had extracted agreements from the major oil companies—first from 
Chevron and Texaco, then from Standard and Mobil, and finally from BP and Shell.  The 
agreements increased the price and created a new national tax rate of 55 percent, assuring 
Libya an extra profit of $300 million in 1971.706 
The major oil companies requested support from the U.S. government in their 
drive to evade the new Libyan terms.707  The Nixon administration ignored the pleas for 
intervention, although it did encourage the companies to offset Libyan production losses 
with oil from Iran and Saudi Arabia.708  The State Department suggested in July 1970 that 
the companies use “every means available to deal imaginatively with the problem of 
seeking to accommodate themselves with the foreseeable evolution of events in 
Libya.”709  The multinational companies faced mounting pressure that autumn, but the 
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State Department expressed little concern.  The department informed President Nixon 
that the celebration of the first anniversary of the Libyan Revolution would be “marked 
by policy announcements affecting the US-dominated oil industry.”  The Revolutionary 
Command Council would use the holiday to garner popular support for the imposition of 
the price increase.  The hike, the memo offhandedly concluded, would be “something the 
companies could live with...by passing it on to the consumers.”710 
The State Department had come to the conclusion that mollifying Maghrebi and 
Qaddafi best served Western interests.  White House and National Security Council 
officials followed the State Department lead. Peter Flanigan explained the government 
position to John McCloy, whose law firm represented many of the American companies: 
 
The penalties of a break with Libya, in terms of emphasizing the degree to 
which Russian-controlled Arab states hold Europe and Japan in pawn for 
energy requirements and also as a result of the exacerbation of the existent 
tanker shortage, were much greater than the negatives which would result 
from a settlement with Libya. 
Like State Department analysts, Flanigan believed the increased costs could easily be 
passed on to consumers.711  The Nixon administration undoubtedly believed that 
accommodating Libyan demands on price set a less toxic precedent than a Libyan 
takeover of oil production.  The degree of permanent sovereignty was at issue, not the 
diplomatic practice itself. 
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Short-term economic interest also drove the American decision.  In reply to a 
1970 National Security Study Memorandum on North Africa, the State Department 
premised its policy on “preserving the American stake” in Libyan oil because of its $750 
million annual contribution to the national balance of payments.712  The director of the 
Department’s energy office and Kissinger’s informal adviser on oil issues, James Akins, 
told the British ambassador in Washington that the price and tax increases were not “the 
real danger” of the Libyan negotiations.  Rather, Akins worried that the Libyans might be 
“contemplating expropriation of some or all U.S. oil interests.”  Akins added that 
concurrent Iraqi action could cause “serious trouble.”  Given the more dire threat of 
nationalization, yielding to Maghrebi’s price increase seemed “reasonable,” especially if 
it led to a pause in Arab demands.713 
The policy of placating oil producers, based on the desire to avoid the worst-case 
scenario of expropriation and the loss of foreign revenue, guided the State Department 
throughout 1970 and 1971.  The policy irritated the multinational oil companies and the 
British government, who believed a unified stand against permanent sovereignty was 
necessary.  The chairmen of BP and Shell travelled to New York in September 1970 to 
convince Akins of the ramifications.  An aggregate capitulation by the companies would 
yield dire consequences, they told the FCO before departing.  The companies’ opinion 
was best summarized by Shell’s lead negotiator in Tripoli.  To yield to Maghrebi would 
“demonstrate to the world” that the oil producers could “dictate the price of oil.”  Similar 
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demands, already called for by Algeria and Iraq, would swiftly spread to the other 
members of OPEC.714 
The British executives left London with the blessing of the British government.  
Before their arrival, Alec Douglas-Home urged the U.S. undersecretary for political 
affairs, Alexis Johnson, not to “persuade [the companies] to give way.”715  Johnson 
ignored his advice.  Upon their arrival in New York, the BP and Shell directors reported 
to that they “found…the U.S. State Department more concerned with the 
implications…for the short-term Western supply position than with the world-wide 
implications.”  Douglas-Home ordered the British ambassador in Washington to 
“urgently” call on Akins and Johnson to explain that “the long-term risks” of a caving in 
to Maghrebi.  Douglas-Home even cabled Secretary of State William Rogers to insist that 
he “encourage the U.S. majors to maintain a united front.”716 
The BP-Shell mission failed despite the foreign secretary’s intervention.  State 
Department policy remained that the companies had “no real option but to settle on the 
Libyan’s terms.”717  Johnson discussed the U.S. strategy with Walter Levy before meeting 
with the executives.  Levy advised him “under no circumstances” to lend support to the 
oil companies’ “hard line.”  Like Johnson and Akins, Levy fretted over a different 
precedent than did the British.  If a supply slowdown occurred because of a breakdown in 
the negotiations, if Europe and Japan faced shortages, their governments could begin to 
deal directly with the Revolutionary Command Council.  The prospect of direct 
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government-to-government discussions was far more dangerous than a price increase for 
Levy.  Bilateral deals not only flouted the corporatist premises of separating diplomacy 
from economics, they also endangered the favored status of U.S. oil interests in Libya.718 
Akins described the meeting in detail.  The “formidable” chairman of BP—Sir 
Eric Drake, the same man who had refused Mossadegh access to the Abadan refinery’s 
books in 1951—explained why the companies should stand firm against Maghrebi.  
Akins responded that U.S. policy had “the companies’ interests at heart.”  At its core, the 
policy of placating the oil-producers served to protect the companies from their own 
rigidity.  The policy prevented their provocation of “irreparable action” by the 
Revolutionary Command Council.719  Drake responded: the consequences of surrender 
were far greater.  He continued dramatically.  The companies and governments were in 
“the most important week in the history of the oil industry since Mossadegh.”  
Acceptance of Maghrebi’s terms would expose the companies “to blackmail all over the 
world.”720   
Johnson and Akins remained unmoved and advised the companies not to expect 
diplomatic support.  Akins stood by American policy after the companies conceded to the 
price and tax increases.  In October 1970, he berated the “totally misguided” stance of the 
oil companies to Derek Egers of the British Oil Department.  “It was a pity” that 
Douglas-Home had become directly involved, he said.  Akins had no doubt that if the 
companies had held out against Libyan terms, their production would have been cut off.  
“The Libyans could afford to do this,” he believed.  If they did, “Europe would then be 
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faced with a shortage of oil this winter.”  The potential consequences of the companies’ 
“reckless attitude” were too great to risk.721 
Few observers outside the Nixon administration agreed with the assessment.  Sir 
Eric Drake, for one, disputed the decision.  “With ill-conceived hostility,” he told one 
U.S. official that “it was really the fault of the US Government that oil companies had felt 
forced to give in to Libyans.”722  The British ambassador in Tripoli acknowledged that 
the Revolutionary Command Council had “played their hand with remarkable skill.”  The 
agreements set a precedent to “increase postings all round the Middle East and Africa.”  
Because of its swollen treasury, moreover, Libya could make good on further threats of 
extreme action.  By late 1970, Libya had forced a settlement on the companies that 
continued to break from the patterns of government-company relations that had 
characterized the postwar petroleum order.  Libyan actions continued a trend of 
permanent sovereignty already initiated in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Venezuela—and 
in OPEC in general.  Maghrebi and Qaddafi had reason “for congratulating themselves on 
having struck a blow for the Arabs and the Third World in general,” the ambassador 
concluded.723 
All levels of the British government agreed with the assessment. The implications 
of American policy were “not hard to see,” the Oil Department held.  The companies 
passed on increased costs to consumers as predicted.  The other oil producers succeeded 
in obtaining “the same type of terms as the Libyans.”724  Furthermore, the accession to 
Libyan demands did not bode well for future struggles.  Douglas-Home noted in a cabinet 
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report that Libya’s “sharply increased” profits would cover their import bill for at least 
the next two years.  The guaranteed income would allow further leeway for Maghrebi to 
be “correspondingly tough toward those who do not agree.”  Triumphant, the 
Revolutionary Command Council was unlikely to display moderation.   
The acceptance of Libya’s unilateral demands placed the companies on “a 
slippery slope,” Douglas-Home feared.725  The Shah, the Oil Department noted, was 
“clearly scenting blood.”726  And, although Akins had argued to the companies that it was 
unlikely that the “impoverished” Iraqis could duplicate the Libyan deal, the department 
found his argument disingenuous.  Negotiations between the Ba’ath government and “the 
unfortunate IPC” already had been “mightily hindered by the events in Libya.”727 
A NEW SENSE OF ENTITLEMENT 
The Revolutionary Command Council would not ease its pressure.728  Indeed, the 1970 
negotiations set in motion a chain of events that would invalidate the long-standing 
concessionary arrangements between the multinational oil companies and the producing 
governments.729  Libyan terms spread in the following months as predicted; the other 
Persian Gulf producers and Venezuela had demanded and received the 55-percent tax 
rate.730   
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After these individual advances, the OPEC oil ministers met and agreed to 
cooperate in their subsequent demands.  The oil ministers informed the companies in 
December that they would be required to participate in the first ever joint company-cartel 
negotiations.  Libya revived its retroactivity argument and announced additional demands 
immediately following the meeting.  The Libyan strategy potentially forced the 
companies to undertake separate negotiations between the Gulf and Mediterranean 
producers.  The companies, in an effort to avoid being caught in an upwardly spiraling 
price war between Libya and the Gulf producers, sought to coordinate “global” 
negotiations with the entire cartel rather than the binary regional formula.731 
The negotiations, the first time the companies and countries faced each other as 
unified bodies, began poorly for the multinationals.  The U.S. policy of placating the oil-
producers again affected the outcome.  It appeared that the Nixon administration did not 
comprehend the ramifications of Libya’s success in cementing its permanent sovereignty 
in early 1971.  Nixon dispatched Undersecretary of State John Irwin to Iran and Saudi 
Arabia in January.  Irwin’s mandate was to convince the Shah and King Faisal to support 
OPEC-wide negotiations.732  Henry Kissinger expressed his extreme displeasure that he 
had not been informed of the mission a day before Irwin’s departure.  Over the phone, he 
supplemented Irwin’s instructions.  Above all else, Irwin was to “get out of the line of 
fire when the firing starts.”733   
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Irwin did just that in a two-hour meeting with the Shah on January 17, 1971.  He 
delivered a letter from Nixon and, following instructions, first apologized profusely for 
the involvement of the U.S. government in the negotiations.  Nixon wanted to make clear 
that the United States was not “representing or taking the part” of the oil companies, 
Irwin concluded the repentant preamble.  Rather, Irwin revived the link drawn by the 
Johnson administration between economic interdependence and political moderation.  A 
quick, OPEC-wide agreement was in “the greater interest, including that of Iran.” 
Qaddafi’s continued threats “that oil would be used as a political weapon against U.S. 
policy in the Middle East” would cause problems not only for Western Europe, but for 
the global economy.  The recent cycle of price increases had unsettled U.S. strategic 
thinking.  The fear was that the pattern would be repeated.  To prevent this intolerable 
situation, Nixon insisted on “global talks” between the companies and the producer 
governments, not the Gulf-Mediterranean division. 
The Shah responded.  He understood that the U.S. government did not want the 
companies to be “whip-sawed by escalation ad seriatim demands by different 
producers.”   Nevertheless, global talks were out of the question.  “It was not possible for 
Iran and the Gulf producers to impose their will on Venezuela or radical Arab producers 
such as Libya, Algeria, and possibly Iraq,” the Shah told Irwin.  It was the companies’ 
responsibility to stand firm against those demands. Global talks were inadvisable because 
an OPEC-wide arrangement would be hijacked by “the extremists.”  Taking the soft line 
recommended by Kissinger, Irwin did not press further.  He even agreed with the Shah 
that the companies needed to be “responsive to the facts of life.”734   
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Irwin met with King Faisal and the Saudi oil minister, Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the 
following day.  Faisal agreed with the Shah that separate negotiations were best: 
“[I]ntroducing Algeria and Libya into this negotiation will render agreement impossible 
or at least result in a settlement which will cost the companies much more heavily.” The 
Libyans were young officers ignorant on oil issues, Yamani then told Irwin, “killing 
goose that laid the golden eggs.”  The Saudi oil minister, who had met with his Iranian 
counterpart the previous day, held the same line as the Shah.  “No one should expect the 
moderates to be able to influence the radicals in an OPEC negotiation,” he said.  “Indeed 
if negotiations are in the OPEC framework, the moderates would probably have to settle 
for the radicals’ demands.”735   
In a decision that oil executives would long resent, Irwin accepted the Iranian and 
Saudi argument.  He recommended separate Tehran and Tripoli talks to the State 
Department on January 20.  The Nixon administration urged the companies to accept the 
regional recommendation, despite protests from the ambassador in Tripoli, who wrote 
that the decision would “play right into Libya’s hands.”736   
Interestingly, the reasons for the Irwin decision were steeped in the assumptions 
that permanent sovereignty had undermined the corporatism of the postwar petroleum 
order.  The company position on global negotiations assumed that Saudi Arabia and Iran 
would “curb the extremists.”  After his discussions with the Shah and King Faisal, Irwin 
was convinced that “such a hope was futile.”  Neither the Saudis nor the Iranians were 
“willing or perhaps able to play moderating role in OPEC-wide negotiations,” Irwin 
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advised.  “[T]here is probable truth to their assertions that such negotiations would result 
in moderates being forced to back extremist demands.”737   
At the same time, the corporatist separation of diplomacy and international 
economics continued to drive American policy.  When the National Security Council 
supported Irwin’s recommendation days later, it noted that “the key question is the nature 
and extent of U.S. government...involvement in the negotiations with OPEC.”  In the 
current situation, the NSC decided to continue corporatist policy and not take “substantial 
role in the negotiations between the companies and producing governments.”738 
The companies found it impossible to steer clear of the Libyan whipsaw, precisely 
because the talks had been split along the lines mandated by OPEC.  The leader of the oil 
companies’ Tehran team, Lord Strathalmond of British Petroleum, briefed Western 
ambassadors soon after discussions began.  The major sticking point of the Gulf 
negotiations was the “companies’ attempt …to negotiate not only a Gulf price but also a 
Mediterranean crude price” for pipeline oil.  If the Mediterranean price could be set, it 
would “assist their co-negotiators in Libya,” led by George Piercy of Exxon.739  But, the 
Gulf producers would not yield.  The oil ministers in Tehran indicated that they expected 
to get whatever price was given to Libya for their Mediterranean pipeline outlets.  In the 
“gloomy” consensus, the companies conceded that it was with Maghrebi whom they 
would conduct discussions regarding Mediterranean prices.  The company negotiators 
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blamed their inability to negotiate on the September 1970 settlement.  Libyan gains had 
given the OPEC nations a new “sense of entitlement,” they told the State Department 740 
The Tehran talks concluded in February with a new tax and price agreement.  The 
oil companies accepted what was considered a substantial price increase—33 cents per 
barrel immediately followed by 5 cents more per year until 1975.741  In return, the Gulf 
governments assured the companies that they would not seek to increase their revenues 
beyond the terms of the agreement for five years.  Nor would they support other OPEC 
governments, “especially Libya,” whose demands exceeded their own.742  The State 
Department instructed the American ambassador to thank the Shah for his “categoric [sic] 
assurances” that the Gulf producers would observe the five-year agreement “regardless of 
the outcome of negotiations in Libya.”743 
The Tripoli negotiations began soon after.  Observers believed it likely that the 
Revolutionary Command Council would negotiate greater price and tax increases than 
those in the Gulf.  “Libya's overflowing treasury makes it theoretically independent of oil 
revenues for extended periods,” the State Department wrote.744  Maghrebi used this 
leverage to negotiate a higher posted price than that agreed to in Tehran, as well as a 
freight premium for its Mediterranean crude.  Critically, the Tripoli negotiations also 
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ended with the companies conceding the annual 5-cent increase already in place in the 
Gulf, plus an additional 2.5 percent.745  
An intelligence report prepared jointly by the departments of State and Defense, 
the NSC, and the CIA noted that the Libyan success would wipe out the Gulf agreement, 
despite the five-year clause and the personal guarantee of the Shah.  The events of 
September 1970 had “stimulated regional solidarity.” The oil producers now were 
showing “a greater degree of unanimity than had been apparent in the past.”  As a result 
of OPEC cooperation, the oil-producing countries now had faith in the “dangerous 
conviction that they held the whip hand.” The agencies confessed that the successful 
venture in permanent sovereignty was “likely to have lasting effects.”746 
 LEAVE THE RUNNING TO LIBYA  
The Revolutionary Command Council used its market power in Europe to not only push 
for higher prices, but to do so in a way that underscored the postcolonial diplomacy of 
permanent sovereignty.  In both the Libyan oil negotiations of 1970 and the OPEC talks 
of 1971, Libyan negotiators presented their case in univeralist terms.  Maghrebi reveled 
in his global brinksmanship, arguing that the changes in the oil industry redressed a series 
of deeper wrongs in international history.  The decision to do so reflected a shift in the 
broader international economy.  The Libyan attitude not only made sense to the leaders of 
other oil-producing nations, it also became a harbinger of similar actions. 
A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate released in April 1971 predicted that 
“Libya’s sheer financial ability to influence Arab—and even world—affairs will grow 
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rapidly.”747  Evidence of Libya’s impact mounted.  The rulers of Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait were careful to disavow Muammar Qaddafi’s extreme brand of pan-Arabism and 
anti-imperialism, but they were content to sit by and allow the oil ministers of Libya and 
Iraq to do the legwork.  The Saudi oil minister, Ahmed Zaki Yamani, told the U.S. 
Ambassador in Jedda in September 1971 that he “would leave the running to Libya and 
Iraq.”  If they received better deals, “Kuwait and Saudi Arabia could not be seen to be 
lagging far behind.”748  In the first OPEC meeting after the 1971 negotiations, the oil 
ministers asserted OPEC’s “natural right” to participation in all company operations.  
“OPEC’s oil tax victory over the oil companies earlier this year marked a definite shift in 
bargaining power in favor of the exporting countries,” the State Department reported.749 
The Libyan posture regarding the continued colonial attitude of Western 
governments and companies toward the oil-producing states in particular and the Third 
World in general took greater hold over the postwar petroleum order.750  By 1972, even 
Saudi Arabia publicly had changed its official policy on the use of oil as a “political” 
measure.  Historians most often present the politicization of oil production in the regional 
context of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  But it also corresponded with the rise in permanent 
sovereignty, which continued to be an important trend in international politics. A 
fundamental challenge to the long-standing status quo, the concept of permanent 
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sovereignty provided a legitimate base from which Libya could subvert the standard 
practices of international energy security.   
Libya led the way in pressing for greater control of its oil resources, in effect 
authenticating the UN resolutions on permanent sovereignty. The political and legal shift 
in the United Nations now amounted to a transfer of economic power.751  The members of 
OPEC consistently emphasized permanent sovereignty during the Tehran and Tripoli 
negotiations.  Whenever an impasse arose, OPEC threatened cartel-wide government 
legislative enactment of its demands if the companies did not capitulate.  In December 
1971, in a scene that brought together the politics of sovereignty and oil diplomacy, 
Libya moved past the threat of unilateral legislation and nationalized the holdings of 
British Petroleum.  The nationalization validated permanent sovereignty, a ubiquitous 
rhetoric in the UN, but now a growing diplomatic practice. 
Ostensibly, the BP nationalization was a blunt response to a problem of regional 
power: the British government’s “collusion” in the Iranian occupation of the contested 
islands of the Tunbs and Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf.  The Libyan accusation had 
merit. The occupation was indeed the result of two years of diplomacy between the 
United Kingdom, the Trucial States, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.  The British Treasury, the 
FCO, and the State Department all concurred, however, that the primary factor for 
nationalization was Libya’s goal of remaining at the forefront of the ongoing OPEC 
negotiations.   
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The Libyan decision came as a bombshell.  Until December 1971, unilateral 
expropriation was not considered a serious agenda item in broader oil politics by any of 
the parties involved.  Instead, a different problem stood at the front of the agenda for the 
producing governments.  Soon after the Tehran and Tripoli agreements, the producers 
had begun to call for equity “participation” in oil production.   
The question of participation also was steeped in Third World political-economic 
thought about terms of trade and permanent sovereignty.  Participation would give the 
producing countries partial ownership of the companies’ production assets.  OPEC passed 
a formal resolution in favor of participation at its July 1971 meeting in its newly 
renovated Vienna headquarters.752  The American and British governments understood 
that the expression of permanent sovereignty was a post-imperial imperative, “probably 
inevitable” in the long run.  Regardless, in contrast to the earlier American policy of 
placating oil-producers, both governments took a less compromising public stance.753  
The FCO and the State Department argued that the demand for immediate participation 
repudiated the stability enshrined in the Tehran and Tripoli contracts.  The cancellation of 
the five-year promise threatened “to throw the producer governments’ relations with the 
oil companies into turmoil,” the Foreign and Commonwealth Office wrote.754    
The primary concern was again one of precedent.  If the companies were forced to 
give way on a degree of participation, no guarantee existed that other concessions would 
not soon follow. Still, in an echo of the policy of placating the oil-producers, the British 
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decided that diplomatic action would be “at best ineffective and at worst counter-
productive.”755  “Creeping nationalization,” as Glen Balfour-Paul called participation, 
was “at least…better than outright legislative measures.”756  John Irwin again reminded 
company executives that the Nixon administration “did not want to get more and more 
involved” in the negotiations.757  
The Revolutionary Command Council sought to politicize the participation issue 
as much as possible.  In September, The Middle East Economic Survey reported that 
Libya had “emerged as the leading hawk” on the issue, insisting on nothing less than 
immediate, majority participation.758  Even the Iraqi delegation to OPEC, which already 
had called for immediate 20 percent participation, would settle for a smaller percentage 
and more flexibility.759  In a statement similar to the five-year guarantee made and broken 
in Tehran, the Iranian government promised that the Gulf producers would not ask for 
more than 20 percent, even if Libya acted “unreasonably as it had in the past.”760  
Industry experts were less sanguine.  If Libya extracted an agreement for majority 
participation, “the Gulf producers [would] be bound to follow suit.”761 
All interested parties realized that the oil weapon was much more than a cudgel to 
be wielded against Israel and its supporters.  The change in scale, though, did not mean 
that regional politics were absent from consideration.  When informing BP and Shell 
executives of his anemic support for their stand against permanent sovereignty, Douglas-
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Home explained that the British could ill-afford to “become involved in a row over oil” 
because of their upcoming withdrawal from the Trucial States.  He urged the companies 
to accept the principle of participation.762   
A row seemed likely.  Shell and BP denied Douglas-Home’s request, telling the 
FCO that they would “certainly fall in with the American Majors if the latter decided to 
oppose participation tooth and nail.”  If so, they expected “full diplomatic support.”763  It 
was unlikely that either the U.S. or the British government would provide any backing.  
British embassy officials agreed with Akins that the companies should “adopt a moderate 
and cooperative stance.”  The State Department concurred that there was “no merit in a 
formal diplomatic approach.”764  In fact, neither the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
nor the State Department considered official diplomatic encouragement to be of much 
value by the end of 1971.  The companies’ legal position guaranteed them little rejoinder 
to unilateral action in the new age of permanent sovereignty.  One Oil Department 
analyst summarized the situation.  The companies did “not have a leg to stand on” 
because the producers “would simply claim participation as a sovereign right.”765 
As British authorities undertook final preparations to depart from the Trucial 
States on November 30, 1971, Iranian forces took the disputed islands.  Fearing the 
estrangement of an essential Cold War ally, both the State Department and the FCO had 
worked, in the words of Alec Douglas-Home, “to solve the Gulf islands problem without 
alienating the Shah.”766  Despite attempts to convince him otherwise, the State 
Department concluded that “the negotiations over Tunbs and Abu Musa would fail to end 
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in an acceptable compromise and the Shah would likely seize the islands.” The final 
outcome was a concession to Iran, largely in return for relinquishing its claim to Bahrain 
in September 1970.767   
According to the agreement, Iran would take control of the Tunbs.  On Abu Musa, 
Iran and Sharjah would share jurisdiction and split any offshore petroleum revenue.768  
After discussions with the United States, King Faisal reassured the British that he would 
not intervene—Saudi diplomatic remonstrations against the island seizure would be 
minimal.769  On November 31, the police forces of Ras al Khaimah resisted the Iranian 
arrival at the Tunbs, resulting in the death of four policeman and three members of the 
landing party.  The sheikhdom invoked its treaty of protection with the United Kingdom, 
but the Foreign and Commonwealth Office terminated all treaty relationships with the 
former Trucial States the next day as planned.770 
A week later, Libya nationalized BP’s holdings, the largest of which was the 
330,000 barrel-per-day Sarir field.  “Ostensibly,” Douglas-Home wrote, the 
nationalization was “in retaliation for the Iranian seizure.”  But, nationalization indicated 
more than a mere protest of Iranian annexation: “It had, in any case, been on the cards for 
other reasons.”771  Douglas-Home briefed his prime minister more explicitly. “Libya’s 
desire to remain the front-runner” in OPEC was the major factor.772   
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The Revolutionary Command Council received the support of the customary Arab 
revolutionary standard bearers.  On December 8, a message from Yasser Arafat was read 
on Libyan National Radio: “On behalf of all our people and all the Palestine revolution 
fighters, we congratulate you and shake your hand for the giant revolutionary step you 
have taken.”  The Voices of Fatah radio station, operating from Cairo, celebrated the 
nationalization as “moving far beyond the traditional Arab reaction to imperialist 
plotting.”773   
The day after the nationalization, a decision BP executives believed Qaddafi had 
taken after consultations with Anwar Sadat, both BP and the British embassy in Tripoli 
“agreed that the Libyan government had the right as a sovereign state to nationalize.”774  
However, both the company and its parent government protested the nationalization on 
the basis that the decree had not provided for compensation.  On December 23, the 
British government presented a note to the Revolutionary Command Council calling on 
the Libyan government to “act in accordance with the established rules of international 
law” and either restore the company’s operations or make reparations.775 
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office requested that the State Department issue 
a similar note “deploring the nationalization.”776  Douglas-Home wrote to the Secretary of 
State, William Rogers, “If the Libyan government’s action does not meet with any 
retribution, both the Libyans and the governments of the other oil producing countries 
will be encouraged to take action against other concessions.”  The cascade effect would 
throw “the existing international oil machinery into complete disarray and consequently 
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jeopardise the security of oil supplies to the western world.”777  Now with full diplomatic 
support, BP was “doing all within their power to prevent the Libyans from getting away 
scot-free, which would set an unhealthy precedent…in the Arab world as a whole.”778  
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office joined the oil companies in pressuring 
consumers to boycott Libyan oil.  Over some protests from its African desk, the State 
Department agreed to “black” the oil from the Sarir concession, making its sale illegal in 
the United States and by U.S. companies.779 
Throughout 1972, BP took legal measures to prevent the nationalized oil from 
arriving to the market and “providing a precedent that others, like Iraq, might rapidly 
follow.”780  This time, the American and British governments provided diplomatic and 
legal support.  In addition to diplomatic pressure, the U.S. Justice Department lifted anti-
monopoly regulations, allowing the major oil companies to meet in New York and design 
a “Libyan safety net” to offset BP’s production loss.  After the Revolutionary Command 
Council requested that the Spanish national oil company, Hispanoil, run the nationalized 
concession, both governments pressured the Franco regime to reject that entreaty.  
Initially, the Spanish foreign affairs ministry expressed concern that their interests would 
also be expropriated “if they did not play the Libyan game.”781 But after an emotional 
quarrel between the executives of BP and Hispanoil, in which the BP director accused his 
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counterpart of “poaching” and “piracy,” the Spanish company endorsed the joint 
company action directed from New York.782 
BP pursued the “black” oil successfully in 1972, including over thirty cases of 
legal action in the Italian court system and backroom bargaining with General Anastasio 
Somoza in Nicaragua.  Even though he was “fighting a rearguard action with the 
petroleum companies against price increases,” Somoza finally acceded to the British 
ambassador’s arguments.  The Oil Department reported that Somoza’s acquiescence 
maintained BP’s “100% success record” in preventing non-Communist countries from 
buying nationalized oil.783  Unfortunately for BP, similar inhibitions did not exist behind 
the iron curtain. In an echo of the Iraqi-Soviet deals, the Libyan News Agency announced 
a marketing contract with Moscow for Sarir crude in late May 1972.  Soviet tankers 
would lift the oil from the former BP terminal in Tobruk.784  Libya cut the production of 
BP’s former partner in the Sarir field, the Bunker Hunt company, to free oil for the Soviet 
deal.785  A Russian tanker arrived on May 31 to take the first consignment of the new 
agreement.  Libyan press reports trumpeted the triumph over the “imperialist oil 
monopolies.”786 
The British embassy in Washington pointed out the ramifications of the Libyan-
Soviet deal.  It would be impossible to “take any kind of legal action in the Soviet 
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courts.”787  Just as in the case of Rumaila, the entry of the Soviet Union into Sarir broke 
the back of the black oil strategy.  Yugoslavia followed in Soviet footsteps in June 1972, 
when the country signed a deal for a half-million tons of Sarir crude per year.  Bulgaria 
and Romania soon concluded separate agreements.788  When the British ambassador in 
Tripoli remonstrated his Yugoslavian counterpart, the response was curt: “The 
nationalization of BP had been legitimate.”789 
These dealings precipitated an agreement between BP and the Revolutionary 
Command Council, further cementing Libyan permanent sovereignty.  In November, the 
Egyptian government conveyed a “top level message” via the directors of Pan American 
Oil on the possibility of compensation from Libya.  Although Sir Eric Drake was 
reluctant to “upset the participation apple cart,” he commenced negotiations in 
December.790  Hispanoil began to work as a quiet conduit between Maghrebi and BP 
executives, who arrived at an agreement that would allow the Spanish company to 
produce and market the nationalized oil.  By then, the French and Italian national oil 
companies had also signed marketing contracts with the Revolutionary Command 
Council.791  
The dramatic confrontation over the BP nationalization died down toward the end 
of 1972.  A new verity characterized the international political economy of oil.  Unilateral 
nationalization, the ultimate expression of permanent sovereignty, had become a 
functional tool.  The politics of the little islands and Arab-Persian antagonism had been a 
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cloak for Libyan action.  Permanent sovereignty had become an end in itself, rather than 
a means to other political solutions.  
 A NEW SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES  
Together, the Libyan and Iraqi nationalizations set an unwelcome precedent.  James 
Akins told his British contact that he was “extremely alive to the dangers into which the 
U.S. oil companies might run, particularly in the Arab-Israeli context, if retaliation 
against oil companies for political reasons proved an early success.”792  For the State 
Department, the “grabbing” of BP had perpetuated the mutually reinforcing assurance 
among the producers that had begun with the 1970 Libyan negotiations.  Reasons for 
moderation, especially the legal difficulties in marketing black oil, had proved 
ineffective.  The traditional means of coercion would now “bounce off” the impervious 
producers.793 
By early 1973, unlike in 1970 and 1971, every actor concerned with oil 
understood the ramifications of the new set of circumstances.  The Arab oil weapon, 
understood by Nasser in 1967 as a lever against Israel, was thoroughly embroiled in the 
larger international question of permanent sovereignty.  Oil control, in turn, gave the 
Arab countries greater wherewithal to punish Israel and its supporters.  Permanent 
sovereignty posed a deeply troubling threat to the structure of the post-war international 
economy and to regional stability.  The concerns expressed were far more immediate 
than those of 1967.  Libya also brought OPEC to the vanguard of Third World countries 
in fulfilling the UN resolutions on permanent sovereignty.   The nationalizations in Libya 
and Iraq, an intellectual outgrowth of decolonization, indicated a growing assertiveness 
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on the part of developing countries.  International attention turned increasingly toward 
the troubled relationship between the developed and developing countries, rechristened as 
the North and the South.  At the same time, the Cold War abetted the growing influence 
of permanent sovereignty.  Soviet aid helped both countries find ready markets; legal 
threats did not have a deterrent effect.   
By 1972, Henry Kissinger was becoming more interested in the amalgamation of 
post-colonial politics and the international economy.   He moved the “oil problem,” 
formerly relegated to the State Department, into NSC hands one week before the Irwin 
mission to Tehran.  Still—as Kissinger focused his attention on Vietnam, trilateral 
diplomacy, and the agreements on strategic arms limitations—the State Department 
managed the OPEC negotiations.  Kissinger expressed frustration at the Nixon 
administration’s inability to make progress on major issues in the Arab world, including 
those regarding petroleum, describing U.S. efforts as “sort of a mad hatter’s party.”794   
In 1973, the price of oil became a prominent topic in world politics, further 
destabilizing the shifting East-West and North-South fault lines.  Then Kissinger would 
begin to take greater notice. 
 
                                                 
794 Telephone Conversation, Kissinger and Kraft, August 9, 1972, NSA, KT, KA08515. 
 259 
Chapter 5:  The Energy Crisis and Petrodollars, 1973-1974 
 
The energy crisis indicates the birth pains of global interdependence.  Our response 
could well determine our capacity to deal with the international agenda of the future. 
 
    Henry Kissinger, 1974795 
 
 The cartelization of oil and the magnitude of the price increases should not be accepted.   
      
George Shultz, 1974796 
 
A nation that can tame the wilderness, that has the most dynamic free market-place in the 
history of man, that can lift the standard of living to heights hitherto unknown, and can 
then place men on the moon – that nation, if it allows free enterprise full freedom, is not 
going to be cowed by the sudden threat of blackmail. 
 
    William Simon, 1974797 
 
On the morning of July 6, 1974, Harold Wilson was livid.  Beginning his second stretch 
in a decade as British prime minister, the 60-year-old political lion had countless reasons 
for frustration.  He had squeaked back into 10 Downing Street with the barest of 
pluralities two months earlier.  His minority government faced the nation’s ghastliest 
political-economic climate since the Second World War, even worse than the 1967-1968 
Sterling crisis that had toppled the remaining architecture of the British Empire and 
ousted his Labour Party from national leadership.  The situation had only worsened since 
October 1973, when OPEC imposed the first of a series of unprecedented oil price 
increases.798 
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At that moment, however, the source of the prime minister’s irritation was more 
immediate.  Much more immediate.  The most powerful diplomat of the era, U.S. 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, would arrive in London in two days and Wilson’s 
cabinet had not risen to the occasion.  “Too many of these briefs,” he scrawled furiously 
in his trademark green felt-tip pen, “are too obsequious.”  The cabinet had substituted 
adulation for analysis.  Their admiration for Kissinger’s prowess bordered at best on hero 
worship and at worst on genuflection.  “HK is not God!” Wilson exclaimed.799 
He elaborated later that day.  Kissinger’s earthly attributes were especially notable 
in his aggressive diplomacy toward OPEC, a problem that in Wilson’s view merited an 
entirely different tack.  “On the whole world energy problem,” effective diplomacy 
needed “to secure cooperation (as opposed to confrontation) between oil consuming and 
oil producing nations.”  Kissinger’s unremitting stand against expensive oil and cartel 
power was too confrontational.  The result was an unpleasant estrangement between the 
Western industrialized world and OPEC.  “I repeat, HK is not God,” he concluded.800 
The best way to deal with OPEC, Wilson told Kissinger two days later, was to 
accept the inevitability of the oil producers’ new financial and political power.  Only then 
could a dialogue emerge that was characterized “not by a means of confrontation,” as 
Kissinger favored, “but through a process of consultation.”  A less hostile stance would 
convince oil producers to increase their investment in the long-term health of the 
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international economy.  Wilson rightly doubted he could change the Secretary of State’s 
mind.  Kissinger continued to take OPEC to task through 1974.801 
A GREAT OPPORTUNITY 
One could argue that the above exchange reflects nothing more than a difference in 
temperament.   After all, in a consensus that has permeated scholarly literature ever since, 
Wilson and Kissinger agreed on a fundamental fact.  The fourfold leap in oil prices 
imposed by OPEC between October 1973 and January 1974 threatened to sound the 
death knell of a quarter-century of economic growth for the industrialized West.  It is also 
true that if Wilson believed the stakes were too high to hazard confrontation, Kissinger 
believed they made it necessary.   
A closer analysis of Kissinger’s diplomacy exposes the frailty of a simple 
psychological argument.  From the first price increase on October 16, 1973, Kissinger 
took an uncompromising position toward expensive oil.  Time and again, he argued that 
the “unilateralism” of OPEC had acute economic and political consequences.  “Large 
price increases” involved the “potential disaster [of] global inflation followed by global 
recession from which no nation could escape,” he told the UN General Assembly in 
1974. Expensive oil would also result in a number of related ills: greater debt financing, 
the foregoing of new investment, bilateral deals between producer and consumer 
governments, and competitive currency devaluations.  Together these problems posed an 
existential threat to “Free World” liberal capitalism, the very basis of international 
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prosperity.802   If nations adopted these illiberal policies of “beggaring [their] neighbors, a 
collapse of the world economy will be inevitable,” he told another group.803 
In the hands of the OPEC nations, terms of trade and permanent sovereignty had 
become a powerful set of ideals.  To forestall the apocalyptic course of events he 
predicted, Kissinger adopted a three-pronged strategy.  First, the United States would 
pressure OPEC members, especially Saudi Arabia, to retract their price increases.  
Second, Kissinger would exhort the other consuming nations to limit their direct bilateral 
dealings with individual oil producers.  Third, he would use his totemic international 
status to emphasize the threat of the OPEC price increases to the integrity of the 
increasingly invoked “global” market economy.   
Kissinger expressed his objectives in characteristically grand terms.  “I think we 
have a great opportunity in this crisis to assume leadership in multilateral solutions and in 
restructuring the world economic system,” he told his staff in early January 1974.804   He 
reformulated his objective in even more far-reaching language to Gerald Ford two years 
later—the United States could “use economics to build a world political structure.”805  
The dual emphasis on politics and economics suggests a fundamental reordering of 
objectives in U.S. strategy toward the international economy.  By forgoing the corporatist 
past, Kissinger believed that American diplomacy could turn the problem of expensive 
oil from a catastrophe into a diplomatic tool of the highest order.806 
                                                 
802 No. 143, “The Challenge of Interdependence,” April 15, 1974, NARA, RG 59, Lord Files, 345. 
803 No. 41, “Remarks of Kissinger before the Harvard/Princeton/Yale Club,” February 6, 1974, NARA, RG 
59, Lord Files, 345. 
804 “Secretary's Staff Meeting,” January 8, 1974, DNSA, KT. 
805 Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Ford, May 24, 1975, National Security Adviser’s 
Memoranda of Conversation Collection, Gerald Ford Presidential Library (hereafter, GFL, NSA 
Memcons). 
806For the propensity of policymakers to try to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, see: Joseph A. 
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 5th ed. (London: Allen &Unwin, 1976  [1942]), 81-86 
and 104-105.  
 263 
In crusading against high prices and pressing the inviolability of liberal 
capitalism, Kissinger remained dominant in the conceptualization and implementation of 
U.S. foreign policy from 1974 to 1977, despite arguments to the contrary that he and 
others have made.807  OPEC’s price increases stood at the front-line of global economic 
and ideological conflict for the United States and the rest of the world.  To Kissinger—
who told his staff, “don’t talk to me about barrels of oil, they might as well be bottles of 
Coca-Cola” and for whom work as an economist once was likened to “being in charge of 
the military for the Pope”—the effect of expensive oil on diplomacy represented a 
different sort of challenge from the strategic questions of triangular diplomacy between 
the Soviet Union and China, the withdrawal from Vietnam, or the Arab-Israeli conflict.808  
What were the consequences of Kissinger’s response to this challenge?  To what 
degree did the historically conscious actor succeed in following his own deliberate model 
of statesmanship? 
 BLACKMAIL, STRANGULATION, AND ROMANTICISM 
The unexpected death of Gamel Abdel Nasser on September 28, 1970 surprised the 
world. A brief silence followed the funeral, but soon upbeat predictions abounded that 
Nasser’s passing meant the end of pan-Arab radicalism.  “There could be no Nasserism 
without Nasser,” the deputy prime minister of Israel, Yigov Allon, hoped in the tersest 
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instance.809  Despite the continued war of attrition along the Suez Canal, it looked as if 
Nasser’s successor, Anwar el-Sadat, would indeed prove more amenable to a negotiated 
peace.  Sadat assiduously avoided head-on confrontation with Israel and sought to 
improve Egyptian-American relations in the following three years.810 
The Nixon administration did not respond to the promising moves, and in 1973 
Egypt began to prepare for war.811  Soviet leaders feared that another Arab-Israeli war 
would undercut superpower détente and counseled Sadat against such actions.  Their 
advice went unheeded.  On October 6, Egyptian and Syrian units attacked Israeli 
strongholds in the Sinai and Golan Heights.  They acted with Saudi Arabian, Kuwaiti, 
and Libyan financing, as well as Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan material support.  
Soviet leaders expressed frustration that Sadat disregarded their counsel, but nevertheless 
began to resupply their “Arab brothers” two days later.812 
Nixon and Kissinger debated whether they would also order an arms airlift to 
Israel.  After Sadat refused a ceasefire on October 12, Nixon famously told Kissinger, 
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“Goddamn it, use every [plane] we have.”813  The airlift decision came despite a recent 
warning from King Faisal that American support for Israel would result in an Arab oil 
embargo.814  Kissinger initially hoped the possibility would remain stillborn.  He told the 
newly promoted Joseph Sisco on October 11, “we have to get the bloody Saudi 
[ambassador] in to keep them from doing something crazy.”815   
Sisco requested a meeting with the ambassador to Washington, but to no avail.  
The timing of the war strengthened the link between the permanent sovereignty of OPEC 
and the Arab-Israeli dispute.  In a previously scheduled meeting four days before the 
American airlift, the OPEC ministers met to discuss the indexing of oil prices to 
worldwide inflation.  At the meeting, they rejected out-of-hand an offer from the 
multinational companie for a 15-percent price increase.816  After the American arms run, 
the Arab oil ministers hastily reconvened at the Kuwait Sheraton.   There, they 
announced the imposition of an oil embargo on the United States, general supply cuts, 
and a 70-percent increase in Persian Gulf oil’s posted price, from $3.01 to $5.11 per 
barrel.  One participant explained the connection between Arab nationalism and domestic 
economic considerations: “The situation presented an opportunity to make money and be 
a patriot at the same time.”   The rest of OPEC immediately followed suit.  The 
announcement marked the first time that OPEC nations set the price of oil, a power 
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reserved exclusively for the multinationals until 1970 and subject to joint company-
government determination after the 1971 Tehran and Tripoli agreements.817 
Price control epitomized OPEC’s long-sought permanent sovereignty.  The 
common phrase, “Arab oil weapon,” was a misnomer given the broad-based support for 
increased prices, but it alarmed officials throughout the industrialized West.  The NATO 
allies except for Portugal refused American use of their bases to refuel the American 
airlift.818  To avoid being subjected to supply cuts, France sold weapons to Libya and 
Saudi Arabia that were transferred to Egypt.  Great Britain shipped arms to the Arabs and 
left its contractual obligations to Israel unfulfilled.   Japan and the European Community 
publicly called on Israel to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders after the fighting ended.  As 
a result, the Arab producers excluded Japan and most of Europe from the embargo.819 
No country could be immune to the price increases. The permanent sovereignty of 
OPEC would only be felt more strongly in the following months, as the cartel 
intermittently increased prices until agreeing in January to freeze the barrel at $11.65.820  
The State Department reported that the effect on the U.S. balance of payments would be 
severe, multiplying the national import bill by over 500 percent.821   The “unreasonable 
price increases” would lead to the “drastic deterioration” of their trade balances, the 
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Secretariat of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development informed its 
members.822  The largest member companies of the organization agreed.  In a “solemn 
speech to a hushed Bundestag,” the German economic minister, Helmut Schmidt, 
conceded that high oil prices would have immediate employment consequences.823  
French President Georges Pompidou nostalgically likened the advent of expensive oil to 
“waking up from a too beautiful dream” in a national television address.824  The price 
increases were “so large” that they “must be regarded as a qualitative as well as a 
quantitative change,” the OECD Secretariat reported in December 1973.825 
The rigor of Kissinger’s Arab-Israeli “Shuttle Diplomacy” between 1974 and 
1976—designed as much to sideline the Soviet Union, establish the paramount position 
of the United States, and consolidate Israel’s territorial gains as to broker a sustainable 
peace—is well documented.826  Notwithstanding his articulated aversion to economics 
(and economists), Kissinger also dedicated considerable energy to the oil price problem 
straightaway.  He received detailed reports from the Departments of State, the Treasury, 
and the National Security Council, and understood that expensive oil was a formidable 
predicament.  It was not one, however, that he believed to be intractable.   
Kissinger’s diplomacy was ad hoc and largely ineffective at the beginning.  First, 
he attempted to convince Saudi Arabia to renege on its commitment to the price 
increases.  To apply pressure on King Faisal, Kissinger threatened not to participate in the 
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Arab-Israeli peace talks until the Arab producers lifted the embargo and OPEC restored 
prices to prewar levels.  Kissinger believed that his hardnosed stance would convince 
Faisal to lower prices.827  The Saudi government did not acquiesce, causing an impasse 
between the world’s largest oil-consuming government and its largest producer.  The 
potential fallout troubled other consuming governments and the oil industry.  “They have 
all the cards!” the chairman of Exxon, Ken Jamieson, exclaimed to Kissinger in late 
October.828   
Kissinger disagreed, basing his decision on a Cold War rationale that emphasized 
the link between military and political power.  Israel’s defeat of the Soviet-armed Arabs 
had avoided “a disastrous impact on the U.S. position in the Middle East and globally” by 
proving the superiority of American arms.  In line with advice from Sisco and his former 
special assistant at the NSC and now the State Department’s director of policy planning, 
Winston Lord, Kissinger believed that the United States held a trump card.  The 
emergency airlift made Israel’s dependence on American weaponry obvious to the world.  
Thus, only the United States could bring Israeli leadership to the bargaining table.  For 
this reason, the Arabs had overplayed their hand.  The price increases provoked “a 
romanticism about the Arab position,” Kissinger told Jamieson.  Because of their 
apparent power, the Arab producers expected Kissinger to be “a prophet who can ride in 
from the desert on a white horse with a dramatic solution.”829 
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In self-consciously setting a farcical blend of Orientalist imagery against his own 
cold-blooded political realism, Kissinger made clear that he would not be that sort of 
prophet.  He explained his strategy to Jamieson a week later.  By making his participation 
in the peace process conditional upon the resumption of pre-war oil supply and price 
levels, Kissinger hoped to prove that Saudi Arabia was the main obstacle to regional 
stability.830  Kissinger began to employ the strategy on November 8, telling King Faisal 
that the embargo had inflamed anti-Arab sentiment in the United States to such an extent 
that it was difficult for him to pursue an “even-handed” policy toward the conflict.831  
Faisal rebuffed Kissinger.   The embargo would not be lifted “until an acceptable 
solution is found to the Israeli question.”832   Likewise, when Nixon informed Sadat that 
the embargo could ruin the peace effort, Sadat refused to respond.833  In preparation for a 
December meeting with the Saudi oil minister, Ahmed Zaki Yamani, Winston Lord 
elaborated, “The whole idea is to convey the notion that we are not in a corner, but he 
is.”834  Still, Lord recommended that Kissinger use the meeting to move away from the 
linkage between the peace talks and oil prices.  The threat held little weight, especially 
since Kissinger had already planned his first peacemaking trip.  The first of many shuttles 
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was an “obvious indication” of his participation, regardless of whether American 
demands were met.   
Like Wilson, Lord urged Kissinger to avoid confrontation, but to no avail.  In 
reviewing Lord’s memo, Kissinger approved his other suggestions, but removed 
references to compromise from the talking points.835  On December 28, he again told his 
staff that “we should hold up the peace talks,” overriding a spirited argument from the 
Near East Bureau that his policy made “it more difficult if not impossible for the U.S. to 
use its influence on behalf of a settlement.”836 
Kissinger added the threat of American military action to the diplomatic arsenal in 
late 1973.  Too much has been made of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger’s alleged 
consideration of a Saudi oilfield invasion, but Kissinger undoubtedly believed the 
military threat was diplomatically useful.837  Before the embargo began, Arab newspapers 
noted with concern an increase in the Marines’ desert training exercises and warnings by 
U.S politicians that they would not countenance Arab “blackmail.”838  Kissinger issued a 
stern warning on November 21, telling the press that he had advised Nixon to consider 
“countermeasures” if the embargo continued “unreasonably and indefinitely.”839 
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 AN UNBELIEVABLE SITUATION 
The public threat of military action had considerable longevity.  From 1974 to 1976, 
Kissinger continued to maintain that a military option, while improbable, was viable.  In 
a December 1974 interview with Business Week, he did not rule out the use of force in 
the case of “the actual strangulation of the industrialized world.”  When informed that his 
statement had caused uproar among Arab leaders, he defended it.  “No nation can 
announce that it will let itself be strangled without reacting,” he told the press.840  After 
replacing the disgraced Nixon, Gerald Ford engaged in more aggressive rhetoric.  
“Sovereign nations cannot allow their policies to be dictated, or their fate decided, by 
artificial [price rigging],” he declared to a Detroit audience.  “Throughout history, nations 
have gone to war over natural advantages.”841 
There was no irony in Ford’s invocation of sovereignty.  Indeed, Ford himself 
explicitly linked American “energy independence” to independence from Great Britain in 
his State of the Union message for the bicentennial.842  (On other occasions, he also 
compared the energy crisis to the War of 1812, the Great Depression, and World War 
II.843)  Other commentators saw “energy dependence” as an affront to American 
sovereignty. A defense consultant, writing under the pseudonym Miles Ignotus in 
Harper’s, described OPEC price control as inverted colonialism.  The oil producers now 
held the rest of the world in the thrall of dependence.  If the United States did not invade 
Saudi Arabia, a “somewhat impoverished America would be surrounded by a world 
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turned into a slum.”  American citizens “would be forced to finance the executive jets of 
the sheiks.”844  
Kissinger was no less mordant than Ignotus, although he did not engage in such 
extreme rhetorical acrobatics.  In a candid moment, he complained to General Francisco 
Franco’s heir apparent in Spain, Luis Carrerra Blanco, who less than twenty-four hours 
later would be assassinated by Basque nationalists.  “It is really an unbelievable 
situation,” he grumbled. “If some small country had tried in the 19th Century to do what 
the Arabs are doing, it would have been occupied.”845 
Kissinger could pine for the orderly days of his beloved Metternich and 
Castlereagh, but the military option was never credible.  Yamani responded to 
Kissinger’s first threat in Business Week by proclaiming to the New York Times that 
Saudi Arabia could blow up its wells and still turn a profit.846  The warning by Yamani 
was serious—oil executives warned the Chairman of the Republican National 
Committee, George H. W. Bush, that Faisal had mined Saudi oil fields to prevent a take-
over.847  In short, the broader trend of decolonization and the failure in Vietnam 
eliminated military occupation as a reasonable decision.  Likewise, the permanent 
sovereignty of the oil producers was well-established, as the Libyan and Iraqi black oil 
cases demonstrated.  The phantom that had haunted a generation of oil producers, 
“Mossadegh Madness,” was no longer considered diplomatic lunacy.   
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Kissinger’s threat of boycotting the peace process was just as implausible.  There 
was little correlation between his participation in Arab-Israeli negotiations and OPEC 
price control.  The price decision transcended the regional peace negotiations.  Lord 
advised Kissinger the he was “unlikely to obtain any change in the overt Saudi position 
by only reasserting, however forcefully and persuasively, our own view.”848  Kissinger’s 
initial expectation of Saudi acquiescence underrated the strength of OPEC, the gravity of 
higher oil prices, and the United States’ ability to influence either.   
Kissinger’s miscalculation also discounted the recent history of international oil 
politics, with which he was familiar.  OPEC had waged a protracted and highly 
publicized campaign to wrest pricing and production control from the grip of the 
multinationals in the previous half-decade. From September 1970 to September 1973, the 
posted price already had moved from $1.80 to $3.07, its largest sustained increase in 
history.849  In June 1973, Wilson’s predecessor at 10 Downing Street, Ted Heath, wrote to 
Nixon about the “growing peril” to the postwar petroleum order.  “All the signs are that 
this situation is going to get worse, not better,” he believed.850 
Sadat understood the nature of the change and sought to use permanent 
sovereignty to Egypt’s advantage, just as Nasser had.  Sadat travelled to Riyadh to visit 
King Faisal two months before the October war.  OPEC’s great strides presented Sadat 
with a more propitious environment than Nasser had ever had for connecting pan-
Arabism and permanent sovereignty.  For Faisal, linking Saudi production control to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict would bring benefits that had not been evident in 1967.  Support for 
Egypt would increase Saudi Arabian and OPEC revenues.  It would also enhance Faisal’s 
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prestige in the Arab world, which continued to be under constant attack from the radical 
leaders in Libya, Iraq, and Algeria.851   
Already in 1971 and 1972, Faisal and Yamani had told the Nixon administration 
that Sadat’s “bold” policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union merited American action.  Both 
the king and his oil minister added ominously that Saudi Arabia would no longer treat oil 
and Arab political interests as distinct issues.852  After Sadat’s 1973 visit, Faisal again put 
American officials on warning, stating unequivocally that no further production 
expansions would occur without a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  “This is the 
strongest statement yet by Faisal,” Kissinger rightly told Nixon, and (wrongly) “his first 
direct linkage of the Arab-Israeli problem with oil.”853 
Oil executives informed the State Department that the Saudi decision to hold 
production levels made it likely that other OPEC members would also impose production 
controls.  Decreased production added further upward pressure on prices.854  Again, 
Faisal’s actions reinforced the unswerving push for greater revenue by the Shah of Iran.  
After meeting the Shah in Tehran in January 1973, Kissinger informed Nixon that he had 
“embarked on another course designed to reinforce his self-styled role as leader and 
originator of ideas in OPEC.”  This time the Shah emphasized price increases rather than 
production control.855  Faisal’s support of Sadat propelled OPEC’s momentum toward 
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attaining two principle tenets of permanent sovereignty, price and production control.  
OPEC announced a new price target of $6.00 per barrel in September 1973, even as 
Arab-Israeli tensions heightened.856 
The Shah was elated.  Since his victories over the oil companies between 1969 
and 1971, he had continued to push for higher oil prices in order to pay for his expansive 
military and civil development projects.  He espoused both the terms of trade theory and 
the doctrine of permanent sovereignty in discussing these domestic and regional 
considerations.  When Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci interviewed him for The New 
Republic in late 1973, the Shah emphasized that increased oil prices were intrinsically 
connected to the high prices of finished goods from the West.  “You’ve sent 
petrochemical prices rocketing,” he told Fallaci.  “You buy our crude and sell it back to 
us, refined as petrochemicals, at a hundred times the price you’ve paid us.  You make us 
pay more, scandalously more, for everything, and it’s only fair that, from now on, you 
should pay more for oil.”857 
Oil was a prime example of Prebisch’s terms of trade thesis, according to the 
Shah.  He placed OPEC within the long-standing Third World discussion over the low 
relative prices of raw materials.  He also embraced a sort of oil exceptionalism.  Not only 
did control over oil find its base in the terms of trade argument, OPEC members had 
elevated that argument to its natural apex.  Soon after the Fallaci interview, the October 
War began.  The Shah became convinced that the combined effects of the embargo and 
the initial price increase would lead to panic buying, which would drive prices higher.  
Michel Jobert, the French foreign minister, expressed his frustration to Kissinger.  “It was 
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clear,” he said, “that the Shah was going to push for another major oil price increase by 
exploiting the current embargo.”858 
The OPEC ministers met again in Iran on December 22.  The Shah convinced the 
other delegates to increase prices at that meeting.859  The next day, to the great distress of 
American officials, he announced that the oil producers had agreed to more than double 
the price of oil from $5.11 to $11.65 a barrel. It was no surprise that the Shah 
energetically employed the egalitarian rhetoric of permanent sovereignty to defend that 
round of price hikes. “It is only equitable and just that the oil producing countries” had 
ended the era in which the industrial powers were “able to buy oil at ridiculously low 
prices.”860 
James Akins wrote from his new post as the ambassador of Saudi Arabia that the 
Saudi monarchy had urged him to relay the need to muzzle the Shah.  But, he also noted 
that it was clear that the Saudi leadership held the same final aim for the price of oil 
despite statements to the contrary.861  In an international economy characterized by the 
self-assurance of OPEC, Kissinger’s initial linkage of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the 
price of oil was misguided.  In fact, it carried on the enduring overconfidence of 
American policymakers, a trend that began when Eisenhower first snubbed OPEC in 
1960.   
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Steeped in the orthodox conviction of energy security, the most influential voices 
within the Nixon administration questioned the influence of OPEC in 1973.  Secretary of 
the Treasury George Shultz told European finance ministers that their fear of OPEC’s 
control of global oil supplies was “overly alarmist.”862  Kissinger expressed consistent 
misgivings about the legitimacy of jeremiads from his oil experts.863  At a nationally 
televised press conference in September, Nixon responded to a reporters’ question about 
“oil as a club to force a change” in his Israel policy: “Oil without a market as Mr. 
Mossadeq learned many, many years ago, does not do a country much good.”  If Arab 
leaders continued to nationalize concessions and increase prices, “the inevitable result is 
that they will lose their markets.”864 
The comments from Nixon and his cabinet ignored the recent string of successes 
for OPEC.  The oil ministers of the producing nations disputed the American sentiments.  
A week after the speech by Shultz, Yamani noted the “stark fact” that the multinationals 
had yielded power to the producers, who could “dictate the flow of oil and the price of 
oil” as they wished.865  On the lower rungs of the American policymaking hierarchy, 
officials also found the confidence of their superiors unwarranted.  The ambassador in 
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Riyadh reported in 1973 that it was unlikely the “gradualist salami tactics” of OPEC 
would ever end.866 
Yamani complained to Akins in January 1974 that he was “extremely annoyed” 
by the constant American references to “Arab oil gouging.”867  Kissinger, undeterred, told 
Brent Scowcroft a week later, “If I was the President, I would tell the Arabs to shove 
their oil.”  Such a show of force “would get the embargo lifted in three days.”868   Reality 
was otherwise.  Kissinger backed away from his manufactured impasse in February, 
delinking the peace process and oil prices in a joint press conference with Nixon’s newly 
assigned federal energy administrator, William Simon.869 
 COHERENT DIPLOMACY: THE FREE MARKET 
Kissinger’s tacit admission of failure did not make him any less of a hawk on expensive 
oil. He was painfully cognizant by early 1974 of the existential challenge to the 
international economy posed by OPEC’s permanent sovereignty.  Simon helped 
Kissinger arrive at this opinion.  British Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey later 
characterized Simon as “far to the right of Genghis Kahn and totally devoted to the 
freedom of financial markets.”870   First in his new position as Nixon’s “Energy Czar” and 
then Shultz’s replacement at the Treasury, Simon would sharpen Kissinger’s stand 
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against cartel power and high oil prices as the enemies of liberal capitalism and global 
economic health.   
George Shultz worked with Simon in the endeavor.  Like Simon, Shultz was a 
firm believer in the free market. In his diary, Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns 
recorded that Shultz responded to OPEC price increases by invoking the market in a 
December 1973 cabinet meeting.  The free market would “equate demand & supply,” 
Schultz held, and eventually would force the price to drop to a “normal” level.871  Burns 
did not share the trust in the market.  “What a pity that this quiet, persuasive, but 
woefully ignorant ideologist has such influence with the president,” he wrote.872 
In close consultation with Simon and Shultz, Kissinger began in early 1974 to 
place greater emphasis on the noxious political effects of high prices, especially the threat 
of a “resource scramble” among Western industrialized countries.  Kissinger believed 
bilateral deals between oil-producing and oil-consuming governments did more than bid 
up prices; they also caused portended a crippling internal contradiction for the Free 
World economy.  If economic bilateralism grew, the political coherence of the West 
would dissipate.  Initially, Kissinger emphasized multilateralism as a solution, by which 
he essentially meant concerted action among the major consumer countries to withstand 
the price increases.  The multilateral emphasis soon fell to the wayside and was replaced 
by an ideological argument emphasizing the free market. In the end, American policy 
incorporated multilateral rhetoric into a broader economic interpretation centered on the 
free market.  
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A multilateral response to OPEC by the industrial consumers made sense, 
Kissinger held at the start. “The industrial democracies could not permit themselves to be 
turned into panicked, paralyzed bystanders while the oil producers played fast and loose 
with the internal cohesion of their societies,” he wrote in his memoirs.873  Kissinger hoped 
the producer societies could band together and resist the price increases.  However, 
actions by other industrialized nations confirmed Kissinger’s concerns that OPEC’s 
“unilateralism” would lead to ruinous competition.   Fearing that Western cohesion 
would antagonize the Arab members of OPEC, the nations of Western Europe and Japan 
blocked an official Declaration of Emergency in the OECD Oil Committee in November 
1973.  The declaration would have brought into action the new oil allocation system 
designed in the wake of the 1967 embargo.  The failure further irritated Kissinger, who 
was still dyspeptic over the NATO allies’ refusal to assist in the Israeli airlift.874   
The world’s two largest oil companies, Exxon and Shell, attempted to lower 
prices in November by reducing their profit margins.  Oil auctions by Tunisia, Nigeria, 
and Iran nonetheless garnered bids of up to $17 per barrel the following month.  Walter 
Levy found the scramble for oil “extraordinary.”875  Competitive devaluations of national 
currencies also loomed as a problem, confirming American concerns.  The French 
government announced in January 1974 that it would float the franc outside of the 
European currency snake.876  Unlike the oil-for-arms contract with Libya in 1971 or the 
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1972 oil contract after the Iraqi nationalization, the franc float could not be reasonably 
depicted as a rearguard steadying of the international political economy.  French 
diplomacy was a “classic beggar-thy-neighbor tactic,” the State Department’s European 
desk wrote.  The float was designed to undervalue the currency and “unload France’s oil-
related trade deficit on its European partners.”877  The devaluation would increase 
pressure on other countries to artificially stimulate their export earnings.  Immediately, 
the International Monetary Fund joined the United States in calling upon other countries 
to refrain from responding to their new oil deficits by competitively cheapening their 
currencies.878 
In addressing the linked problems of an oil scramble and the potential for 
competitive devaluations, Kissinger emphasized cooperation among industrial countries 
in late 1973 and early 1974.  He combined free market and multilateral language in doing 
so.  The oil price increases had little to do with economic laws of supply and demand, 
Kissinger told his staff and the leaders of other nations.  It was only the absence of a 
united consumer front, what became known as a “consumer cartel,” that allowed OPEC 
to raise prices so spectacularly.879  Continued industrial disunity legitimized the price 
increases, he believed.  Kissinger proposed the creation of an “Energy Action Group” 
among the industrial democracies to counter the trend.  Although they cited concerns that 
collective action among the consuming nations would provoke OPEC, the foreign and 
finance ministers of Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan accepted 
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Kissinger’s unprecedented group invitation to Washington for a conference in February 
1974.880 
The multilateral emphasis on a united consumer front began to diminish in the 
two months leading up to the Washington Energy Conference.  To be sure, Kissinger, 
Simon, and Shultz continued to tout the consumer counter-cartel, but the free market 
argument became strikingly more prevalent.   The United States worked earnestly to label 
expensive oil not only an economic threat but also an ideological menace of global 
proportions.  American diplomacy identified “OPEC unilateralism” as an illiberal 
bogeyman, a negative counter-image of the free market. American policy began to 
demonize OPEC and make the parallel argument that the free market was the only 
rational system capable of meeting the new global challenge of expensive oil.   
Public rhetoric skimmed over a more complex economic reality.  Kissinger, 
Simon, and Shultz worked to portray the price increases as representative of a greater 
ideological struggle.  However, most policymakers and economists understood the 
problem in a far more complicated context in which the price increases stoked an 
inflamed sense of uncertainty about Western prosperity.  
The transition in the international political economy from stability to instability in 
the early 1970s is one of the most important stories of the twentieth century.  In the 
quarter century after World War II, the United States and its Cold War allies experienced 
unprecedented economic growth, creating affluence that had an indelible impact on 
American diplomacy. The postwar sense of abundance, imbued in Keynesian economic 
principles, captured the imagination of the nation’s most influential commentators.  The 
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young Philip Roth satirized the copious feeling in Goodbye Columbus in 1959: “Fruit 
grew in their refrigerator and sporting goods dropped from their trees!”881  Economist 
Paul Samuelson proclaimed grandly, “[W]e as the artists, mixing the colors of our palette, 
can have the capital formation and the rate of current consumption we desire.”882  Such 
sentiments reflected a broad American belief in permanent prosperity, a conviction that 
extended across party lines and through presidential administrations.883  
Even so, the fabric of postwar affluence was wearing thin.  A new sense of 
economic insecurity had begun to permeate American culture, resulting largely from 
problems for the American balance of payments and, subsequently, the U.S. gold stock 
and value of the dollar.  The deterioration was rooted in the “politics of productivity” of 
the early Cold War.  Policymakers agreed that international cooperation in the pursuit 
Western European and Japanese economic growth would protect those countries from 
predatory communism.884  In 1949, the United States thus allowed Europe and Japan to 
break the trade liberalization standards signed at Bretton Woods in 1944.885   
European currencies became convertible after 1958 and the deficit became a 
growing threat to international economic stability.886  Within the burgeoning, mostly 
unregulated Eurodollar market, speculative capital flows based on national interest rate 
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changes soon became second nature.  The American trade deficit mounted, the dollar 
weakened, and currency speculation reinforced a macabre feedback loop.  The volatile 
mix of fixed exchange rates, the American deficit, and increased capital movement had 
seriously jounced the international political economy by the end of the decade.887 
To stem speculation against the dollar, the Johnson administration increased 
capital controls after the 1967 sterling crisis.888  One of Nixon’s campaign promises was 
to bring an end to the controls.  In his first cabinet position as director of the Office of 
Management and the Budget, George Shultz made the removal of capital controls a 
priority.  Citing future supply-side visionary Arthur Laffer, Shultz argued that the 
“prestige costs” and “economic costs” of capital controls far outweighed their balance-of-
payments benefits.889  The Nixon economic team relaxed controls and began to push 
Europe and Japan to alter their exchange rates and open their markets to American 
exports.  Between 1970 and 1972, world monetary reserves doubled from $79 billion to 
$159 billion.  By 1973 gold accounted for less than a quarter of dollar-denominated 
international reserves.  The United States suspended dollar convertibility into gold in 
1971 and the European Common Market countries floated their currencies against the 
dollar in 1973.890 
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The Bretton Woods order had perished.  Global monetary policies formed a 
complex environment in which oil prices now played a central role.  With little dissent, 
though, academics, journalists, and policymakers identified cheap oil as critical to 
continued Western economic growth.  In one characteristic instance, State Department 
analysts reminded Kissinger that postwar affluence had been driven by “abundant low-
cost petroleum supplies.”891  Expensive oil compounded the existing uncertainty in the 
international political economy.  Kissinger understood that the basis for international 
prosperity had changed dramatically and that oil was a part of it.  “Economic 
relationships are changing more rapidly than the structures which nurtured them,” he said 
in December 1973.  The Arab oil embargo had “made a chronic crisis acute...but a crisis 
was coming in any event.”  Kissinger emphasized the problem of oil as exemplary of the 
larger lesson of “distinguishing the long-range from the ephemeral.”892   
Whether purposeful or subconscious, the new emphasis on oil prices glossed over 
a more complex situation.  The decision to place diplomatic stress on expensive oil 
marked a new direction for U.S. diplomacy toward the energy crisis.  Kissinger began to 
call greater attention to the free market.   The same week, he changed part of a speech to 
NATO leaders to underscore the evils of expensive oil.  “Western societies face a disaster 
in continuing down the road of unlimited competition for natural resources,” Kissinger 
gravely intoned.  He emphasized the anti-liberal nature of cartel power and railed against 
his European allies for surrendering to it. “A return to economic nationalism [would] 
destroy our political unity and bring on global depression.”  NATO members needed “to 
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join together to ensure that the world’s great democracies are never held to ransom 
again,” just as “the men of vision” who formed the Marshall Plan had done.893 
Aside from the delicious irony evident in Kissinger’s invocation of the Marshall 
Plan, an irony likely not perceived by the speaker or his audience, a close reading of the 
speech leads to two conclusions.  First, the leaders of the Western industrial world took 
the application of permanent sovereignty by OPEC very seriously indeed, a long cry from 
earlier descriptions of it as an unfeasible concept.  Second, Kissinger’s December 1973 
speeches downplayed the unsteady context into which higher oil prices were introduced, 
emphasizing instead the noxious effects of OPEC’s price control.   
Simon buttressed the tactic with an analysis of the global oil market that laid the 
problem of expensive oil at the doorsteps of a greedy OPEC and panicked European 
governments.  In a briefing paper for Kissinger in January 1974, he described the new 
prices as “emotional” and called European actions a “senseless bidding up of the price of 
crude oil on the world market.”894   In 1974 and 1975, Kissinger and Simon would 
continue to attack expensive oil and what they argued was its root cause, OPEC 
“unilateralism,” as the primary culprits for international economic woes.   In squarely 
setting “pressures toward unilateralism,” defined by the State Department as 
“nationalization, cartel-like action, beggar-thy-neighbor trade and payments action,” 
against “an open and interdependent world economy,” U.S. foreign policy used expensive 
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oil to move the complex economic concerns of the mid-1970s into a Manichean political 
context.895 
The treatment of expensive oil culminated a long search within the Nixon 
administration for a more consistent ideological standpoint toward the international 
economy.   The administration began to search for coherence in January 1971, when 
Nixon ordered the director of the new Council on International Economic Policy, Peter 
Peterson, to carry out a wholesale reassessment of foreign economic policy.  In April, 
Peterson reported what many economists and government officials already knew—the 
American economic superiority undergirding the postwar system had disappeared.  
Peterson did not just recommend that the Nixon administration incorporate economic 
considerations more fully into foreign policy.  Even further, he suggested that the Nixon 
administration reverse its priorities by placing foreign policy in service of the 
international economy.896 
The Peterson report left to it to others to figure out the conceptual link between 
economic considerations and foreign policy.  Following the Peterson report, Fred 
Bergsten of the NSC told Kissinger that it would be necessary to “increase the 
‘economic’ content of foreign economic policy,” but the notoriously territorial Kissinger 
resisted an economic turn in his diplomacy.897  Kissinger’s resistance weakened in 1973.  
Nixon assigned Shultz the chairmanship of a new Council on Economic Policy in 
February.  The first meeting discussed the importance of “communicating a visible 
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economic philosophy that expresses the unifying themes of our own policy.”898  However, 
although Shultz wrote in the council’s first agenda that “greater economic freedom” was 
the ultimate “political and moral objective” of American policy, he wrote, the council 
struggled to find a cause célèbre for the argument.899 
Kissinger also had become concerned with the problem of the relationship 
between international politics and economics.  In his first discussion with Simon about 
“oil and other things” in August 1973, Kissinger raised the “tender problem” of economic 
diplomacy—the State Department had “no ability now to systematically sell it 
politically.”  Rather, economic diplomacy functioned “on technical economic grounds on 
its own merit.”  The inconsistency, Kissinger complained to Shultz, was inadequate.900  
As Shultz, Kissinger, and Simon began to work together in preparation for the 
Washington Energy Conference in February 1974, language attacking OPEC on the 
grounds of its practice of permanent sovereignty would provide coherence.  The attack on 
“unilateralism” transmuted into a workable agenda Shultz’s desire for a moral and 
political substantiation of his economic philosophy and Kissinger’s need to “sell” 
economic diplomacy.   
Policy recommendations from within the State Department helped Kissinger 
shape the agenda.  Kissinger requested a report on the “international dimension” of 
American oil policy in November 1973.  The authors of the report were Winston Lord 
and Julius Katz, the director of the department’s Economics Bureau.  In their 19-page 
report, Katz and Lord held that above all American diplomacy needed to “arrest the trend 
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toward unilateralism, the imposition on consumers of ever higher prices, and the 
progressive extension of producer influence and control.”901 
The Treasury Department further injected a market-driven analysis into the 
critique of expensive oil.  In his first report as the chair of Nixon’s new Energy Action 
Group in January 1974, Shultz concluded that “the cartelization of oil” and “the 
magnitude of the price increases, should not be accepted.”902  Shultz “strongly asserted 
that the price of oil now existing was intolerably high” to the Executive Board of the 
International Monetary Fund the same month.  He hoped, as did Kissinger, that his 
statement would help to “build up resistance to further price increases.”903 
In both the State and Treasury analyses, OPEC “unilateralism” had driven prices 
to an artificially high level.  Only multilateral cooperation among the industrialized 
consumers could bring prices down.  On January 31, 1974, Kissinger told his staff that 
the proceedings of the Washington Energy Conference would emphasize the ideological 
schism between unilateralism and multilateralism and the need to counter OPEC’s “cartel 
power” with “consumer solidarity.”  Responding to a staff member’s argument that it was 
necessary to downplay the confrontational aspect of the industrial cohesion, Kissinger 
exploded: “We have said it a hundred times and it’s bull!”  He had convened the 
conference, “of course...to create a united front.  That’s the only purpose.”  The other 
countries needed to be reminded that they had  
 
no other choice except common disaster or a multilateral approach—if we 
cannot organize ourselves, then we really are in the condition of Greek 
cities facing Macedonia or Rome.  The only way the consumers can 
                                                 
901 Katz and Lord to Kissinger, “U.S. Oil Policy – The International Dimension,” November 3, 1973, 
NARA, RG 59, Lord Files, 346.  Katz would later become the United States’ chief negotiator for the North 
American Free Trade Agreement. 
902Secretary’s Staff Meeting, January 8, 1974, DNSA, KT. 
903 Herbert Stein, “Meeting with Shultz, Ash, and Stein,” January 21, 1974, RNL, White House Special 
Files, President’s Office Files, Box 93 (hereafter, WHSF, POF, 93). 
 290 
protect themselves against what is a revolution in international finance, in 
international economics, is to share a common perception of the problem 
and organize it.904 
The singular purpose of the Washington Energy Conference, Kissinger wrote 
immediately afterwards, was the formation of a “counterweight to OPEC.”905 
Kissinger, Shultz, and Simon met Nixon in the Western White House in San 
Clemente two days before the conference.  The president, beleaguered by the Watergate 
scandal, hoped the three would not be “forced into a position where the Europeans go 
into business for themselves or where it looks like a confrontation with the producers.” 
Nixon also raised the stakes, telling Kissinger to “talk turkey” to the “technical types” at 
the conference.  If his European counterparts did not line up with American-led 
multilateralism, Kissinger should tell them they could not “expect us to hold our military 
role.”  Kissinger supported Nixon, telling him, “We have never failed by being strong.”906 
Hours after leaving California, Kissinger reminded Shultz and Simon that the 
Washington Energy Conference would take place “against the background of intense 
concern that the energy crisis could plunge the world into a period of economic, and 
potentially political, instability.”  The other countries’ “go-it-alone” attitude could 
“snowball into a ruinous competition.”  The American objective was clear: “we need to 
demonstrate that the energy crisis is manageable through multilateral cooperation.”907 
Shultz, Simon, and Kissinger all drove home the benefits of multilateralism at the 
conference.  In doing so, they continued to employ free market logic. Kissinger told the 
British, German, French, and Japanese foreign ministers in the opening speech of the 
summit: “The energy crisis indicated the birth pains of global interdependence.  Our 
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response could well determine our capacity to deal with the international agenda of the 
future.”  The “manipulation” of OPEC’s raw material supply represented “the ultimate 
challenge...to the fragile fabric of international principles and institutions,” he continued.  
Failure to cooperate multilaterally “would threaten the world with a vicious cycle of 
competition, autarky, rivalry, and depression such as led to the collapse of the world 
order in the thirties.”908   Simon and Shultz encouraged Kissinger to strengthening the 
language on the “non-sustainability of present oil prices.”909  Kissinger accepted the 
advice, telling the ministers that the “quantum increase in prices...are simply not 
sustainable.”910 
Simon then lit into the ministers, telling them that their “unconstrained bilateral 
deals” had helped legitimize “the sharp and sudden upswing in prices.”911  Following 
Simon, Shultz argued that even “the best cooperative efforts” could not offset the damage 
caused by “the abrupt and spectacular increases in oil costs.”   In the face of the problem, 
Shultz emphasized market freedom: “At a time of vast new uncertainty....we must agree 
to keep open our markets for goods and capital and to avoid the temptations of 
competitive devaluations.”912  That night, at a special White House dinner, Nixon echoed 
the previous formulations.  Individual action threatened to “drive up prices, drive down 
our economies, and drive us apart.”913 
The dual emphasis on multilateralism and the market was more than public 
diplomacy directed at the finance and foreign ministers of the industrialized countries.  
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The two points fused together at the foundation of Kissinger’s diplomatic thought.  
Kissinger penned a long, comprehensive memorandum to his assistant secretaries, 
entitled simply “Foreign Policy Goals,” in May 1974.  Free-market objectives 
complemented multilateralism in his synthesis. The two major tasks of the State 
Department were to strengthen the department’s ability to formulate policy 
recommendations in conceptual terms and institutionalize “a lasting framework for the 
planning and execution of American foreign policy.”  To achieve the organizational ends, 
Kissinger enumerated a number of “broad policy goals.” His belief in “a growing and 
open world economy” was central to each. 
Because of the dramatic changes in “the global structure,” Kissinger continued, 
American foreign policy faced the challenge of “a more open fluid environment” in 
which “a new structure of lasting qualities has yet to emerge.”   In a market-based 
conception of multilateralism, Kissinger wrote that the new structure could be 
characterized either by international competition or collaboration.  Economic changes 
had “compressed the planet” and multiplied the consequences of national competition.  
Multilateral collaboration, on the other hand, would guarantee international stability.  
Only by taking into account “the global interest,” could nations effectively pursue their 
national interest.  At the same time, economic growth through the free market was central 
to Kissinger’s formulation.  The tenets of the free market would drive multilateralism.  
Just as “national security requires global security,” he concluded, so too did “national 
prosperity require an expanding global economy.”914 
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ECONOMIC REALISM AND AMERICAN TRADITION 
The “Kissinger-Simon hard-line” against OPEC, as one British policymaker labeled U.S. 
policy, was not foreordained.  Rather, it emerged in a particularly fluid context in which 
multiple formulations competed for international legitimacy.915  Still, the market-
multilateral position became entrenched in 1974.  The U.S. response to the oil price crisis 
proved influential in shaping not only American diplomacy, but also the future agenda of 
the international economy, coloring the limits of permanent sovereignty. 
In one revealing case, the United States worked to diminish the role of the 
International Monetary Fund in dealing with the investment of the gargantuan surpluses 
of the oil-producing countries after the price increases.  Simon summarized the problem 
of “petrodollar recycling” for Gerald Ford in July 1974: “The situation is troublesome—
there are a number of producers with a lot of money, nowhere to spend it, and the banks 
and financial markets are in trouble.  Oil prices have created great instability in the 
international financial markets.”916  The twin emphasis on multilateralism and the free 
market evident in the Washington Energy Conference preparations and Kissinger’s May 
1974 memo skewed definitively toward the latter as petrodollar recycling became a 
bigger problem.  The dominance of the free market position was clear by June 1975, 
when Ford made his strongest statement on oil prices.  Any further increases in world 
prices would be considered “a serious act...totally without economic justification,” the 
president said.  “If free market principles were to apply,” a price cut was imminent.917 
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The principles of the free market may be deeply engrained in the American 
psyche as a basic right.918  But American diplomats adopted a new energetic free-market 
argument regarding the question of petrodollars in 1974.  The petrodollar question was 
closely linked to the interpretation Simon, Shultz, and Kissinger shared regarding OPEC 
“unilateralism.”  Predictions of the size of the petrodollar transfer from oil consumers to 
producers increased throughout 1974. The quantities of international capital transferred 
from consumers to producers, as wide-ranging as predictions were, marked an 
unprecedented event.  Analysts at Morgan Guaranty noted the potential extent of these 
surpluses in mid-1974, citing World Bank and OECD estimates of a cumulative OPEC 
surplus of $300 and $650 billion by 1980.919 
The debts of oil-consuming countries matched these surpluses and represented a 
serious problem.  How would the debtors finance their loss?  Where would the newfound 
wealth of the oil producers go?  No one knew for sure.  The International Monetary Fund 
reported that there was “no reason to expect” that capital flows from OPEC deposits 
would match the individual deficits of the consumer countries.920  The lack of time-tested 
strategies for guiding OPEC’s newfound wealth back into the economy engendered much 
anxiety.  It would be difficult to exaggerate the sense of urgency felt by new debtor 
countries that had no confidence that their financial needs would be met.   
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Most countries agreed that petrodollar recycling required an increase in 
multilateral financial cooperation, likely through substantial new credit lines in the 
International Monetary Fund funded by oil producers.921  The managing director of the 
Fund, Johannes Witteveen, proposed the first of these credit lines in January 1974.  The 
“Witteveen facility” sought to mitigate “the very large deterioration” of the current 
accounts of “the overwhelming majority of countries.”922   Witteveen argued that the 
Fund would ensure an “equitable and prudent” recycling of OPEC money.  To preempt 
the free market critique, he carefully positioned the Witteveen facility as “an alternative 
and supplement to market flows.”923 
The Witteveen facility found strong support in Europe and Japan but was 
immediately opposed by the United States.  Kissinger, Simon, and Shultz dissented on 
the basis that the credit line legitimized expensive oil and undercut Kissinger’s initiative 
for a consumer counter-cartel.  Shultz told Nixon that the United States should not “too 
readily bail out oil-importing countries...lest that weaken the resolve to get the price 
down.”924  The U.S. government worked to curb the Witteveen facility throughout 1974.  
Beginning in September, Simon and Kissinger also quashed a British proposal for a 
second, larger credit line.   
American opposition to the Witteveen facility stemmed primarily from the belief 
that debt relief would legitimize OPEC’s price increases.  Simon maintained that 
financial markets could manage the problem of investment if prices dropped.  Following 
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the free market school of thought, Kissinger and Simon also posited that even if prices 
did not stabilize, petrodollar recycling needed to occur through the private capital market 
rather than a controlled public system.925 
As a first step to limit the Fund’s role, Simon pushed for a series of mandatory 
conditions for countries that used the Witteveen facility.  The central requirement was 
that borrowing should be allowed only for countries that relaxed their capital controls, as 
the United States had continued to do since 1971.  The conditions internationalized 
Shultz’s domestic crusade against capital controls.  Simon abolished the remaining 
controls in the United States in 1974, accelerating the global process.  These two 
decisions forced states to borrow mostly in open capital markets.926 
The emphasis on private capital in petrodollar recycling became central to 
American diplomacy emphasizing the free market.927  Simon explained the objectives to a 
House subcommittee in late 1974: “Our analysis of the forces underlying the energy 
markets has led us to the conclusion that the present level of oil prices is unjustifiable and 
that there can be no fundamental solution to the energy crisis without a reduction in the 
inflated price of oil.”  Because oil prices were unnaturally high, Simon said, the United 
States was not attracted to “purely financial ‘recycling’ schemes, for these would treat 
only the symptoms and not the root of the problem itself.”928 
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Simon hoped that the U.S. financial market, rather than the International 
Monetary Fund, would be the primary recipient of petrodollars.  Lifting American capital 
controls served that purpose by allowing more American banks to accept greater 
quantities and amounts of petrodollar deposits.  Simon reported to the Senate in 
September 1974 that the U.S. financial market had grown massively since the beginning 
of the energy crisis.  Capital controls no longer limited the size of short-term deposits in 
New York.  Of the $17.2 billion inflows of short-term capital reported by U.S. banks, he 
estimated that $7 billion came from OPEC nations.929  By emphasizing the liberalization 
of petrodollar flows, Simon hoped the vigor of the U.S. financial market would preserve 
a dominant American position in international finance.930 
Other observers felt less confidence in the ability of the private market to cope 
with petrodollar flows effectively or equitably.  In June 1974, the Secretary General of 
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, Emile van Lennep, 
expressed his frustration with U.S. policy: “We just cannot assume that private market 
arrangements can efficiently cope both with absorbing the surpluses and with directing 
them where they are needed.”931  Analysts worried in particular that the pressure on the 
capital base of Western banks would reach a point at which the banks would be unable to 
accommodate further deposits.  American bankers, including the Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, Arthur Burns, also questioned the ability of the financial system to handle oil 
money.  Burns contradicted Shultz’s advice that Kissinger “tone down” doubts that the 
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financial markets might not be able to handle the recycling of funds without the help of 
the International Monetary Fund.  Burns believed that the capital markets would be 
“strained to handle recycling.”932 
International pressure for multilateral involvement in petrodollar recycling grew 
throughout 1974.   Most observers thought the International Monetary Fund should 
enlarge the Witteveen facilities.  The Fund supported Burns’ and van Lennep’s analyses 
in an internal report.  Analysts admitted that the ability of the private market to recycle 
petrodollars had been “reasonably good.”  Still, analysts found preoccupying the “marked 
break in the customary patterns of international capital flows.” As prices remained high, 
the “structural problem” of the ballooning deficits of the oil consuming nations would 
only increase in severity.  Furthermore, as the debtors’ deficits grew, they would become 
less credit-worthy.  Investment would waver and private funds would inevitably dry up in 
the medium-term.  “There is no assurance, and indeed little likelihood, that the aggregate 
flow of funds...will be adequate, in direction and volume, from the point of view of the 
world economy,” the Fund team concluded.933 
The British Treasury also had serious misgivings about leaning so heavily on the 
market.  Economists there agreed with their counterparts in the International Monetary 
Fund.  The Western governments could not “rely entirely upon the free market system,” 
because the banking system would “suffer some constipation.”  Furthermore, many 
countries would not be able to afford the higher interest rates that would inevitably follow 
as their deficits grew.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, thus began to call 
for the preservation of multilateral channels to absorb OPEC money.  The largest would 
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be a second Witteveen fund.  Johannes Witteveen agreed with Healey: a second oil 
facility would help the debtors adjust to the burden of expensive oil.934 
Meanwhile, Simon and Kissinger continued to insist that OPEC lower prices, 
which they hoped would alleviate some of the pressure on the financial market.  
Kissinger met several times with Faisal on his Middle East shuttles and consistently 
pressed the point.935  Simon made a long trip to the Middle East and then to Europe in 
July 1974.  In the Middle East, Ford instructed him to raise the problem with King Faisal 
that “current oil prices cannot go on.”  (Ford also expressed his doubts that “you can do 
very much as long as the Shah holds up the prices.”936)   Simon then suggested to 
Kissinger that they try to persuade the Shah, but Kissinger demurred, reminding Simon 
and Ford of Iran’s strategic role as a regional policeman.937 
After failing on the Middle East leg of his trip to convince OPEC leaders to freeze 
prices, Simon proposed a new summit meeting of the Western finance ministers.938   He 
received a lukewarm response, which prompted Kissinger to telephone his counterparts to 
suggest expanding the finance meeting to include foreign ministers, as at the Washington 
Energy Conference.  In his conversation with the British foreign secretary, James 
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Callaghan, Kissinger again expressed that it was “intolerable” that the “800 million 
people” in the industrialized and developing countries could be “held to ransom.”939 
The petrodollar corollary to the energy crisis became more troublesome as it 
became apparent that American diplomacy would not affect prices.  OPEC members, 
especially Saudi Arabia, continued to cut production to maintain high prices.  The oil bill 
of the consuming countries, according to the OECD, rose from $50 billion to over $130 
billion in 1974.940  The build-up of OPEC surpluses was only expected to continue at a 
faster rate in late 1974 and throughout 1975.  Pressure on the financial system also 
increased in the lending direction, as the reserve cushions of oil consuming nations 
sagged and eventually disappeared.  As a result, more governments would be forced to 
look for greater external financing.  International insistence for a larger role for the Fund 
grew.  “There is...a wide measure of agreement that new mechanisms will be needed,” 
one analyst wrote in October 1974.941 
To offset calls for a second Witteveen facility, Simon and Kissinger returned to 
the free market analysis that expensive oil was an “unnatural” phenomenon.942  Both 
continued to maintain that the market would eventually force prices down.  For many, the 
American opposition to International Monetary Fund recycling ignored the blatant reality 
that the oil-producing countries now controlled the tap.  After a June 1974 trip to visit 
“friends on Wall Street,” including André Meyer of Lazards, British financier Harold 
Lever noted that few bankers accepted the U.S. government view that prices would drop.  
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“New York is far less sanguine than Washington,” he reported.943  Lever had stronger 
words for Simon, whom he criticized for being “breezily optimistic” about oil prices.  
Simon’s belief that OPEC would “break down” because the producers would be unable to 
maintain their production agreements was disingenuous in the face of the collective 
application of permanent sovereignty.944 
Industry observers shared Lever’s opinion.  The British cabinet engaged in 
extensive consultations with economic ministers, oil executives, and academic 
economists.  All concluded that the long lead times for the development of energy 
alternatives made it unlikely that world demand for OPEC oil would decrease any time 
soon.945  The British economic attaché in Washington, Peter Ramsbotham, told Kissinger 
that “there is little likelihood of the market itself reducing the price of oil in the next year 
or so.”946  The Atlantic Council—including such prominent industry insiders as the 
Chairman of Shell, John Loudon, and a former State Department assistant secretary now 
employed by the Bechtel Corporation, Parker T. Hart—also advised that diplomacy could 
not lower prices.  Rather, U.S. policy needed to emphasize “the sound, long-term 
recycling of Arab wealth.”947  Experts in the U.S. government agreed.  The White 
House’s Council of Economic Advisers reported that the lack of substitutes for Persian 
Gulf oil made any short-run price change unlikely.948 
The energy crisis entered its second year and the financial world became 
increasingly anxious about the huge flows of oil money.  International Monetary Fund 
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officials worried that the first Witteveen facility was too small to handle the problem.  
Their prediction came true on October 4, 1974, when the Fund announced that it had 
reached its lending limits.949  Wall Street also was less optimistic that it could cope with 
the petrodollar flood.  Chase Manhattan overvalued its bonds to demonstrate its unease at 
the Fund announcement.950  The two events raised further questions about the wisdom of 
leaning so heavily on the private capital market.  Harold Lever summed up the sense of 
disquiet, advising Harold Wilson in December 1974 that the multilateral investment plan 
of the Fund was far better than “ad hoc, not to say anarchic” market-based recycling.951 
Healey circulated a proposal for a second, open-ended oil facility to the G-5 
finance and foreign ministers in advance of their October 1974 meeting.  The proposal 
sought to disabuse Kissinger and Simon of what Healey believed was “a misconceived 
link between the issue of oil prices and that of recycling.”  The spillover of the American 
policy of “brinksmanship” on oil prices into debates about petrodollar recycling, in 
particular, was “dangerously imprudent.”952   Healey hoped the “Witteveen II” credit line 
would attract at least $30 billion.  He also reminded Kissinger and Simon that the relative 
small amount would leave the majority of petrodollars in private capital markets.953 
The United States continued to advocate the market as the primary means of 
recycling.  Despite Kissinger’s opening statement at the October meeting that the United 
States “was prepared to be influenced by their partners’ views,” according to one British 
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observer, there was “a hard core to the American attitude.”  Away from the pleasantries 
of formal diplomacy, Kissinger’s professions of open-mindedness must have seemed far-
fetched.  The U.S. delegation did not budge from their contention that Healey’s proposal 
would “put OPEC in the driving seat.”954  The introduction of a new International 
Monetary Fund facility on the level proposed by the British would effectively legitimize 
high oil prices by accepting their inevitability.  Worse, Witteveen II even equipped the 
international system to accommodate further price increases.  The thrust of American 
policy echoed Shultz’s critique of panic buying six months earlier at the Washington 
Energy Conference.  Kissinger had often repeated the sentiment, once even telling the 
French foreign minister that “most countries acted as if they were rabbits paralyzed by a 
snake.”955   
Simon explained the dense economics of the American train of thought to the 
other delegations. Absent a mechanism in the International Monetary Fund, the interest 
rates of Western banks would fall, lowering the profitability of OPEC investments.  
Decreased interest rates would have a related economic and political effect on oil prices.  
In reaction to the economic impulse, the OPEC nations would reduce the quantity of their 
investments.  Then, in order to bring down their profits, the oil producers would slash the 
price of oil.956  Simon’s interpretation of diminishing returns on Arab investments, 
however, did not take into account that the oil producers might lower production instead 
of prices, as Saudi Arabia was already doing.  Nor did it consider the fact that increased 
prices had been the guiding principle of permanent sovereignty all along, from Prebisch 
to Mossadegh, from Maghrebi to the Shah. The British Treasury believed that the 
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American policy of “deliberate abstention from the recycling field,” thus allowing 
financial assets to become less satisfactory to the oil producers, was “far more likely to 
invite production cut-backs than price reductions.”957 
In fact, the oil-producing countries already had begun to lower production to keep 
prices up.  Simon’s fluency on the benefits of the free market was stronger than his 
economic reasoning. He had eloquently defended the free market a month earlier in a 
speech to the Independent Petroleum Association.  In the face of expensive oil, he 
complained, “the idea of free enterprise seems to have lost its sheen.”  Some critics 
thought “the Arabs now have the United States in a perilous unbreakable hammerlock.”  
Simon believed Arab power was overblown:   
 
I totally disagree, and I do so on the very solid grounds of economic 
realism and American tradition.  A nation that can tame the wilderness, 
that has the most dynamic free market-place in the history of man, that can 
lift the standard of living to heights hitherto unknown, and can then place 
men on the moon – that nation, if it allows free enterprise full freedom, is 
not going to be cowed by the sudden threat of blackmail. 
From Simon’s perspective, the OPEC price increases “were not only bad politics but bad 
economics.”958  The market-driven conclusion was obvious—another Witteveen facility 
would abjectly capitulate to the producers.   
Kissinger and Simon worked to curb Healey’s proposal by replacing it with a less 
multilateral solution, a “closed-circuit Common Trust” that would be managed from the 
Paris offices of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development.959  In 
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December 1974, Simon elaborated the ramifications of what the American policymakers 
promoted as the “Kissinger Solidarity Fund,” emphasizing that it gave final priority to the 
free market.  The $25 million fund was nothing more than a “safety net.”  It was “not 
intended to provide free, unlimited or unconditional aid.”  Rather, it was “standby 
support,” only available after a nation took other “reasonable measures to resolve its 
difficulties.”960  Simon later repeated to the OECD Secretariat that the proposed funds 
could be accessed only as a last resort.961 
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund welcomed the Kissinger 
Solidarity Fund as evidence that “the extent and urgency of the need for official recycling 
facilities seemed at last to be widely recognized.”  However, the board also speculated 
that Kissinger designed the proposal as “an attempt to prevent a Fund oil facility...from 
being established.”  If the Kissinger Fund was meant to replace the second Witteveen 
facility, American policy represented “a serious departure from international solidarity.”  
The board concluded, “The Fund must press ahead with the design of a petroleum facility 
for 1975.”962 
Simon curtailed that effort.  He told Kissinger in August 1974 that the biggest 
problem with the Witteveen facility was that “Europe is becoming dependent on the 
Arabs both for oil and for money.”963  Simon used U.S. voting power in the International 
Monetary Fund to ensure Witteveen II would exist “on a much more limited basis than 
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had been proposed by the Europeans and others.”964  He forced the option in the January 
1975 Executive Board meeting by telling the other delegates that any amount over $5 
billion, a far cry from Healey’s initial $30 billion estimate, would have to be cleared with 
Ford.965 
American failure to support the International Monetary Fund was troubling.  The 
petrodollar build-up now formed a substantial part of global monetary reserves, an 
imbalance that threatened to undermine the nascent credibility of the post-Bretton Woods 
system of floating exchange rates.  However, given American power in the Fund, the 
opposition had little choice but to concede defeat.  Witteveen and Healey accepted the 
marginalization of the second oil credit line.  The rest of the industrial nations endorsed 
the Kissinger Solidarity Fund in February 1975.966   
On its face, the American position on oil debt was a pragmatic one: Bad debts on 
the free market were an instrument that would put downward pressure on oil prices.  Any 
system in which an international institution served as the guarantor for loans would have 
the opposite effect.  Kissinger explained the reasoning at another economic summit of the 
industrialized countries in 1975: “Our strategy has been to transform the market 
conditions for oil...to reach a point where OPEC loses its unilateral power to control oil 
prices.”  In a sense, the American emphasis on the private financial market squared with 
Kissinger’s earlier emphasis on multilateral solidarity, even though it limited the 
multilateral recycling of petrodollars through the International Monetary Fund.  Very 
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simply, both policies assumed that if consumer countries demonstrated that they were 
“not willing to deal at present prices, the prices would weaken.”967  
Most observers disagreed with American policy, both in terms of its economic 
reasoning and its political consequences.  The free-market school of thought and its stand 
against expensive oil nonetheless shaped the nature of petrodollar recycling.  But it did 
more than that.  It also set a market precedent for other crises.   
THE FREE MARKET AGENDA 
Attempts to establish consistent connections among people, ideas, and events are 
notoriously perilous.  With a productive, controversial, and historically conscious 
individual such as Henry Kissinger, the peril is amplified.  However, the conclusions that 
can be drawn from analyzing the energy crisis far outweigh the fear of losing oneself in 
the byzantine debate about Kissinger and his legacy.968 
The analysis of the American response to the energy crisis becomes even more 
important because many challenges of the globalizing world played out within 
discussions about the new problem of expensive oil.  The tension between politics and 
economics was not the least of these new global challenges.  Kissinger understood the 
problem of the energy crisis through two overlapping lenses, multilateralism and the free 
market.  To be fair to Kissinger the avowed realist, he was not a die-hard free-market 
ideologue, as his strategy towards the United Nations would soon show.969  On the other 
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hand, Kissinger took a remarkably narrow ideological position toward the price hikes in 
1974, especially regarding the issue of OPEC “unilateralism.”  And, although he 
consistently stressed multilateralism in his grand formulations of a new world political 
structure, the doctrinaire emphasis on the free market far overshadowed multilateralism 
in practice.970 
In initially taking such a strong stance against expensive oil and cartel power, 
Kissinger had the primary objective of rolling back oil prices.  However, it was obvious 
to most observers by early 1974 that the likelihood of a price reduction was 
infinitesimally small.  Western Europe and Japan were too vulnerable to join the United 
States in a counter-cartel.   
Kissinger’s uncompromising geopolitical view that nothing should be done to 
accommodate high oil prices had great negative ramifications, including the obstruction 
of Witteveen II.  The petrodollar decision affected all oil consuming nations, developed 
and underdeveloped alike.  American diplomacy directed the OPEC cash pool in a way 
that changed the nature of international finance.  As a result of the eradication of capital 
controls and the limited role of the International Monetary Fund, countries began to get 
money in considerable amounts from private international banks for the first time since 
the 1920s.  Banks replaced international institutions as the locus of the majority of the 
world’s growing finance capital.   
In limiting the second Witteveen facility, the United States effectively excluded a 
number of the underdeveloped countries from direct petrodollar aid and shepherded them 
toward the private market.  The non-oil developing countries were among the principle 
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users of petrodollars between 1974 and 1980, borrowing over $200 billion from banks 
and bondholders.  The debt cycle was unsustainable.  It is likely that the larger role 
envisioned by Healey for the Fund would have mitigated many developing countries’ 
financial problems in the early 1980s.971 
Private control over capital, in marked contrast with the privileged position of 
international institutions envisioned in Bretton Woods, empowered free market thought 
in American diplomacy.  The energy crisis also forced Kissinger to recognize the fiction 
of the autonomy of geopolitics from economic concerns.  In a clear break from his past 
aversion to the complexities of international economics, Kissinger realized that 
conditions made any such separation impossible. Throughout, as was true with the rise of 
permanent sovereignty in the previous decade, ideas about economics affected politics.   
Without the possibility for immediate success in lowering prices, Kissinger chose 
a diplomatic path that emphasized a high-octane stand against price increases.  He 
impelled American diplomacy toward the front of an international policy current adapting 
the neoclassical ideas of academic economists into a new argument linking economic 
freedom to global stability. The current would continue to channel the agenda of the 
international economy away from multilateralism and toward the free market in 1975.  In 
that year, it would strike at the homeland of permanent sovereignty itself, the United 
Nations.972 
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Chapter 6:  The Limits of Permanent Sovereignty, 1974-1976 
Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some 
academic scribbler of a few years back. 
 
John Maynard Keynes, 1936973 
 
I see no reason to talk theory when we can in a practical way just screw up the 
negotiations. 
 
Gerald Ford, 1975974 
 
The president of Uganda and chairman of the Organization of African Unity, Al Hadji Idi 
Amin Dada, arrived on the floor of the General Assembly on October 1, 1975.  The 
former heavyweight boxing champion had been accompanied on his trip to New York by 
one of his wives, a nineteen-year-old ex-member of the Uganda Armed Forces’ infamous 
“Suicide Squad.” He wore a gold-embroidered green uniform, decorated with the insignia 
of the British Victoria Cross and other medals.975 
Amin acknowledged the assembly, paused, and began to speak.  “As a pure and 
proper son of Africa, who does not believe in any colonial and imperialist language, I 
shall address you in an African language,” he began.  His tongue was native, but his 
credentials were universal.  Amin spoke “for the people of Uganda...the Organization of 
African Unity...and all members of the third world.”  He then employed the anti-
neocolonial rhetoric so common in the United Nations. “Imperialism is being resolutely 
driven back, and the peoples of the industrialized countries are showing fresh interest in 
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the genuine development of the third world and in its fight for economic independence 
and construction,” he proclaimed. 
Like many apostles of permanent sovereignty in the aftermath of the oil price 
crisis, Amin chose to “dwell particularly on the economic problems [that] created 
bottlenecks in world development.”  The advocates of permanent sovereignty had 
mapped out their position, the New International Economic Order, at the Sixth Special 
Session of the General Assembly in March 1974.  For Amin, the New Order was a 
movement for the “restoration of full economic rights to the hitherto exploited, 
oppressed, and enslaved peoples of the Third World.”  Because it coincided with OPEC 
price control and the accession of the former Portuguese colonies in southern Africa to 
the United Nations, the declaration marked a turning point in the Third World struggle 
for independence.  The end of formal colonialism was but a single step in a longer 
journey.  “The world-wide war for self-determination and political independence is 
almost over now, but the struggle for self-reliance continues,” Amin said. “The present 
stage in this struggle is for economic independence.”  Without economic independence, 
“political freedom is meaningless.”976 
Amin’s stance was less sturdy than his speech implied.  Linguistically, he gave 
only brief introductory remarks in the Luganda language of his homeland.  The Ugandan 
ambassador delivered the rest of the speech in English.  Neither did Amin speak for a 
unified Third World.  Uganda was hardly a typical Third World country, if such a thing 
existed.  He was no typical leader, even if one could be found.977 In a French 
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documentary released the previous year, an idiosyncratic Amin had played accordion in a 
jazz band at a formal dinner and then discussed plans to attack Israel.978  On a deeper 
level, Third World unity concerning the 1974 New Order declaration was less stalwart 
than he suggested.  Nor was the policy of the industrialized countries moving along the 
lines of renewed interest that seemed self-evident to Amin. 
The near-universal use of the language of permanent sovereignty and economic 
development in the Third World was as striking as it was misleading.  The new American 
ambassador to the UN, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, paid little attention to Amin’s sermon 
on permanent sovereignty, economic independence, and the goals of nationhood.  Rather, 
the former Senator from New York condemned the Ugandan president as a tyrant.  
Moynihan discussed the “despotism” of Amin in detail and noted the “many thousands of 
killings and atrocities” committed in Uganda since he had seized power in 1971.979  A day 
later, Moynihan refused to refute a controversial New York Times description of Amin as 
a “racist murderer.”  The Organization of African Unity (OAU) expressed indignation 
about Moynihan's “discourteous attack.”   The statement was not only a personal affront 
to Amin, but also an “unfriendly act” toward the OAU itself.   Other ambassadors from 
the developing world also supported Amin’s speech and told reporters that he had 
“forcefully expressed a strong current of feeling of the Third World.”980 
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RAISING HELL IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
Amin was far from the only Third World leader Moynihan criticized in his short tenure as 
UN ambassador.981  The above interchange reflects the pervasive nature of the Third 
World critique of the international political economy.  It also epitomizes a new American 
strategy to blunt that critique, formed in early 1975.  The strategy followed the tracks set 
down in the 1974 debate over the recycling of petrodollars.  In public diplomacy, the 
Ford administration mounted a charm offensive and emphasized its conciliatory nature 
toward Third World economic demands.  Privately, the administration used its power to 
buoy the private capital market. Thus, even as the United States pushed the international 
political economy toward a free market agenda, policymakers continued to emphasize 
multilateralism.  If the private recycling of petrodollars could be couched in multilateral 
discourse, so too could economic relations with the developing world.   
The emphasis on the market in U.S. foreign policy was part of a broader 
intellectual shift in American economic thought.  A review of the intellectual and 
material contexts for what one development economist called “the conservative counter-
revolution” is necessary to understand American diplomacy toward the developing 
world.982   The dramatic increase in oil prices occurred concurrently with the deepest 
recession since the 1930s.  The three-decade wave of abundance following World War II 
had ended.  The death of the Bretton Woods system had forced policymakers to search 
for new strategies to assure U.S. power.   That the international economy had plunged 
into recession emboldened critics of postwar Keynesianism.  The greatest fears of Keynes 
and his followers, price inflation and unemployment, became real in the 1970s.  Policy 
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advisers and economists had no response.  At the same time, modernization theory had 
come under an even more thorough attack, tainted by accusations of neo-colonialism and 
American imperialism.983 
A new imaginative space in the field of economic development opened.  Just as 
the sheer size of petrodollar reserves challenged the capital market, proponents of 
permanent sovereignty continued to object to the structure of the international economy.  
Building on the insights of Prebisch and other in the 1960s, North American Marxist 
thinkers Paul Sweezy and Paul Baran had begun to develop what soon came to be known 
as “dependency theory.”   The new field repeated the terms of trade argument, but 
broadened its analysis to the longer historical patterns of capitalist exchanges between the 
industrial “center” and the Third World “peripheries.”  Sweezy and Baran offered a 
Leninist interpretation of the critique of “natural comparative advantage.”  They claimed 
that the industrial nation’s exploitative tendencies perpetually limited the possibility for 
economic growth in “the backward world,” causing greater and greater inequality.984  
Dependency theory became more influential in the early 1970s, when Andre Gunder 
Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein, and others further delineated and popularized the terms of 
trade theory with their discussions of “underdevelopment” in the “peripheral regions” of 
the “capitalist world-system.”985 
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The effective control of OPEC over the production and price of oil represented 
the culmination of a long process of decolonization and the end of Western political 
domination.  Since the early 1950s, a growing group of recently decolonized and other 
Third World nations had attempted to use their nominal political sovereignty to gain 
greater wealth.  They had almost always failed.  The permanent sovereignty of the oil 
producers finally rectified the situation.  According to the powerful egalitarian narrative, 
OPEC had reshuffled the imperialistic relationship between peripheral raw material 
suppliers and metropolitan consumers.986 
The idea of permanent sovereignty had only gained influence since the mid-
1960s, owing in great measure to the work of the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development.  In 1965, the undersecretary for economic and social affairs at the United 
Nations, Philippe de Seynes, wrote that “an economic doctrine for the developing 
countries is gradually evolving.”987  In the decade before the oil price crisis, Prebisch’s 
initial analysis found an increasingly sophisticated voice in Third World academic and 
policymaking circles.  Dependency theorists built upon Prebisch’s terms of trade 
discussion to forge a more thorough critique of the international economy.  Politicans and 
diplomats joined theorists in arguing that the skewed imperial structure of the economy 
not only held back the growth of peripheral income and production.  It also forced those 
nations into perpetual economic reliance on the metropolitan center. 
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The “dependencia” model stood in direct opposition to the free market thought 
that drove U.S. foreign policy, and was influential.  Even critics of dependency theory 
accepted many of its premises.  “[C]onventional analysis accepts that behind the veil of 
nominal political sovereignty, LDCs still lack much of the substance of real economic 
independence,” the political economist Benjamin Cohen wrote in 1971.  “[D]espite 
decolonization, relations with the advanced capitalist countries still spell dominance for 
the metropolitan center, dependence for the nations of the periphery.”988   Like Prebisch, 
dependency theorists rejected the classical economic theories of trade.  Like Prebisch 
(and Kissinger for that matter), these authors also worked with a unified conception of 
politics and economics.  The political-economy of the relations between rich and poor 
countries formed a single analytical framework.   
For these theorists, national independence and statehood did little to change the 
fact that economic growth was conditioned by dependence on the international political 
economy.  Elaborating on Prebisch’s terms-of-trade thesis, dependency theorists argued 
that dependency existed whenever the development and expansion of one economy was 
subjected to the development and expansion of another.  If the thesis in itself was 
unremarkable, it was meaningful for Third World nations because capital and manpower 
from the industrialized West played such a prominent role in their national economies.  A 
general feeling developed that the international political economy itself limited their 
sovereignty by constraining the decision-making capacities of national political 
authorities.989  One prominent economist, Stephen Hymer, even went so far as to call this 
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“The New Imperial System.”990  Although others did not go to such lengths, the notion of 
dependence was widely shared and held a powerful sway in many parts of the world.   
Dependency theorists built on Prebisch’s thesis of unequal trade by also holding 
that imperialism had bequeathed a skewed allocation of value for natural resources.  The 
low prices for natural resources forced less-developed countries to rely on rich capitalist 
ones not only for finished goods and services, but also for capital.  Furthermore, even 
though most LDCs had only a narrow range of exports to pay for their imports, the 
metropolitan governments of the international political economy used increasingly 
advanced policies to further entrench the bias in the periphery toward raw material 
production. The policies included “cascading” tariffs, import and export quotas, 
commodity purchase agreements, foreign aid, and investment incentives.991 
Any system of interdependence involves different degrees of dependence.992  For 
a growing group of academics and politicians, permanent sovereignty represented an 
economic basis of a truly post-colonial world, a way to change the biased global 
structure.  OPEC had presided over a triumph for the concept.  As oil producers led the 
way in pressing for greater control of resources in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
cartel gave substance to the UN resolutions on permanent sovereignty.  According to the 
advocates of permanent sovereignty, the oil-producers had converted the political, 
discursive, and legal shift in the United Nations into a broader realignment of global 
economic power.   
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The academic production of dependency theory coincided with the peaking of the 
political influence of permanent sovereignty in the international economy.  The 
magnitude of the oil price increases and the demands of the New International Economic 
Order transcended past Third World defiance.  The success of OPEC and the rise of 
permanent sovereignty as a guiding principle of economic development in the Third 
World led to greater demands for change in the international economy.   However, the 
advent of expensive oil also forced American policymakers to reassess development 
policy. Western economists who did not subscribe to modernization or dependency 
theory also contemplated new critical theories of development economics. The most 
important of these, free-market development, set strikingly different terms for the 
practice of permanent sovereignty. This brand of thought emphasized, above all, the 
economic and political virtues of free markets.993  
The energy crisis was a formative context for the acceptance and application of 
free market thought to diplomacy by American policymakers.  As they drew lessons from 
economic theory, including the sophisticated monetary analysis of Milton Friedman and 
others, economic ideas became downsized and politicized.994  The transition led to the 
wide-scale approval of neoliberal diplomacy, by which powerful sectors of the U.S. 
government began to apply the basic lessons of free market thought to foreign policy.995  
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The belief became prevalent and guided foreign policy in the highest echelons of the 
Departments of State and Treasury.  In taking a free market stance, the Ford 
administration placed its diplomacy within a vanguard movement in economic thought in 
the United States.996  Kissinger’s decision to make the free market the central economic 
component of foreign policy in 1974 was the crystallization of these concepts. American 
strategy became steeped in an “economistic view” of foreign policy, a conception that 
reduced complex relations to mechanistic terms of market behavior or non-market 
behavior.997  
Scholars such as Friedman and Michael Novak, as well as development 
economists like P. T. Bauer and policy commentators like Irving Kristol, championed the 
revival of market ideology in diplomacy.  Free market thought gave rise to a muscular 
anti-statist and pro-market diplomacy that would transform U.S. relations with the 
developing world.998 Free market thought worked in direct response to the challenge of 
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permanent sovereignty, which emphasized a different type of economistic view: one of 
state power versus foreign interests. In their dualistic visions, the two intellectual 
extremes touched.999   
Neoliberal diplomacy informed American foreign policy toward the United 
Nations.  The aggressive stance Moynihan took on human rights issues was more than an 
attempt to point out that the United States did not hold a monopoly on historical injustice 
or contemporary misconduct.  It also formed part of a larger American strategy to 
undermine the impregnable state power at the root of permanent sovereignty.  “It is time 
for the United States to go into the United Nations and every other international forum 
and start raising hell,” Moynihan wrote in the conservative magazine Commentary before 
his June 1975 appointment.  “Racist murderer” had been simply the most recent 
upbraiding of “new nations” he believed “were subordinating freedom and denying the 
rights of individuals.” Moynihan held that American officials should not “appease” the 
Third World, but display toughness in the face of anti-American hostility.  “Such a 
reversal of roles would be painful, but it could be liberating also,” Moynihan felt.1000 
Moynihan received widespread support for his diplomacy in the American media.  
William F. Buckley, Jr., described him in The New York Post as “the nearest thing to a 
jolt of pleasure we have taken since the formation of that Tower of Babel.”1001  Noting 
that Amin received much of his financial support from Muammar Gaddafi, William 
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Safire also celebrated Moynihan’s “new rhetoric” in his New York Times column.  By 
treating “other representatives from less developed nations as rational, intelligent human 
beings,” Moynihan represented a departure in American diplomacy. Before, the United 
States did nothing more than “smile indulgently as an assortment of imperialists, 
aggressors, racists, and murderers condemn the United States as the world's worst 
imperialist, aggressive, racist, and murderous state.”1002  The cartoonist Pat Oliphant 
approvingly depicted Moynihan as a buffed-up boxer dropping a horse-shoe into his 
glove. “What do you call a Six Foot Five angry Irishman?” one Third World leader asks 
another upon observing this scene. “Sir,” the other responds.1003 
Media support for Moynihan was part of a more general critique of the United 
Nations shared in American academia and in the U.S. government.  The Harvard political 
scientist and unofficial dean of U.S.-Third World relations, Rupert Emerson, wrote 
expressively about the “double-standard of human rights.” Noting the history of rights 
violations in “new” countries, he held that “[t]he standards for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms which have been set for the unfree countries should surely find no 
less observance in those which have already won freedom.”1004 The recently retired editor 
of The Saturday Review, Norman Cousins, questioned “whether the UN any longer serves 
a useful purpose.”  Hans Morgenthau believed it did not.  “The UN does not reflect the 
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world,” the professor at the New School and founding father of realism told Cousins. “It 
is a caricature; it distorts actual power relations.”1005 
American officials held a similar position.  Unlike scholars, journalists, and 
cartoonists, though, policymakers cited Third World militancy on economic issues as the 
paradigmatic example of the United Nations’ chronic impairment.  The State Department 
objected to the “steamroller tactics” of the developing countries in multilateral 
discussions, characterizing their advocacy of permanent sovereignty as immature and 
taken “without adequate consideration.”1006  Later, the Department lamented that the 
“legitimate function as a safety valve for emotion and frustration” of the General 
Assembly was too often “grossly overused to display fervor and solidarity.”1007   
American policymakers, journalists, and scholars believed the Ford administration 
needed a strategy to stem the political abuse heaped upon the United States in the 
deliberative bodies of the United Nations and in the Third World at large.  Scholars have 
noted many reasons for the rise of human rights as an international concern in the 
1970s.1008  Moynihan’s human rights stance, though, was a small part of a different 
policy.  His selection by Kissinger as UN ambassador in 1975 represented a new posture 
of vocal American opposition to Third World demands, primarily those with economic 
content.   
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The schism presented by the energy crisis remained a bone of contention in 
debates about international politics throughout the 1970s.  The American neoliberal 
strategy sought to bridge the gap between Third World demands for economic change 
and its own free market vision for the international economy.  Official human rights 
rhetoric often served as a smokescreen, a diversion designed to take international 
pressure off of American foreign economic policy.1009  American officials downplayed 
disagreements over the international economy and took a pragmatic stance of conciliation 
toward the New Order.  In doing so, the United States sought to change the public agenda 
of the United Nations. 
In the case of Idi Amin, Moynihan’s silence on economic issues was deafening 
and his emphasis on human rights part of a broader political-economic strategy. The 
conciliatory attitude the United States would begin to take toward permanent sovereignty 
was also pragmatic, a policy designed with the contrary purpose of retrenching free 
market thought and practice. 
OPEC AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 
American policy toward the United Nations was not a cynical ploy, but part of a multi-
layered strategy.  It was again Henry Kissinger and the State Department that decisively 
employed neoliberal diplomacy.   Ironically, the success of neoliberal diplomacy had 
much to do with the agenda set by permanent sovereignty.  To begin with, the Third 
World economic discourse had become inextricably tied up with the question of the “new 
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era” of expensive oil, a phrase invoked by Kissinger and many others during the 1973-
1974 price increases.1010   
The effect of higher oil prices figured prominently in development debates at the 
national and international levels.  The example of Cameroon is telling.  The discovery of 
oil in the Rio del Rey basin by the French company Elf would soon provide a financial 
windfall.  However, the OPEC price increases had increased the costs of the nation’s 
traditional earning sector, agriculture, to an unsustainable level.1011  The question of 
expensive oil also insinuated its way into the nation’s pan-African politics.  The prime 
minister of Cameroon, Nzo Ekangiki, resigned as Secretary-General of the OAU in 
December 1973 after controversy arose over his choice of Walter “Tiny” Rowland as the 
organization’s energy consultant.  Rowland directed the London Rhodesia Company and 
was intimately linked to South African and Portuguese designs to prop up the illegal 
white minority regime in Rhodesia.1012 
Internationally, a greater problem dwarfed the African leaders’ concern over the 
questionable selection of Rowland.  In the previous three months, OPEC had quadrupled 
the posted price of petroleum.  The price increase posed a grave threat to the development 
plans of African and other Third World countries.  The immediate effect on African 
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national economies was drastic.  In Southern Africa, reduced shipments from Pretoria 
caused fuel crises in Lesotho, Botswana, and Zambia.1013  In Ethiopia, high oil prices 
pushed fertilizer costs to an unsustainable level.1014  Other African nations, including 
Liberia and Amin’s Uganda, turned directly to Arab oil producers to fund development 
projects for which they no longer had cash or foreign aid.1015  Even the less poor African 
countries faced difficulties.   Zaire, for example, benefited from record-high copper 
prices but still incurred a $180 million deficit in 1974 owing to increased oil prices.  In 
Niger, where uranium deposits were expected to grow in value, high costs played a 
supporting role in the widespread discontent that led to the toppling of Hamani Diori in 
April 1974.1016 
The collective problem confronted by the African heads-of-state in their 
December 1973 meeting became much more than an intra-African debate about the 
troubling credentials of their energy consultant.  The experience of the African countries 
reflected a greater Third World reality: expensive oil caused their trade deficits to 
increase and their development plans to flounder.  While African experiences were 
unique in many ways, they were not distinct.   
Because of the small size of their national economies, oil formed a far larger 
percentage of the balance of payments for developing nations than it did for the Western 
industrial ones.  Developing nations from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia joined 
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the Africans on the “Hardest Hit” list circulated by the United States and other industrial 
nations after the price increases.1017  Raúl Prebisch’s old friend and replacement as the 
President of the Economic Commission of Latin America, Enrique Iglesias, explained the 
Latin American situation.  The energy crisis was “hitting the least-developed countries 
the hardest” because of their inability to gain access to “adequate funding in international 
money markets.”1018  Other countries had already pressed oil-rich Venezuela “to fulfill its 
duty” to what the foreign minister called his “less fortunate Latin neighbors.”1019 
The case in Asia was similar.  The Japanese Deputy Prime Minister, Takeo Miki, 
travelled to Saudi Arabia to meet with King Faisal in November 1973.   Rather than 
broaching the industrial ramifications of expensive oil for Japan, Miki emphasized 
humanitarian concerns.  The food production of developing Asian states, he explained, 
had become dependent on Japanese petrochemical fertilizers.  Without help paying for 
the oil used to make fertilizer, the states faced famine.1020 
The oil-related problems of the Third World also alarmed American 
policymakers.  Embassy reports and local news items rose quickly up the information 
chain and became a major concern at the highest level of government in early 1974.  
Kissinger dramatized the LDC problem that February.  If all donors ended every aid 
program, public and private, the impact on the non-OPEC Third World would have been 
“much less severe than the rise in prices that was agreed to in one afternoon by the oil-
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producing countries.”1021  Other observers agreed.  The “NoPECs,” as the non-oil 
developing countries were labeled in a thankfully short-lived neologism, faced short-term 
financial crisis and the ruin of long-term development plans.1022  “The increased price in 
oil poses the most difficult adjustment problem for the developing countries,” wrote a 
joint committee created by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to deal with 
the crisis.1023 
Third World leaders celebrated the success of OPEC in raising the price of oil, 
despite the profound effect on their economies.  In a February 1974 speech delivered in 
front of Kissinger, Mexican president Luis Echeverría criticized American “restrictions 
of the exercise of sovereignty over natural resources” as part of an “economic and 
geopolitical design for hemispheric domination” by the United States.1024  According to 
another Latin American group, the oil crisis confirmed “the vulnerability of the powerful 
and the strengthened position of the weak.”1025  The military head-of-state of Ghana, 
Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, criticized the attempts of “certain unnamed industrial 
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countries to impose their will on developing countries in the aftermath of the energy 
crisis.”1026   
Third World support for OPEC followed the doctrinal lines of permanent 
sovereignty.  Kissinger expressed frustration at the Third World stance.  “If you had 
abolished the [World Bank] and rolled prices back to September levels, the LDCs would 
be better off than they are today,” he told the German Secretary of State, Egon Bahr.  
“The Arabs have done that and yet these greater consequences seem to be hardly noticed 
by the LDCs.”1027  Denis Healey agreed.  “None of the LDCs...view that oil prices are too 
high,” the British Chancellor of the Exchequer told his counterparts. “They see the 
situation as a legitimate exploitation of market power.”1028   
In the previous half-decade, Arab and non-Arab OPEC members employed the 
egalitarian rhetoric of permanent sovereignty in their quest for production and price 
control.  As consistently, they used broad support in the United Nations as a stamp of 
legitimacy. Whenever an impasse arose in their negotiations with the multinational oil 
companies, OPEC members jointly threatened national legislation to enact their demands.  
The threat to employ permanent sovereignty undercut the companies’ counter-argument 
that they held a “legally acquired right” to exploit national resources, even if the right had 
been attained as part of a colonial or otherwise unequal relationship. 
OPEC had both employed and validated the discourse of permanent sovereignty.  
Within the organization, members disagreed on a number of topics, especially regarding 
the Cold War and the use of oil in the Arab-Israeli conflict.  However, the OPEC nations 
put their political differences aside to pursue the primary goal of permanent sovereignty.  
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The United States’ principal oil-producing allies in the Cold War, Saudi Arabia and Iran, 
worked closely with Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath and Muammar Gaddafi’s Libyan 
Revolutionary Command Councils to increase the OPEC nation’s control over their 
oil.1029  By 1973, the distance between what were once known as the “oil radicals” and the 
“oil conservatives” had vanished.   
The increased presence of permanent sovereignty on the international stage was 
causally linked to OPEC’s control of prices in the minds of Third World leaders.  Third 
World economic demands did not gain attention in 1974 because of the originality of 
their ideas.  Rather, as one UN official noted, the ideas were “highlighted at a time when, 
following the OPEC example, the developing countries were perceived to be acquiring 
new bargaining strength, adequate to force decisions capable of making at least some 
dents on the existing world economic order.”1030 
OPEC members depicted themselves as a vanguard of permanent sovereignty, a 
model other commodity producers could follow. Algerian President Houari Boumediène 
told Le Monde in February 1974 that the American attempt “to establish a protectorate” 
over the post-crisis petroleum order necessitated a coherent Third World response.1031 A 
day later, Boumediène invoked UN procedure and called for a Special Session of the 
General Assembly on the topic of “Raw Materials and Development.”  Boumediène 
argued, as had a host of LDC leaders before him, that permanent sovereignty was an end 
goal of decolonization.  In his request, Boumediène emphasized the “new equilibrium 
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between developed and developing states” and the possibility for “non-aligned 
[countries] to assert greater control over their natural resources.”1032  The market power 
of the large industrialized consumers had too long kept down raw material producers. 
Cartel action for a variety of natural resources was needed to revalorize earnings.1033   
When Boumediène and other OPEC ministers touted their own sovereignty as an 
inspirational example for the Third World producers of other commodities, it was not 
surprising that they had such widespread support.  Third World leaders genuinely hoped 
that OPEC stood at the cusp of a new movement to convert the political independence of 
decolonization into economic power.  Boumediène opened the Sixth Special Session of 
the General Assembly with a “militant address,” calling on developing countries to “take 
government action to raise the world market prices of their exports.” The Algerian 
delegation rallied the majority of nations to their leader’s call for a New International 
Economic Order.  The New International Economic Order, the U.S. delegation reported, 
“confronted the developed world with...new rules for international economic relations 
which would respond to virtually all developing country demands expressed over the past 
two decades.”1034 
A confrontational tone emerged.  It appeared as if the OPEC producers would be 
successful in defending their actions as “merely overthrowing the artificially low prices 
impose on them.” The representatives of developing nations, the U.S. ambassador 
reported, “universally condemned the current structure of economic relations.”  When 
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invited to address the UN delegates on April 15, Kissinger took umbrage with the New 
Order, emphasizing his opposition to cartels and unilateralism. The intervention meant 
little in practical terms.  At the end of the Special Session, the General Assembly 
published a Program of Action. The primary goal of the New International Economic 
Order was phrased unmistakably in the language of permanent sovereignty: “to correct 
the inequalities and redress the existing injustices” of the international political economy, 
qualified as “the remaining vestige of alien and colonial domination.”1035 
Two weeks after his speech, Kissinger was the guest of Boumediène at the 
People’s Palace in Algiers.  Boumediène began their dinner by telling Kissinger that his 
economic ideas were “outdated.”  He then frankly asked why Kissinger continued to harp 
on high oil prices, when it was clear that expensive oil would remain a permanent 
characteristic of the international economy.  Kissinger responded sharply by equating 
American policy on oil prices to that of “Brezhnev on world revolution.”  The analogy 
Kissinger chose is telling.  His stand on oil prices was ideologically entrenched and he 
could not waver, just as Brezhnev could not.  Kissinger realized the U.S. could do little to 
lower oil prices in the short term, he said to Boumediène.  Nevertheless, he would never 
agree with the “demagoguery” of the United Nations or “the idea of cartels.”1036 
PREBISCH’S FAILURE 
The challenge of permanent sovereignty had always been an existential one for liberal 
capitalism and the corporatist framework of the postwar era. The terms of trade thesis, 
and its neocolonialist and dependency outgrowths, questioned the basic dogma of 
comparative advantage.  In doing so, it cast doubt on sharp lines drawn between politics 
and economics. However, permanent sovereignty had rarely been taken seriously by the 
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United States and the other industrialized countries.  Now, the oil power of OPEC and the 
call for a New International Economic Order in the United Nations stood squarely and 
vocally against the free market ideology that was becoming so central to American 
diplomacy.  
The American delegation to the United Nations could not swallow what it called 
the “heavily biased presentation” in the United Nations.  The delegation objected most 
strongly to what it called the “heart” of the resolution: articles allowing for 
nationalization, calling for “just and equitable relationships” between raw material export 
prices and import costs, and urging the creation of more raw material cartels.1037  “The 
global rich country-poor country dialogue is in bad shape, as evidenced by the outcome 
of the UN Special Session,” Winston Lord told Kissinger.1038 
Potentially, the global dialogue had real economic consequences.  Other attempts 
to practice permanent sovereignty had been written off as unsuccessful.  Now they 
seemed more likely to proceed.  “We have to face the fact that the OPEC syndrome is 
catching on. There are already phosphate-pecs, bauxite-pecs, banana-pecs and others,” a 
worried Harold Wilson told President Ford.1039 A March 1974 interagency study in the 
U.S. government reported the “more general concern that we may be passing from an era 
of abundant supplies into one of constant shortage.”1040  A poll of U.S. Treasury analysts 
noted the prevalent belief that “the 1972-1974 period might mark the dawn of a new era 
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for which past commodity policy was not longer suited.”1041 These positions reflected a 
broader societal critique of resource management in the United States, shared by interest 
groups such as the Club of Rome and the budding environmental movement.1042 
The Ford administration took the challenge of permanent sovereignty seriously.  
In December 1973 and January 1974 staff meetings, Kissinger requested studies from 
both the State Department and the NSC on “the use of raw materials as a weapon against 
the West.”1043  After conducting its research, the State Department responded that “cartel-
like action from minerals producers” was not “a general problem.”1044  In a more detailed 
report, the NSC responded that the probability of cartelized “price gouging” was highly 
unlikely in materials other than oil.  Indeed, the largest recent efforts at non-oil 
permanent sovereignty had ended badly.1045 
As the “South” of the increasingly invoked “North-South divide” came to terms 
with the promise and perils of permanent sovereignty, the United States used the issue of 
high oil prices to encourage a split between OPEC and the non-oil Third World. At a 
November 1975 summit meeting in Rambouillet, France, industrial nations agreed that it 
was necessary to break what Germany’s chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, called “the unholy 
alliance between OPEC and the Third World.”1046  Kissinger, who later repeated the 
                                                 
1041 U.S. Treasury, “Summary of Report to Economic Policy Board on Commodity Policy for Non-Fuel 
Minerals,” n.d. (April 1975), U.S. Council of Economic Advisers records, GFL, Alan Greenspan Files, Box 
58. 
1042 Tom Robertson, “‘This is the American Earth’: The American Empire, the Cold War, and American 
Environmentalism,” Diplomatic History 32: 4 (2008), 561-584. 
1043 NSSM 197, “Critical Imported Materials,” March 4, 1974, FRUS, 1969-1976, XXXI, 255n2; Decision 
Memorandum, “The Secretary’s Regional Staff Meeting,” March 9, 1975, DNSA, KT. 
1044 Lord to Kissinger, “Critically Imported Materials,” March 22, 1974, NARA, RG 59, Lord Files, 345. 
1045 Recent failed applications included Jamaican and Moroccan attempts to raise the prices of bauxite and 
phosphate, a series of copper price agreements between Chile and Zambia, and Prebisch’s attempt to 
organize cocoa producers.  See Winston Lord, “Critical Imported Materials: NSSM/CIEPSM Study,” July 
11, 1974, NARA, RG 59, Lord Files, 345.  See also the interesting file on copper in the White House 
Central Files of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library. 
1046Memorandum of Conversation, November 16, 1975, GFL, Seidman Papers, 312. 
 334 
phrase, never doubted the goal. “The LDCs are weak reeds,” he told his staff when 
planning for the Sixth Special Session.  The State Department worked to weaken the 
reeds still further after the Special Session.  Policy toward the UN complemented that 
toward the IMF, forming part of a coherent strategy to use the problem of oil-related debt 
as a political lever.  The State Department began to form policies to help developing 
countries cope with their massive trade deficits.  These policies applied especially the 
“hardest-hit,” a fluctuating group composed by India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Chile, 
Jamaica, and “many smaller African countries”1047 
The Ford administration retooled the same basic tactics employed with the 
International Monetary Fund.  The first evidence of neoliberal diplomacy toward the 
United Nations dealt directly with the now 74-year-old Raúl Prebisch.  The General 
Assembly approved a series of emergency measures as part of the New International 
Economic Order, including the creation of an Emergency Relief Fund.  Like the 
Witteveen facility, the Emergency Relief Fund was designed to mitigate the difficulties 
confronting the nations most seriously affected by “the global economic crisis.”1048   
The Secretary General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, called Prebisch out 
of retirement to manage the fund. Now an iconic figure in the field of development 
economics, Prebisch endeavored with what his biographer has called a “youthful energy” 
to solicit funds for the UN emergency fund. On May 24, 1974, he described his itinerary 
to Enrique Iglesias: “The adventure has begun! Tomorrow I leave for a trip starting with 
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the European Community and continuing on to Algeria, Rome, Libya, Kuwait, Abu 
Dhabi, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.”1049 
The State Department opposed the Prebisch mission.  During the Sixth Special 
Session, the U.S. delegation voted against the Emergency Relief Fund on the grounds that 
such a “complex and highly technical matter” should be left to the International Monetary 
Fund.1050 As soon as the session ended, the State Department argued against it in internal 
memos.  The General Assembly had “properly identified [the] major task of relief for the 
poor countries hardest hit by oil,” analysts told Kissinger.  But the delegates had 
incorrectly passed the task “to a UN forum which neither the industrial countries nor the 
oil producers have shown a strong inclination to support.”1051 Writing with greater 
urgency a month later, Winston Lord and an NSC economist, Thomas Enders, told the 
Secretary that it was “politically necessary” for the United States to direct financial 
initiatives “to an international coordination point other than the UN’s Ad Hoc Committee 
on a Special Fund.”   The Emergency Fund was “unwieldy and loaded against us.”1052 
American policy toward the UN began to mimic the tactics taken toward the 
International Monetary Fund.  In a hook-and-ladder moment, the U.S. used a combination 
of conciliatory, multilateral language and alternative proposals to supplant the 
“international coordination point.”  Kissinger called for a Development Security Fund, 
which would use a mix of aid and private capital.  Described as a compromise, the 
proposal was actually designed to replace the Emergency Relief Fund.1053 Prebisch, on the 
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other hand, believed the UN fund should continue on a permanent basis.  As of 
September 1975, he had gathered between $5 billion.  He reported to Waldheim that the 
aid would not meet the financing gap expected for the developing countries in 1974 and 
1975.  For Prebisch, the proportion of multilateral contributions was “very small” 
compared to the problem of oil-related deficits.1054 
Prebisch himself noted the link between U.S. policy toward the United Nations 
and the International Monetary Fund.  “Unfortunately, the figure proposed by Dr. 
Witteveen was cut by the U.S. delegation,” he wrote Kurt Waldheim in January 1975.   
The fact that the new Witteveen facility would not be enough to meet the deficits of the 
developing countries in 1975 raised an “important problem” for Prebisch: “There will be 
a vacuum that has to be filled in one way or another,” he concluded, “to avoid a very 
difficult situation for the hardest hit developing countries.”1055 
NEOLIBERAL DIPLOMACY 
That vacuum would be filled mostly by private banks.  In contrast with the privileged 
position of international institutions in the Bretton Woods era, in 1974 and 1975 private 
capital markets gained prominence.  Proposals by the Ford administration in the UN, not 
to mention diplomacy toward the International Monetary Fund, served as a corridor into 
the capital market for developing nations.  Conciliatory rhetoric helped construct the 
corridor and lead the Third World into it.1056  
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As with the question of petrodollar recycling, Third World debt provided the State 
Department with different options.  The surge of international liquidity provided by 
OPEC, scholars of the international finance have shown, dovetailed neatly with the 
lending plans promoted by the United States’ largest banks.1057  American banks, onshore 
and off, would play the central role in recycling petrodollars.  Bankers accepted the oil 
exporters’ deposits and lent them to countries that were short on capital.  The infusion of 
capital into the private market relieved financial executives of previous funding 
worries.1058  According Denis Healey, “the bankers...were licking their lips at the thought 
of what they would get out of it.”1059   
At the same time, notwithstanding declarations of Third World unity, OPEC 
preferred to keep its money in the First World.1060  The concentration of a significant 
share of the world’s liquid capital in petrodollars, channeled through a small number of 
American and European banks, in turn fueled a highly liquid international market.  Much 
of the liquidity was used for interbank loans, leading to a growing dependence on 
volatile, short-term deposits.  Volatility led banks to apply variable interest rates.  
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Changing interest rates allowed banks to shift the cost of funds to their borrowers.  Many 
of these borrowers, they hoped, would be the sovereign states of the Third World.1061 
Henry Kissinger convened a top-level State Department meeting to discuss the 
international economy in February 1975.  Flush from the victory over the Witteveen 
facility a month earlier, Kissinger’s economic adviser, Tom Enders, delineated the 
relationship between economics and politics in U.S. policy toward the Third World.  
Conciliation in the political realm and resoluteness in the economic worked hand-in-
hand. “The main point is political; breaking up the bloc of 77,” he told Kissinger.  
Economic diplomacy provided the key to this political goal: “A new commodity 
framework” would “take preemptive action politically” and have “substantive economic 
interest.”  American strategy could thus balance “anti-cartel provisions” with more 
palatable concessions to the Third World.  Conciliation included putting “money on the 
table” through “provisions relating to access to markets and access to financing.”  
American policy would shield economic rigidity with political compromise and the carrot 
of investment incentives.  Enders hoped U.S. policy could limit “UNCTAD, the 
Algerians, and others’” ability “to exploit this as a North-South issue.”1062 
Kissinger followed Enders’ broad suggestions, much to the dismay of William 
Simon.  The Treasury Secretary argued vehemently that the emphasis on compromise in 
U.S.-Third World diplomacy sent the wrong message. “To imply that the ‘system’ is the 
problem can only serve to provide grist for the political mills of those political 
leaders...who choose to excuse their own policy failures by blaming them on forces 
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beyond their control,” he wrote Kissinger.1063  Simon saw the move toward conciliatory 
language as an ideological betrayal.  He wrote to President Ford that the strategy placed 
the United States “in danger of compromising our basic commitment to the free 
enterprise system.”1064   
Simon lost the battle.  In July 1975, he offered to assign a Treasury officer to 
Moynihan's UN delegation, an offer the State Department declined by stating simply that 
“the continuing battles on U.S. international economic and financial policy should be 
fought and resolved in Washington.”1065  The attempt by Simon to block Kissinger’s UN 
diplomacy points toward longer turf war between Treasury and State in making foreign 
economic policy. The problem of Third World debt was a natural location for such a 
battle. Before being replaced by Simon, George Shultz argued that the Treasury should 
take the lead in rescheduling the oil-related debt of developing nations. The Treasury 
proposal posed “serious problems for the conduct of foreign policy,” Winston Lord wrote 
to Kissinger at the time. Further increases in the price of oil would prevent many more 
countries from meeting their debt obligations.  Getting “the right mix” of Western aid, 
capital loans, and oil-producer contributions was “at the heart of our foreign policy 
approach to the energy problem as it affects LDCs.” The Treasury proposal denied the 
U.S. government “the flexibility to handle future debt relief on the basis of any 
considerations other than financial.”1066 
Kissinger defended the right of the State Department to set the tone of economic 
diplomacy, a fact evident in the United States’ conciliatory stance toward the next Special 
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Session of the UN General Assembly, held in November 1975.  Still, in the end “the right 
mix” of public and private capital was close to Simon’s free-market objectives.  Kissinger 
explained to Ford, “My role is to project an image of the U.S. which is progressive.” 
Despite the fact that he agreed on substance with Simon, the United States could not take 
such a strident ideological line.  Rather than attempt “to vindicate a system which no one 
will support,” Kissinger hoped that he could “fuzz it up” and make economic gains with 
little or no political sacrifice.  “I don’t want to accept a New Economic Order,” he told 
the president, “but I don’t want to confront Boumediène.”  Ford agreed, telling Kissinger, 
“I see no reason to talk theory when we can in a practical way just screw up the 
negotiations.”1067 
Later the same day, Kissinger again explained the goals of conciliation to Simon.  
He repeated that he was not betraying his free market breakthrough of the previous year, 
but protecting it:  
 
Given the fact of Marxist domination in the thinking of LDCs, it is suicide 
to defend the existing system.  We would be like the Austrians in the 19th 
century.  We have to avoid an international dispute where Americans say 
the existing system is great and the LDCs call for a new economic order.  
This is a losing wicket.  Nobody will support us.”1068   
 
Ford supported Kissinger in a Cabinet meeting the next day.  “I strongly believe in the 
free enterprise system,” he told a simmering Simon.  The problem could be solved best 
“through a papering over of wording differences.”  Specifically, it would not pay off for 
the United States to take a “theological” stance against the “general philosophy” of the 
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New International Economic Order.  The President believed that the U.S. delegation 
could “control the situation better by seeming conciliatory and cooperative.”1069 
Simon disagreed, asking Ford, “If we don’t defend the free market...who will?” 
The Chair of the Federal Reserve, Arthur Burns, agreed with Simon.  “It appears...that we 
are going to acquiesce in manipulation or market control arrangements,” he lamented to 
the rest of the Cabinet members.  Kissinger responded to the two economists, explaining 
again that the move toward conciliation was tactical, not substantive.  “Obviously we 
can’t accept the new economic order,” he said.  “But, I would like to pull its teeth.”  The 
U.S. goal was to “divide these countries up, not solidify them.”  Like Ford, Kissinger 
used spiritual terms to object to a rigorous free-market discourse.  “We can’t do this on a 
theological basis,” he repeated.     
Ford made the final decision, telling Simon, “We need not go around reiterating 
the virtues of the private enterprise system.”  Although Simon continued to disagree, the 
president was firm.  He told the frustrated ideologue, “We can then defend free enterprise 
best in this way.” At the end of the meeting, Kissinger again reassured Simon, reminding 
him that they shared the broadest objectives.  “We can use the ambiguities to accomplish 
our objectives,” Kissinger said.  He then added pointedly, “It is better to have the Finance 
Ministers be bastards.”1070 
Although Simon did not mention it, part of the 1975 policy followed up on his 
broader analysis of the unnatural nature of expensive oil.  In a March 1974 interagency 
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paper, Treasury and State analysts linked the relationship between OPEC and the Third 
World to higher oil prices.  “To the extent that international institutions or industrialized 
countries mitigate the oil-induced balance of payments difficulties of LDCs, the case for 
a price rollback is weakened,” they wrote, reflecting the argument Simon made regarding 
the Witteveen facilities in the International Monetary Fund.  “[I] if we do nothing, the full 
effects of the financial hardships on LDCs will be manifested in a strong expression of 
world public opinion aimed at a price rollback.”1071 
Thus, Kissinger subtly changed the neoliberal diplomacy of late 1973 and 1974 in 
his policy toward the Seventh Special Session in 1975.  In 1974, he used economic 
philosophy as an overarching vision of U.S. foreign policy.  Now he took the opposite 
stance.   “If we make these ideological issues, they will be insoluble with the LDC’s,” he 
explained to one Treasury official.  “They will not be insoluble if they can be reduced to 
technical issues.”  The statement was the exact inverse of his 1973 conversation with 
Shultz, in which he lamented that economic policy was too often arrived at on purely 
technical grounds.1072   
Kissinger told Brent Scowcroft, “On the world economic scene, I think we 
shouldn’t push so hard on the philosophic ‘free market’ push.  We should deal 
pragmatically.”1073  His economic turn nonetheless remained a central driving force in his 
diplomacy.  “Foreign policy,” he told the Treasury official, in a phrase that would be 
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much-repeated in the following decades, “is fueled by economic issues.”  A 
preponderance of evidence suggests that Kissinger saw conciliation with the New Order 
as a tactic, and agreed with Simon and Ford on the larger question of the free market.  
Furthermore, the United States’ new emphasis on human rights was linked to the 
concerns about the market.  “On the broader North/South question,” Kissinger told Simon 
in May 1975, “I want to split them....That is why we have Moynihan going up there to 
take them on.”1074   
The Simon-Kissinger debate suggests that a deep-rooted agreement existed below 
their superficial quarrel over tactics.  Kissinger discussed the strategy with Moynihan in 
June 1975, in preparation for the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly. “I 
don’t want to take an ideological stance and simply argue the virtues of the market 
economy,” he told the new ambassador, now two weeks from taking up the post.  “Our 
basic strategy must be to hold the industrialized powers behind us and to split the Third 
World.”  By focusing attention on practical measures, Kissinger continued, “Bloc 
formation in the Third World can be inhibited.”1075 
Kissinger met with his staff several times to discuss the Seventh Special Session 
of the United Nations.  He also received regular updates from a new joint National 
Security Council and Economic Policy Board (EPB) task force on commodities, assigned 
to iron out policy differences between the Departments of Treasury and State.  The task 
force advised Moynihan’s team to take a “flexible approach.”  Flexible, it turned out, was 
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a relative term.  The U.S. would continue to oppose the more outright forms of permanent 
sovereignty, including “indexation, generalized multi-commodity agreements, and 
specific commodity agreements that attempt to maintain prices above long-term market 
levels.”1076 
The Seventh Special Session began in November 1975. American policy was to 
separate what one official called “the middle class” developing countries from “the 
international basket cases.”  Moynihan and his delegation emphasized “the 
incompatibility of interests” between the “resource rich” and the “resource poor.”1077  
Addressing the Seventh Special Session, Moynihan questioned the legitimacy of the New 
International Economic Order.  But, he also promised that the United States would 
restructure world economic relations to improve Third World access to Western markets.  
Moreover, Kissinger had instructed Moynihan to accede to consumer-producer forums 
for each major commodity.  Finally, the American delegation called for the creation of a 
series of new banks with softer lending criteria.  The banks, including an International 
Resource Bank, would assist the developing countries’ ability to exploit their own 
resources.1078 
If aspects of permanent sovereignty had become broadly accepted, free market 
thought remained powerful in the American conceptions of the pragmatic results Ford 
and Kissinger sought.  The goal of the policy of conciliation was to incorporate 
                                                 
1076 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XXXI: Foreign Economic Policy, 1973-1976, 295. Editorial Note. 
1077 Ferguson to Moynihan, “U.S. Policy Re: 7th Special Session,” July 11, 1975, The Papers of Daniel P. 
Moynihan, I: 335, LOC. 
1078Branislav Gosovic and John Gerard Ruggie, “On the Creation of a New International Economic Order: 
Issue Linkage and the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly,” International Organization 
30 (Spring 1976), 309-345. 
 345 
permanent sovereignty into the fold of neoliberal diplomacy.  The best example of this is 
the denouement of the proposals for new regional banks and the International Resource 
Bank.  On the technical side, American policy continued along the lines suggested in the 
first Kissinger-Shultz-Simon discussions in late 1973.  The U.S. would promote what the 
State Department called “semi-commercial banks” to provide finance for countries that 
were threatened with being “crowded out of international capital markets.”1079  Treasury 
recommendations expressed the objective of the banks most clearly.  “We should 
encourage the use of financial incentives to increase the number of producers,” a 
Treasury working group on commodities recommended.  Economically and politically, 
the equation was remarkably simple: “More producers mean less [sic] cartels and less 
effective cartels.”1080 
The proposal for the International Resource Bank envisioned several other steps 
to curtail the political effectiveness of the New International Economic Order.  Pushing 
against one of the planks of permanent sovereignty, the United States urged the Third 
World to accept an international agreement to protect private investment.  Safeguarding 
the investments of multinational corporations became a central aspect of neoliberal 
diplomacy.1081 The U.S. government also continued to promote mixed, private-public 
capital as a corridor to the free market.  In August 1975, Kissinger requested Ford’s 
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approval for a $200 million replenishment of the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, and a $450 million one for the International Finance Corporation.  The 
additional funds would enable the World Bank “to increase its involvement in the 
development of mineral sources.”  The money would “complement private investment” 
and allow the World Bank to establish an investment trust that would “expand the access 
of...the middle-level developing countries to international capital.”1082 
The State Department hoped the initiatives would blunt the egalitarian criticism of 
the New International Economic Order.  Moynihan believed they did, advising the 
General Assembly that the United States had shown “that it could negotiate in good faith, 
and doing so, reach genuine accord.”  Waldheim fought back in the closing address of the 
Seventh Special Sessions, pointedly telling Moynihan and the other delegates that the 
New International Economic Order was “about change, not about a smoother 
management of the status quo.”1083    
By then it was evident to most observers that the policy of conciliation had paid 
direct dividends.  Kissinger’s replacement as National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, 
reported the success of the UN strategy to Ford.  The new Conference on International 
Economic Cooperation, an outgrowth of the Seventh Special Session, had been attended 
by the finance and economic ministers of 8 industrialized countries, 8 OPEC members, 
and 11 developing countries.  Solid groundwork for a “constructive North-South 
dialogue” had been established on the basis of American objectives, Scowcroft wrote.  
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Public diplomacy, “our intention to be conciliatory,” had paved the way future initiatives 
emphasizing the private market.  Diplomacy had weakened the “unnatural” alliance 
between OPEC and the other LDCs “by highlighting the adverse impact of the oil price 
increase and demonstrating our sympathy for the problems this has caused.”1084 
The success of American strategy was as evident to Third World leaders as it was 
to Scowcroft.  In a meeting of Latin American energy ministers, one stated that “Each 
nation has the right to the sovereign use of its natural resource.”  Permanent sovereignty, 
though, was not as clear cut in the hands of the OPEC nations.  “[T]he right of individual 
livelihood imposes the obligation toward collective survival,” he continued.1085  The 1975 
Lomé convention, an agreement signed between the European Community and 71 Third 
World nations, pointed toward the new trend.  The agreement provided formerly 
colonized nations with duty-free access to key European commodity markets.  The 
breakthrough was hailed by its supporters as an “innovative and groundbreaking move 
toward more equitable trade and aid relations.”1086  
The most influential Third World voices understood the accords differently.  For 
Enrique Iglesisas, the Lomé Convention signaled “the death of the Prebisch-inspired UN 
Conference on Trade and Development scheme.” Developing countries’ interests had 
been moved from under the United Nations “‘bloc’ umbrella.” The convention reinforced 
                                                 
1084 Scowcroft to Ford, “Report on the Conference on International Economic Cooperation,” December 
1975, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XXXI: Foreign Economic Policy, 1973-1976, 300. 
1085AmEmbassy Buenos Aires to SecState, “4th Meeting of Latin American Ministers of Energy,” August 
21, 1974, ET, CFP 73-76, RG 59, USNA. 
1086Isebill V. Gruhn, “The Lomé Convention: Inching Toward Interdependence,” International 
Organization 30 (Spring 1976): 240; John Ravenhill, “What Is to Be Done for the Third World Commodity 
Exporters? An Evaluation of the STABEX Scheme,” International Organization 38 (Summer 1984): 537–
574. 
 348 
the economic positions of the developed and developing world, Iglesias lamented.  It was 
“a significant relapse in the sense that it is a straightforward and open neo-colonialist 
arrangement.”1087   
American policymakers felt confident that most developing countries would 
accommodate U.S. policy.  The promise of technology and investment capital, no matter 
the terms, was too enticing.  After the initial proposal at the Seventh Special Session, the 
State Department and the Treasury continued to work together to develop a specific plan 
for the International Resource Bank.  Free market thought drove the discussion.  
Ultimately, the bank sought to “mobilize and encourage” the flow of private and public 
capital into resource development projects.  Again, following Simon’s long-standing 
emphasis on private capital, public finance served the purpose of reinforcing the private 
financial sector.  “The primary function of the International Resource Bank,” the State 
Department wrote, “will be to facilitate the financing of resource investment projects.”  
The bank would also “exert a moderating influence on host country disputes with private 
companies.”  The relegation of permanent sovereignty in the international economy, in 
turn, would secure “the essential raw materials to sustain global prosperity.”1088 
American officials sought to bring precision to the proposal for an International 
Resource Bank in the following months.  The pre-eminence of private capital became 
even clearer during the process.  The U.S. mission to the OECD emphasized that the bank 
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would have a “broad mandate” in the developing countries, especially “where there is a 
need to facilitate investment.”  Specifically, the resource bank would use a new financial 
instrument, commodity bonds, to provide extra capital to potential raw material 
producers.  In return for commodity bonds, the producing countries would guarantee their 
contracts with private companies.1089  The specter of OPEC’s permanent sovereignty was 
never far off in crafting this proposal.  One State Department official explained in the 
UN, “The I[nternational] R[esource] B[ank] would not operate as a traditional bank in the 
sense of making loans to resource projects from general funds.”  Rather, it would connect 
private investors to host governments and “guarantee the performance commitments 
made by all participants in the contract.”1090 
Simon wrote to World Bank President Robert McNamara in October 1976 to 
suggest that the World Bank begin studying the proposal for the establishment of the 
International Resources Bank.1091  The World Bank prepared a scathing critique, but it 
agreed to take on the role of providing “insurance” loans in the fields of energy and raw 
material exploration and production.1092  The U.S. Mission to International Organizations 
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in Geneva reported that U.S. policy had successfully “generated severe strains within the 
G-77 and fracture lines in the Non-Aligned Movement.”1093 
NON-PERFORMANCE FOR POLITICAL REASONS 
Moynihan laid out his philosophy for the Seventh Special Session in private letter to 
William F. Buckley, the conservative editor and television host.  “You will pardon my 
conviction that we had showed that we were willing to work with them, but not about to 
be bullied,” he wrote.1094  The public strategy toward the UN, emphasizing a superficial 
conciliation with the New International Economic Order, diverged from the initial 
response to the 1973 price increases.   
If public diplomacy changed, the objectives behind foreign policy did not.  The 
International Resources Bank was a necessary instrument because permanent sovereignty 
had “distorted” the “pattern of foreign, primarily private, resource investment,” the U.S. 
delegation to the OECD explained.  The “deterioration” in the investment climate needed 
a remedy.  By granting assurances against permanent sovereignty—rephrased as “non-
performance for political reasons”—U.S. policy hoped that commodity bonds of the 
International Resource Bank would minimize the obstacles to “the most rational” 
international distribution of capital investment.1095   
The United States continued to use its power in international affairs to control 
various multilateral decision-making processes, especially those central to setting the 
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agenda for the international political economy.  As with the International Monetary Fund, 
U.S. policy toward the New International Economic Order, the UN Emergency Fund, and 
the Seventh Special Session worked to pull global economic processes toward the free 
market.   
Prebisch noted the success of neoliberal diplomacy and the failure of his own.  He 
wrote to Waldheim, “The heavy borrowing of all types has added markedly to the 
indebtedness of these countries.”1096  The International Monetary Fund reported that the 
total international bank claims on nonbanks rose from $61 billion at the end of 1970 to 
$326 billion in December 1976.1097  The “over-optimistic” evaluation of the Third World 
position by raw material producers, based less in economic reality than in the egalitarian 
ideology of permanent sovereignty and the New International Economic Order, increased 
the demand for development loans.  American proposals pushed the Third World nations 
toward private capital.  Development funding increasingly took the form of private loans.  
International Monetary Fund analysts predicted that the poor countries’ exposure to 
commercial credit would have drastic negative effects on their development and on the 
international monetary system, including large-scale defaults and currency instability.1098 
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Conclusion: The Irony of Permanent Sovereignty 
Trends are not laws. 
     Karl Popper, 19571099 
Attempts to imagine a better future have remained simplistic and schematic. 
     Albert O. Hirschman, 19821100 
 
The application of permanent sovereignty had been profitable and complete for the OPEC 
nations.  “In view of the radically changed circumstances since the establishment of 
OPEC in 1960,” the oil ministers formulated a new long-term strategy.  A “group of 
experts” met nine times over two years and commissioned a number of outside studies.  
In his introduction to the final committee report, Ahmed Zaki Yamani noted that OPEC 
had “more than achieved its initial objectives.”  The oil producing nations “had come to 
take full control over all aspects of their oil industries, including the key decisions of 
pricing, production levels, and investment.”1101 
Walt Rostow also described the effects the application of permanent sovereignty 
by OPEC.  The oil producers had come to the front of “an intellectual revolt” and turned 
it into “a political revolt from which the international community still has not 
recovered.”1102  OPEC had reversed the terms of trade for oil with momentous 
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consequences.   The leaders of the oil nations continued to place themselves on the 
rhetorical cusp of Third World sovereignty.  Recently decolonized and other Third World 
nations had attempted to use their permanent sovereignty to gain greater wealth since the 
early 1950s.  They had almost always failed. Now, according to the powerful egalitarian 
narrative, OPEC had reset the terms of trade between peripheral raw material suppliers 
and metropolitan consumers. 
OPEC AND THE THIRD WORLD 
The energy crisis became an unquestioned reference point for broader issues in the 
international political economy. Many observers agreed with Rostow and the oil 
ministers.  The terms of trade thesis had become an article of faith among political 
economists.  In his 1979 Nobel Prize Lecture, Arthur Lewis pointed out that economic 
growth in the industrialized world did not cause commensurate growth in exports from 
poor countries.1103  Likewise, Lance Taylor accepted “the iron law of trade for poor 
countries” that relegated Third World nations to be the hewers of raw materials and 
drawers of oil for the industrialized world.1104   
Prebisch’s controversial terms-of-trade thesis was more influential than ever.  
Likewise, the ability of permanent sovereignty to reset the trade patterns imposed by 
colonialism was a widely-accepted belief.  Ali Mazrui, an Oxford-trained Kenyan 
political scientist who had been exiled from the University of Makarere by Idi Amin, 
delivered a series of lectures for the BBC.  Linking past and present inequality, Mazrui 
argued that permanent sovereignty had been only a step towards “a more equitable share 
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not only of the resources of the planet but also of the capacity to control the march of 
history.”1105   
The majority of UN members also envisioned permanent sovereignty as a cure for 
the question of unequal exchange.  “[S]uch objectives as removing injustice and inequity 
among nations, narrowing the widening gap between rich and poor nations, and enabling 
the Third World to occupy its rightful position in the world economy cannot be realized 
unless there is a transformation of the world economic order,”  the UN wrote in its new 
training manual in 1976. Since Prebisch’s foundational critique of comparative advantage 
a quarter century before, permanent sovereignty had defined Third World hopes for a 
post-imperial future.  Full control over natural resources, the manual continued, “is 
regarded as one of the decisive instruments for the economic liberation of the developing 
countries.”1106 
As the extent of oil-related debt became clear, however, one would be pressed to 
interpret the UN training manual as anything but a counsel of despair or, alternatively, an 
extraordinary leap of optimistic imagination.  Once a ballast of economic liberation for 
the Third World, permanent sovereignty had folded in upon itself.  The developing 
nations without indigenous oil reserves suffered the most from the oil price increases.  
During the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly and after, it had taken 
only a nudge by the United States to undermine the egalitarian idealism of the New 
International Economic Order and bring most of the cash-starved Third World to the 
private financial market.  
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The principle of sovereign non-interference, confirmed in the Helsinki Final Act 
in 1975, did not extend into the economic realm.  For the proponents of permanent 
sovereignty, this was a bitter pill to swallow.  A winter of discontent swept through Third 
World economic thought in the late 1970s.  Development economists were particularly 
dismayed.  In his presidential address before the American Economc Association, entitled 
“The State of Development Theory,” Lewis described the field as “in the doldrums.”1107  
H. W. Arndt published The Rise and Fall of Economic Growth, emphasizing the 
latter.1108  Albert O. Hirschman discussed “The Rise and Decline of Development 
Economics” in the first chapter of his book Essays on Trespassing.1109  Shortly after, 
Deepak Lal wrote about The Poverty of Development Economics.1110  Amartya Sen 
lamented that development economists, “would-be dragon slayers,” felt that they “had 
fallen on their swords.”1111 
Permanent sovereignty had failed not only in the political-economic realm, but 
also in the terrain of the imagination.  Sovereign debtors shared the cynicism of 
economists.  In the field of diplomacy, Third World complaints were explicitly tied to oil 
debt.  The term “North-South Dialogue” emerged at the May 1977 Conference for 
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International Economic Cooperation.  For many Third World leaders, the “so-called 
‘Dialogue’” was anything but.  The Brazilian delegate held that the negotiations had led 
“to a low common denominator.”1112  The industrialized countries refused even to 
consider the Third World’s primary objective, official financial assistance to bridge oil-
related payments problems.  The North also declined to discuss other measures of 
adjustment aid for the South, emphasizing instead the private capital market.  The 
developing nations jointly noted with regret the failure of “most of the proposals for 
structural changes in the international economic system.”1113   
The new U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, emphasized that private capital 
was “vital, and will continue to offer even greater resources over a wider range of 
activities than official aid.”1114  Ronald Muller, an economist at American University, 
disagreed with Vance after observing the conference.  Muller proposed the enactment of 
a new Witteveen facility.  Official aid for Third World nations would “allow the IMF to 
expand its lending capacity for refinancing the debt of nation-states now owed primarily 
to private multinational commercial banks,” he told a Senate committee. Muller 
nonetheless remained as skeptical as his colleagues.  A new International Monetary Fund 
program would do little to break “the vicious circle of LDC debt.”  If oil prices remained 
high, official aid would be “no more than an austerity band-aid.”1115 
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The growth of sovereign debt in the poorer nations also troubled the Development 
Committee of the World Bank, especially because the bulk of new financing was 
concentrated in private loans rather than direct investment or official aid.  Both the Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund made strong pleas for increased flows of official 
capital in 1975.  The outlook for the poorest countries was “particularly bleak,” Robert 
McNamara told his officials.  In a meeting of the Joint Ministerial Committee of the Bank 
and the Fund, H. Johannes Witteveen endorsed the position that “substantial increases in 
capital flows” were necessary to prevent “the continued detrioration of the position of 
most of the developing countries.”  The Joint Ministers emphasized that low-income 
countries needed official, concessional assistance.1116 
Under such circumstances, the inability of permanent sovereignty to reform the 
international economy in the grandiose manner envisioned by Raúl Prebisch and his 
followers was patently obvious. Prebisch himself grimly noted the gravity of the situation 
for most Third World Nations.   Private petrodollar recycling had “political meaning” 
because almost all the investment would move from the oil producers to banks in 
developed countries, he wrote the UN Secretary General.1117   
The energy crisis had begun with the emergence of a post-colonial economic 
worldview in the early 1950s.  The new interpretation held that the potential for 
development in the majority of the world continued to be strangled by unfair terms of 
trade.  Economic inequality had been perpetuated by the corporatism of the postwar 
petroleum order.  But, as the oil producers employed permanent sovereignty, economic 
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liberation had unintended consequences for the international economy.  In particular, the 
American emphasis on the private market set the future agenda of globalization, creating 
a blueprint for the response to future crises.   
Severe global imbalances materialized as a result of the energy crisis.   The non-
oil developing nations confronted unprecedented balance-of-payments deficits, one that 
would only worsen in the coming years.1118  Conditions had crystallized for long enough 
for OPEC and the New International Economic Order to capture the imagination of the 
Third World, but they began to fracture as soon as they formed.  American proposals 
during the energy crisis were designed as corridors to the free market.  Because of 
American neoliberal diplomacy, most national deficits would be financed by private 
loans. The idea of permanent sovereignty lost power as the former colonies and other 
poor states found their independence compromised by a different mechanism: 
indebtedness to private banks.   
Sovereign debt would characterize the place of the Third World in the 
international political economy.  The transition from permanent sovereignty to sovereign 
debt only takes on its full meaning if set against the context of the energy crisis and the 
neoliberal diplomacy of the United States.  
SOVEREIGN DEBT AND THE LIMITS OF ECONOMISM  
However powerful its critique of structural imbalances in the international economy, 
however clear its call for equality, the moral rhetoric of the New International Economic 
Order came at a price.  If 1974 was perceived by many as a breakthrough year for 
permanent sovereignty, the period immediately afterwards marked its downfall.  The 
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energy crisis and the collapse of sovereignty opened space for neoliberal diplomacy to 
determine the future agenda of the international economy.  Market-based thought gained 
influence in the State Department in direct response to the challenges of permanent 
sovereignty and the energy crisis. 
“Attempts to imagine a better future have remained simplistic and schematic,” 
Albert Hirschman wrote in 1982.  “Actions undertaken under the impulse of some 
magnificent vision” could only have limited results.1119  This position reflected an 
uncertainty about the relationship between ideas and policy.  In the cases of permanent 
sovereignty and neoliberal diplomacy, economic thought became the basis for policy.  It 
seemed impossible to avoid the ill consequences of over-simplification in that process.  
The application of economic thought to international politics was, by definition, a form of 
selective analysis.  The rigid economistic way in which the theories were applied to 
diplomacy displaced the complexity of experience.1120  
The two intellectual extremes converged in their economistic interpretations.  The 
prescriptions of neoliberal diplomacy did little to improve the dire situation of the Third 
World.  Confronted with a complex challenge that required different responses to 
different circumstances, neoliberal diplomacy could not respond with the intellectual 
sophistication and imagination the complexity of the Third World required.  Standard-
formula approaches made few concessions to Third World heterogeneity and thus 
handicapped development plans.  Likewise, the uneven application of permanent 
sovereignty had negative consequences for the majority of the adherents to the New 
International Economic Order.  
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But for the energy crisis, an analysis emphasizing economistic thought can only 
partially explains the relationship between ideas and international politics.  The ideas of 
permanent sovereignty and neoliberal diplomacy were closely connected on a deeper 
level.  Although politicians and policymakers naturally simplified academic ideas, in 
each case the main arguments of scholars regarding sovereignty remained largely 
unadulterated.   
In fact, the success of neoliberal diplomacy found its base in the irony of 
permanent sovereignty. Neoliberal diplomacy may have assumed a contrasting 
relationship between state sovereignty and the international economy, but it shared the 
basic notion of state power.  American policy maintained sovereignty as a key concept, 
while delineating clear limits to its practice.  “Sovereign debt,” not permanent 
sovereignty, became the common invocation in discussions about international 
development.  The linguistic change effectively placed sovereignty at the service of 
private finance.  The erosion of permanent sovereignty did not involve the official 
downgrading of sovereignty as a cherished value.  In its new usage, sovereignty was 
folded into a new code that corresponded to different interests.   
By supporting a robust internationalist version of neoliberal diplomacy, the U.S. 
government emphasized the limits the formal legal entitlement of statehood.  The 
economic restrictions placed on sovereignty implied a mutual responsibility between the 
member states of the global society and the arbiters of the international economy.  
Neoliberal diplomacy thus used the post-colonial norm of sovereignty to connect global 
governance directly to free-market thought.  The emphasis by American poliymakers on 
privately owned sovereign debt made national borders more permeable to capital.   
The flow of capital followed the flow of ideas.  The process of transition from 
permanent sovereignty to sovereign debt was not the simple replacement of one 
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international agenda with another.  Rather, the ebb and flow of ideas more closely 
resembled waves washing over each other.  Neoliberal diplomacy was as much the 
accumulation of sedimentary layers from the recent past as it was a new construction.  To 
put the matter starkly, the United States employed neoliberal diplomacy to turn the 
problem of sovereignty to its advantage, accentuating the nation’s paramount position in 
international finance.   
The United States and the less-developed countries disagreed in their approach to 
the energy crisis.  Whereas advocates of neoliberal diplomacy depicted the international 
problem of poverty as a technical economic issue, proponents of permanent sovereignty 
saw development as a broader redress for past inequalities.  Steeped in an egalitarian 
interpretation, permanent sovereignty had sought to forge a moral link between 
international politics and economics.  Neoliberal diplomacy effectively erased the moral 
content of the economic question from international politics.  The tension between 
economics and politics was thus indicative of a deeper conflict between morality and 
amorality, one that lies at the heart of the history of globalization.  The early movement 
towards neoliberal diplomacy in 1974 and 1975 resulted in large part to its reactionary 
stance against permanent sovereignty.  For this reason, neoliberal diplomacy omitted the 
primary concern of Third World economists, diplomats, and national leaders since 
Prebisch first published his thesis.  The long-standing inequality of the Third World, a 
vestige of imperialism, continued through the assertion by the United States of the free 
market as the guiding principal for the international political economy.   
The irony of permanent sovereignty thus had profound moral implications.  
Neliberal diplomacy was never constructed with the developing world in mind.  It was 
conceived, designed, and practiced with one primary goal: the perpetuation of the global 
power of the United States in a period in which that power was increasingly questioned.  
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By placing free market norms at the heart of globalization, American diplomacy also 
confirmed the United States as the enforcer of those norms. 
LESSONS OF THE ENERGY CRISIS?  
For Henry Kissinger, the morale was simple.   He wrote in 1979 that the calculus of 
power central to his geopolitics “required an integrating, conceptual framework.”1121  In 
1982, he founded Kissinger and Associates, whose mission built on his revelation during 
the energy crisis of the nexus between international politics and economics.  Kissinger 
described the goals of the company to Robert McNamara, who he recruited as a 
colleague. “The increasing interdependence of economic and political developments has 
created unprecedented problems of strategic choice for corporate and institutional 
policymakers,” he wrote.  “The decisive issues for international affairs today, not only 
public but private, are at the intersections of economics and politics, and of national and 
international policy.”   The synthesis of “ideas and knowledge,” Kissinger envisioned, 
would allow his clients to work “in a way which is global in scope and concept, rather 
than piecemeal or departmental.”1122 
In the nascent days of globalist euphoria, Kissinger followed up on the political-
economic ideas of Kissinger & Associates in Newsweek.  As he did as Secretary of State, 
he pointed to the energy crisis as the central turning point.  The “idyll” of post-war 
economic growth had ended “above all” because of the “nearly twentyfold increase in oil 
prices since 1973.”  The article employed apocalyptic language to describe the practice of 
permanent sovereignty by OPEC: “these events have shaken the economic and political 
foundations of the post-war political and economic order.”  Kissinger was more 
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concerned however with the ability of national power to shape international affairs.  “The 
real question is how governments can establish confidence in their ability to dominate 
events,” he wrote.1123  
The relationship between permanent sovereignty and neoliberal diplomacy forces 
more sober and less ambiguous conclusions.  What place do concepts like “economic 
justice” and “equality” have in modern international society?  The terms of trade thesis 
supported profound changes in the structure of the international economy, but permanent 
sovereignty did not actually lead to those changes.   The intended effects of permanent 
sovereignty, a redistribution of power in the international economy, were clearly 
important in the actions called for on a massive scale during the energy crisis.  The irony 
of permanent sovereignty, so evident in its easy replacement by neoliberal diplomacy, 
was a real departure from those hopes.  By 1976 permanent sovereignty was subordinated 
to international finance and free market thought.  In the era of expensive oil, sovereign 
debt became an intrusive violation of autonomy for Third World nations.1124   
The success of OPEC was transient.  The oil-importing nations of the Third 
World were the major victims of the energy crisis.  After 1974, the relative position of the 
Third World worsened steadily.  To understand why this occurred, the influence of what 
Hirschman called “intended, but unrealized effects” are as important as the historians’ 
more common fascination with F. A. Hayek’s “unintended consequences.”1125  As 
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unsustainable debt began to dominate the international development agenda, the concept 
of global justice inherent to permanent sovereignty ran into serious difficulties.  In 1981, 
the administration of Ronald Reagan began to emphasize “supply-side foreign policy.”  
Building on the roots of neoliberal diplomacy, the administration stressed market-based 
solutions and private investment.   
By the 1990s, the neoliberal basis of globalization was widely accepted.  The 
National Security Adviser to President Clinton, Anthony Lake, explicitly linked 
American power to “market economics” in a 1993 speech entitled “From Containment to 
Enlargement.” Lake was incorrect, however, in stating that the “virtuous circles of 
international economic action” had brought about “new and diverse” pathways for 
American influence.1126  There was little novel about this.  The speech shared the goals of 
neoliberal diplomacy held by American administrations since the energy crisis.   
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